

GREEK EARTH, ROMAN KINGDOM:  
BYZANTIUM AS TROUBLED  
PLATONIC POLITY

by

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## ABSTRACT

What is Byzantium (*Romanía-Graikía*) as a polity? A republic undergirded by Roman popular sovereignty, as recently asserted by Anthony Kaldellis, a Romano-Hellenistic empire operating from monarchical and theocratic principles/forces, a synthesis of the two, or neither? By extension, what is the nature of Byzantine political theory? How and on what terms did Byzantines (*Romaíoi-Graikoí*) conceptualize/theorize their own *politeia* or political community? The primary issue that this project will address entails the *classification of the Byzantine polity as a republican monarchy based on Roman popular sovereignty* rather than as an extension of Greco-Roman *pambasileia*, or monarchical absolutism, with Christian theocratic elements. The secondary issue that this dissertation will address involves the classification of the Byzantine polity's core inhabitants as exclusively *Romaíoi*, or Romans speaking Greek by happenstance, as opposed to *Romaíoi and Graikoí*, or Christian/Christianized Greeks *in se* with Roman citizenship. The significance of the aforementioned issues can be demonstrated via a substantive historical treatment of the Eastern Roman polity and a comparative analysis of modern 21st-century theories of Byzantium (i.e., Anthony Kaldellis' *popular/republican anachronization* and Ioannis Stouraitis' *elite-imperial rarification*). The dissertation argues that Byzantium (New Rome) is a Greco-Christian monarchy, albeit troubled, and that *monarchical republicanism* is a poor model obfuscating an understanding of the Eastern Roman polity.

Keywords: Byzantium, kingship, monarchical republicanism, nationhood/ethnicity, political theory, sovereignty.

## ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ (Abstract in Greek)

### Γραικών Γή, Ρωμαίων Αρχή: Το Βυζάντιο ως ανάστατη Πλατωνική Πολιτεία

Τί ήταν το Βυζάντιο (*Ρωμανία-Γραικία*) ως πολίτευμα; Είναι μήπως ένα πολιτικό σύστημα στηριζόμενη στην Ρωμαϊκή λαϊκή κυριαρχία, σύμφωνα με τον Αντώνη Καλδέλλη, ή μία Ελληνο-Ρωμαϊκή αυτοκρατορία που λειτουργεί με βάση μοναρχικές και θεοκρατικές αρχές; Ή μήπως είναι μία σύνθεση απο τα δύο ή κανένα απο τα δύο; Επιπλέον, ποιά ήταν η φύση της Βυζαντινής πολιτικής θεωρίας; Πως και με ποιούς όρους περιέγραφαν οι Βυζαντινοί (*Ρωμαίοι-Γραικοί*) την ίδια τους την *πολιτεία* ή πολιτική κοινότητα; Το κύριο θέμα αυτής της μελέτης περιλαμβάνει την *ταυτότητα της Βυζαντινής πολιτείας ως μοναρχία βασιζόμενη στη Ρωμαϊκή λαϊκή κυριαρχία* αντί ως μία επέκταση της Ελληνο-Ρωμαϊκής *παμβασιλείας* ή απόλυτης μοναρχίας με Χριστιανικά θεοκρατικά στοιχεία. Το δευτερεύον θέμα με το οποίο θα ασχοληθεί αυτή η εργασία είναι η ταυτότητα του κύριου πλυθυσμού της Βυζαντινής πολιτείας. Ήταν αποκλειστικά *Ρωμαίοι*, δηλαδή Ρωμαίοι μιλώντας τυχαία τα ελληνικά/γραικικά, ή *Ρωμαίοι και Γραικοί*, δηλαδή Χριστιανοί/Χριστιανοποιημένοι Έλληνες *έν είναι* με Ρωμαϊκή υπηκοότητα; Για τη σωστή ανάλυση των προαναφερόμενων θεμάτων χρειάζεται μία βαθιά ιστορική μελέτη της Ανατολικής Ρωμαϊκής πολιτείας βασιζόμενη στην συγκριτική ανάλυση των δύο σημερινών (21ου αιώνας) πολιτικών θεωριών για το Βυζάντιο, απο τη μία του *λαϊκού/δημοκρατικού αναχρονισμού* του Αντώνη Καλδέλλη και απο την άλλη της *ελιτιστικής/αυτοκρατορικής συγκέντρωσης* του Ιωάννη Στουραίτη. Η διατριβή επιχειρεί ότι το Βυζάντιο (Νέα Ρώμη) είναι μία Ελληνοχριστιανική μοναρχία, *άν και ανάστατη*, και ότι ο *βασιλικός ρεπουμπλικανισμός* είναι ένα πτωχό μοντέλο περιπλέκοντας μία κατανόηση της Ανατολικής Ρωμαϊκής πολιτείας.

## DEDICATION

✠ IN HONOR AND MEMORY OF THE GREEKS, PROGENY OF HELLENES, IN CHRIST:

ATHANASIOS ORFANOS AND DEMETRIOS ORFANOS, FATHER AND SON  
RESPECTIVELY, EXECUTED IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD 1941 BY NAZI  
BARBARIANS IN THE VILLAGE OF KYDONIAN PERIVOLIA OF CHANIA  
DURING THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF CRETE

GEORGE NICHOLAS ORFANOS OF SMYRNA, FATHER OF DEMETRIS ORFANOS THE  
NOBLE SOLDIER AND GRANDFATHER OF GEORGE DEMETRIS ORFANOS THE  
SCHOLAR-TEACHER, WHO SURVIVED THE CATASTROPHIC AND GENOCIDAL  
SMYRNA FIRE OF 1922 A.D., THE COLLAPSE OF THE GREEK FRONT IN NORTHERN  
EPIRUS IN 1941 A.D., AND HIS CAPTIVITY BY NAZI FASCISTS DURING THE  
GERMAN OCCUPATION OF CRETE ✠

[ ✚ GLORY TO THE FATHER AND TO THE SON AND TO THE HOLY SPIRIT  
NOW AND FOREVER AND UNTO THE AGES OF AGES AMEN ✚ ]

## ΑΦΙΕΡΩΣΗ (Dedication in Greek)

✠ ΕΝ ΤΙΜΗ ΚΑΙ ΜΝΗΜΗ ΤΩΝ ΓΡΑΙΚΩΝ, ΠΑΙΔΕΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ, ΕΝ ΧΡΙΣΤΩ:

ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΟΣ ΟΡΦΑΝΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΣ ΟΡΦΑΝΟΣ, ΠΑΤΕΡΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΥΙΟΣ  
ΑΝΤΙΣΤΟΙΧΑ, ΕΚΤΕΛΕΣΘΕΝΤΕΣ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΕΤΟΥΣ ΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΙΟΥ ΗΜΩΝ 1941 ΑΠΟ  
ΒΑΡΒΑΡΟΥΣ ΝΑΖΙ ΕΝ ΤΟ ΧΩΡΙΟΝ ΠΕΡΙΒΟΛΙΑ ΚΥΔΟΝΙΑΣ ΧΑΝΙΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ  
ΔΙΑΡΚΕΙΑΝ ΤΗΣ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΤΟΧΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΡΗΤΗΣ

ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ ΝΙΚΟΛΑΟΣ ΟΡΦΑΝΟΣ Ο ΣΜΥΡΝΙΩΤΗΣ, ΠΑΤΕΡΑΣ ΤΟΥ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΥ  
ΟΡΦΑΝΟΥ Ο ΕΝΤΙΜΟΣ ΣΤΡΑΤΙΩΤΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΠΠΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΥ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΥ  
ΟΡΦΑΝΟΥ Ο ΛΟΓΙΟΣ-ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΟΣ, ΠΟΥ ΕΠΕΖΗΣΕ ΤΗΝ ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΟΦΙΚΗΝ ΚΑΙ  
ΓΕΝΟΚΤΟΝΙΚΗΝ ΦΩΤΙΑΝ ΤΗΣ ΣΜΥΡΝΗΣ ΤΟΥ 1922 Μ.Χ., ΤΗΝ ΠΤΩΣΗΝ ΤΟΥ  
ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΟΥ ΜΕΤΩΠΟΥ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΒΟΡΕΙΟ ΗΠΕΙΡΟ ΤΟ 1941 Μ.Χ., ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ  
ΑΙΧΜΑΛΩΣΙΑΝ ΤΟΥ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥΣ ΦΑΣΙΣΤΕΣ ΝΑΖΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΡΚΕΙΑΝ ΤΗΣ  
ΓΕΡΜΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΤΟΧΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΡΗΤΗΣ ✠

[ ✚ ΔΟΞΑ ΣΟΙ Ο ΠΑΤΡΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΥΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΑΓΙΟΥ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΣ  
ΝΥΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΙΩΝΑΣ ΤΩΝ ΑΙΩΝΩΝ ΑΜΗΝ ✚ ]

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## INTRODUCTION

### *Byzantium in Synopsis: History, Political Theory and Historiography*

The story of this dissertation is a story about Byzantium as a political order primarily and about the Byzantines as a people secondarily. Was the eastern half of the ancient Roman state a traditional emperorship or a traditional republic that happened to have a king? To whom were the Byzantines beholden to politically, an emperor or themselves? Was there an instant, or series of instants, in Byzantium when Byzantines flipped their political script from kingship to democracy? These questions are connected by what is at stake: the potential misclassification of the Eastern Roman polity with respect to *sovereignty*. And there are two opposing views, or frameworks, on Byzantine sovereignty: the *traditional view*, held by scholars such as Ioannis Stouraitis, that treats Byzantium as a divinely mandated emperorship (i.e., the emperor as the ultimate authority that the people are beholden to) and the *critical view*, held by scholars such as Anthony Kaldellis, treat the same state as a republic with a monarch (i.e., the people as the ultimate authority that the emperor is beholden to). As this dissertation will show, the foundation of the former "orthodoxy" involves the *Roman revolution of the Roman princeps based on Greek kingship refreshing the tradition of Greco-Roman monarchy* whereas the basis of the latter "heresy" entails the *Roman tradition of Roman popular sovereignty based on the revolution against the Tarquin monarchy*. Also, this dissertation will address, though not resolve, the issues affecting the traditional and critical views of Byzantium through an analysis of impactful moments in the polity's historical development.

For political theorists unfamiliar with the Eastern Roman polity, a survey, by no means

exhaustive, of synoptic descriptions of Byzantine civilization can serve as a useful starting point. Said descriptions follow, more or less, the same tripartite theme (i.e., Hellenism, Lex Romanum, Christianity) despite using different operative frameworks. Beginning with *People and Power in Byzantium*, Alexander P. Kazhdan and Giles Constable frame Byzantium in terms of *retention* where it "was the only medieval state that retained Greek science and literature, Roman law and administration, and Christian faith" (Kazhdan and Constable 1982, 12). In *History of the Byzantine State*, George Ostrogorsky offers a crisp definition of his subject of inquiry: "Roman political concepts, Greek culture and the Christian faith were the main elements which determined Byzantine development" (Ostrogorsky and Hussey 1968, 27). For Ostrogorsky, Byzantium is a product of *crisis-induced integrationism* where "the integration of Hellenistic culture and the Christian religion within the Roman imperial framework" was a "synthesis [...]" made possible by the increasing concern of the Roman Empire with the East which was necessitated by the crisis of the third century" (Ostrogorsky and Hussey 1968, 27; brackets mine). In *The Ancient Greek Sources of Byzantine Absolutism*, Milton V. Anastos, like Ostrogorsky, offers the following useful definition of Byzantium:

[...] the major sources of Byzantine civilization as a whole were three in number: (1) the language and culture of ancient Greece, (2) Roman civilization, especially as manifested in law, the imperial administrative system, and art, and (3) the Christian heritage — the Bible and the dogma of the Church (Anastos 1965, 92; brackets mine).

Upon comparison, Anastos' *sources of Byzantine civilization* overlap with, or are not substantively different from, Ostrogorsky's *elements of Byzantine development*. But the difference, if any, is in the method of definition where Ostrogorsky defines Byzantium using a *parts-to-whole approach* (i.e., constitution/holism) whereas Anastos defines Byzantium using a *whole-to-parts approach* (i.e., decomposition/atomism). In *Social and Political Thought of Byzantium*, Ernest Barker frames the Eastern Roman polity in terms of *Greek-guided syncretism*

where it "was, in its nature, an amalgam of Greece and Rome, with the balance inclining progressively to Greece, but with Rome still present in the mixture", with "[t]he essence of the Byzantine *Basileia* [being] Christianity in its Greek form of Orthodoxy" (Barker 1957, 33; Barker's emphasis, brackets mine). In the introductory chapter of *Byzantium: An Introduction to East Roman Civilization*, Norman H. Baynes frames the Byzantines as "Christian Alexandrians" where "[i]n art they still follow Hellenistic models" and "inherit the rhetorical tradition, the scholarship, the admiration for the Great Age of classical Greece, which characterized the students of the kingdom of the Ptolemies" (Baynes 1948, xix–xx; brackets mine). In his critique of scholarly assertions that "East Rome was an 'oriental empire'", Baynes states "that the complex civilization of the [Byzantine] Empire were indeed the Roman tradition in law and government, the Hellenistic tradition in language, literature, and philosophy, and a Christian tradition which had already been refashioned on a Greek model" (Baynes 1948, xx; brackets mine). In *The Byzantine Patriarchate 451–1204*, George Every frames Byzantine civilization in *cultural progression* terms where it "was the result of a development in Greek culture within the carapace of Roman administration, assimilating many oriental elements, pagan, Persian, Jewish, and Christian, until this syncretism affected not only the culture, but the framework of administration and government" (Every 1947, 20). In *Staat und Gesellschaft des byzantinischen Reiches*, August Heisenberg frames the Eastern Roman polity along obvious *state-society lines* where "Byzantium is the Roman realm of the Greek nation that became Christian" (Heisenberg 1923a, 364: "Byzanz ist das christlich gewordene Römerreich griechischer Nation"; translation mine). In *Le Développement des Études d'Histoire Byzantine du XVIIe au XXe Siècle*, Louis Bréhier frames Byzantium as an *organism* where it is "the organic development of the Roman empire become Christian and Hellenic" (Bréhier 1901, 34: "L'empire byzantin est donc le

développement organique de l'empire romain devenu chrétien et hellénique"; translation mine).

Synoptic descriptions of Byzantium are not limited to 20th-century scholars and historiographers.

In *Introducing Byzantine History*, Alexios G. C. Savvides and Benjamin Hendrickx frame

Byzantium in *procedural* terms where "the Later Roman Empire was gradually transformed into a medieval Greek Empire through three basic procedures: its Christianisation, its de-Latinisation and its eventual Hellenisation, a process more or less completed by the early 7th century A.D."

(Savvides and Hendrickx 2001, 29). For Savvides and Hendrickx, "Byzantium was born out of the merging of imperial Rome with Christian Hellenism" defined by its tripartiteness: its Greek socio-cultural and linguistic component, its Roman political and administrative component, and its Christian religio-theological component (Savvides and Hendrickx 2001, 29–30). In

"Byzantium: A Very, Very Short Introduction", Liz James frames the Eastern Roman polity in terms of *contrast* as "there were two major differences between the Roman and Byzantine empires: Byzantium was, for much of its life, a Greek-speaking empire, orientated towards Greek, not Latin culture; and it was a Christian empire" (James 2010, 5).

Another useful starting point for political theorists unfamiliar with Byzantium is a survey, again unexhaustive, of Eastern Roman political theory beginning with Ernest Barker's *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium*: "[t]he political theory of Byzantium [...] begins in what may be called a *Fürstenspiegel*, or 'mirror of princes', such as is to be found in 'the Exposition of Heads of Advice and Counsel' addressed by Agapetus, a deacon of the Church of St. Sophia, to Justinian I" (Barker 1957, 20; Barker's emphasis, brackets mine). For Barker, "the main current of the stream of Byzantine political theory [...] consisted of speculations, mainly by the clergy (and occasionally by the emperors themselves), on the nature of the 'God-founded power' of the emperor, on the methods of education for the exercise of that power, and on the uses to which the

power should be put" (Barker 1957, 21; brackets mine). The "other currents" of Byzantine political thought that Barker delineates are five-fold: 1) "the 'layman's reflections'" (e.g., Kekaumenos' *Strategikon*, Theodore Methochites' *Miscellanea*, etc.), 2) "'scholastic' treatises" (e.g., Anonymous' *On Political Science*, commentaries on Aristotle's *Politics*), 3) "the discourses of the philosophers" (e.g., Photios, Psellos, Plethon), 4) "the law-books, customs, and administrative documents", and 5) "miscellaneous [texts]" such as fables (e.g., *Barlaam and Josephat*) and "theological treatise[s] [that] will issue, during the course of the argument, into a political discourse" (e.g., St. John Damascene, an Iconodule, "proclaim[ing] that there are limits to the things that are Caesar's") (Barker 1957, 21–24; brackets mine).

In Milton Anastos' "Byzantine Political Theory", Byzantine political theory is defined by multiple sources involving ancient Greek philosophy, Hellenistic kingship established by Alexander the Great, and Roman law (see APPENDIX I for further details). Another survey is provided in Paul Magdalino's "Basileia: The Idea of Monarchy in Byzantium" where "the sources of [Byzantine] political thought may be understood in terms of the three ancient civilizations from which Byzantium famously blended its unique identity: the Hellenic, the Roman, and the Judeo-Christian" (Magdalino 2017, 577; brackets mine). Like Anastos, Magdalino treats the Hellenic source as primarily *theoretical* (e.g., philosophy, rhetoric, history, literature and mythology), the Roman source as primarily *institutional* (e.g., *Corpus Iuris Civilis*), and the Judeo-Christian as primarily *religious* (see APPENDIX I for further details). Barker's survey is *textually determined* (i.e., text as source of culture) whereas the surveys of Anastos and Magdalino are *culturally determined* (i.e., culture as source of text), a difference in approach rather than substance.<sup>1</sup> But whatever their distinctions, all three surveys are complemented by, or at least overlap with, A. S. Fotiou's "Plato's Philosopher King in the Political Thought of Sixth-

Century Byzantium". Fotiou examines the fragmentary text *On Political Science* illustrating that "there are [...] certain specific aspects of Plato's *Republic* which were an obvious influence on the Byzantine *politeia*: 1. The class stratification of the state. 2. Justice as the principal virtue of the ideal king. 3. The criteria for the selection of a ruler / king[.] 4. The training of the philosopher king: his apprehension of the Good" (Fotiou 1985, 18; brackets mine). Case in point, the aforesaid text "draws heavily upon Plato's threefold division of the soul in the *Republic*" and "makes the soul the foundation of his just state and society" (Fotiou 1985, 21; Fotiou's emphasis).

A just king is a man in whose soul reason (*logos*), spirit (*thymos*), and desire (*epithymia*) are kept in perfect balance and perform their proper function which justice applied to God, things divine and civil matters would flow forth as if from a natural source. (*Anonymous* in Fotiou 1985, 21; Fotiou's emphasis)

Even the "definition of kingship is written in Platonic language and content" though the "word 'salvation' [...] may have a Christian ring to it, since the Byzantine author was a Christian Neoplatonist" (Fotiou 1985, 21; brackets mine).

Kingship is concerned with political matters; its aim is to achieve the well-being (*euexia*) of these matters according to justice; its end is the very performance of just acts from which a useful thing comes, namely the salvation (*soteria*) of man. (*Anonymous* in Fotiou 1985, 21; Fotiou's emphasis)

Ultimately, the history of Byzantine political theory is, or at least begins as, the "bridge from pagan to Christian ideas of kingship", which can be found in "the so-called 'Letter of Aristeas'" where Aristeas "was deeply indebted to Hellenistic political theory", but "could not, as a Jew, endorse the notion that the ruler was himself divine" (Anastos 1978, 22).<sup>2</sup> Said letter, specifically, "stress[es] the divine origin of kingship since it is God [...] who confers royal power" and "repeatedly urges" that "the good ruler can live up to his responsibilities only if he imitates God" (i.e., *divine mimesis* where "with God's help, [the ruler] concerns himself with justice, mercy, and the welfare of his subjects") (Anastos 1978, 22–23; brackets mine). Further evidence of the

"transition from the pagan to the Christian theory of absolutism" can be found in a composition by Plutarch, a 2nd-century Greek scholar and philosopher, "addressed 'To an uneducated ruler,' the purpose of which [...] was to convince the addressee that no ruler could aspire to the authority and quasi-divine status which characterizes the royal office if he lacked a suitable training in philosophy" (Anastos 1978, 23; brackets mine). Lastly, an intimation of said transition can be found in Plato's *Letters*, which according to John M. Cooper "profess to be from the last two decades of Plato's life" with the second letter addressing Dionysius II of Syracuse, the son of "[t]he general Dionysius [who] had established himself as 'tyrant' of the previously democratic Syracuse" (Cooper 1997, 1634; brackets mine). Authenticity issues aside (see Cooper 1997, 1634), Plato's second letter influenced Christian Apologists and Moderatus the Neo-Platonist (Gaston 2009, 574) where the king is the primary and ultimate source of virtue:

It is like this. Upon the king of all do all things turn; he is the end of all things and the cause of all good. Things of the second order turn upon the second principle, and those of the third order upon the third. Now the soul of man longs to understand what sort of things these principles are, and it looks toward the things that are akin to itself, though none of them is adequate; clearly the king and the other principles mentioned are not of that sort. The soul thereupon asks, What then is the nature of these principles? This is the question, O son of Dionysius and Doris, that causes all the trouble; or rather, this it is that produces in the soul the pains of childbirth, from which she must be delivered, or she will never really attain truth. (*Letters II: Plato to Dionysius, Welfare* in Cooper 1997, 1634; see also Gaston 2009, 574)

A third useful starting point for political theorists unfamiliar with Byzantium is a survey, also unexhaustive, of the history of historiographical perceptions of the Eastern Roman polity. In Fiona K. Haarer's "Writing Histories of Byzantium", modern Byzantine scholarship begins with Italian scholar Flavio Biondo who in the 1450s "wrote a history of Italy [...] dating the decline of Rome from the sack of the city in 410, and attributing the decline to the barbarians" (Haarer 2010, 10; brackets mine).<sup>3</sup> Haarer also delineates the historical trajectory of said scholarship from Biondo to early 21st-century scholars by broadly covering authorial contexts (e.g., Edward

Gibbon "influenced by the values and moral prejudices of the Renaissance and the European Enlightenment"), archaeological advancements, issues of terminology (e.g., "Byzantine", "Late Antiquity"), and debates surrounding frameworks/views (e.g., decline versus transformation, continuity versus discontinuity) (see Haarer 2010, 10–20). Parts of the aforesaid trajectory, combined with elements from Alexander A. Vasiliev's "Western European Scholarship" (see Vasiliev 1952, 3–31) and John Monfasani's "Byzantium and the End of the Middle Ages" (see Monfasani 2019, 245ff), are summarized and organized into the following table:

Table 1: Historical chart of historiographical perceptions of Byzantium

<b>HISTORIOGRAPHER (HISTORICAL CONTEXT)</b>	<b>HISTORIOGRAPHICAL PRODUCTIONS (TIME OF COMPOSITION/PUBLICATION)</b>	<b>VIEW OF BYZANTIUM</b>
Adam Usk (Late Middle Ages)	<i>Chronicon</i> (15th century)	Positive
Flavio Biondo (Italian Renaissance)	<i>Ab inclinatione Romanorum imperii</i> (1450s)	Negative
George Abbott (English Humanism)	<i>A Briefe Description of the whole World</i> (1617)	Positive
Thomas Fuller (English Humanism)	<i>Andronicus, or, The vnfortunate politician shewing sin stoutly punished, right surely rescued</i> (1646)	Positive
John Milton (English Humanism)	<i>A Common-Place Book</i> (1630–1650); <i>A Defence of the People of England</i> (1651/1692)	Negative
Philippe Labbé (French Humanism)	<i>De Byzantinae Historiae Scriptoribus</i> (1648)	Positive
Charles du Fresne, sieur du Cange (French Humanism)	<i>Histoire de l'empire de Constantinople sous les empereurs français; De familiis byzantinis; Constantinopolis Christiana; Historia Byzantina duplici commentario illustrata</i> (1633–1688)	Positive
Anselme Banduri (Benedictine Order)	<i>Imperium Orientale, sive Antiquitates Constantinopolitanae</i> (1711)	Positive
Baron de Montesquieu (French Enlightenment)	<i>Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence</i> (1734)	Negative
Michel Le Quien (French Enlightenment)	<i>Oriens christianus</i> (1740)	Positive
Voltaire (French Enlightenment)	<i>Le pyrrhonisme de l'histoire</i> (1768)	Negative
Edward Gibbon (English Enlightenment)	<i>The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire</i> (1776–1788)	Negative
Georg W. F. Hegel (German Idealism)	<i>Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte</i> (1822–1830)	Negative

Added to the above table are 15th-century Welsh chronicler Adam Usk and 17th-century

English humanists John Milton, George Abbott, and Thomas Fuller. Special attention will be given to the latter scholars in a later chapter for two reasons: 1) their familiarity with Greek historians *from* the Eastern Roman polity *regarding* the Eastern Roman polity, and 2) their disqualifying, as pre-moderns familiar with republics, Byzantium as a monarchical republic. As for Usk, his *Chronicon* covering the years 1377 to 1421 AD does not focus on Roman history but does describe Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus' (reign: 1391–1425 AD) visit to England:

The emperor of the Greeks, seeking to get aid against the Saracens, visited the king of England in London, on the day of Saint Thomas the Apostle (21st December), being well received by him, and abiding with him, at very great cost, for two months, being also comforted at his departure with very great gifts. This emperor always walked with his men, dressed alike and in one colour, namely white, in long robes cut like tabards; he finding fault with the many fashions and distinctions in dress of the English, wherein he said that fickleness and changeable temper were betokened. No razor touched head or beard of his chaplains. These Greeks were most devout in their church services, which were joined in as well by soldiers as by priests, for they chanted them without distinction in their native tongue. I thought within myself, what a grievous thing it was that this great Christian prince from the farther east should perforce be driven by unbelievers to visit the distant lands of the west, to seek aid against them. ("A.D. 1400" in Thomson 1904, 219–220)

What is interesting is Usk's contemporary observation of Emperor Palaeologos as a "great Christian prince" without any republican qualifiers. For the author, the Byzantine emperor travelled both *in the flesh* and *as a body of holy, or holy-like, authority* the latter of which is evident in the unity of the emperor's Christian Greek entourage.

Despite their mixed views, European scholars studying the Eastern Roman polity were governed by a single question: *Where does Byzantium historically fit?* (e.g. Edward Gibbon treating Byzantium as the irrational antipode to his own era of rationality, positioning it in a schema of decline and downfall). The validity and perennality of the question, Gibbon's bias aside, is premised on efforts to contextualize the Eastern Roman polity and its inhabitants. The subject of historical contextualization is addressed in Averil Cameron's *Thinking with Byzantium*,

which delineates the "problem about where Byzantium is placed in the broad spectrum of historical thinking" (Cameron 2011, 44). Cameron analyzes different contextualizations of Byzantium by critiquing a series of historiographical models including what she labels the "Eurasian Model", the "Comparative Model", the "Western European Model" and the "Orthodox Model" all four of which have been summarized and organized into the following table:

Table 2: Historiographical models contextualizing Byzantium

MODEL	DESCRIPTION
Eurasian Model	Framework where "Byzantium, and indeed Rome, [is] seen in the context of the whole of Eurasia, not just of Europe and the Mediterranean" (Cameron 2011, 44; brackets mine).
Comparative Model	Christopher Wickham's <i>Framing the Early Middle Ages</i> "bring[s] an explicitly comparative approach to the period and deal[s] with both east and west, Byzantium and western Europe"; Brent D. Shaw "took Wickham to task for being too narrow, for writing, in fact, about a 'Roman Mediterranean system, or MWS ('Mediterranean World System')" though Cameron treats Wickham's work as "a remarkable feat of comparative history [...] that rests on the conception of an east and west linked in certain ways by trade, economic exchange and social ties, even if those ties were weakening towards the end of the period covered" (Cameron 2011, 45; brackets mine).
Western European Model	Framework that excludes or includes Byzantium in the history of Western Europe; Georges Duby arguing that "Byzantium had nothing to do with the western Middle Ages" versus Evelyn Patlagean arguing that Byzantium "was not to be separated from the 'medieval west', but on the contrary to be seen as integrally connected to it" (Cameron 2011, 46).
Orthodox Model	Samuel Huntington's "now notorious" framework where Byzantium embodies "a third, middle ground between west and the far east – 'Orthodox civilisation'" defined by "the <i>absence</i> of [...] 'western' characteristics: the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and overseas colonialism" (Cameron 2011, 46; Cameron's emphasis, brackets mine).

This project does not, nor intends to, align itself with any of the above historiographical models. Nevertheless, an answer to the question *Where does Byzantium historically fit?* is offered as follows: since the Eastern Roman polity embodies, or is a substantive case study of, *Christian Greek elect nationhood*, it therefore fits into the broader historical phenomenon of

*elect nationhoods* (e.g., Jews/Israelites as God's Chosen People, Armenia as first Christian state, Russia as self-proclaimed "Third Rome", etc.). Such an answer is *not* an attempt at establishing a new type of community but is rather in keeping with Paul Magdalino's accurate assertion, based on medieval Greek literature, "of the Byzantines' notion of themselves as the Chosen People (and hence, the 'Holy Nation')" (Magdalino 1991, 5; brackets mine). But the more important question to ask is how was Christian Greek elect nationhood *politically concretized* in Byzantium? It is at this point that one must return to the distinction between the *traditional view* and the *critical view* of the Eastern Roman polity previously mentioned.

#### *Traditional and Critical Views of Byzantium*

As stated earlier, the traditional view of Byzantium entails the *Roman revolution of the Roman princeps based on Greek kingship refreshing the tradition of Greco-Roman monarchy*. Undergirding this view is the establishment and evolution of Greco-Roman vertical power structures and principles centered around a monarch. An early paragon of said view is Ronald Syme's *The Roman Revolution* whose "central narrative [...] records the rise to power of Augustus and the establishment of his rule" that "witnessed a violent transference of power and property" (Syme 1939, vii; brackets mine). For Syme, it was *oligarchy* that "emerge[d] as the dominant theme of political history, as the binding link between the Republic and the Empire" altogether based on "the question confronting the Romans themselves": *Libertas* or *Pax et Princeps*, freedom or political stability (Syme 1939, vii–viii, 2–5ff; brackets mine). The same theme also appears in Donald Earl's *The Age of Augustus* where "[i]f the Roman Republic meant anything, it meant the free traffic of power and office among the members of the ruling oligarchy" and "[i]f an individual or faction, establishing by force or excess of prestige a temporary predominance, prevented this traffic, that was tyranny" (Earl 1968, 19; brackets mine).

Of course, oligarchy was not limited historically to ancient Rome as it was "the most common form of polis government" in classical Greece (Ober 1989, 7). Getting back to Syme, he cites various ancient Roman primaries (i.e., Pollio, Tacitus, Lucretius) stating that "[t]he [Roman] *nobiles*, by their ambition and their feuds, had not merely destroyed their spurious Republic: they had ruined the Roman People" (Syme 1939, 513; Syme's emphasis, brackets mine). As a result, "the Roman people was ready to surrender the ruinous privilege of freedom and submit to strict government as in the beginning of time" (Syme 1939, 513). And speaking of beginnings, Syme selects Appian's *Romaica* (I.6.24) and Lucan's *Pharsalia* (I.670) to illustrate, if not substantiate, the relationship between *kingship*, *political liberty*, and *political order*:

In the beginning kings ruled at Rome, and in the end, as was fated, it came round to monarchy again. Monarchy brought concord. During the [Roman] Civil Wars every party and every leader professed to be defending the cause of liberty and of peace. Those ideals were incompatible. When peace came, it was the peace of despotism. 'Cum domino pax ista venit.' (Syme 1939, 9 including footnotes 6 and 7; brackets mine)

For traditionalists like Syme, *monarchy is the alpha and omega of Roman civics with Hellenism as a strictly symbolic/rhetorical force* where Octavian "was acclaimed in forms and language once used of Alexander" though Octavian's *Res Gestae* is "explained [...] not with reference to the religions and kings of the Hellenistic East but from Rome and Roman practice, as a combination between the *elogium* of a Roman general and the statement of accounts of a Roman magistrate" (Syme 1939, 305, 524; Syme's emphasis, brackets mine).

Later traditionalists (or *neo-traditionalists*) such as Paul Zanker and Fergus Millar, however, showed that the *relationship between Roman emperorship and Greek kingship was historically substantive, or more than symbolic/rhetorical*, thus challenging without upending their predecessors' views of Roman politics after the Republic. In *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus*, the spread of Hellenic culture for Zanker is a key, if not *the* key, backdrop for

comprehending the historical development of Augustan imperial imagery:

With the Roman conquest of the Greek East, Hellenistic culture overwhelmed the still primitive society of the Roman city-state. [...] The effects on the Roman way of life, religion, and character were unmistakable. The contrast between the old *mores maiorum* and what would soon be condemned as *luxuria* in Rome could scarcely have been more striking. [...] The effects of Hellenization were particularly marked because Roman society was at this time undergoing rapid internal changes, and the city-state, overburdened by the administration of a huge empire, would eventually collapse. The spoils of war, together with economic expansion, had led to a concentration of wealth and property in the hands of a few, while the masses of the poor fled the country for Rome. Large private armies gave rise to factions that in turn made the victorious generals into political powers rivaling the state itself. The radical redistribution of wealth loosened previously rigid class distinctions. Ambitious social climbers, especially leading men from the cities of Italy and wealthy freedmen, pressed for social recognition and political power. In the new, pervasive competitive spirit, no longer was it only the nobility who competed for the benefit of the Republic, but many others for personal advancement and material gain. Hellenistic art, quickly adapted by the Romans, played an important part in these developments. [...] Without this background we cannot understand the new imagery of the Augustan Age." (Zanker 1988, 1–2; Zanker's emphasis, brackets mine)

As best described by Raymond Van Dam, Zanker's "approach was both a complement to Syme's perspective and an antidote" (Van Dam 2008, 7). Specifically, Zanker "assumed that Augustus and his supporters used art and iconography in order to reveal the emperor and to project favorable images" (i.e., Augustus as "an equally manipulative self-promoter") whereas "Syme had approached Augustus' reign with the assumption that the emperor and his cronies used literature and art to conceal their power" (i.e., Augustus as "a manipulative dissimulator") (Van Dam 2008, 7). In *The Emperor in the Roman World*, Millar details the continuity of Hellenistic principles, memories, and practices in Roman operations of governance illustrated in the following series of facts (both social and brute<sup>4</sup>):

- Memory of Alexander the Great: "[T]he memory of Alexander exercised an enduring influence on the military role of the emperor" and the "long-established conceptions of what a 'king' should be [...] did indeed help to transform a Roman *princeps* into a

descendant of the Hellenistic kings" (Millar 1977, 3; Millar's emphasis, brackets mine).

- Receipt of Golden Crowns: The receipt of gold crowns was a "custom [...] inherited from the Hellenistic kings, and had established itself in Rome as soon as major victories were won by Roman generals in the Greek east; for the Greek cities naturally made to these victors the same offerings which they were accustomed to make to victorious kings" (Millar 1977, 140–141; brackets mine).
- Roman Imperial Letters: Roman imperial letters, "[l]ike the letters of Hellenistic kings or of republican or imperial provincial governors [...] would open with an address in the form 'The emperor (name and titles) to the magistrates, council and people of (name of place) *salutem dicit (chairein)*', and end, originally, with a greeting in a single word, *valete (eutucheite or errôsthe)*" (Millar 1977, 221; Millar's emphasis, brackets mine).
- Petitions and Requests for Imperial Rights and Privileges: "[I]t was [...] in the related areas of petitions and requests concerning the rights and privileges of temples and priests, of religious and artistic festivals and associations, that we have the most specific testimony to the inheritance by the [Roman] emperor of roles performed by the Hellenistic kings" (Millar 1977, 361, brackets mine).
- Establishment of New Greek Cities: For Millar, "[t]he creation of new Greek cities, sometimes by actual physical settlement, sometimes by granting of a city-constitution and sometimes by mere re-naming, had been a characteristic function of the Hellenistic kings, was taken over by Roman pro-magistrates in the east in the last century of the republic, and continued by the emperors" (Millar 1977, 395–396; brackets mine).
- Emperor as the Presiding Priest of the Mouseion: The *Mouseion* in Alexandria "provides the most specific and concrete of all instances of a direct transfer of functions from

Hellenistic kings to Roman emperors" since it "was in origin a shrine dedicated to the Muses, and that in nominating its presiding priest (*hiereus*), Augustus was assuming a role in religious life" and was "also [...] assuming a role in intellectual life"; essentially, "the role adopted by the emperors in relation to the Museum was an aspect of their attachment to the cultural and religious values and institutions of the Greek world" (Millar 1977, 492–493, 506; Millar's emphasis, brackets mine).

- Imperial Decrees: According to Millar, "the ritual of the passing of a decree, despatch of ambassadors, and presentation of the decree with an accompanying oration, was perhaps the most fundamental contribution of Hellenistic diplomacy to the shaping of the [Roman] imperial rule" (Millar 1977, 618; brackets mine).

In his later work titled *A Greek Roman Empire*, Millar extends his study of Roman kingship to 5th-century Byzantium. The author specifically examines "the complex functional balance between Greek [subjects] and Latin [state institutions] which marked the 'Greek Roman Empire'" during the reign of Emperor Theodosius II (Millar 2006, xv–xviff; brackets mine). Millar asks "[h]ow [...] a 'Greek Roman Empire' c[a]me about" and responds by accurately stating that "there had been such a thing for centuries" where the "wider Greek world, created first by the colonizing activity of the Archaic period, and then by the conquests of Alexander in the second half of the fourth century B.C.E., had come under Roman rule between the second century B.C.E. and the second century C.E." (Millar 2006, 2; brackets mine). What makes 5th-century Byzantium a *Greek Roman empire* are the following key phenomena:

- Constantine the Great: "[T]he work of [Emperor] Constantine, ruling between 306 and 337" involving his "conversion to Christianity, followed by all subsequent Emperors except Julian (361–63); and his foundation of Constantinople as a 'new Rome'" (Millar

2006, 3; brackets mine). Said foundation involved the transfer of Roman power from the city of Rome to the Greek city of Byzantium referred to here as the *translatio imperii*.

- Geopolitical Division of the Roman Empire: "[T]he division [of the Roman Empire] into twin Empires [...] came about [...] almost by accident" where "Theodosius I (379–95) [...] ruled a unified Empire, with his two sons, Arcadius and Honorius," and when the emperor died, Arcadius "ruled from Constantinople until his death in 408 [...] while [...] Honorius [...] ruled from Italy until his death in 423" (Millar 2006, 3; brackets mine).

Differences aside, both traditionalists and neo-traditionalists treat the *deification of the Roman emperor* as an important given. Syme, for instance, mentions Octavian's "avenging of Caesar, and with it his own divine descent, [being] advertised by the inauguration of the temple of *Divus Julius* in 29 B.C." (Syme 1939, 305; Syme's emphasis, brackets mine). This accords with Bradley H. McLean's analysis where the emperor's deification was "[o]ne of the outcomes of the assassination of Julius Caesar" who ultimately "was adopted as one of the [Roman] state gods, with an altar and later a temple being erected for him" (McLean 2002, 336; brackets mine). Also, Caesar's deification translated concretely into the *cult of the emperor*, which "spread throughout the empire" and "can be viewed as both an outgrowth of the Roman concept of the extraordinary individual who manifested transcendent powers and, *in the eastern empire, as a continuation of the Hellenistic royal cult, which viewed the ruler as an epiphany of a god*" (McLean 2002, 336–337; emphasis mine).<sup>5</sup> Complementing McLean's correct assertion on Greek kingship is J. Joel Farber's article titled "The *Cyropaideia* and Hellenistic Kingship" where the author concerns himself "not with how the [Hellenistic] kings actually ruled but solely with the ideas that people in general seem to have held about them and how the kings wanted their people to regard them" (Farber 1979, 498; brackets mine). Farber delineates the ideals of kingship, both

values and practices, from Xenophon's *Cyropaideia*: 1) *aretē* meaning "excellence", 2) *eusebeia* meaning "piety", 3) *dikē/dikaiosynē* meaning "justice", 4) *philotimia* meaning "love of honor", 5) *spoudē/prothymia* meaning "earnestness/zeal", 6) *pronoia* meaning "forethought", 7) *epimeleia* meaning "attention", 8) *phrontis* meaning "care", 9) *eunomia* meaning "good will", 10) *philanthropia* meaning "love of humanity", 11) *katoiktisis* meaning "compassion" or "pity", 12) *praotēs* meaning "gentleness" or "meekness", 13) *sotēria* meaning "salvation", 14) *euergesia* meaning "benefaction", and 15) *voēthos* meaning "helper" (see APPENDIX III for further details). It is important, of course, to note that said ideals do not necessarily represent Eastern influences at least for Milton V. Anastos who, besides describing Xenophon's *Cyropaideia* as "a fanciful, semi-fictional panegyric", argues that Eastern influences were external (i.e., "dress, protocol, and court ceremonial") and that "philosophical principles of absolutism [...] were translated into practice by the rulers of the Graeco-Roman world, who knew little, if anything, about putative Eastern counterparts or parallels and were not affected by them except, perhaps, very indirectly" (Anastos 1978, 14, 20; see also Anastos 1965, 90ff; brackets mine).

Other ideal virtues and practices of Hellenistic kingship include: 1) "honor[ing] officials who gave themselves to their tasks 'unhesitatingly'" with Xenophon's "Cyrus want[ing] to make his men *aprophasistous* allies (2.4.10)" along with honoring "unhesitating obedience [as] the greatest *ἀρετάς* (8.1.29)", 2) "set[ting] up a military-type bureaucracy ([as Cyrus does in *Cyropaedia*] 8.1.13ff)" in order "not to be troubled with unimportant matters", and 3) "giv[ing] encouragement to [...] subjects, [...] that Cyrus not only does himself (8.1.12, 21), but recommends to his officers (7.1.18)" (Farber 1979, 513–514; Farber's emphasis, brackets mine). As for Hellenistic *concretas*, McLean states that "[m]any villages (*δῆμος, κόμη, κατοικία*) modeled their organization on the democratic government of cities by setting up an assembly and

by giving to officials the same titles as their counterparts in their cities" (McLean 2002, 305; brackets mine). Also, "villages had *no political sovereignty*" though they "did have limited powers to legislate on some social, religious, and administrative models" (McLean 2002, 305; emphasis mine). Evidence of Hellenistic *eusebia* is confirmed on a Greek plaque associated with the Council of Mopsuestia of 550 AD. According to Gilbert Dagron, "[o]n a plaque, which must originally have been embedded in the wall of a church, are engraved, in a cartouche, an acclamation in honor of the emperor [Justinian] and, in two strictly symmetrical medallions, acclamations—to the right, in honor of Bishop Antoninus—to the left, in honor of the military commander (*στρατηλάτης*) Marthanius" (Dagron 1980, 26; Dagron's emphasis, brackets mine). Specifically, the plaque's acclamation bluntly praising the Byzantine monarch reads as follows:

<p>Ἰουστινιανοῦ  εὐσεβοῦς δεσ-  πότου εἰς  αἰῶνας  ἡ βασιλεία  [(Dagron 1980, 26: Figure 1)]</p>	<p>May Justinian,  the pious mas-  ter, unto the  ages  reign  [(English translation mine)]</p>
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What is also interesting is the appearance of Hellenistic *praotis* and *soter* in Byzantine hymns and poetry dedicated to Emperor Basil I of the Macedonian dynasty who reigned from 867 to 886 AD. The former appears in the anonymous 9th-century Byzantine poem honoring the emperor Basil's gentleness/meekness ("τῆ πραότητι", Line 125 in Markopoulos 1992, 231) and the latter appears in Patriarch Photios' "first hymn for Basil: [...] Μεγαλύνω σου, Σῶτερ, τὴν θεῖαν δυναστείαν" (Markopoulos 1992, 227 citing *Patrologia Graeca* 102, col. 580A; brackets mine). But as compelling as the evidence in support of the traditional view is, adherents of the

*critical view* of the Eastern Roman polity are unconvinced.

As mentioned previously, the *critical view* of Byzantium involves the *Roman tradition of Roman republicanism based on the revolution against the Tarquin monarchy*. Undergirding this view is the establishment and evolution of Roman horizontal power structures and principles beginning with *consensus/negotiation* between rulers and ruled and then *beholdenness* of rulers to the ruled rendering the latter as *sovereign*. An early paragon of this view is Clifford Ando's *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire* arguing "that the Roman state successfully invoked the obedience of its subjects by appealing to several principles of legitimation concurrently" (Ando 2000, 5). For Ando, "Rome's desire for *consensus* [...] opened a conceptual and discursive space for provincials and Romans alike to negotiate the veracity of Roman propaganda and the rationality of the Roman administration" (Ando 2000, 7; Ando's emphasis, brackets mine). Consensus and negotiation are themes evident in Anthony Kaldellis' *The Byzantine Republic* with regards to "Popular Acclamations and Imperial Accession" where Kaldellis states that "[t]o become emperor of the Romans in Byzantium one had first to be *elected* (i.e., chosen) for the office and then *elevated* to it" (Kaldellis 2015, 102; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine). The former "depended on the contingent facts of power" (e.g., "orchestrated by a ruling emperor for an heir", "army would march on the capital and its general would present himself as a candidate for the throne", etc.) whereas the latter "always took place in a public ceremony of universal acclamation" where "[l]egitimacy was derived from universal consensus [...], the *consensus universorum* or *consensus omnium*", which Kaldellis regards as "a monarchical variation of Cicero's definition of *res publica*" (Kaldellis 2015, 103; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine).

21st-century Byzantine Scholarship: Elite-Imperial and Popular-National Models

In 21st-century Byzantine scholarship, the *traditional view* of Byzantium is defended by Ioannis Stouraitis' *elite-imperial model*. The model appears in a dialogue between Stouraitis and his opponent Anthony Kaldellis, champion of the *popular-national model* representing the *critical view* of Byzantium entailing the *Roman tradition of Roman republicanism*. The dialogue began in 2014 when Stouraitis critiqued the main argument in Kaldellis' *Hellenism in Byzantium* where a Roman nation-state was established beginning in the 7th century AD via Roman political culture subsuming into its own matrix the diverse ethno-cultural landscape of the Eastern Roman provinces (Stouraitis 2014, 178 citing Kaldellis 2007, Chapter 2: 42–119). Specifically, Stouraitis posited his *thesis* using a critical approach to "argu[e] that a conceptualization of the [Byzantine] collective identity [...] needs to be disconnected from essentialist and reifying views on perennial ethnicity as well as from the modern phenomenon of the nation-state" (Stouraitis 2014, 175; brackets mine). In 2017, Kaldellis submitted an *antithesis* using an evidence-based approach to criticize Stouraitis' "suggest[ion] that Roman identity was limited to a tiny elite in Constantinople [...] see[ing] the empire as a system of exploitation of the provincials that precluded meaningful identification between the two" resulting in the "Roman label [being] part of a misleading homogenizing discourse used by elites and implied no horizontal community" (Kaldellis 2017, 173–174; brackets mine).

According to Stouraitis, Kaldellis' popular-national model of Byzantine group identity constitutes an "approach that, while [...] correctly reject[ing] essentialist and reifying views on ethnicity, [...] is, at the same time, prone to adopt an essentialist and reifying view on political culture and political identity within a pre-modern, highly stratified imperial social order" (Stouraitis 2014, 183–184; brackets mine). Moreover, Stouraitis finds that Kaldellis' "dismissal

of Roman ecumenism as a main trait of Eastern Roman identity is [...] preconditioned by the need to adapt the Byzantine vision of community to the traits of the [modern] nation[-state] [...] as an inherently limited and boundary-oriented imagined political community" (Stouraitis 2014, 185–186; brackets mine). In other words, Stouraitis treats Kaldellis' paradigm as embodying an *essentialist reification* of Byzantine political identity that *projects* the modern nation-state onto the medieval past involving imperial states. According to Kaldellis, Stouraitis' *elite-imperial model* (or "elite reading" of Byzantine political self-conceptualization) "'rarif[ies]' Roman identity to the point where it can be blown away by a slight theoretical breeze [...] stand[ing] in a long tradition of denialism, by marrying Franz Dölger's view that Roman identity in Byzantium was a function of court propaganda to Cyril Mango's view of Byzantine literature as a distorting mirror of classicizing fantasy" (Kaldellis 2017, 209; brackets mine). In other words, Kaldellis treats Stouraitis' model as embodying an *anti-essentialist rarification* of Byzantine political identity that *denies* expressions of collective Romanness by non-elites in the Eastern Roman, or Byzantine, polity.

With respect to the evidence used to bolster the *elite-imperial model*, Stouraitis relies on: 1) the "representation of the Eastern Roman notion of 'homeland' in the writings of the élite [...] consistently referr[ing] [...] to the extensive and vague territorial boundaries of the Roman Oecumene, the traditional *orbis romanum*", 2) the "Eastern Roman provincial masses' high degree of illiteracy [...] complemented by both regional and ethnic linguistic diversity [...] crucial in maintaining vertical cultural cleavages in the absence of an established mass public culture", 3) the "Christian identity of provincial populations in the [Byzantine] empire's [...] territorial core hardly predetermined their ideological allegiance to the Roman imperial state of Constantinople and its ruling élite's vision of community" and 4) "the use of ethnonyms for an ethno-cultural

categorization of Roman subjects from within, from the Roman élite" (e.g., "Greeks" and "Slavs" in the *De Administrando Imperio* of Emperor Constantine VII) (Stouraitis 2014, 187, 196, 203, 208; Stouraitis' emphasis, brackets mine). With respect to the evidence used to support the *popular-national model*, Kaldellis relies on primaries treating and depicting "the Romans of Byzantium [as] a large ethnic group [...] making up the vast majority of its population" such as: 1) "elite sources and [...] the social valence of Roman identity claimed for and by the Byzantine army", 2) "provincial sub-elite or non-elite sources" and 3) "foreign sources describing Byzantine society" including Arabic texts (Kaldellis 2017, 174–175; brackets mine).<sup>6</sup>

Despite their compelling positions, Stouraitis and Kaldellis represent opposite poles of a *false dilemma*.<sup>7</sup> First, both authors engage in reification *and* rarification by discursively downplaying and/or denying the historic place of Hellenism, including its Greek/Hellenized bearers (both elite and non-elite), as *the foundational civilization of the Eastern Roman, or Byzantine, political realm*.<sup>8</sup> Second, both the *elite-imperial model* and the *popular-national model* suffer from the following fallacies: 1) *false framing* where the rhetorical and real dimensions of Eastern Roman politics, whatever their overlaps, are reduced to a simplistic "either-or" by Stouraitis' focus on vertical power and Kaldellis' focus on horizontal power, 2) *selection/confirmation bias* where Stouraitis and Kaldellis only choose sources that support their own paradigms without attempting to systematically falsify the hypotheses and assumptions underlying their own paradigms, and 3) *school of names*, or *legalism*, where both authors assume or assert that "[t]here is no continuity between the classical Greeks and the Byzantines" since the Byzantines "call[ed] themselves and thought of themselves as Romans and Christians" (Vryonis 1978, 248; brackets mine). Although the aforementioned fallacies are interrelated, this dissertation will mainly concentrate on the third fallacy, via Speros Vryonis Jr.'s work titled

"Recent Scholarship on Continuity and Discontinuity of Culture", since it serves as the backdrop that animates the other two fallacies.

Within the context of criticizing modern Byzantine scholarship (up until the late 1970s), Speros Vryonis Jr. states that "the Byzantines call[ing] themselves Rhomaioi [...] is a significant fact", but that what "is equally important, however, [is] to ascertain the actuality which lurks beneath the name" (Vryonis 1978, 248; brackets mine). For Vryonis, the term *Rhomaioi* (i.e., Romans) "was applied to the Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians, or to those who had not only been baptized but who had been brought up as Rhomaioi, i.e. Greek-speaking and with some sort of Greek education" (Vryonis 1978, 248). And although Kaldellis, like Vryonis, treats the *Rhomaioi* as "the Greek-speaking and [Christian] Orthodox population of free citizens", the author, unlike Vryonis, finds that the "Byzantines were not Greeks because they spoke Greek (that is a modern nationalist interpretation)" but "rather, their language (Greek) was renamed Roman because they were Romans" (Kaldellis 2017, 176, 196; brackets mine). For Kaldellis to state that modern nationalism is behind the argument that the "Byzantines were [...] Greeks because they spoke Greek" is a *false assumption* that fails to recognize the historical reality that the Byzantines *themselves* identified their *own* nationhood as Greek (*Graikoí*) due to their native Greek culture/civilization, language and literature (e.g., τῶν Γραικῶν γράμματα καὶ τὴν γλῶσσαν or "of the letters and language of the Greeks" per Theophanes Confessor; see also Vryonis 1999 and Tsougarakis 2006). Also, the Byzantines did not rename but rather *applied*, legitimately via Constantine, the epithet *Roman* to their own Greek language (*ρωμείκα*) while still referring to their native Hellenic tongue as *Greek* (see, for instance, γραικικῶν, Γραικικὴν on page 209 of APPENDIX II). Even Stouraitis acknowledges that the "Christianization of the [Roman] empire [led to] the ethnonym Hellene [being] gradually substituted by the semantic equivalent *Graikos*

in denoting the member of the ethno-cultural collectivity due to the religious discourse that identified Hellenism with paganism" (Stouraitis 2014, 208; Stouraitis' emphasis, brackets mine). Moreover, the "fact that *Graikos* is translated as Hellene in the lexica of the Byzantine period leaves little doubt that the literate Eastern Roman élite was well aware of the historic-cultural signification of the employed ethnonym" (Stouraitis 2014, 208; Stouraitis' emphasis). Yet despite such accurate observations, Stouraitis contradicts himself by invoking the Byzantine elites' awareness of their own Greek ethno-civilizational provenance, a core dimension of their Christian Greek *elect nationhood*, while arguing that "the Eastern Roman ruling élite did not employ Greek ethnic discourse to circumscribe its self-identification" (Stouraitis 2014, 206). And if Stouraitis is not self-contradictory, then the argument that Greek ethnic discourses were not used is contradicted by Byzantine historical figures such as Empress Athenaïs-Eudocia who were recorded as having used them (see pages 227–228 in APPENDIX II for further details). Differences notwithstanding, Stouraitis and Kaldellis are similar in their distancing all things Greek, except language, from all things Byzantine lending credence to a terse 2001 critique of Byzantinology made by Alexios G. C. Savvides and Benjamin Hendrickx involving the *absurdity and unhistoricity of reducing the Byzantines to the sum of their Greek linguistic parts*:

One of the major issues of Byzantinology (the scholarly discipline dealing with all branches and aspects of the Byzantine world and its civilisation) has always been associated with the << Hellenic/Greek >> character of the Byzantine state and that character's measure and degrees. [...] [T]here are also scholars who continue to adopt rather far-fetched viewpoints, by maintaining that the Byzantines were simply << Graceophone Romans >> and that the early Byzantine emperors (up to the Justinianic era, or even until the early 7th century) had more common characteristics rather with the Roman *imperatores* of the past than with their Byzantine/Greek *epigoni*. Evidently, these scholars have not comprehended the way in which the term << Roman >> and its derivatives were employed in the Byzantine Empire, nor could they comprehend why the modern Greek idiom adopted in the post-Byzantine era the variants << *Rhomiōs* >> / << *Rhomeōs* >>, but also << *Rhomanīa* >> and << *Rhomeosēne* >>, imparting the connotations of the continuation and survival of Hellenism through the ages. (Savvides and Hendrickx 2001, 24–25; Savvides and Hendrickx's emphasis, brackets mine)

Savvides and Hendrickx aside, the *justification* for the Kaldellis-Stouraitis dialogue being a false dilemma entails its falsely assuming that what constitutes, or embodies, a *Graikós* ("Greek") in the Eastern Roman polity was inferior to, per Stouraitis, or was subsumed by, per Kaldellis, what constitutes a *Romaíos* ("Roman"). It also neglects Byzantine *elect nationhood* where the *Romaíoi-Graikoí* are the Greek nation (*not* nation-state) of New Rome *chosen* by their Christian God and *beholden* to Him *through* His representatives on Earth, one secular (i.e., emperorship, politics, *thyrathen*) and one divine (i.e., Patriarchate, religion, *ierakon*), and, in turn, *protected* by Him, again, *through* his representatives on Earth. As will be illustrated later in this dissertation, both *Romaíoi* and *Graikoí* were used synonymously by the Byzantines themselves to express an *ecumenical nation* or a nation (ethnos/genos) under the crown beholden to God (see CHAPTER I, pages 31–33).

As for discussions held *after* the start of the Kaldellis-Stouraitis dialogue, John Haldon in 2016 provided a series of observations germane to the state of Byzantine scholarship in the 1980s. For Haldon, there was a Kuhnian paradigm shift in modern Byzantine studies in the 1980s entailing the so-called *linguistic turn* (i.e., post-structuralism/post-modernism or the viewing of the Eastern Roman polity and its inhabitants through the lenses of "intertextuality, [...] authorial intention, [...] reception, and [...] the relativiz[ation] of cultural interpretive possibilities") (Haldon 2016a, 4–5; brackets mine).<sup>9</sup> Moreover, Kaldellis' *The Byzantine Republic* arguing for the Eastern Roman polity existing as a republican monarchy undergirded by a sovereign Roman populace (i.e., Roman general will) is, for Haldon, not only reflective of the aforesaid paradigm shift but also untenable since provincial hostility/opposition to the ruling elites in Constantinople does not illustrate evidence for a general will among the people (Haldon 2016a, 8). But *why* the linguistic turn? Because for Haldon, "the changes [in Byzantine Studies]

since the late 1970s have been faster and more far-reaching than those beforehand, and that a real broadening of the historical agenda has occurred which contrasts very strikingly with the slower rate of change of the period from the Second World War until the 1970s" (Haldon 2016b, 4; brackets mine).

Haldon's observations aside, the possible backdrop to the Kaldellis-Stouraitis dialogue entails, in Gilbert Dagron's words, the "paradox of legitimate power versus a state governed by law, ἔννομος ἀρχή versus ἔννομος πολιτεία, [that] is found in legal sources (the *Digest*, the preambles of Novels, etc.) as well as in commentaries and treatises" (Dagron 1994, 34; Dagron's emphasis, brackets mine). Dagron's justification is a "Byzantium [that] must sort out and manage legacies that are difficult to reconcile, opting to be 'republican' or 'monarchist' according to the moment and circumstance, while remaining Christian" (Dagron 1994, 27; brackets mine). The aforesaid paradox echoes, or overlaps with, the tension between *dignum* (dignity) and *utile* (utility) in Cicero's *De officiis* (*On the Offices*), which in turn is derived from, or broadly reflects, the tension between *dikē* (justice) and *anagkē* (need) in the Melian Dialogue of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (5.89.1). The legacies that Dagron sees within the Eastern Roman polity broadly overlap with Peter Stacey's assessment of Cicero having "an extended tussle to uphold the Stoic rule that what is *dignum* is always what is *utile*" (Stacey 2007, 30; Stacey's emphasis). For Stacey, Cicero "moves uneasily between redefining the honourable in terms of the rationality necessary to the republic's flourishing, and conceding exceptions to the Stoic understanding of the rule when it is applied in the face of clashes between what is *dignum* in the Stoic moral universe with what is *utile* to the Roman *res publica*" (Stacey 2007, 30; Stacey's emphasis). Nevertheless, the distinction between *power* and *law* has a precedent in Aristotle's *Politics* involving "the question whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the

best men or by the best laws" ("ἀρχὴ δ' ἔστι τῆς ζητήσεως αὕτη, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων"; see *Politics* 3.1286a in Rackham 1944; Rackham's translation).

But is the Eastern Roman political community *truly* a paradox or are scholars *reading* a paradox into it? For all intents and purposes, I will argue that the Byzantine polity was *not* a paradox defined and driven by the Greek mythological equivalent of the perpetual game between the Teumessian Fox, the fox that always evades capture, and Laelaps, the canine that always captures its prey. Rather, *Romanía-Graikía* was, as stated earlier, an *elect nation* organized, broadly speaking, into a Christianized Platonic polity where the emperor's *divine mimesis* renders him the *living law* and the *state of exception*. By *divine mimesis* I mean that the emperor is, or aspires to be, the *subsummer* of the community's *táxēs* (τάξης, "immutable/ideal order"), the Byzantine equivalent of Parmenides' *stasis*, and the community's *oikonomía* (οικονομία, "mutable/concrete household management"), the Byzantine equivalent of Heraclitus' *flux*. And if the emperor is not a subsummer, then he is at least a *facilitator/guardian of the subsummation of the body-politic's "organs" (i.e., classes) existing and operating on behalf of the Thrice-Holy God as subsummer-in-chief*. A useful case in point is the *Strategikon*, "a manual of advice" composed by an 11th-century Byzantine "provincial, or rural, noble[man]" named Kekaumenos (Geanakoplos 1984, 236; brackets mine; see Savvides 1986–1987 on Kekaumenos' family). Kekaumenos' text, addressed "to his young sons" and "filled with counsels for proper conduct in a variety of situations" (Geanakoplos 1984, 236), offers the following wisdom regarding how one must behave before the Byzantine emperor:

If you are in service of a ruler, do not serve him just as a ruler and a mere man: serve him as king, and as if he were God. If he be without knowledge and unfit for his position, and you are far above him in knowledge and wisdom and fitness, do not despise him, and [? or] he will dismiss you. Do not say, "He dare not do me any

harm". I have seen in my time many men dismissed and disgraced in that way. If you are in the service of the king, and hold a subordinate position, guard your speech at all times, and submit yourself to your superiors; act deliberately as if you were the least of all men, and then God will exalt you. Do not be harsh or inflexible, and do not fail to order yourself reverently to your superiors: pay them attention, but do not pay it perpetually, for familiarity is wont to breed contempt. (Barker 1957, 122–123; Barker's brackets)

In the above passage, Kekaumenos clearly instructs his sons to treat their emperor not as a mere mortal, but as a *king with divine mandate*. Interestingly, the author uses elements derived from the Aesopic tradition, specifically the story titled *The Fox and the Lion*, with respect to advising his children to avoid contemptuousness towards their superiors by avoiding familiarity with them (see Roueché 2003, 30ff on Kekaumenos' rhetoric). But what is the *justification* for such advice?

Kekaumenos is clear:

οὐδέποτε γάρ τις ἐτόλμησεν ἀνταρσίαν ποιῆσαι κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς Ῥωμανίας πειρώμενος διαφθεῖραι τὴν εἰρήνην, καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς διεφθάρη. διὰ ταῦτα οὖν παραγγέλλω ὑμῖν, τέκνα μου ἡγαπημένα, οὓς μοι δέδωκεν ὁ Θεὸς, εἰς τὸ μέρος τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ εἰς τὴν δούλωσιν αὐτοῦ εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ ἐν Κωνσταντίνου πόλει καθεζόμενος βασιλεὺς πάντοτε νικᾷ. (ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟΝ ἐν Wassiliewsky καὶ Jernstedt 1896, 73–74)

No one has ever dared to revolt against the emperor and the Roman Empire [*Romanía* or "Domain of the (New) Romans"], breaking the peace, without destroying himself. That is why I counsel you, dear children whom God has given me, always to align yourself on the side of the emperor and in his service. For the emperor who sits in the city of Constantine always triumphs. (STRATEGIKON in Geanakoplos 1984, 237; Geanakoplos' translation; brackets mine)

Returning to Dagron's paradox, the ἔννομος ἀρχή *is* the ἔννομος πολιτεία for Kekaumenos meaning that *the emperor is the legitimate wellspring of God-given power from which flows the legitimacy of the polity's governing laws thus rendering said paradox a modern paradoxification of pre-modern Eastern Roman civics*. That tensions existed, or were prone to emerge, between *táxēs* and *oikonomía* in the Eastern Roman polity's own historical progression are undeniable (e.g., Iconoclasm, Byzantine civil war of 1341–1347, etc.). But said tensions, however extreme,

neither illustrate nor prove that Christian Greeks functioned civically as New Romans by perpetually oscillating between monarchism and monarchical republicanism. The polity of *Romanía-Graikía* was, and understood itself as, *one nation of Christian Greeks chosen by God living under the rule of God*. They believed this mandated a *Greco-Roman monarch governing secular affairs and that the Patriarch of Constantinople govern religious affairs*. Both, on their lights, were *chosen by God or enthroned on Earth by imitating Him in Heaven*. Such an assessment overlaps, to an extent, with Carol G. Thomas' terse, yet accurate, historical description of Byzantine social and administrative life:

Byzantine society was theocentric: there were two governing authorities, secular and spiritual – the emperor and the patriarch respectively. The unifying factor was not a single individual but rather it was God who granted power to both [...] The administration of the empire had two branches: the military/civil stem whose power flowed from the emperor and the religious stem directed by the patriarch of the Church in Constantinople. The two branches met in the officer of the *synkellos*, a high cleric appointed by the emperor in agreement with the patriarch of the Orthodox Church, who acted as a liaison between the two high dignitaries of state. (Thomas 2014, 119; Thomas' emphasis, brackets mine; Papadakis 1991, 1993 defines *synkellos* as "the adviser and fellow-boarder of a patriarch" or "patriarch's confidant")

But what do the terms *polity* and *nation/nationhood* mean? The next chapter will offer definitions for the aforesaid terms, along with their relevance to Byzantium, after first outlining what this dissertation does and does not cover.

## CHAPTER I – PREFACING THE POLITY

### Dissertation: What it is and what it is not

The aim of this section is to expand on the abstract in order to clarify what this project *is* and *is not*. Of course, the civic classification of the Eastern Roman polity is a complex subject that this dissertation will not resolve. Furthermore, the main questions posited (i.e., What is Byzantium as a polity? How and on what terms did Byzantines conceptualize/theorize their own political community?) are asked to address the applicability of monarchical republicanism to Byzantium and are connected by more pressing questions: *How was sovereignty defined by the Christian Greeks of New Rome and who exactly was sovereign?* The exploration of Eastern Roman sovereign power, respecting the *neo-traditionalist view* backed by ample evidence of Byzantines as (New) Romans *and* (Christian) Greeks, is what makes this project, first and foremost, a work *of* Political Theory *for* Political Theory in terms of form. Substance-wise, this dissertation is *eclectic* in that it sources, or draws from, multiple and overlapping facets of reality: politics, political philosophy, warfare, law, history/historiography, diplomacy, literature/literacy, logic, education (*paideia*), language, religion/faith, nationhood/ethnicity (*ethnos/genos*), inscriptions, numismatics, trade/economics, seals, papyruses, etc. The rationale for eclecticism with respect to source selection is, metaphysics aside, two-fold: 1) reality, as a whole, is not constrained by any one dimension of causality be it final, formal, efficient or material, and 2) reality, in part, entails "[o]ld things becom[ing] new again in course of time" according to the ancient Greek poet Nikostratos (*Fr. Com. Gr.*, 4th century BC; brackets mine). The methods used are *historical-contextual*, undergirded by the inquiry *What is the causality of polity X?*,

and *critical-comparative*, underscored by the question *What is the truth-value and truth-conditions of theoretical paradigm X in relation to polity X?* And although the former method will primarily focus on the history of political principles (i.e., *ideals*, theory, the Platonic route) because of their *salience in the source material*, it will also touch upon political behaviors (i.e., *concretes*, events, the Aristotelian route) because of the *historical actualization of said principles*.

This project, of course, *is not* many things. It is neither a genealogy of a single concept, practice or value, nor a contextualization of a singular event/phenomenon, nor a study of any singular text and its manuscript recensions, nor an exclusive progress report on the evolution of modern academic disciplines and/or intellectual currents, nor a comparative analysis of religious movements, nor a position-piece exclusively on pre-modern nations/nationhoods. As for the subject of inquiry (i.e., Christian Greeks and their Eastern Roman polity), it is referred to throughout this dissertation as *Romaíoi-Graikoi* ("Romans-Greeks") with respect to the main population and *Romanía-Graikía* ("Domain of the [New] Romans-Domain of the Greeks") with respect to said population's polity altogether predicated on the subject of inquiry's *own* terms of autoclassification used in the subject of inquiry's *own* texts. Three examples shall suffice with more facts on Greek, including Eastern Roman, nationhood available in APPENDIX II:

- in the 9th century AD, Archbishop Methodius of Constantinople used in his encomium to Saint Nicholas the synonymous terms/phrases *Ρωμανία* ("Domain of the [New] Romans", *Romanía*), *Γραικίας* ("of Greece", *Graikias*), and *της Γραικῶν [...] γῆ* or ("earth/land [...] of the Greeks", *tēs Graikón [...] gē*) altogether denoting the *New/Eastern Roman polity in its entirety* (Anrich 1913, 180–181; translation mine, brackets mine),
- in the 10th century AD, Leon Magistros Choïrosphaktes composed a letter addressed to Emperor Leo VI who reigned from 886 to 911 AD; in it, Leon clearly refers to his own

polity as "state of the [New/Eastern] Romans" ("Ῥωμαίων ἀρχῆ", *Romaíon archē*) (Sakellionos 1883, 396–397; brackets mine). The author also unambiguously treats his Greek contemporaries captured by the Saracens during their raid on the city of Thessaloniki in 904 AD ("αἰχμαλωσίαν Γραικῶν", *aichmalosian Graikon*) as his "fellow tribesmen" ("ὁμοφύλων αἰχμαλώτων", *omophylon aichmaloton*) (Sakellionos 1883, 396–397; translation mine, brackets mine), and

- in the 10th-century *Testimony of the 63 Holy and Glorious Martyrs of Christ*, Symeon the Monk narrates the fate of the Christian Greeks, hailing from the city of Ikonion in Byzantine Asia Minor, in Muslim-conquered Jerusalem when Leo the Isaurian was emperor (reign: 717–741 AD) (Papadopoulou-Kerameos 1907, 136–163). In it, the Byzantine author bluntly defines the New/Eastern Roman polity as "territories of the Greeks" ("τῶν Γραικῶν μέρη, ἧτοι τῆς Νέας Ῥώμης" in Papadopoulou-Kerameos 1907, 141; translation mine).

The above list is *not* designed to resolve any debates surrounding the identity of the Byzantines. Instead, it is meant to show that the presence and use of the descriptors *Romaíoi-Graikoí* and *Romanía-Graikía* in this dissertation are *justified*. Said descriptors *constitute neither ex nihilo inventions, nor artificial archaisms, nor products of literary sarcasm, nor products of conflicts with the Latin West, nor products of conversion based on or appealing to modern nation-state discourses, nor rare historical phenomena* (see, for example, Malatras 2011, 422 on Byzantine Hellenism as "word-play"). The list also *renders reductionistic* Clifton R. Fox's assertion that "the term 'Romania' referred to the territory where the Greek speaking 'Romaioi' lived" (Fox 1996). But how does one *know* that the listed terms meant what they meant? An answer is offered by Greek lexicography: Hesychius of Alexandria (5th/6th century AD), Stephanos Byzantios (6th century AD), and the author(s) of the *Suda* (c. 10th century AD) all equate the

tribonym *Graikós* to the tribonym *Hellene*, as Aristotle did in his *Meteorology* (4th century BC), with Pseudo-Zonaras (12th century AD) equating the term *Romaíos* with the tribonym *Graikós/Raikós* (Papadopoulou 2015, 190–200; see also Browning 1991, 1221 on Byzantine lexis). As for words beginning with *Byzant-*, Helena Bodin correctly notes their origins in the Western European *semiosphere* or "semiotic space that makes linguistic communication possible" (Bodin 2016, 13):

[T]he name Byzantium (denoting the empire, not the city) is an early modern, Western European coinage, dating back to the middle of the sixteenth century. It can be described as a *retronym*, a kind of neologism, naming an old and lost world in a different way from during its active days, and as an *exonym*, naming an area in a different way from how its inhabitants themselves do – or did. Byzantium as well as Byzantinism are thus designations from within the Western semiosphere, imposed on a historical reality but sometimes taking on imaginary qualities. (Bodin 2016, 17; Bodin's emphasis, brackets mine)

But more important than nomenclatures is the *ideology* of Byzantinism (New Romanism). In the Western European semiosphere (i.e., *outsiders*), Byzantinism "is described as an autocracy based on orthodoxy, and characterised by rigidity and stifling ceremonial" whereas in the Byzantine semiosphere (i.e., *insiders*), the ideology "emphasises continuity rather than fragmentation, and [...] offers a still living tradition with future political and religious aspirations" (Bodin 2016, 18; brackets mine). Bodin's *semiosphere* overlaps, to an extent, with Anthony Kaldellis' *ideology* as "what was taken for granted in the political culture" (Kaldellis 2015, 3). Kaldellis bases his definition of ideology on physicist Jocelyn Bell Burnell's *mental wallpaper* (i.e., "a short-hand for the assumptions we don't get around to articulating") and neuroscientist David Eagleman's "hardwired instincts [...] usually left out of the spotlight of inquiry" (Kaldellis 2015, 3 and 204, endnotes 4–5; brackets mine). For Kaldellis, "[i]deologies are matrices of meaning and normativity" that "are usually implicit rather than explicit" and so "[i]deology must be excavated" for "it will not necessarily be written in letters of gold ten feet tall" (Kaldellis 2015, 4;

brackets mine). Thus, Kaldellis reasons, "norms of the political sphere" must be distinguished from context-specific, attitude-varying Byzantine sources such as "a *topos* of imperial rhetoric, the standards by which historians evaluated emperors' reigns, a legal preface, the slogans chanted in the streets against an emperor by a rioting populace, and a work of moral advice addressed to an emperor" (Kaldellis 2015, 4; Kaldellis' emphasis). But however context-specific and attitude-varying Byzantine texts are, there is, at least, *some* historical evidence of civic wallpapering by Christian Greeks that will appear later in this dissertation illustrating a norm whereby citizens *subscribed*, either willingly or begrudgingly, to the active agents of the Eastern Roman polity's dominant civic paradigm (i.e., *pambasileia* or *monarchy qua monarchy*). For said evidence to concretely show the norm of said wallpapering, it must: 1) exclude Byzantine citizens seeking justice from officials whose authority was designed by, or whose fealty is to, the emperor or his subordinates, 2) exclude Byzantine citizens seeking relief/exemption from tax collections, and 3) exclude Byzantine citizens receiving, or expecting to receive, imperial protection from barbarian attacks. And notwithstanding their history of anti-Roman prejudice, the demonyms *Byzantine(s)* and *Byzantine Greek(s)*, along with the politiconym *Byzantium*, in English are used throughout this dissertation *only* on account of their familiarity to English-speakers just as their equivalents in Greek (i.e., Βυζαντινοί, Βυζαντινοί Έλληνες, Βυζάντιο) are used *only* on account of their familiarity to Greek-speakers (see Aerts and van der Star 1993, 312–313 regarding byzantionyms and their negative connotations in different European languages; see also Theodoropoulos 2021, 26ff on the Byzantine usage of *Byzantine*, i.e., Βυζάντιος, "by the imperial chancery to describe individuals who were culturally 'Eastern Romans'"). But before discussing monarchical republicanism, it is important to first answer the following questions, one ontological and one epistemological: *What is a polity?* and *How do you know a polity when you see one?*

*Polity, Nationhood and Authorial Intent/Sincerity*

With respect to the first question, a *polity* is, according to Robert Denemark's reading of Ferguson and Mansbach's *Polities* (1996, 53), "the ability to mobilize persons and their resources for value satisfaction, generally requiring a degree of institutionalization and hierarchy" (Ferguson et al. 2000, 8 and footnote 12). In Michael Mann's reading of *Polities*, "Ferguson and Mansbach advance the proposition [...] that states are not the only polities, defined as any value-oriented mobilization of persons and resources that is institutionalized and hierarchized" since "[f]amilies, villages, voluntary and business organizations [...] can be considered polities" (Ferguson et al. 2000, 24–25; brackets mine). Mann, of course, correctly distinguishes *polities* from *societies*. Specifically, the author states that he "make[s] a parallel anti-unitary argument [in his two-volume series titled *The Sources of Social Power* (1986 and 1993)] and focuses on societies rather than polities" where "societies have always consisted of multiple, overlapping, intersecting networks of interaction" (Ferguson et al. 2000, 25 and footnote 45; brackets mine). Mann also "distinguish[es] four primary power networks: cultural and ideological, economic, military, and political" (Ferguson et al. 2000, 25 and footnote 45; brackets mine). For the purposes of this dissertation, *society* and *polity* are treated as substantively, though not entirely, synonymous since, according to Speros Vryonis Jr., "political and cultural identity are not identical and interchangeable with an independent state" where "[c]ulture is much broader, exists without the state, and can include the state as part of culture" (Vryonis 1999, 28; brackets mine). Nevertheless, the *polity* is coterminous with the Greek *politeia* defined as *purposefully organized anthropic lifeways* constituting the culmination of realities (i.e., extant and developing social and brute facts) beginning with the *oikos* (οἶκος, "family household") and its direction of development. By *direction of development*, this dissertation refers to either the Platonic *oikos*,

meaning the top-down community *formed around the philosopher-king/queen and his/her family* or the Aristotelian oikos, meaning the bottom-up society *substantiated by families qua families*. The former is a *specialized household* and the latter is a *general household* both of which are based on the reality of *anthropic complementarianism*, the theopneustically organic caretaking shared between men and women, parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, etc. (see Aesop's *Lark Burying Its Father* and Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, 8.12). Interestingly, the Platonic oikos is confirmed by the fact that "[t]he domains of the crown were administered as a group of theoioi oikoi (domus divinae) in the sixth century, euageis oikoi by the eleventh"; even "[t]he Great Palace of the emperors was a cluster of oikoi, each with its own staff" (Magdalino 1984, 93; Magdalino's underlining, brackets mine). Essentially, the Christian Greeks of the Eastern Roman polity, as a subject of inquiry, are, as will be stressed throughout this project, a traditional nation and *not* a modern nation-state with the former similar to Ferdinand Tönnies' *gemeinschaft* (i.e., face-to-face/organic society) and the latter similar to Tönnies' *gesellschaft* (i.e., impersonal/bureaucratic society) (on Tönnies, see Glossary in Harris and Hollis 2001, xli–xliv).

With respect to the question, *How do you know a polity when you see one?*, an answer involves examining the *givens, or Parmenidian stasis, of nationhood* per Herodotus' taxonomy (i.e., ancestry/kinship, culture, language and religion in *Histories* 8.144.2), as well as the *dynamics, or Heraclitan flux, of nationhood* including terms of collective autclassification and criteria of inclusion/exclusion. Said criteria are added because "the family, the tribe, the clan, the city and the nation must alike confront the issue of membership" (Richter 2011, 11). The response is similar to Rogers Brubaker's *commonalities* (i.e., "the sharing of some common attribute") and *connectedness* (i.e., "the relational ties that link people") combined with Max Weber's *Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl* (i.e., "a feeling of belonging together") altogether

producing *groupness* or "the sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded, solidary group" (Brubaker 2004, 47). Brubaker's analysis of *groupness* overlaps with Jeffrey Weeks' delineation of *identity* since both are predicated on the reality of *belonging* innate to the anthropic condition (i.e., Aristotle's *Politics*, 1.1253a: "man is by nature a political animal", "ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον"). Brubaker, however, prefers "alternative terms [that] might stand in for 'identity'" such as *identification*, which is "intrinsic to social life" and "lacks the reifying connotations of 'identity' [...] invit[ing] us to specify the agents that do the identifying" (Brubaker 2004, 41; brackets mine). Still, the overlap is justified as Weeks' *identity* is based on what is *common*:

Identity is about belonging, about what you have in common with some people and what differentiates you from others. At its most basic it gives you a sense of personal location, the stable core to your individuality. But it is also about your social relationships, your complex involvement with others [...] Identities are not neutral. Behind the quest for identity are different, and often conflicting values. By saying who we are, we are also striving to express what we are, what we believe and what we desire. The problem is that these beliefs, needs and desires are often patently in conflict, not only between different communities but within individuals themselves. (Weeks 1990, 88–89; brackets mine)

Getting back to *nationhood*, what is important ultimately is how it was defined by the subject of inquiry: the *Romaíoi-Graikoí* of *Romanía-Graikía*. For example, Emperor Leo VI, reigning from 886 to 911 AD, in his *Taktika* defines nationhood in the Eastern Roman polity, or just its metropole, as a sort of "God-head": Roman, Greek and Christian (the underlying *ousia*, or substrate, being Alexander the Great's international order). According to Theodora Antonopoulos, the *Taktika* "dates from the early 900's" and "is a scholarly work based on Hellenistic military material, as well as from the *Strategikon* of Emperor Maurice" (Antonopoulos 1997, 10; Antonopoulos' emphasis). Furthermore, the work "attempts to adapt earlier military practices to the current state of warfare (especially on the Eastern front)" (Antonopoulos 1997, 10). More

importantly, the emperor is clear with respect to the aforesaid *criteria of inclusion/exclusion*:

Our father, autokrator of the Romans, Basil, now in the divine dwelling, persuaded these peoples to abandon their ancient ways and, having made them Greek [i.e., *γραικώσας*, "Graecized"], subjected them to rulers according to the Roman model, and having graced them with baptism, he liberated them from slavery to their own rulers and trained them to take part in warfare against those nations warring against the Romans. By these means, he very carefully arranged matters for those peoples. As a result, he enabled the Romans to feel relaxed after the frequent uprisings by the Slavs in the past and the many disturbances and wars they had suffered from them in ancient times. (*Taktika*, Constitution 18.95 in Dennis 1984, 471; brackets mine; on *γραικώσας* see Tsaras 1969, 135–157 and Tsougarakis 2006, 30)

The triadic, or at least layered, ontology of the Eastern Roman polity was *not an isolated phenomenon*, either literary or real, as shown in the following passage from *The Chronicle* of Theophanes Confessor, a 10th-century Greek historian, where the Greek and Roman criteria of Byzantineness are explicit and the Christian criterion is implicit:

In this year [Empress] Irene sent Konstaes the sakellarios and Mamalos the primikerios to Charles the king of the Franks to betroth his daughter (who was called Erythro) to her son the Emperor Constantine. After they came to an agreement and exchanged oaths with each other, the eunuch scribe Elissaios was left behind to teach Erythro the *Greeks' letters and customs and to educate her in the customs of the Roman Empire*. (Annus Mundi 6274 in Turtledove 1982, 141; emphasis and brackets mine; "Greek letters and language" in Mango and Scott 1997, 628; the *sakellarios*, "in the early period", was "connected with the care of the imperial bedchamber" per Kazhdan and Magdalino 1991, 1828–1829; the *primikerios* was "the senior member of any group of functionaries" per Kazhdan 1991, 1719–1720)

By *nationhood*, this dissertation refers to: 1) both the civic and non-civic aspects of a community, or *politeia*, exhibited in its own *metropole* (inner territories), and 2) specifically the non-civic dimension of a community, or *koinotēta* (κοινότητα, "society"), either coupled with its own civic dimension exhibited in the *periphery* (outer territories) or overlapping with the civic dimension of a metropole belonging to a different community. The definition, to an extent, overlaps with Barry Cunliffe's description of "core-periphery relationships" where, for instance, "a Greek colony planted on a barbarian shore is a core to its barbarian periphery, but to the world of the

Greek Aegean the colony itself is part of the periphery" (Cunliffe 1988, 4). And despite their distinctions, interactions undoubtedly existed between the politeia's metropole (i.e., *ἄστυ*; *astu*, urban pole of the *polis*) and its periphery (i.e., *χωρίον/κώμη*; *chorion/komē*, rural pole of the *polis*). The polis' poles, *astu* ("city brains of the politeia") and *chorion/komē* ("village guts of the politeia"), embody both the broadness and specificity of the ruler-subject relationship including the causal timespace that said relationship inhabits where the *politeia* exists and operates as an organized body: the totality of political reality or politics as a "wine-dark sea" (see *Iliad's* οἴνοπα πόντον, *Odyssey's* οἴνοπι πόντω and Rutherford-Dyer 1983 for details). All this is what this project terms *primal politicopoiesis* (αρχέγονη ή πρωταρχική πολιτικοποίηση) where the First Cause, or "Prime Mover", of the body-politic is *anthropic complementarianism*, earlier defined as essentially divinely-inspired natural human associations, undergoing an organically determined division-of-labor cascade; the Platonic division-of-labor cascade entails the oikos' direction of development from *astu to chorion/komē* ("brains to guts", "leader to people") whereas the Aristotelian division-of-labor cascade involves the oikos' direction of development from *chorion/komē to astu* ("guts to brains", "people to leader"). Defining primal politicopoiesis, as a rubric that Byzantium falls under, is apropos insofar as it helps to distinguish it from Benjamin de Carvalho's *subjectification* entailing "a process [where the] 'subjects of the king' gradually became the political subjects of the state" or "a gradual process linking people and land more closely to the state" (de Carvalho 2016, 58–59; brackets mine). Primal politicopoiesis, both in principle and in practice, places the *populace as with-under its own champion as domain and domain as champion* (e.g., the philosopher-king *is* the polity and the polity *is* the philosopher-king) whereas *subjectification* puts the *people as with-under its domain as domain* (e.g., the state *is* the state). Byzantium, again, falls under the former category and is *not*, for all intents and

purposes, a modern state meaning a polity sovereign to itself. And if this dissertation's analysis of body-politics is incontrovertibly incorrect, then one can neither dismiss nor deny the importance of the *oikos* not only in ancient Greece (see Small 1998 and Humphreys 1993, Chapter 1), but also in the Christian Greek *oikoumene* (οικουμένη, "world/cosmic household") the groundwork of which was laid by Alexander's *cosmopolis* (κοσμόπολις, "world as city, city as world"; see APPENDIX III for details on Hellenistic kingship).

According to Paul Magdalino, "the oikos – the household with all its dependents and dependencies – was the basic building-block of all Byzantine urban and bureaucratic structures" and "was also the basic unit of ecclesiastical administration" (Magdalino 1984, 92, 94; Magdalino's underlining). This is complemented by Leonora Neville who states that the *oikos* ("nuclear family") was a key part of Byzantine society:

An aristocratic *oikos* and a peasant *oikos* were the same with respect to many of the roles. This means not that Byzantine society was egalitarian but that similar relationships existed at distant levels of the social hierarchy were described with a terminology that emphasized their similarities. [...] Familial households were fundamentally structured around physical kinship, in particular around a nuclear family. The nuclear family emerges as one of the clearest social units visible in Byzantine sources. The head of a household was its owner or *despotes* [δεσπότης]. *Despotes* was a proper form of address for the emperor, but any owner of a thing was its *despotes*. In our fiscal information the head of a household was the *oikodespotes* [οικοδεσπότης], the house-owner. The author of the *Marcian Treatise* saw the countryside as inhabited by *choroikodespotai* [χωροικοδεσπότης], village house-owners/lords, and "simple villagers." [...] The *oikodespotes* was the father of the core family of the household. An ideal father was providential and charitable toward his children and cultivated their character through proper correction. These characteristics are appropriate for other men in positions of leadership. The head of a monastic household was the spiritual father of the brothers. The emperor should govern the empire as a father governs his house. (Neville 2004, 69–70, Neville's emphasis, brackets mine)

Of course, behind every *despotes* was a *despoina* (δέσποινα) or "[t]he wife of a male head of household" (Neville 2004, 70; brackets mine). According to Neville, "[w]omen could be heads of household in their own right as widows" as shown, for example, in the *Cadaster of Thebes*

(Neville 2004, 70; brackets mine). The *Cadaster* is an 11th-century Byzantine text containing "the names of individual taxpayers, the amount of the tax, and cases of tax alleviation" (Kazhdan 1991, 2032; see also Kazhdan 1991, 363 on Byzantine cadasters generally). Moreover, the document "records property tax due from a number of households headed by women" (Neville 2004, 70). But the essential takeaway from Neville's analysis of the *oikos* is that despite the unegalitarian nature of Eastern Roman society, *the emperor must rule his oikos (i.e., the state household) the way a father rules his oikos (i.e., the family household)*. Thus, the Byzantine Greek *oikos* embodies, or at least echoes, an important dimension of Aristotle's *Politics* where men and women, parents and children, and rulers and ruled are different by nature:

And of this we straightway find an indication in connection with the soul; for the soul by nature contains a part that rules and a part that is ruled, to which we assign different virtues, that is, the virtue of the rational and that of the irrational. It is clear then that the case is the same also with the other instances of ruler and ruled. Hence there are by nature various classes of rulers and ruled. For the free rules the slave, the male the female, and the man the child in a different way. [...] Hence it is manifest that all the persons mentioned have a moral virtue of their own, and that the temperance of a woman and that of a man are not the same, nor their courage and justice, as Socrates thought, but the one is the courage of command, and the other that of subordination, and the case is similar with the other virtues. (*Politics*, 1.1260a translated by Rackham 1944; brackets mine)<sup>10</sup>

Because the *polity* is described and depicted through various *mediums* (e.g., books, coins, seals, etc.), it is important to address, though not resolve, issues of authorial sincerity and intent. In his "Republican theory and political dissidence in Ioannes Lydos", Anthony Kaldellis provides his *position on authorial sincerity* with respect to his analysis of John Lydos' 6th-century text titled *On the Magistracies of the Roman State*:

*Sincerity, as well as its opposite, must be demonstrated, not taken for granted.* Scholars sometimes forget that in their rush to uncover the basic principles of what they take to be dominant world-views, which has transformed the rhetorical clichés of panegyric works into unquestioned doctrines. Such clichés do give us insight into how contemporaries conceptualised political relationships but there is no reason to think that they were accepted by everyone, even by the orators themselves. (Kaldellis

2005, 10; emphasis mine)

The *sincerity-insincerity dichotomy* is the wellspring premise-wise from which flows the difference between formulaic rhetoric (*virtuality*) and lived human experiences (*corporeality*). The dichotomy is evident in Kaldellis' justification of his position on authorial sincerity where "degrees of mendacity" exist via Augustine's *Confessions* 6.6.9 and Menandros' *The Imperial Oration* 370.14 where *insincere rhetoric* was admittedly used by the former and advised by the latter for readers to employ (Kaldellis 2005, 10 and footnotes 41–42). But *degrees of mendacity* constitute a specious rationale and an insufficient litmus test for ascertaining the sincerity of any given Byzantine author (not that Byzantine propaganda was nonexistent such as *The Chronicle of Monemvasia*, an authorially anonymous, quasi-historical pseudo-chronicle about the Avaro-Slavic invasions in Greece meant to negotiate the city of Patras' status in the Byzantine church hierarchy; see Curta 2004, 66–69 and Kazhdan 1991, 445 for historical summary; on text's questionable historicity, see Constantelos 1970, Kyriakides 1947, 33–92, and Setton 1950, 513–521 *contra* Charanis 1950). They assume, for instance, that disinformation, or false information *with* the intent to mislead, is coterminous with misinformation, or inaccurate information *without* the intent to deceive (i.e., falsely assuming that *malice* and *ignorance* are identical). All this raises the question posited by Jakov Ljubarskij: "How should a Byzantine text be read?"

(Ljubarskij 2003, 117). For the author, there is no single answer:

[...] it is hardly possible to give any recommendations on how to read Byzantine texts. Different kinds of texts should be read differently and every approach, as I mentioned above, can be justified. But at the same time it is of importance to stress that at least some pieces of Byzantine literature moved beyond the conventions imposed by the formal, rhetorical elements derived from the process of education. They are to be evaluated as artistic works and should be read as multi-dimensional texts with overtones, and these overtones can often be the most significant element of the composition. (Ljubarskij 2003, 125; brackets mine)

If Ljubarskij is correct that Byzantine texts should be read as multi-dimensional artistic works

that justify all reading approaches, then an Aristotelian *en einai* (έν είναι, "as is") *approach is the most useful method to reading and analyzing Byzantine texts* for the purposes of this dissertation.

But what of the *three problems* raised by John Patrick Diggins? Specifically, what of the *problem of ideology* (e.g., "whether ideas are authoritative in that they determine behavior by virtue of obligating it"), the *problem of motivation and causation* (e.g., "treating ideas as either the 'causes' or 'consequences' of behavior"), and the *problem of language* (e.g., "explain 'why' language is used by thinkers who use it") (see Diggins 1984, 350, 358, 363)? The *en einai approach* respects words and deeds as *overlapping realities*, especially words of deeds (narratives of historical events) and deeds of wordsmithing (production of historical narratives):

Ever since Aristotle, the dream of philosophy is to bring words and deeds, thoughts and things, the subjective and the objective, into correspondence one to another. To know meant both to explain behavior and to represent accurately what is outside the mind. [...] Aristotle and other classical thinkers believed that man must act with full knowledge of what he is doing, and for Machiavelli unveiling the causes of men's action was the key to political understanding. (Diggins 1984, 354, 357; brackets mine)

And so this project will *not* attempt to prove the sincerity of Byzantine authorial intent, avoiding Formalism's *intentional fallacy*,<sup>11</sup> and rather place the burden on Kaldellis to prove that the author of any given text is always insincere. And with that said, the following section will address Kaldellis' charge of *monarchical republicanism* made against the traditional view of the Eastern Roman polity. Said address will include a survey of historical events that will *test* the criteria that for Kaldellis justify classifying the Eastern Roman polity as a republican monarchy:

1) "a robust conception of the public interest and public property to which the monarch is subordinated in normative texts", 2) "a conception of a legally or ethnically-defined populace whose material wellbeing forms the sole legitimating factor for the operation of government", 3) "historical instances of popular intervention in the sphere of politics that were accepted by elites as legitimate, indeed often as constitutive of their own power and positions", and 4) "documented

continuity between th[e] [Byzantine] polity and the ancient Roman *res publica*, coupled with awareness of that continuity" (Kaldellis 2021, 489; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine). Now let us turn to the subject of *sovereignty* involving Jean Bodin, Giorgio Agamben's *state of exception* and Jason Franke's *constituent moments* since it serves as a necessary backdrop for later defining and contextualizing *monarchical republicanism*.

## CHAPTER II: ON SOVEREIGNTY

*Why sovereignty?* Because it is what connects, as stated earlier, the questions posited in the introduction condensed as follows: *Who in Romanía-Graikía was sovereign?* By asking who the ultimate arbiter of authority in the Byzantine polity was, one can reasonably ascertain in one's search for an answer what Byzantium was as a type of polity. *For political sovereignty is what determines political agency whereby the former frames, animates and justifies the latter; the presence of political agency alone, whatever its level of organization, says nothing about whether said agency is the first and final overseer of political power.* With that said, the aim of this chapter is to explore sovereignty in Byzantium by examining whether Giorgio Agamben's *state of exception* and Jason Franke's *constituent moments* are apropos and historically applicable to the Eastern Roman polity. Also, this section will cover the *pouvoir constituant*, or constituent power, with Andreas Kalyvas connecting it with the *state of exception* and Renato Cristi criticizing Kalyvas. But before discussing Agamben and Franke, it is first important to define the term *sovereignty*.

In his *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, the 16th-century French political theorist Jean Bodin defined *sovereignty* as the "absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth" with *commonwealth* constituting "a just government, with sovereign power, of several households and of that which they have in common" (Bodin and Franklin 1992, I.VIII, 1). For power to be sovereign, it must exhibit *absolutism* and *perpetuality* where Bodin defined the former as "not to be subject to any law at all" and the latter as "'for the life of him who has the power'" (Bodin and Franklin 1992, I.VIII, 6, 8). Bodin's account is not without some tensions. According to Edward

Andrew, Bodin's *theory of sovereignty* is incongruous with the author's own "insistence that sovereigns should not tax subjects without their consent" (Andrew 2011, 81; brackets mine). Andrew is critical of Julian Franklin's position of there being no inconsistency between Bodin's absolutist theory and the author's "insistence on popular consent to new taxation" since "Bodin's action, as deputy in the Estates General at Blois, in blocking royal proposals for raising taxes 'was devoid of constitutional intentions'" (Andrew 2011, 81). Franklin's position, for Andrew, is untenable given "Bodin's claim that he risked his life at Blois by his opposition to the Crown and, replying to a Genevan critic, that he could not be more public-spirited 'than what I have dared to write—that even kings are not allowed to levy taxes without the fullest consent of the citizens'" (Andrew 2011, 81). But whether or not Bodin was inconsistent, the more absolutist concepts of the *theory of sovereignty* are a key starting point with respect to defining what a sovereign constitutes. And with that said, what does it mean exactly to *be* sovereign? For Bodin, "persons who are sovereign must not be subject in any way to the commands of someone else and must be able to give the law to subjects, and to suppress or repeal disadvantageous laws and replace them with others – which cannot be done by someone who is subject to the laws or to persons having power of command over him" (Bodin and Franklin 1992, I.VIII, 11). From that premise, Bodin reasons that "[t]his is why the law says that the prince is not subject to the law; and in fact the very word 'law' in Latin implies the command of him who has the sovereignty" (Bodin and Franklin 1992, I.VIII, 11; brackets mine). But what *justifies* the simultaneous enmeshment *and* detachment of law and sovereignty? He who is truly sovereign *makes and breaks the rules* though Bodin is correct to note that "[t]he absolute power of princes and of other sovereign lordships [...] does not in any way extend to the laws of God and of nature" (Bodin and Franklin 1992, I.VIII, 10; brackets mine).

At this point, one must ask: *why* Bodin? The *Six Books of the Commonwealth* (*Les Six Livres de la République*) was published in 1576, roughly 123 years *after* Constantinople's fall, with Bodin's historical context being "the growing consolidation of power in the French and other Renaissance monarchies" (Franklin 1991, 299–300). The reason is because Bodin's *theory of sovereignty* offers a "precise definition of supreme authority" along with "its scope, and [...] the functions that it logically entailed" (Franklin 1991, 298, 300; brackets mine). More importantly, said definition emerged from dialogues Bodin had with other scholars on the legal nature of the *merum imperium* ("pure command") such as the 16th-century Italian law scholar Andrea Alciato "who held that the possession of the *merum imperium* by right of office was a corruption of Roman civil law, [and] that every power in the state, other than (abusive) feudal grants, was merely a right of exercise derived by delegation from the prince" (Franklin 1991, 299–300; Franklin's emphasis, brackets mine). Bodin himself, according to Julian H. Franklin, "constantly attempted to reconcile the new idea of royal dominance with the French juridical tradition of which he was a great admirer and connoisseur" (Franklin 1991, 300). *Reconciliation* was what led Bodin to chart the nature of sovereignty setting the stage for its precise definition:

Unlike Alciato and his followers, accordingly, Bodin divided the *merum imperium* into a (minor) part that could be held by magistrates and a (major) part held only by the prince. And by this conservative route he was led, ironically, to a new and theoretically momentous question as to the character of sovereignty. He now sought to determine those powers that could not be held by magistrates, but only exercised, if the prince was to be accounted sovereign. Although this topic had sometimes been touched upon by other jurists of the time, Bodin was to treat the question in a more fundamental and systematic way than anyone before him. He now proceeded to derive the necessary rights, or 'marks', of sovereignty from the concept of supremacy itself. The question that he asked, in other words, was what prerogatives a political authority must hold exclusively if it is not to acknowledge a superior or equal in its territory. (Franklin 1991, 300; Franklin's emphasis)

According to Myron Piper Gilmore, *imperium* "in the Roman constitution [was] the legal word used to describe the assemblage of the highest forms of public power, including both the

jurisdiction and the supreme command" (Gilmore 1967, 20; brackets mine). As for *merum imperium*, Emperor Justinian's *Digest* defines it as "the power of the sword to punish the wicked" based on the *Duties of Quaestor* composed by the 3rd-century Roman jurist Ulpian (*Digest* II.1.3 in Watson 1998, 40; Watson's translation) with said power (or *gladii potestas*), for Milton Himmelfarb, being "interchangeable with *jus gladii*, 'the law/right of [wielding] the sword'" (Himmelfarb 1972; Himmelfarb's emphasis and brackets). Getting back to Bodin, one could argue that his political theory is inapplicable to pre-modern monarchical polities such as Byzantium as it was speaking to the rise of absolutist, or absolutizing, modern states. But whether or not said theory applies to the Eastern Roman polity does not change the validity of the question regarding supreme authority drawn from Bodin's chapter *On Sovereignty*. From that premise, one can then broaden the aforementioned question to include pre-modern political communities provided they possess principles and/or institutions of vertical and/or horizontal power. In other words, the following broad inquiry borne out of Bodin's *theory of sovereignty* is worth asking, historical applicability notwithstanding: who was the ultimate source and overseer of authority, if any, in the New/Eastern Roman polity?

Answers to the above question of Roman sovereignty, be it Old or New, are offered by both the proponents of the *traditional view*, who see the *Roman emperor as sovereign*, and the proponents of the *critical view* seeing *Roman law and popular consensus as sovereign*. An example of the *traditionalist response to the question of sovereignty* is Ronald Syme describing, per Tacitus and Seneca, Augustus and his government along lines of *political arrogation and political autonomy*:

Augustus' relation to the Roman Commonwealth might also be described as organic rather than arbitrary or formal. It was said that he arrogated to himself all the function of Senate, magistrates and laws. Truly—but more penetrating the remark that he entwined himself about the body of the Commonwealth. The new member

reinvigorated the whole and could not have been severed without damage. His rule was personal, if ever rule was, and his position became ever more monarchic. Yet with all this, Augustus was not indispensable—that was the greatest triumph of all. Had he died in the early years of the Principate, his party would have survived, led by Agrippa, or by a group of the marshals. But Augustus lived on, a progressive miracle of duration. As the years passed, he emancipated himself more and more from the control of his earlier partisans; the *nobiles* returned to prominence and the Caesarian party itself was transformed and transcended. A government was created. [...] The Roman State, based firmly on a united Italy and a coherent Empire, was completely renovated, with new institutions, new ideas and even a new literature that was already classical. The doom of Empire had borne heavily on Rome, with threatened ruin. But now the reinvigorated Roman People, robust and cheerful, could bear the burden with pride as well as with security. (Syme 1939, 520–521; Syme's emphasis, brackets mine)

An example of the *critical response to the question of sovereignty* is Anthony Kaldellis framing the Eastern Roman polity along lines of *popular sovereignty*:

Calling Byzantium (or any Roman-style empire) a 'republic' will strike most readers as counterintuitive. In modern times, increasingly since the eighteenth century, monarchies and republics have been viewed as mutually exclusive types of regimes. This has been reinforced by the modern (not Roman) convention of using the labels 'Republic' and 'Empire' to distinguish two phases of Roman history. But *res publica* in Roman usage (*politeia* in Byzantine Greek translation) did not refer to the type of regime that governed the polity. It referred rather to certain underlying aspects of a polity that, among other things, legitimated the use of state power in a context of popular sovereignty. In the eyes of the Romans themselves, what we call 'the Empire' was just another phase of the history of the Roman *res publica*, for the purpose of state power and the theory of popular sovereignty did not necessarily change in the transition from the regime of the consuls to that of the emperors. (Kaldellis 2015, 19–20; Kaldellis' emphasis)

Key themes prefacing the above passage entail *popular consensus* and *legal negotiation* that

Kaldellis finds support for via his quoting from Jill Harries' *Law and Empire in Late Antiquity*:

As Jill Harries put it succinctly about late antiquity:

Emperors were entitled to respond, or not, not only to legal pressures but to social and political pressures as well. This right was in fact essential to the emperor's own legitimacy as a law-giver; he could expect his constitutions to be backed by the consent of society as a whole, the *consensus universorum* . . . The emperors' openness to social change may have made their legislation more responsive to public needs and changing social mores than it would otherwise have been . . . Historically Roman law has always contained a moral dimension, meaning that it was responsive to the social mores of the time, and

it was an accepted part of juristic theory that the application of some laws was heavily dependent on social attitudes. (Kaldellis 2015, 12–13; Kaldellis' emphasis and ellipses)

Kaldellis, concurring with the above excerpt, then writes:

[...] It is a picture such as the one that Harries paints for late antiquity that this book will seek to defend regarding the Byzantine polity, and not only about law but about its very conception and political sphere. Specifically, the polity was conceived by its rulers and subjects as a unified community founded on shared values, and the legitimacy of the regime was based on its solicitude for the values and welfare of its subjects in the Roman 'republican' tradition. [...] This ["moral and political"] framework created reciprocal responsibilities between rulers and subjects, and emperors had to take the pulse of the *politeia* before making decisions. The law itself fell into this arena of negotiation. [...] The law [...] was subject to the prevailing consensus about the common good. (Kaldellis 2015, 13–14; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine)

Harries does state that her work "attempt[s] to provide an alternative reading of late Roman Law" where "to discuss Roman Law in terms of 'obedience' or the reverse is a misconception of what law is for" (Harries 1999, 4; brackets mine). But if Late Roman imperial legislation is, as Harries asserts, *heterogeneous in terms of authorship*, then said legislation neither proves nor serves as a useful preface for popular sovereignty in Late Roman and later Byzantine politics:

Late imperial law must be understood as a form of hybrid creation. Emperors themselves did not have a legal training or, indeed, in some cases, much education of any kind. *They had the right to decide what the law was*. On the other hand, many drafters of imperial laws, known from the mid-fourth century on as quaestors, were in fact men with a good understanding of law, who had read some juristic writings and had some understanding of legal principle. When, therefore, emperors deferred to the advice available, it became possible for the legal tradition reflected in the 'opinions of the ancients' to be merged discreetly with the apparent dirigisme of late imperial legislation. *Not that this was always the case*. (Harries 1999, 2; emphasis mine)

Harries' views aside, if Roman law, as the codified manifestation of the Roman *omnis populus* undergirding the Roman *res publica*, informs the critical view of the Eastern Roman polity, then one can infer that *law* itself is the least common denominator connecting the Roman *res publica*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *general will* and the Byzantine *politeia*. But what exactly does *law* mean? Rousseau offers the following definition:

But when the entire populace enacts a statute concerning the entire populace, it considers only itself, and if in that case a relationship is formed, it is between the entire object seen from one perspective and the entire object seen from another, without any division of the whole. Then the subject matter about which a statute is enacted is general like the will that enacts it. It is this act that I call a law. (*On the Social Contract*, II.6 in Cress and Wooton 2011, 179)

So if law is "the entire populace enact[ing] a statute concerning the entire populace", then is such a definition applicable to the Eastern Roman polity? One would have to answer the question in the negative given the survey of historical events covered in the next chapter along with Emperor Comnenus' edict forbidding the popular seizure of shipwrecked property altogether illustrating the *historical salience of emperorship*. The aforesaid salience accords, to an extent, with Bodin's view of the Roman Principate:

the early Roman emperors were not sovereign, but only chiefs and first citizens, who were called *principes*. This form of state, in appearance aristocratic but monarchical in practice, was called a *principatus*. The emperor's [only] prerogative was to be the first in dignity, honor, and precedence, although in fact the majority of emperors were tyrants. Indeed, one day, when some foreign kings were arguing about their nobility and grandeur at his table, Caligula quoted the verse from Homer, *Ouk agathon hē polukoironiē eis koiranos estō basileus* – that is to say, "It is not expedient to have many rulers, and there is need for but one king," and he was not very far, says Suetonius, from taking the diadem and changing the form of state, which was a principate, into a kingdom. Now it is clear that in a principate, the captain or prince is not sovereign, any more than is the duke at Venice, as we shall explain in due course. But even when one acknowledges that the emperors had effectively usurped sovereignty, and they surely had, it is no surprise that Trajan, who was one of the best princes that ever existed in the world, swore to keep the laws, even though he was exempt in his capacity as prince. It was to provide his subjects with an example of scrupulous observance. And previous to him no emperor had ever done this. (Bodin and Franklin 1992, 25; Bodin's emphasis, Franklin's brackets)

If Bodin is correct, then Trajan's law-keeping oath weakens the claim that the Roman, and later Byzantine, polity was a monarchical republic since the oath was driven by Trajan's *own will as a Roman prince* and not by Roman law itself or even the *general will* of the Roman citizenry. Said claim is further weakened by Trajan's later successor, Antoninus Caracalla, who persecuted the Aristotelians (or Peripatetics) according to the Greek historian Dio Cassius.<sup>12</sup> And even if one

concedes that the first Roman emperors were not sovereign *ab initio*, their arrogation of power in the Roman body-politic set the stage for later Roman emperors to *become* sovereign. But said arrogation, as a self-sovereignizing process, began with Augustus according to Syme, which means that Caligula either later magnified Augustus' legacy or merely affirmed it. Still, it is necessary to ascertain whether Byzantine citizens, as a whole, were sovereign by passing them first through the lens of Agamben's *state of exception*, justified by Kaldellis' use of Agamben (see Kaldellis 2015, 85–87), and second through the lens of Franke's *constituent moments*, justified by its pertinence to the subject of popular sovereignty.

### State of Exception

The *state of exception* is a defining feature of Giorgio Agamben's *paradox of sovereignty* where "the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order" meaning that "the sovereign, having the legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law" (Agamben 1998, 15). Said paradox, as accurately noted by Agamben, has a precedent in the Greek poetry of Pindar specifically *Fragment 169*:

Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς  
θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων  
ἄγει δικαῖᾶν τὸ βιαιότατον  
ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρὶ. τεκμαίρομαι  
ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος.  
(Kyriakou 2002, 195; see also Ostwald 1965, 111,  
Lloyd-Jones 1972, 46, and Pavese 1993, 145–153)

The *nomos*, sovereign of all,  
Of mortals and immortals,  
Leads with the strongest hand,  
Justifying the most violent.  
I judge this from the works of Hercules.  
(Agamben 1998, 30; Agamben's emphasis)

According to Kaldellis, the Roman "monarchy had its roots in the chaos of the Republic and the

monarch was a way to save the polity from its own systemic flaws" (Kaldellis 2015, 85). From that point of departure, the author argues that "[t]he power of the emperor was not the only state of exception in the polity" since "the rest of the polity could suspend its own lawful participation and take matters into its own hands against the emperors [...] given that the polity was understood as the property of the people" (Kaldellis 2015, 86; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine). Specifically, Kaldellis states that "[t]he *populus* could act outside that law (and any other law) when it so chose, because it ultimately was the source of all authority in the Byzantine political sphere"; "[t]he authority of the people could trump the legal enactments of the emperors" and even "rebels too could appeal to the higher law of the common good of the republic when they set aside the laws of treason and their own oaths of loyalty" (Kaldellis 2015, 88; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine). But how are the people sovereign if there were *multiple* holders of state-of-exception powers in the Byzantine body-politic? If the people could operate alegally against the emperor's legality, then how can they be sovereign if the emperor can do the same thing against the people's legality? And with respect to Giorgio Agamben's delineation of the *state of exception* as a political paradigm, Kaldellis asserts the following:

Giorgio Agamben has written a provocative treatise on "the state of exception," the emergency suspension of the normal operation of law in order to meet a crisis. While he theorizes this as a feature of modern liberal regimes that is tending to become the rule rather than the exception, he discusses also its Roman precedents, including, though only tangentially, the person of the emperor. He quotes previous theorists according to whom the state of exception constitutes a "point of imbalance between public law and political fact . . . the intersection of the legal and the political," and concludes that it "appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal form . . . a no-man's-land between public law and political fact." This state of exception, a form of which was the position of the Roman emperor, "is not a special kind of law (like the law of war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law's threshold or limit concept." (Kaldellis 2015, 85–86)

Agamben indeed quotes other theorists such as Carl Schmitt's *Politische Theologie* (i.e., Schmitt's definition of the *state of exception*: "[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception"<sup>13</sup>),

François Saint-Bonnett's *L'état d'exception*, and Alessandro Fontana's *Du droit de résistance au devoir d'insurrection* (Agamben 2005, 1; Schmitt 2005, 1; brackets mine). Yet, the *state of exception* is a political paradigm with ancient and modern variants that share, at best, a limited overlap and, at worst, complete and utter mutual exclusivity. Starting with the pre-modern *state of exception* (*Ausnahmezustand* in German), Agamben states that it entails the ancient Roman *iustitium* produced via a *senatus consultum ultimum*:

There is an institution of Roman law that can in some ways be considered the archetype of the modern *Ausnahmezustand* [...]: the *iustitium*. [...] Upon learning of a situation that endangered the Republic, the Senate would issue a *senatus consultum ultimum* [final decree of the Senate] by which it called upon the consuls (or those in Rome who acted in their stead: *interrex* or proconsuls) and, in some cases, the praetor and the tribunes of the people, and even, in extreme cases, all citizens, to take whatever measures they considered necessary for the salvation of the state (*rem publicam defendant, operamque dent ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat* [Let them defend the state, and see to it that no harm come to the state]). At the base of this *senatus consultum* was a decree declaring a *tumultus* (that is, an emergency situation in Rome resulting from a foreign war, insurrection, or civil war), which usually led to the proclamation of a *iustitium* (*iustitium edicere* or *indicere* [to proclaim or declare a *iustitium*]). (Agamben 2005, 42; Agamben's emphasis and brackets)

The Latin word *iustitium* "literally means 'standstill' or 'suspension of the law'" that "imply[s] [...] a suspension not simply of the administration of justice but of the law as such" and so "[t]he meaning of this paradoxical legal institution [...] consists solely in the production of a juridical void" (Agamben 2005, 41–42; brackets mine). Agamben provides an example from *Philippics* 5.12 where Cicero, "[c]onfronted with the threat of Marcus Antonius [...] leading an army toward Rome, [...] addresses the [Roman] Senate" by stating: "I assert that it is necessary to declare a state of *tumultus*, proclaim a *iustitium*, and don the cloaks" (Agamben 2005, 45; Agamben's emphasis, brackets mine).<sup>14</sup> Essentially, Agamben synthesizes "the results of [his] genealogical investigation of the *iustitium*" whereby:

- "The state of exception is not a dictatorship (whether constitutional or unconstitutional,

commissarial or sovereign) but a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations [...] are deactivated",

- "This space devoid of law seems [...] to be so essential to the juridical order that it must seek in every way to assure itself a relation with it, as if in order to ground itself the juridical order necessarily had to maintain itself in relation with an anomie",
- "[A]cts committed during the *iustitium* [...] are neither transgressive, executive, nor legislative, they seem to be situated in an absolute non-place with respect to the law",
- As a concept, the force-of-law (Agamben has an "X" strikethrough over the word "law") "is a response to th[e] undefinability and th[e] non-place" that is the *iustitium* operating "as if the suspension of law freed a force or a mystical element, a sort of legal *mana* [...], that both the ruling power and its adversaries, the constituted power as well as the constituent power, seek to appropriate" (Agamben 2005, 50–51; Agamben's emphasis, brackets mine).

According to Agamben, the pre-modern version of the *state of exception* as a political paradigm has antecedents in ancient Rome involving the principle of *necessitas legem non habet* as expressed in Gratian's *Decretum*:

The principle according to which *necessitas legem non habet* was formulated in Gratian's *Decretum*. It appears there two times: first in the gloss and then in the text. The gloss (which refers to a passage in which Gratian limits himself to stating generically that "many things are done against the rule out of necessity or for whatever other cause" [*pars I. dist. 48*]) appears to attribute to necessity the power to render the illicit licit (*Si propter necessitatem aliquid fit, illud licite fit: quia quod non est licitum in lege, necessitas facit licitum. Item necessitas legem non habet* [If something is done out of necessity, it is done licitly, since what is not licit in law necessity makes licit. Likewise necessity has no law]). But the sense in which this should be taken is made clearer by a later passage in Gratian's text concerning the celebration of the mass (*pars III. dist. 1. c. 11*). After having stated that the sacrifice must be offered on the altar or in a consecrated place, Gratian adds, "It is preferable not to sing or listen to the mass than to celebrate it in places where it should not be celebrated, unless it happens because of a supreme necessity, for necessity has no

law" (*nisi pro summa necessitate contingat, quoniam necessitas legem non habet*). More than rendering the illicit licit, necessity acts here to justify a single, specific case of transgression by means of an exception. (Agamben 2005, 24; Agamben's emphasis and brackets)

The main takeaway from the above passage is that law and necessity for Gratian are *realities constituting separate domains of anthropic life*. Interestingly, the separateness of law and necessity in the *Decretum* broadly echoes Thucydides' treatment of politics as existing and operating within the *area between the distinct realms of need and justice* as illustrated in the dialogue between the need-driven Athenians and the justice-seeking Melians (see *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 5.89.1 and Gustafson 2000, 201). So here the Greco-Roman distinction between law and necessity serves as a preface towards demonstrating that Kaldellis' reading of Agamben's *State of Exception* neglects a key nuance in the publication's analysis of the *state of exception* where *necessity* is not at the core of any pre-modern juridical order. The nuance begins with Agamben delineating the meaning(s) of the Latin phrase *necessitas legem non habet*:

A recurrent opinion posits the concept of necessity as the foundation of the state of exception. According to a tenaciously repeated Latin adage (a history of the *adagia*'s strategic function in legal literature has yet to be written), *necessitas legem non habet*, "necessity has no law," which is interpreted in two opposing ways: "necessity does not recognize any law" and "necessity creates its own law" (*nécessité fait loi*). In both cases, the theory of the state of exception is wholly reduced to the theory of the *status necessitatis*, so that a judgment concerning the existence of the latter resolves the question concerning the legitimacy of the former. (Agamben 2005, 24; Agamben's emphasis)

Now in addressing the aforesaid "recurrent opinion", Agamben quotes the *Summa Theologica* of Saint Thomas Aquinas:

If observing the letter of the law does not entail an immediate danger that must be dealt with at once, it is not in the power of any man to interpret what is of use or of harm to the city; this can be done only by the sovereign who, in a case of this sort, has the authority to grant dispensations from the law. If there is, however, a sudden danger, regarding which there is no time for recourse to a higher authority, the very necessity carries a dispensation with it, for necessity is not subject to the law [*ipsa necessitas dispensationem habet annexam, quia necessitas non subditur legi*].

(Agamben 2005, 25; Agamben's emphasis and brackets)

For Agamben, Aquinas illustrates that "the theory of necessity is none other than a theory of the exception (*dispensatio*) by virtue of which a particular case is released from the obligation to observe the law" (Agamben 2005, 25; Agamben's emphasis). Essentially, "[n]ecessity is *not a source of law, nor does it properly suspend the law; it merely releases a particular case from the literal application of the norm*" (Agamben 2005, 25; brackets and emphasis mine). More importantly, Aquinas states that "the authority to grant dispensations from the law" is exclusively "done [...] by the sovereign" meaning that the *state of exception* as a paradigm rests in the hands of a polity's monarch and not a polity's populace (sovereign or otherwise). Now as for the modern variant of the *state of exception*, Agamben states the following:

It is only with the moderns that the state of necessity tends to be included within the juridical order and to appear as a true and proper "state" of the law. The principle according to which necessity defines a unique situation in which the law loses its *vis obligandi* (this is the sense of the adage *necessitas legem non habet*) is reversed, becoming the principle according to which necessity constitutes, so to speak, the ultimate ground and very source of the law. This is true not only for those writers who sought in this way to justify the national interests of one state against another (as in the formula *Not kennt kein Gebot* [necessity knows no law], used by the Prussian Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and taken up again in Josef Kohler's book of that title [1915]), but also for those jurists, from Jellinek to Duguit, who see necessity as the foundation of the validity of decrees having force of law issued by the executive in his state of exception. (Agamben 2005, 26; Agamben's emphasis and brackets)

So given the above passage, the difference between the ancient and modern versions of the *state of exception* is that the former treats *necessity as outside of the law* whereas the latter treats *necessity as the basis of law*. In fact, the modern *state of exception* is historically based on the *state of siege* from the French Revolution:

The institution of the state of siege has its origin in the French Constituent Assembly's decree of July 8, 1791, which distinguished among *état de paix*, in which military authority and civil authority each acts in its own sphere; *état de guerre*, in which civil authority must act in concert with military authority; and *état de siège*, in which "all the functions entrusted to the civil authority for maintaining order and

internal policing pass to the military commander, who exercises them under his exclusive responsibility" (ibid.). [...] In any case, it is important not to forget that the modern state of exception is a creation of the democratic-revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one. The idea of a suspension of the constitution was introduced for the first time in the constitution of 22 Frimaire Year 8, Article 92 of which reads, "In the case of armed revolt or disturbances that would threaten the security of the State, the law can, in the places and for the time that it determines, suspend the rule of the constitution. In such cases, this suspension can be provisionally declared by a decree of the government if the legislative body is in recess, provided that this body be convened as soon as possible by an article of the same decree." The city or region in question was declared *hors la constitution*. Although the paradigm is, on the one hand (in the state of siege) the extension of the military authority's wartime powers into the civil sphere, and on the other a suspension of the constitution (or of those constitutional norms that protect individual liberties), in time the two models end up merging into a single juridical phenomenon that we call the *state of exception*." (Agamben 2005, 5; Agamben's emphasis, brackets mine)

The main takeaway from the above passage is that "*the modern state of exception is a creation of the democratic-revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one*" (Agamben 2005, 5; emphasis mine). So the Eastern Roman populace rebelling against and deposing Emperor Michael V in 1042 AD (see Kaldellis 2015, 90–94) does not mean that it embodied a *state of exception* derived from popular sovereignty. The reason is because the concrete weaknesses, policy-related or not, of any Byzantine emperor neither extended to nor suspended nor nullified the divinity of emperorship; the *empsychos nomos* ("living law") of kingship endured/remained even if a monarch in Byzantium was brutally replaced by another (see Kantorowicz 2016, 42–47 on the corporeal and divine bodies of the Christian monarch). So the argument that the Byzantine populace operated "outside th[e] law (and any other law) *when it so chose*" (Kaldellis 2015, 88; brackets and emphasis mine) is, truth-value aside, false in terms of truth-conditions; by *truth-conditions*, I mean that for the aforementioned argument to be true, it requires the imposition of modern state-of-exceptionalism, or the imposition of any modern legal framework, onto the *demos* of a pre-modern monarchical power-matrix (thus rendering the argument *anachronistic*).<sup>15</sup>

Is there, however, any evidence illustrating that the *state of exception* was held in the hands of

the Eastern Roman monarch? Bodin provides an example from Byzantine history in support of his conclusionary position on the relationship between tyrannicide, ordinances and sovereign succession:

To conclude this question, then, the good ordinances and worthy acts of a tyrant who has been killed should not be repealed. It is thus a great mistake on the part of princes to repeal all the acts of tyrant-predecessors. But it is an even worse mistake to give rewards to those who killed a tyrant and thereby smoothed the successors' path to sovereignty. For the lives of the successors will never be secure unless they punish the assassins as Emperor Severus very wisely did in putting to death all of those who had a part in the murder of Emperor Pertinax. This, according to Herodian, was the reason why no one dared to make an attempt upon his life. The emperor Vitellius presented Emperor Otho with signed requests for a reward for their disloyalty. *And Theophilus, the emperor at Constantinople, summoned all of those who had made his father emperor after they had killed Leo the Armenian so that he could reward them for so great a deed. But when they came they were executed, along with many others who had not been involved.* (Bodin and Franklin 1992, 124; emphasis mine)

The use of execution by Byzantine emperors to secure their own sovereign authority raises a broader question: how was Byzantine law, its source notwithstanding, enforced? The question is asked to determine whether or not Agamben's *state of exception*, be it ancient or modern, even applies to Byzantine legal culture and judicial norms. An answer is offered by Rosemary Morris' "Dispute settlement in the Byzantine provinces in the tenth century":

The emperor was *fons legum* [i.e., source of law]; the law books provided not only texts of imperial edicts (the Novels) which had the force of law, but also the accumulated wisdom of the Roman state since its foundation. [...] By the side of this mountain of legal material stood the machinery to enforce it. The administrative organs of the Byzantine state were, again, directly descended from Roman prototypes. Law enforcement remained, in the first instance, the prerogative of city or provincial officials, though the emperor stood as the final court of appeal. (Morris 2003, 126; Morris' emphasis, brackets mine)

If the above passage is accurate, then what were the Roman forerunners of Byzantine law enforcement? Christopher J. Fuhrmann provides an answer quoting from, and building on, Ramsay MacMullen's *Enemies of the Roman Order*:

The Romans' approach to policing and public order, in the words of one scholar [i.e., Ramsay MacMullen], was 'extremely mixed and hard to describe.' Variety is the keyword. A wide spectrum of civilian and military groups policed the Roman Empire, from the municipal slave serving as prison guard to the praetorian guardsman outposted to a north African station. (Fuhrmann 2012, 7; see also MacMullen 1975, 164; brackets mine)

Critical of the *self-help model* (i.e., "noninstitutional means of conflict resolution and social control"), Fuhrmann's "fundamental argument [...] is that the self-help model often fails to fit the imperial-era evidence and that state policing expanded in the first three centuries AD" (Fuhrmann 2012, 7–8; brackets mine). Moreover, "[t]he expansion of policing occurred as a result of an accretion of the state's ad hoc responses to security needs in Rome, Italy, and the provinces" (Fuhrmann 2012, 7–8; brackets mine). Later, Fuhrmann states "that civilian policing by provincial communities is marked by variety and, in many areas, sparseness" where "[m]ost of Western Europe [...] seems to have had no regular, standing civilian police institutions in Roman times" whereas "Egypt, by contrast, had a daunting array of police officials" (Fuhrmann 2012, 9; brackets mine; see also Tovar 2001 on Roman/Byzantine policing in Egypt). Yet even with the expansion of Roman state policing (especially in the eastern provinces), Byzantine law enforcement as a prerogative of Byzantine provincial and/or urban agents does not mean that said prerogative was always exercised. This is evident not only in Eastern Roman officials rebelling against their own emperors, as will be shown in the next chapter's historical survey, but also evident in Byzantine law itself. And speaking of *Byzantine law*, David Wagschal offers a definition via his synoptic analysis of Dieter Simon's *Rechtsfindung am byzantinischen Reichsgericht (Rulings of the Byzantine Imperial Court)*:

In effect—although these are not quite Simon's words—Byzantine law may be understood as functioning as a grand literary enterprise, focused on justice, and with laws constituting one (and only one) potential pool of literary tools for constructing and effecting justice. Other tools can also be employed, including any type of reasoned argument, a moral precept, or a citation from classical authors. Ultimately,

as Simon puts it, one never so much argues 'from' the law as 'with' the laws. [...] Simon notes that laws nevertheless remained important in this [Byzantine] world, and he includes many examples of quite sophisticated technical rule arguing and application. The continued high status of laws, he suggests, may be explained by *the fact that laws remain closely connected to the authority and person of the semi-divine emperor*. Indeed, Simon observes, *every Byzantine hearing could be considered an extension of the emperor's personal jurisdiction*. This, however, tended to heighten the degree of equity in the system, as *the emperor's decision is beyond rational critique or the demand for juridical consistency—it is always a quasi-divine statement in the realm of the Just and the Good*. (Wagschal 2015, 7–8; emphasis and brackets mine)

The personal connection between the Byzantine throne and Byzantine law renders the latter legally inconsistent despite the former being a constant staple of authority (e.g., emperors undoing prior imperial edicts). And so Agamben's *state of exception*, be it ancient or modern, is essentially inapplicable to Byzantine law given that its prerequisite is *juridical consistency* (i.e., tradition of legal precedent). But to be fair, the idea of Christian Greek popular sovereignty (with the potential for juridical consistency) does appear, at least among English intellectual circles, centuries *after* the geopolitical dissolution of the Eastern Roman polity (i.e., Fall of Constantinople on May 29th, 1453 with the subsequent Ottoman conquest of the Trebizondian Empire in 1461). In his *Two Treatises on Government* (1689), John Locke notes the Christian Greeks under Ottoman rule in his discussion of the political principle of *popular consent*:

Who doubts but the Grecian Christians descendants of the ancient possessors of that Country may justly cast off the Turkish yoke which they have so long groaned under when ever they have a power to do it? For no Government can have a right to obedience from a people who have not freely consented to it: which they can never be supposed to do, till either they are put in a full state of Liberty to chuse their Government and Governors, or at least till they have such standing Laws, to which they have by themselves or their Representatives, given their free consent, and also till they are allowed their due property, which is so to be Proprietors of what they have, that no body can take away any part of it without their own consent, without which, Men under any Government are not in the state of Free-men, but are direct Slaves under the Force of War. (Locke 1988, 394: *The Second Treatise*, 192)

Given the above passage, the issue at this point is not about the perennality of Greek nationhood,

which Locke correctly does not dispute. The issue rather is whether or not said nationhood exhibited a form of political self-corporealization in the Eastern Roman polity similar to Jason Franke's *constituent moments* whenever its popular agents congregated and/or rebelled.

### Constituent Moments

What exactly is a *constituent moment*? According to Jason Franke, *constituent moments* are "when the underauthorized — imposters, radicals, self-created entities — seize the mantle of authorization, changing the inherent rules of authorization in the process" (Franke 2010, 8). In other words, "constituent moments dwell in a space where there is enacted felicity that nonetheless breaks from the conventions of authorized context — a felicitous infelicity" where *felicity* for Frank "invokes J. L. Austin's theory of the performative utterance" (Franke 2010, 8). Also, "[c]onstituent moments invent a new political space and make apparent a people that are productively never at one with themselves" meaning that they "enact a political power that transcends the state's legal organization" but "enact their claims wholly on the democratic authority of the people themselves: out of these enactments a new democratic subject emerges" (Franke 2010, 8; brackets mine). Although Franke focuses on post-revolutionary America, his concept of *constituent moments* is a useful metric in ascertaining the degree of political self-corporeality (i.e., *democraticness*, *republicanness*) of Byzantine popular agents.

The *justification* for using Franke's *constituent moments* as a metric of democraticness is Jean Bodin's 16th-century political theory (i.e., *theory of sovereignty*). According to Richard Tuck, Bodin is "the first person to insist on the importance of a distinction" between government and sovereignty "writing in the 1560s and 1570s" (Tuck 2015, 9). Specifically, "[t]he distinction made its first appearance in chapter 6 of [Bodin's] *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* of 1566, a long chapter devoted to the *status Rerumpublicarum*" that, according to Tuck, "is

structured as a fairly methodical and radical critique of Aristotle's *Politics* Books III to VIII" (Tuck 2015, 10; Tuck's emphasis, brackets mine). For Bodin, the issue, according to Tuck, "was not that Aristotle had no concept of sovereignty, but that he was not clear about what it meant to be 'dominant' in a city" (Tuck 2015, 12–13). In the sixth chapter of the *Methodus*, Bodin acknowledges Aristotle's *Politics* IV.14 involving, as correctly asserted by Tuck, the "three 'elements' (μόρια) in any constitution" (i.e., tripartite body-politic: *deliberational, magisterial, judicial*) (Tuck 2015, 13). However, Bodin himself states that "[Aristotle] nowhere defines *summum imperium*, which he himself calls κύριον πολίτευμα and κυρίαν ἀρχή, and in which the *Reipublicae status* consists" (Tuck 2015, 13; Tuck's emphasis and brackets). But whether or not Aristotle failed to define what is *sovereign* (or *kyrion*), Bodin's difference "between the terms *summum imperium* ["greatest control"] and *administratio* ["management"] would henceforward remain the standard way of describing the distinction between the 'sovereign' and the 'government' in the Latin texts of Renaissance and post-Renaissance Europe" (Tuck 2015, 12; Tuck's emphasis, brackets mine). Although the *Methodus* was developed *after* the Fall of Constantinople in 1453, its emphasizing the difference between *government* and *sovereignty* justifiably raises that important question when analyzing any polity: *Whose power undergirds and oversees the polity?* Andreas Kalyvas and Renato Cristi, both analyzing Bodin and Schmitt, offer different answers with the former subscribing to an alternative definition of sovereignty that connects, to an extent via Jon Elster's delineation of the "[exceptional] circumstances that induce constitution-making" (see Kalyvas 2005, 229 and Elster 1995, 370ff; brackets mine), the *pouvoir constituant* with the *state of exception* whereas the latter subscribes to a holistic approach to sovereignty that finds Kalyvas' connection both historically and theoretically untenable. Broadly speaking, the Kalyvas-Cristi dialogue overlaps with the Kaldellis-Stouraitis

dialogue previously covered. On the one hand, Kalyvas and Kaldellis subscribe to "heretical" views about sovereignty where supreme power is inherently and ultimately *horizontal* whereas Cristi and Stouraitis, on the other hand, subscribe to "orthodox" views regarding sovereignty where supreme power is inherently and ultimately *vertical*. But what *is* constituent power?

### Constituent Power

In his *Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power*, Andreas Kalyvas "seek[s] to recover" an "alternative conceptualization of the sovereign as constituent power" whereby *sovereignty* exists "not as the ultimate coercive power of command but instead as the power to found, to posit, to constitute, that is, as a constituting power" (Kalyvas 2005, 225; brackets mine). For Kalyvas, the traditional conception of sovereignty entails *supreme command of a supreme leader* "born on the battlefields of the Roman imperial armies" that "survived the Middle Ages as the Kaiser of the Holy Roman Empire" and "transmitted to modernity through Bodin's legacy" (i.e., "Bodin's absolutist theory of sovereignty") (Kalyvas 2005, 225). The alternative conception of sovereignty involving *constituent power*, however, has the following essential characteristics: 1) the "positing aspect" where "the sovereign is the one who makes the constitution and establishes a new political and legal order" meaning that "the sovereign is the constituent subject" who "determines the constitutional form, the juridical and political identity, and the governmental structure of a community in its entirety", and 2) the constituent sovereign's "tense and ambivalent relation to the constitutional order it founds" where said "sovereign moves uneasily inside and outside the constitution, escaping, sometimes resisting its total absorption by the instituted reality" (Kalyvas 2005, 226–227). As for the *state of exception*, Kalyvas offers two reasons for connecting it to constituent power: 1) "the exception is the condition of possibility of sovereignty, not its essence" where "at the moment of an organic crisis [...], where the closure of

the social explodes to bring about a displacement among its different structural levels, including the legal system, that there is the possibility for a radical change in the political and juridical organization of society" and 2) "the failure and collapse of the previous regime" (Kalyvas 2005, 228–229; brackets mine). Kalyvas bases his position on "constituent power demand[ing] that *those who are subject to a constitutional order co-institute it*" on his reading of Schmitt's *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* where the text states that "[i]t belongs to the essence of democracy that every and all decisions which are taken, are only valid for those who themselves decide" (Kalyvas 2005, 238 and footnote 90; Kalyvas' emphasis, brackets mine). It is Kalyvas' reading of Schmittian political thought that Renato Cristi correctly treats as a *misreading*.

In his work titled *Schmitt's Lesson: Constituent Power, Sovereignty and the Monarchical Principle*, Renato Cristi criticizes Andreas Kalyvas' analysis of Schmitt's political thought by addressing the fact that Kalyvas "does not take into account that for Schmitt the people is not the only subject of constituent power" where the *monarchische Prinzip*, or monarchical principle, "can also claim that role" (Cristi 2008, 17). The criticism is evident in Cristi's statement about Kalyvas' reading of Schmitt's *Constitutional Theory*: "It would be risky to think that Kalyvas interprets that text as a confession of democratic faith on the part of Schmitt" (Cristi 2008, 18–19: "Sería aventurado pensar que Kalyvas interpreta ese texto como una confesión de fe democrática por parte de Schmitt."; brackets mine, translation mine). For Cristi, Kalyvas incorrectly assumes Schmitt's *constituent power* exclusively references the people's constitution-making powers when in reality it refers to the constitution-making powers of *the prince and the people* (Cristi 2008, 19). Cristi is correct given the following passage where Schmitt discusses the democratic and dynastic types of political legitimacy:

Two types of legitimacy, dynastic and democratic, may be distinguished historically. These types of legitimacy, in turn, correspond to both subjects of the constitution-

making power, prince and people, which matter historically. Where the idea of *authority* is predominant, the king's constitution-making power will be recognized; where the democratic idea of the *maiestas populi* prevails, the constitution's validity rests on the people's will. So one can speak of constitutional legitimacy only in historical terms and under the perspective that distinguishes among dynastic and democratic legitimacy. (Schmitt and Seitzer 2008, 9.1; Schmitt and Seitzer's emphasis)

The above passage complements Cristi's accurate assertions where "[a]ccording to Schmitt, whoever has the ability to violate, and hence relativize, the legal order is the sovereign" and that "[a]bsolute government, either monarchical or democratic, presupposes a sovereign prince, or a sovereign people, who themselves stand, *legibus solutus* [i.e., unbound by law], above legality" (Cristi 2008, 24: "Según Schmitt, quienquiera tenga la facultad de violar, y por tanto relativizar, el orden legal es el soberano. Gobierno absoluto, ya sea monárquico o democrático, implica un príncipe soberano, o un pueblo soberano, que se posicionan, *legibus solutus*, por sobre la legalidad."; brackets and translation mine). But even though there are dynastic and democratic forms of political legitimacy, only the former (i.e., the prince) historically possessed *state of exception* powers for Schmitt:

When in the interest of the political existence of the whole such statutory violations and measures are used, the superiority of the existential element over the merely normative one reveals itself. Whoever is authorized to take such actions and is capable of doing so, acts in a sovereign manner. Since the sixteenth century, therefore, the question regarding sovereignty and "absolutism," considered in legal history terms, involved a statutory rupture in the existing legitimate order. The prince was 'legibus solutus.' In other words, according to prevailing conditions and without being hindered by limitations of valid laws and contracts, he was authorized and in a position to undertake the necessary measures in the interest of political existence. [...] The *lawmaker* as legislator can only establish statutes, not violate them. The question did not involve lawmaking, but rather sovereignty, or the existential superiority over the norm. (Schmitt and Seitzer 2008, §11.II.2c on page 154; Schmitt and Seitzer's emphasis, brackets mine)

The above assessment of dynastic sovereignty, including its powers of exception, is consistent with Schmitt's second definition of *constitution* as "the concrete type of supremacy and subordination because there is no social reality no order without supremacy and subordination"

(Schmitt and Seitzer 2008, §1.I.2 on page 60). And although Schmitt defines "the constitution of the *state*" as "the political unity of the people", it does not *ipso facto* mean, *contra* Kalyvas, that only the *demos* is sovereign (Schmitt and Seitzer 2008, §1.[3] on page 59; Schmitt and Seitzer's emphasis). That "the state *is* a constitution" means that "[i]t *is* a monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, council republic, and not *have* merely a monarchical or other type of constitution" for "[t]he constitution is a '*form of forms*,' forma formarum" (Schmitt and Seitzer 2008, §1.I.2 on page 60; Schmitt and Seitzer's emphasis, brackets mine). But it must be noted that Schmitt distinguishes the *state of exception* from *constitution-making power*, or constituent power, defining the latter as "*the political will, whose power or authority is capable of making the concrete, comprehensive decision over the type and form of its own political existence*" (Schmitt and Seitzer 2008, §8.I; Schmitt and Seitzer's emphasis). In other words, constituent power entails "the comprehensive foundation of all other 'powers' and 'divisions of powers'" (Schmitt and Seitzer 2008, §8.I.4).

Proponents of the *critical view* of the Eastern Roman polity assert that popular rebellions in the Eastern Roman polity constitute an expression of *state of exception* powers that reflect the Byzantine *demos* as a *general will* (see Kaldellis 2015, 86–88). First and foremost, the assertion is predicated on the anachronistic assumption that modern public opinion existed in pre-modern Byzantium. In his *Bread and Circuses*, Paul Veyne extensively covers Greco-Roman *euergetism* defined as "the fact that communities (cities, *collegia*) expected the rich to contribute from their wealth to the public expenses, and that this expectation was not disappointed" (Veyne and Pearce 1990, 10; Veyne and Pearce's emphasis). More importantly, Veyne distinguishes modern from pre-modern forms of public opinion within the historical context of the intertwined relationship in the Roman world between the public and the private, the heteronomous and the autonomous:

[...] there did not exist the phenomenon called public opinion, which cannot coexist for long with absolute right, or consequently with the euergetism of a sovereign who is a god or who reigns by divine right. For public opinion does not consist in rebelling, suffering silently or being discontented, but in claiming that one has the *right* to be discontented and that the monarch, even when his ministers may have misled him, can nevertheless be at fault – whereas a property-owner cannot be at fault in relation to what is his own property. [...] public opinion, if it exists at all, does not itself make policy, but merely comments *post facto* on decisions taken by those to whom it has surrendered the care of politics. Even so, a gulf separates the political life of the Roman Empire or of an *ancien régime* monarchy from that of a modern democracy. Today public opinion passes judgment on the government; then the people loved their sovereign and right-thinking persons praised submission as the duty of every loyal subject. Only the senatorial caste, the narrow ruling class who had knowledge of public business and public events, represented a sort of public opinion; decency compelled them to act responsibly and not to contradict the people's notion of the Emperor. One would strangely misunderstand the realities of the past if one failed to appreciate that the people's love for their sovereign is a sentiment that has always existed, or nearly always, and that when the Emperor's name was spoken, this had to be done in the respectful and affectionate tone in which Catholics used to speak the name of the Pope. [...] This was not a sentiment that men chose to cultivate but one that was induced, like children's love for their father, and so it was automatically transferred to the next Emperor, or to a successful usurper. The people loved their sovereign, they considered that taxes were too heavy, and they set a bulkhead between these two ideas. [...] The Emperor's name was spoken with respect, but people did not have political opinions and political discussion was unknown. (Veyne and Pearce 1990, 295–296; Veyne and Pearce's emphasis, brackets mine)

Kaldellis treats Veyne's absence of public opinion as an "extreme formulation" and is "skeptical of such arguments" including the "body of theory which claims that 'public opinion' is a function of modern bourgeois society" (Kaldellis 2015, 127). For Kaldellis, public opinion existed in the Eastern Roman polity as "the people's role [...] was decisive through inaction" when "Theodosios Monomachos, a cousin of the late emperor Konstantinos IX, [...] declar[ed] his candidacy for the throne" in 1056 AD only to be "[a]bandoned by all" and finally "exiled to Pergamos" (Kaldellis 2015, 128; brackets mine). But the author, drawing from the Byzantine historians John Skylitzes and Ioannes Zonaras (see Kaldellis 2015, 238), reifies the people by conflating the *will of all* with the *sovereign will* evident in Zonaras' revealing description of Byzantine commoners deriding Monomachos as a *faction*, specifically a "popular mob" (*dēmodēs ochlos*, δημῶδης

ὄχλος; see Zonaras' *Annales* 18.1 in Pinderi and Büttner-Wobst 1841, 656). Kaldellis finds support for his views on public opinion from Zvi Yavetz's *Plebs and Princeps* and Jerry Toner's *Popular Culture in Ancient Rome* (see Kaldellis 2015, 145). He specifically quotes Yavetz's assertion that "the Roman *plebs* was not some *Lumpenproletariat* but a class possessed of an ancient tradition" but miscontextualizes Yavetz by omitting some key details: 1) *class disharmony* where the "Roman aristocracy despised the *plebs*" and "the *plebs* [...] entertained [...] contempt for the still lower classes (such as [...] slaves and non-citizens)", 2) *imperial operationalization* where "an emperor was able to use them [i.e., "the Roman *plebs*"] as a deterrent against the senate and even against the army", and 3) *political subservience* where "[t]he common people in Rome were in favor of a single ruler" (see Yavetz 1969, 136; Yavetz's emphasis, brackets mine). Kaldellis also quotes Toner's description of Roman popular culture as "a 'moral economy' to ensure that the elite fulfilled their social obligations to the people" via the non-elites deriding, subverting and manipulating elites in Roman society (Toner 2009, 10). But however compelling Toner's description is, it does not *ipso facto* mean that Roman, and later Byzantine, public opinion existed. That is because for public opinion to exist requires, at the very least, *political self-reliance* on the part of the populace and not, following Yavetz, *political subservience* derived from, or echoing, Aesop's *The Frogs Who Wished for a King*. Other than public opinion (or lack thereof), there is a second point to be made regarding the proponents of the *critical view* asserting that Byzantine popular revolts are manifestations of *state of exception* powers representing the *sovereign will* of the Byzantine *demos*. And that point is that popular rebellion alone, including acts of political inaction, says nothing about whether the rebelling populace is sovereign or operates in accordance with a *general will* which is, or is substantively coterminous with, the *demos as the pouvoir constituant* that 18th-century French political writer

Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès would refer to as the *Third Estate*. But, as the title of Sieyès' pamphlet would have us ask: "Qu'est ce que le tiers état?" or "What is the Third Estate?" According to the author, the Third Estate is a *complete nation where the people are the source of legality and as a whole have polity-establishing powers*:

What is a nation? A body of associates living under common laws and represented by the same legislative assembly, etc. [...] The Third Estate then contains everything that pertains to the nation while nobody outside the Third Estate can be considered as part of the nation. What is the Third Estate? *Everything*. [...] By Third Estate is meant all the citizens who belong to the common order. Anybody who holds a legal privilege of any kind deserts the common order, stands as an exception to the common laws and, consequently, does not belong to the Third Estate. As we have already said, a nation is made one by virtue of common laws and common representation. [...] In every free nation, and every nation ought to be free, there is only one way of settling disputes about the constitution. One must not call upon Notables, but upon the nation itself. If we have no constitution, it must be made, and only the nation has the right to make it. [...] The nation is prior to everything. It is the source of everything. Its will is always legal; indeed it is the law itself. Prior to and above the nation, there is only natural law. If we want to formulate a clear idea of that sequence of positive laws which can emanate exclusively from the will of the nation, the first are the constitutional laws. These are of two kinds: some determine the organization and the functions of the legislative body; the others determine the organization and the functions of the various executive bodies. [...] Neither aspect of the constitution is the creation of the constituted power, but of the constituent power. [...] The national will [...] never needs anything but its own existence to be legal. It is the source of all legality. [...] A nation is always in a state of nature and, amidst so many dangers, it can never have too many possible methods of expressing its will. [...] A political society cannot be anything but the whole body of the associates. A nation cannot decide not to be the nation, or to be so only in a certain fashion: for that would be saying that it is not the nation in any other fashion. Similarly, a nation cannot decree that its common will shall cease to be its common will. (Sieyès 1789 in Luebke 2012, 3, 12–14; brackets mine)

For Sieyès, the *nation is unto itself* and therefore *is* the constituent power, "the source and the supreme master of positive law" (Sieyès 1789 in Luebke 2012, 13). Granted, *constituent power* and *state of exception* powers are dimensions of sovereignty, dynastic *and* democratic, with the former involving the *ab initio source of polity establishment* and the latter entailing an *extra-legal response to a crisis affecting the polity*. However, the Byzantine *demos*, factional or

otherwise, was *not* exercising state of exception powers upon opposing Byzantine authority since it was *not* the subject of constituent power. Said *demos* historically *exacerbated extant crises* by supporting usurpers to the Byzantine throne (e.g., Greens acclaiming General Phocas) or *caused crises* by rebelling against a Byzantine monarch in favor of another (e.g., overthrow of Michael V). From the Byzantine authorities' standpoint, including the emperor, revolts within the Eastern Roman polity are *existential threats to said polity that must be quelled*. But why is that the case though? Because unlike the Athenian *demos qua demos* (i.e., sovereign people or *hyperlaos*), the New Roman polity was a *basilic oikos* (βασιλικός οίκος) circumscribing an extant body of Roman citizens with existing Greek nationhood as *dependent demos* (i.e., sovereignless people or *hypolaos*). In other words, Byzantium was the product of Emperor Constantine's *constitution-making powers* derived from God's power (i.e., τούτῳ νικά [☩], "with this conquer [Chi-Rho]"<sup>16</sup>) and supported by the Roman military the stage for which was set after Constantine defeated Maxentius at the battle of the Milvian Bridge (312 AD) and then defeated Licinius at the battles of Cibalae (316 AD), Adrianople (317 AD), Adrianople (324 AD), and Chrysopolis (324 AD) (on Constantine's victories, see Pohlsander 2004, 25, 41, 44). That said, Roman soldiers did *not* make Constantine, *contra* John Milton (see CHAPTER III), since they became *his partisans upon achieving victory after having their shields and/or military banners symbolically armed with the Chi-Rho* (see Pohlsander 2004, 23–24 on Constantine's use of the Chi-Rho). When Constantine finally secured his sovereignty after vanquishing both Maxentius and Licinius, he alone, as the Alexandrian prince/philosopher-king in Christianized Roman form, was the *constituent power* (technically the *re-constituent power* meaning a source of supreme command that establishes a new polity within the parameters of an existing polity). But *being* the subject of constituent power is not enough. For Constantine *exercised* his *re-constituent powers* via the

*translatio imperii* when he moved the Roman capital from Italy's Roma to the Greeks' Byzantion transforming the latter into Constantine's City, *The Polis* ("Ἡ Πόλις"), Constantinople. And speaking of Constantinople, Sylvain Destephen states that one must "resist the temptation to consider the city founded by Constantine as an instant capital and seat of a single and permanent imperial authority" since the emperor "did not disclose any intention to promote a new capital, but rather expressed the need for a rear base for fresh troops and supplies, and perhaps also for regaining strength and waiting better weather conditions" (Destephen 2019, 10). Constantine's military needs, however, neither alter nor diminish the permanence of the *translatio imperii* that marked Byzantion as *the* dominant powernode given Constantine using his *re-constituent* powers to *re-establish* the city and *re-name* it after himself all while embodying the Roman capital. The emperor as sovereign means that he alone possessed anything like *state of exception* powers in the face of existential threats or at least set the stage for his successors to use said powers when opposed thus exerting their own sovereignty in the process. Interestingly, Constantine historically exists between Julius Caesar, who also emulated Alexander, stating that *res publica* is merely a name without body or form (allowing Caesar to define what it is) and Napoleon Bonaparte who stated, "I am the *pouvoir constituant*" (see Cristi 2008, 18 quoting Arendt 1990, 163; Arendt's emphasis). The sovereign prince and the sovereign people represent the distinction, made by Schmitt, between *medieval* (technically Post-Classical to Late Antique) *and modern conceptualizations of constitution-making power*:

According to the medieval understanding, only *God* has a potestas constituens, so far as it is spoken of at all. The clause "All power (or compulsion) is from God" (Non est enim potestas nisi a Deo, Rom. 13:1), means God's constituting power. [...] During the French Revolution, [Emmanuel-Joseph] Sieyès developed the theory of the *people* (more precisely of the *nation*) as the subject of the constitution-making power. In the eighteenth century, the absolutist prince had not yet been designated the subject of the constitution-making power. Yet this was only because the thought of a free, comprehensive decision reached by persons with regard to the type and form of their

own political existence was at first only gradually able to take the form of a political deed. In the eighteenth century, the aftereffects of the Christian theological images of God's constituting power, despite all clarification, were still strong and vital (Schmitt and Seitzer 20008, §8.I.4; Schmitt and Seitzer's emphasis, brackets mine)

In the next chapter, this dissertation will focus on defining *monarchical republicanism* and, as stated earlier, testing monarchical republicanism's historical applicability to Byzantium. Said applicability is marshalled through a survey of notable events in Byzantine history and through treatments of the Eastern Roman polity by early modern scholars of monarchical republicanism.

### CHAPTER III – BYZANTINE MONARCHICAL REPUBLICANISM?

The aim of this section is three-fold: 1) define *monarchical republicanism*, 2) examine the assertion that Byzantium was a republican monarchy via a substantive, though unexhaustive, survey of historical events, and 3) examine the Eastern Roman polity via early modern scholars of monarchical republicanism. This chapter is informed by the following question: Is it apropos, on historical grounds, to classify the Eastern Roman polity as a republican monarchy? In his 2015 publication titled *The Byzantine Republic*, Anthony Kaldellis defines "the regime of Byzantium [as] an 'imperial republic'" meaning "a republic with an emperor" though for him it is preferable to regard the Eastern Roman polity as "a republican monarchy, monarchical republic, or just 'the Roman Republic in its monarchic phase'" (Kaldellis 2015, 22; brackets mine). By *republic*, Kaldellis quotes a definition from Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *On the Social Contract*:

Rousseau explains that republics are not defined by a particular type of government. "I call republic any state by laws, whatever may be the form of administration: for then the public interest alone governs the *res publica* counts for something. Every legitimate government is republican." He adds in a crucial note on the last word: "By this word I understand not only aristocracy or a democracy, but in general any government guided by the general will, which is the law. To be legitimate, the government must not be confused with the sovereign, but be its minister: the monarchy itself is a republic." As we have noted, the fact of monarchy should not hinder us from viewing Byzantium as a republic. (Kaldellis 2015, 98 quoting Rousseau's *On the Social Contract*, II.6)

For Kaldellis, monarchical republicanism is representative of Byzantium's "complex political culture in which different ideological systems were superimposed, one Roman, republican, and secular and the other late Roman, metaphysical, and eventually Christian, [...] occup[ying] different sites of the political sphere" (Kaldellis 2015, xii; brackets mine). Moreover, the author

builds on the works of Hans-Georg Beck, a mid-to-late 20th-century German Byzantinist, whose "great insight", according to Kaldellis, was that Byzantine "politics, despite changes in institutions, continued to be dominated by the ideological modes and orders of the [Roman] republican tradition" (Kaldellis 2015, xii; brackets mine). But *why* historical events in examining the monarchical republicanness, or lack thereof, of Byzantium? Because Kaldellis is critical of his contemporaries "tend[ing] to privilege what the Byzantines professed to believe over what they actually did" (Kaldellis 2015, 6; brackets mine). Also, historical events are important because even if the Eastern Roman polity is incorporated into the history of monarchical republics, does the *conduct* of Byzantine subjects in relation to their own emperors *justify* such an incorporation? But before diving into events drawn from Byzantine historical sources, it is important to first explore the meaning of monarchical republicanism along with its historical context.<sup>17</sup>

### *Historical Definition of Monarchical Republicanism*

What exactly is a *monarchical republic* or a *republican monarchy*? One answer, absent in Kaldellis' *The Byzantine Republic*, begins with Patrick Collinson's "'Self-government at the king's command'" (Collinson 1987, 396), which is the title of Albert Beebe White's work on the historical origins of English democracy (see White 1933). For Collinson, the town of Swallowfield, a microcosm of 16th-century Elizabethan England, was "a self-governing republic of the 'chief inhabitants'" where "regular assemblies were planned, at which those present were to speak in order of rank and without fear of interruption" (Collinson 1987, 395–397). Questioning whether Elizabethan England was a republican monarchy, Jonathan McGovern states that monarchical republicanism is a "paradox [that] seems to have been invented by John Adams who wrote in 1789 that England was a 'monarchical republic ... because the sovereignty, which is the legislative power, is vested in more than one man'" (McGovern 2019, 515 quoting Adams' letter

to Roger Sherman; brackets mine). Said paradox reflects the semantic ambiguity surrounding the term *republicanism* as noted by Adams in 1807 when he stated that "[t]here is not a more unintelligible word in the English language than republicanism" (Rodgers 1992, 38; brackets mine). Adams' contemporary, Thomas Jefferson, stated in an 1816 letter to John Taylor, an agricultural reformist and author of *A Defence of the Measures of the Administration of Thomas Jefferson* (1804), "that the term *republic* is of very vague application in every language" defining it as "a government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority" (Koch and Peden 1944, 669–670; Jefferson's emphasis). In fact, McGovern mentions Louise Hodgson's *Res Publica and the Roman Republic* where Hodgson "arrived at the conclusion [...] that '*res publica*' did not in fact refer to the Roman republican state but rather to civic property and affairs" (McGovern 2019, 517; brackets and emphasis mine). From there, McGovern reasons "that when English authors, reared on Cicero, used the word 'commonwealth' in their own compositions, they also *conceived of the state as a shared enterprise in which many individuals and corporations had a stake*" (McGovern 2019, 517; emphasis mine). The author, furthermore, finds that "the [English] word 'commonwealth' did not, by any stretch of the imagination, mean that subjects were thought to be sovereign; it meant that subjects [...] had a *shared interest in the prosperity and stability of the realm*" (McGovern 2019, 517; brackets and emphasis mine). Of course, one must delve deeper into the meaning of the term *res publica* to ascertain its connection, if any, to Roman popular sovereignty or the Roman equivalent of Rousseau's *general will* (i.e., the political supremacy of the *demos qua demos* or *hyperlaos*<sup>18</sup>).

According to Louise Hodgson, "[t]he marked lack of ancient theorizing, whether political or philosophical or legal, over what *res publica* entailed suggests the [ancient] Romans were more

interested in engaging with *res publica* than in developing a fully articulated concept of what it might be" (Hodgson, 2017, 2; Hodgson's emphasis, brackets mine). The author mentions Julius Caesar "expressing just such a conceptual hollowness when he said (notoriously) that '*res publica* is nothing, a mere name without body or form'" (Hodgson 2017, 2 quoting Suetonius' *Divus Julius*, 77). For Hodgson, the *res publica* "did not mean 'the Roman Republic', in the sense of the political superstructure that succeeded the monarchy and lasted until the Augustan principate", "[n]or was it the term for Rome's corporate identity", and "was not 'a republic' in the sense of a specific *type* of political system, defined by the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* as any state 'in which supreme power is held by the people or their elected representatives' or by [Harriet I.] Flower as fundamentally "'government with the participation of the governed", rather than anarchy or tyranny'" (Hodgson 2017, 3; Hodgson's emphasis, brackets mine). Drawing on various Roman sources (i.e., Cicero, Sallust, Pomponius), Hodgson finds that "the *res publica* is something that should be managed *for* the public good, but need not necessarily be managed *by* the public and certainly should not be read as synonymous *with* the public" (Hodgson 2017, 4; Hodgson's emphasis). Also, the author warns against "reading *res publica* literally as 'the public thing'" since "different parts of the same community will have different perspectives on their shared *res publica*" (Hodgson 2017, 5; Hodgson's emphasis). Essentially, "the *res publica* is the communal space within which those concerned with the administration of civic affairs move, and so means something closer to 'the internal political space (however it may be organized) of a given civic community'" or "a field of positions that changes in meaning dependent on where a person stands in socio-political space" (Hodgson 2017, 5; Hodgson's emphasis).

Complementing Hodgson's analysis, Claudia Moatti finds that "the [ancient] Romans used the singular *res*, to capture the general whole" where "their existence lay in their status of

envelope, which sometimes approximated a semantic vacuum [...] whose content varied according to experience: *res publica* could indeed define either the totality of the public, or one element only (the army, the *aerarium*, the cults, etc.), or it could even be a mere symbol" (Moatti 2020, 121; Moatti's emphasis, brackets mine). Moreover, *res* "could be the object of knowledge of power" and "were objects of debate or action, but never subjects" given that "[f]or a *res* to acquire a precise signification, individuals needed to look at it, talk about it, or act on it; they needed to interact in relation to it" (Moatti 2020, 122; Moatti's emphasis, brackets mine). Moatti even mentions 20th-century German philosopher Martin Heidegger "according to whom the word *res* came from the Greek *eirô*, which means 'to talk about something'" (Moatti 2020, 122; Moatti's emphasis). Such an etymology means that "a *res* did not have any objective existence: it existed precisely as the object of interactions between different actors" (Moatti 2020, 123; Moatti's emphasis). On a side note, Roman *libertas*, according to Catalina Balmaceda, basically "meant the status of non-slavery, being primarily understood as the absence of domination" (Balmaceda 2020, 5). Reasoning from Livy (3.45.8), Balmaceda states that "*libertas* in Rome was based on law and implied having certain rights: the right to act without constraints, the right of protection under the law, the right to be your own master" (Balmaceda 2020, 5 and footnote 20). But "in the struggles during the crisis of the late Republic", Balmaceda is correct to note that *libertas* is "found to work as a political catchword used for propaganda" (Balmaceda 2020, 5). Let us now turn to a brief reflection on the sources selected for this project's historical survey.

### Reflection on Source Selection

Why does this dissertation's historical survey have the sources it has? Mainly to determine whether the case that the Eastern Roman polity was a republican monarchy has been made by addressing the evidence used by proponents of the *critical view*. Secondly, the survey's sources

are selected to provide a *broad snapshot of a cosmos rich in dialogues and events* (some of which corroborated by outside evidence) that modern Byzantine scholarship overlooks and/or elides. Both reasons are animated by *eclecticism* similar to James Howard-Johnston's "historian *qua* scavenger" where a "miscellany of written sources" are "supplemented by material evidence" (Howard-Johnston 2024, 3; Howard-Johnston's emphasis, brackets mine). But with what, and through what, *lens* does the dissertation see Byzantium and the Byzantines? With and through a Christian Greek lens (*Γραικός/Ελληνας έν Χριστώ*) inhabiting a contemporary world that does not share, and at times is hostile to, its *devotion*, within *reason*, to its *own living heritage* (see this project's endnote 8 for Hugo Rahner's accurate description of what Christian humanism *is* and what Hellenic Christians *do*). But how do you get things right if you yourself are biased? *Trust, but verify* (with an acknowledgment that perfection, at times, can be an enemy of the good). That, for example, some Byzantine primaries contain exaggerations composed by politically biased authors does not justify discarding the wheat with the chaff. Whatever their flaws, the following sources are read and examined with *fairness in mind*. Why? Because the *voices of Christian Greeks are their own and have their place* offering at least some insights into Byzantine-era life even if they imperfectly encapsulate their own historical milieu.

### Survey of Historical Events

Events recorded in Byzantine historical accounts run counter to modern 21st-century historiographical narratives that the Eastern Roman polity was a monarchical republic. Said events are thematically organized around *dominance* per Wilhelm Ensslin's description of Byzantine imperial administration:

His imperial power, founded in this way and fettered by no written constitution, was theoretically at least, unlimited. Everything was subject to the imperial majesty. As in former times, the Autokrator held the supreme command over the army, and, not

being obliged to follow the counsel of his advisers, could himself decide for war or for peace. A long line of capable soldiers exercised this right, down to the last Constantine, who was killed while fighting for his capital. Furthermore, the Emperor was the sole and unrestricted legislator. In this capacity he organized and supervised the administration. He appointed the officials and officers, allocated their powers, and determined their rank. He gave special care to the financial administration for its successful management was an essential condition for the welfare of the State. He decided what taxes should be levied and how the moneys raised should be applied, and he alone controlled the income of the imperial treasuries. The Emperor was also supreme judge, for he was the final interpreter of the laws (Ensslin 1948, 273–274).

Byzantium, of course, is more accurately a *polity* as opposed to a state with a capital "S" though Ensslin's description is supported by at least *some* historical examples involving the Eastern Roman government's handling of domestic and foreign affairs. But *why* dominance? Because dominance in the form of political majesty, with or without divine right, is a civic culminator and a civic mortar where the former is sought after because majesty transforms its possessor into *the* source-node of power that, per the latter, binds all, or most, of the polity's members together.

*Majesty* is correctly defined in the following passage from Quentin Skinner's "The state":

Underlying the suggestion that a distinctive quality of stateliness 'belongs' to kings was the prevailing belief that sovereignty is intimately connected with display, that the presence of majesty serves in itself as an ordering force. This was to prove the most enduring of the many features of charismatic leadership eventually subverted by the emergence of the modern concept of an impersonal state. As late as the end of the seventeenth century, it is still common to find political writers using the word 'state' to point to a conceptual connection between the stateliness of rulers and the efficacy of their rule. [...] But the same assumptions also survived even among the enemies of kingship. When Milton, for example, describes in his *History of Britain* the famous scene where Canute orders the ocean to 'come no futher upon my land,' he observes that the king sought to give force to his extraordinary command by speaking 'with all the state that royalty could put into his countenance' [...]. (Skinner 1989, 92; Skinner's emphasis, brackets mine)

And so it is majesty, as sought-after status of dominance, that explains how Byzantium, both in Constantinople and in the provinces, was, as I will argue, concretely a *political mess* underneath its own ideals of philosopher-kingship that Christian Greeks revered and, human flaws notwithstanding, aspired to live up to. In other words, "[t]he emperor, along with the empress,

embodied good order and, it was hoped, projected that condition to all people under the royal sway" (Thomas 2014, 119; brackets mine). This reality is contrary to Kaldellis' "republican idea of a state" based on Skinner's assertion about classical republicanism where there was "No effective contrast drawn between the power of the people and the powers of the state" (Kaldellis 2015, 37; Skinner 1989, 115). More importantly, the following (unexhaustive) survey of events from Byzantine history will marshal key context-rich counterfactuals substantiating a picture of the Eastern Roman polity radically different from the one promulgated by the proponents of the *critical view*.

The historical events surveyed in this section show that republicanism, monarchical or otherwise, constitutes a poor framework that obfuscates our understanding of the Eastern Roman polity. Said polity, despite the informational limitations of the Greek (and some Latin) primaries consulted here, was a *messy monarchy* meaning a political mess ordered, however imperfectly, by the king's majesty; simply put, orderly kingship atop disorderly socio-political tensions.<sup>19</sup> And the aforementioned *messy monarchy* is exhibited via the *unrepublican relationship between the Byzantine emperor and his subjects with the former sovereigning either kindly, negligently or wrathfully and the latter obeying the former either out of reverence, begrudging acceptance or abject fear*. That "the people of Constantinople (and probably of the provinces too) regularly mocked emperors either by staging vicious parodic skits or by singing insulting ditties and songs" (Kaldellis 2015, 146ff) does not prove that derision of a *throne's occupant* constitutes derision of the *throne itself* (see APPENDIX IV on the salience of emperorship in Byzantine life). This altogether runs counter to Kaldellis' "restor[ing] the *political* dimension of [popular] interventions" in the Eastern Roman polity and "draw[ing] attention to how emperors responded to these interventions" (Kaldellis 2015, 120; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine). For Kaldellis,

Byzantine emperors generally "submitted to the demands of the people, or had no choice in the matter, or humbly asked for forgiveness, to play for time or reestablish their legitimacy" where such behaviors altogether constitute "what we would expect in a republican monarchy" (Kaldellis 2015, 120). Yet any intervention by the people, either in part or in whole, against a king is, as the following events will show, a demand for *the* king and *not*, if Byzantium were a monarchical republic, a demand for kingship with, at best, kings sharing sovereignty with their subjects or, at the extreme, kingly compliance with the people's sovereign will. Furthermore, the republican model fails spectacularly when said interventions, upon defeat, result in an unchallenged monarch in principle galvanizing his default powers of command to become an unchallenged monarch in practice as in the cases of Justinian *and* Justinian II. But however one frames the relationship between the emperors and the people, the following Byzantine historical events offer enough evidence of popular politically-motivated behaviors to justify eliciting a pattern: *the "will of the people" was a will of all and not a general will via the aggregation (individual to class) and disaggregation (class to individual) of political wills.*

The counterfactuals to the republican model that this, again unexhaustive, historical survey will focus on are: 1) the *popular uprising* against Anastasios I, 2) the *violent accession* of Justin I, 3) the *imperial quelling of revolts* (e.g., Nika Riot), 4) *imperial elimination of political opposition* (e.g., suspension of the Byzantine Senate by Justinian I), 5) *military coups* (e.g., overthrow of Maurice and Justinian II), 6) *factionalism* (e.g., Michael V and the restoration of Zoe), and 7) the Byzantine citizenry's *general acceptance of imperial socio-economic policies* (e.g., Leo III the Isaurian, Irene the Athenian, Nikephoros I, and Alexios I Komnenos).

The first counterfactual to the republican model pertains to the events of 512 AD during the reign of Emperor Anastasios I (r. 491–518 AD). Kaldellis finds signs of a monarchical

republic, but he ought not have. Crowned emperor in 491 AD, Anastasios "expressed his gratitude to Empress Ariadne, the officials, the senate, the army, and the people [...] without saying a word about any kind of obligation to the patriarch [i.e., Euphemios<sup>20</sup>] or the church, although he [...] pa[id] homage to the Holy Trinity" (Anastos 1993, 30–31, 40 citing Theophanes' *Chronographia*; brackets mine). Speeches aside, Kaldellis notes the following turbulent events of 512 AD derived from the *Chronicle* of Byzantine historian John Malalas:

In 512, Anastasios's reign was rocked by another popular protest over a religious question. The protestors were chanting, 'A new emperor for Romanía (ἄλλον βασιλέα τῆ Ῥωμανία),' and they declared for Areobindos after burning the house of the unpopular ex-prefect Marinos. Areobindos fled but Anastasios appeared in the hippodrome without his crown and offered to abdicate, which calmed the crowd. When the people told him to put his crown back on, they were symbolically reinvesting him with imperial authority, which they had originally given to him in 491. A contrite appearance in the hippodrome and a desire to open negotiations were a standard imperial response to such situations. (Kaldellis 2015, 120–121)

The above description, as already stated, is based on Malalas' historical account of Anastasios' reign. Kaldellis omits or downplays elements that can round out the record. Specifically, Malalas frames the popular uprising as a *mob* and details the emperor's *brutal reprisals against the mob*:

In his reign a civic insurrection took place among the Byzantines in Constantinople over Christian belief, because the emperor wanted to add to the *Trisagion* the phrase they use in the eastern cities, 'He who was crucified for us, have mercy on us'. The population of the city crowded together and rioted violently on the grounds that something alien had been added to the Christian faith. There was uproar in the palace which caused the city prefect Plato to run in, flee and hide from the people's anger. The rioters set up a chant, 'A new emperor for the Roman state', and went off to the residence of the ex-prefect Marinos the Syrian, burned his house and plundered everything he had, since they could not find him. For he had heard that this great mob of people was coming towards his house, and had fled. They claimed that, as an easterner, Marinos had suggested this phrase to the emperor. After plundering his official apartments they cut up his silver with axes and divided it out. They found an eastern monk in the house whom they seized and killed and then, carrying his head on a pole, they chanted, 'Here is the enemy of the Trinity'. They went to the residence of Juliana, a patrician of the most illustrious rank, and chanted for her husband, Areobindus, to be emperor of the Roman state. Areobindus fled and hid in Perama. The emperor Anastasios went up to the *kathisma* in the hippodrome, without a crown. When the people learned this, they went into the hippodrome. The emperor, through

his sacred pronouncement, gained control of the populace of the city, exhorting them to stop murdering and attacking people at random. The whole crowd became quiet and begged him to put on his crown. As soon as they became quiet and stopped forming crowds, the emperor ordered that arrests be made. Of the many brought into custody, he had some punished and others thrown into the Bosphorus by the city prefect. They suffered in this way for many days and after countless numbers had been executed, excellent order and no little fear prevailed in Constantinople and in every city of the Roman state. (*Chronicle* 16.19 in Jeffreys, Jeffreys and Scott 1986, 228; Jeffreys, Jeffreys and Scott's emphasis)

Nowhere in the above passage does Malalas lend himself to the view that the Byzantine populace telling Anastasios to keep his crown was a symbolic form of imperial reinvestiture based on their own sovereign authority. Anastasios' command to eliminate his enemies renders dubious the claim that the emperor's public display of contrition was an act of consensus-seeking. Rather, said display was (or could have been) an act of, in Christopher Kelly's words, "stooping to conquer" (Kelly 2013b, 221). Specifically, *stooping to conquer* constitutes, according to Kelly, a paradoxical relationship between Roman *civic activism* (or *ciuilitas*) and Christian humbleness with Theodosius II (r. 408–450 AD) as a key precedent:

Of course, there is a self-evident distance between *ciuilitas* and Christian humility, but what connects them is that both these dramatic and highly ritualised expressions of imperial condescension turn on the same paradox: the assertion of superior position through its abdication. The point was crisply made [...] in an imperial ruling issued by Theodosius II (at Constantinople in March 431) regulating the right to asylum in churches. (Kelly 2013b, 228; Kelly's emphasis, brackets mine)

The following Theodosian ruling that Kelly correctly quotes is centered on *majesty*, which explains Emperor Anastasios' behavior towards the Constantinopolitan mob in 512 AD:

Those seeking sanctuary were not to be armed, 'for we, whom, as is proper, the weapons of sovereignty always encircle, and whom it is not right to be without bodyguards, when entering God's church, we leave the weapons outside, removing our diadem, and by the appearance of a lesser majesty assure all the more for ourselves the reverence due to majesty.' (Kelly 2013b, 228 including footnote 28)

Examples of *stooping to conquer* in practice include "Theodosius and [Emperor Arcadius' wife] Eudoxia [...] parad[ing] through the streets of Constantinople allow[ing] them to display their

closeness to the citizens of the capital and the orthodoxy of their faith" (Kelly 2013b, 228; brackets mine). In the case of Emperor Theodosius, he "walk[ed] barefoot the seven miles from the Great Palace [of Constantinople] to the Hebdomon" after "a destructive earthquake in late January 447" (Kelly 2013a, 43; brackets mine; *Hebdomon* refers to a "suburb of Constantinople" situated on the Sea of Marmara" per Gregory 1991a, 907). As for Empress Eudoxia, she "in 400/402 thr[ew] aside her purple robes to dance in joy before martyr relics as they were transferred at night to a shrine on the shores of the Propontis (Sea of Marmara) south-west of Constantinople" (Kelly 2013a, 43; brackets mine).

The second counterfactual to the republican model entails *succession wars* discussed by Kaldellis. Specifically, said counterfactual is in response to Kaldellis' position with respect to the "making and unmaking of emperors" where the "people [...] usually did not take the lead at such moments, although their consent was necessary to legitimate the outcome" (Kaldellis 2015, 105; brackets mine). By *people*, Kaldellis specifically refers to the popular classes distinct from other "elements of the [Byzantine] polity (the army, the senatorial 'aristocracy,' the higher clergy, or trade groups)" (Kaldellis 2015, 105; brackets mine). But if Byzantium were historically a monarchical republic, then would not the consent of the popular classes be necessary to legitimate *most, if not all, steps* in the elevation and removal of emperors (i.e., initiation, deliberation and outcome)? And if popular consent was necessary, was it sufficient for a faction to grant its consent or did the Byzantine "public" wait to discover that its own consent embodied the whole or a majority? And how would Byzantine members of the public know that their emperor had the people's support? The case involving Justin's rise to power may not entirely satisfy such questions. But said example does show the messiness of imperial politics. The absence of explicit or expressed consent, influences from imperial largesse aside (e.g., Empress

Zoe's philanthropy), from a popular faction *limited* to Constantinople neither defines nor commands the majesty of the Byzantine throne.

My counterargument to Kaldellis can be illustrated in a moment when an emperor's successor had to be chosen. The sudden demise of Emperor Anastasios occurred in 518 AD ending, according to Geoffrey Greatrex, a "reign [that] proved to be a stable and prosperous time for the eastern empire" where "[r]ebellious Isaurians were brought into line in the 490s and a Persian invasion in 502 was countered effectively enough to restore peace between the two sides in 506" with "the imperial treasury accumul[at]ing a healthy surplus" (Greatrex 2008, 244; brackets mine). Anastasios' death led to a series of brutal events according to Milton V. Anastos' analysis of Emperor Constantine Porphyrogennitos' *Book of Ceremonies* (*EKΘΕΣΕΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΟΥ ΤΑΞΕΩΣ*, *Ektheseis tēs Basileiou Taxeos*):

When it became known that the throne had become vacant, the *silentarii* (officials who served as ushers for the imperial Consistorium, so called because at least originally they were to impose silence and keep order) notified Celer, the Magistros (the Greek form of *Magister officiorum*, the chief officer of the bureaux of the civil service, who was responsible for the conduct of court ceremonies) and Justin, the *comes* (i.e., the commander) of the *excubitores* (crack troops, the chief palace guards), who was eventually elected emperor. As soon as they arrived at the palace in response to these tidings, Celer ordered the *candidati* (special palace troops whose name was derived from the fact that their uniforms were white) and the rest of the *scholarii* (originally an elite military corps but now parade-ground soldiers) to assemble, and Justin made what seems to have been a formal announcement: "Our Lord [*Despotes*: Emperor], being mortal, had died. We must all therefore take counsel together and choose an emperor pleasing to God and suitable to the Empire." Celer made a similar statement to the *candidati* and the officers of the *scholarii*. Then at dawn, the chief imperial officials (ἄρχοντες) met [presumably at the palace]. At the same time, the people (ὁ δῆμος) congregated in the hippodrome and called upon the Senate to elect "an emperor chosen by God" (ἐκ Θεοῦ: literally "from God"). Thereupon, the high imperial officials and the Archbishop of Constantinople set up benches in the portico in front of the great triclinium (the *Megas Triklinos*, the great state dining room of the imperial palace with 19 accubita [i.e., couches], each of which had capacity for twelve guests reclining in the ancient manner) and there launched into a bitter discussion of candidates for the succession. (Anastos 1975, 184–185; Anastos' emphasis and brackets)

As shown in the above passage, Anastasios' death triggered a *gathering of different classes* (militaro-bureaucratic, senatorial, popular) resulting in the *initiation of a harsh dialogue* over who would succeed the emperor. Of course, the exchange of acrid words swiftly *metastasized into an exchange of brutal actions*:

[...] the wrangling continued, and the *excubitores* in the hippodrome chose a certain tribune named John, one of Justin's associates (who later became bishop of Heraclea). But the Blues (one of the four 'demes' or factions of the people) were so displeased by this choice that they threw stones at the *excubitores*, and suffered a number of casualties when the latter retaliated with bows and arrows. (Anastos 1975, 186; Anastos' emphasis, brackets mine)

The violence between the stone-throwing *segment* of the populace and the arrow-firing palace guards was just the beginning as the Senate's selection of Justin was initially "opposed by some of the *scholarii*, one of whom punched [Justin] in the face and cut his lip" (Anastos 1975, 186; Anastos' emphasis, brackets mine). Justin ultimately became emperor and, following Anastasios' example, expressed his gratitude, according to Milton V. Anastos, in a "letter of 518 to Pope Hormisdas of Rome in which [Justin] ascribed his accession to the throne to divine favor, the high officials, the senate, and the army but is silent about the people and the patriarch who had crowned him" (Anastos 1993, 31 citing the *Collectio Auellana*; brackets mine). But the emperor's silence is not material. What is material is how the *behavior of the demes* during Justin's rise to the throne lends credence to Alan Cameron's critique of Russian Byzantinist "T. Uspenskij [...] who first made the unhappy suggestion that the Byzantine demes might be descended from the demes of Athens" where "the Byzantine demes are municipal units, residential areas of the city" (Cameron 1976a, 25 citing Uspenskij 1894; brackets mine). Specifically, Cameron asserts that the Byzantine *dēmes* in Constantinople had no connection to the *dēmos* of ancient Athens:

While there were demes in the Attic sense in Alexandria, and various other Hellenistic foundations, there is no evidence that they even existed at Constantinople or indeed at most of the other cities of Asia Minor racked by the violence of *δημοι*

from the fifth century on. The 'deme-organization' of Constantinople is no more than a hypothesis created to explain the later use of the term *δῆμοι* [...] Had there ever been demes of the Attic or Alexandrian sort at Constantinople, it is strange indeed that Stephanus of Byzantium, writing at Constantinople in the sixth century, should have felt it necessary to gloss the word *δῆμος· παρ' Ἀθηναίοις κώμη* [i.e., *dēmos· village community of the Athenians*]. He did so because for him the word had an altogether different meaning. For Antioch the argument from silence is virtually impregnable. Thanks to the abundant surviving writings of Libanius, we know more about the municipal life of Antioch in the fourth century than of any other city in the ancient world. From the fifth century on Antioch was if anything more plagued by the *δῆμοι* of the factions than even Constantinople. Yet it is certain that Antioch never had demes in the Attic sense. (Cameron 1976a, 25–26; Cameron's emphasis, brackets mine)

Cameron partially quotes Stephanus of Byzantium's *Ethnika* from which the entire first line of the "Dēmos" entry is as follows: "village community of the Athenians and the popular masses" ("Δῆμος· παρ' Ἀθηναίοις ἡ κώμη καὶ ἡ τοῦ πλήθους συλλογή." in Billerbeck and Zubler 2011, 36; English translation mine). Still, Cameron's analysis of the Byzantine *dēmes* refutes Kaldellis' position that people in Byzantium had the "right to assign or reassign power" with "Rousseau's view of republican sovereignty [...] perfectly reflect[ing] Byzantine norms" (Kaldellis 2015, 115; brackets mine). Further evidence against said position is provided by *In Praise of Justin II*, a Latin poem "celebrating the accession of Justin II" composed by Flavius Cresconius Corippus who was "[a]n elementary school-teacher originating from Vandal Africa" (Cameron 1973, 4; brackets mine; see also Baldwin and Cutler 1991b, 533). But *why* Corippus? Because the "wandering poet", who in "ca.566 [...] turned up in Constantinople", "commands attention mainly as a contemporary source" (Baldwin and Cutler 1991b, 533; brackets mine). For Kaldellis, Corippus is a "court poet [who] compares the *imperium Romanum* to a single body, only he is really talking about the *res publica*, not the 'empire' if by that we mean the provinces, and in fact he calls it the *res publica* in the middle of the speech [i.e., *In Praise of Justin II*]" (Kaldellis 2015, 17; brackets mine). However, Kaldellis' description misframes the 6th-century author who in

reality synonymizes *Romanum imperium* with *res publica* (something Cicero would have detested per Peter Stacey's *Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince*). Said description also neglects the following dialogue from Corippus between Justin II and the populace where the term *res publica* is correctly translated by Alan Cameron as *state* referring to, given the dialogue's context, a *monarchically-defined and monarchically-organized polity*:

But Justin himself, stricken by the fate of his blessed father [i.e., Justinian I], kept refusing the throne in tears, flooding his cheeks with the great flow, and his face and clothing were soaked. So great was the love he had for his elder.

[Justin II:] 'Stop,' he said. 'You are asking something hard and are urging me in vain, my friends. So then, shall I adorn this head of mine by putting on it the crown when Justin should be sad? The world itself wishes to weep. The state [i.e., *res publica*] and the world have lost a father, not a ruler. What man did he not with his kindly piety sustain, nurture, admonish, nourish or love? Yet, though innocent, many wished to injure him: a ruler's position does not lack envy. I shall go sadly to my father's funeral: I refuse the insignia of monarchy.'

*As he said this the whole throng lay at his feet and in that position begged him together:*

[Populace:] 'You are pious, take pity on your suppliants, holy one: help us in our danger. As day dawns you will soon see that all is lost if the people hear that the palace is empty and there is no emperor. However much you are moved by your love for your virtuous father, let not your love for your country come second to that you have for him. Your uncle himself as he was dying ordered you to hold sway. See the greatness of the old man's farsighted concern for our city and the world together. God has brought about on your behalf all that he wished to happen. Mount your father's throne, and rule the world in subjection to you, mighty emperor. A golden age shall dawn when you are on the throne, nor with the Roman court be seen to change its ruler.' (*In Praise of Justin II*, Book 1 in Cameron 1976b, 90; Cameron's translation; brackets and emphasis mine)

Embellishments aside, the above passage shows the people's *willing submission* to Justin II's monarchical authority, a dynamic evident in the following passage from Corippus again:

Then the young men began to make merry and add praises to praises; they applauded with their feet, and stepped out in sweet steps and made new songs with wonderful tunes. They called the pious Justin and Sophia two lights. Organs, lutes and lyres rang out throughout the city, a thousand kinds of pleasure, a thousand banquets, dancing, laughter, conversation, joy and applause. They prayed for life for the imperial pair in

happy shouts. 'After its old age', they said, 'the world rejoices to grow young again, and goes back to its old shape and appearance. The iron age has now gone, and the golden age is rising in your time, Justin, hope of the city and the world, light of the Roman Empire [i.e., *Romani iubar imperii*], glory added to all the emperors to have reigned before, whose conquering wisdom has gained the highest peaks of your father's throne.' They repeated Sophia's name and called her the second light, and added a new song with their applause. (*In Praise of Justin II*, Book 3 in Cameron 1976b, 103–104; Cameron's translation, brackets mine)

Other details from Corippus involving Justin II's successful assumption of the Byzantine throne

are summarized by Alan Cameron:

At once the senators and others present formally acclaim Justin. There is still much uncertainty as to which precise moment or actually 'makes' him Emperor, but the poet does seem to imply that the crowning with the diadem is crucial. Once it is over Justin can take his seat, fully robed and crowned, upon his throne [...] and deliver his coronation speech. In the acclamations which precede his ascending the throne, the Emperor and Empress are hailed as 'the two lights of the world' – again the Scriptural imagery which pervades the poem. The Byzantine emperor was God's image and representative on earth, and however incongruous it may seem to us, his people expected him to be described in terms which emphasised his closeness to Christ. The diadem itself was not a crown but more of a headband in origin, owing something to Hellenistic models and something to the wreaths worn by Roman consuls and generals. Individual emperors had worn diadems in the early empire, but it did not become fully established as part of an official insignia until the Late Empire (late third century onwards), with its more monarchical concept of the Imperial power. [...] Justin walks along the passages connecting the Palace to the Royal Box ["in the Hippodrome"], flanked by his high ministers, like stars to his sun. Finally he makes his dramatic appearance, like a divine epiphany, fully robed and crowned. Making the sign of the Cross he takes his seat and receives the acclamations of the crowds and of the Blues and Greens, the circus factions. Arms wave, sleeves billowing like the waves of the sea; there seems to be formal singing and movement, perhaps actually dancing. This was one of the great moments in Byzantine life, when the emperor confronted his people, at once raised above them as the image of Christ and face to face in the Roman tradition of direct contact. (Cameron 1973, 7–8; brackets mine)

Kaldellis admits he "ha[s] no objection" to Cameron's "concern [...] that we must not see the *factions* as expressing any kind of popular sovereignty" (Kaldellis 2015, 243; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine). But the irony is that Cameron's *Circus Factions* is what undermines the *critical view* not to mention that passages from *In Praise of Justin II* render Kaldellis' treatment of Corippus anachronistic and reificatory. Irony aside, the historical evidence marshaled so far casts

doubt that Byzantium was a monarchical republic and lends support to this project's position that the Eastern Roman polity was a *messy monarchy* as the next counterfactual will further illustrate.

The third counterfactual to the republican model entails the *imperial quelling of revolts* in response to Kaldellis predicating the Byzantine emperor's authority on popular approval. This counterfactual is premised on the following question: why would an emperor need to eliminate popular dissent if his power is dependent upon popular approval? The case example examined here is the suppression of the Nika Riot by Justinian I in 532 AD.

The Nika Riot (or Nika Revolt) was, according to John Bagnell Bury, "[t]he great popular insurrection which shook the throne of Justinian in the fifth year of his reign and laid in ashes the imperial quarter of Constantinople" (Bury 1897, 92; brackets mine). The event, as correctly asserted by Timothy E. Gregory, was "named after the Greek word *nika!* ("conquer!"), the cheer of spectators at the races in the hippodrome that became the battle cry of the rioters in 532" (Gregory 2005, 126; Gregory's emphasis). Bury uses a *triangulation approach* (i.e., Byzantine primaries, chronology, topography) to chart the riot's progression on a day-to-day basis from January 11th to January 19th, 532 AD (Bagnell 1897, 118–119). Geoffrey Greatrex later uses a broader *comparative approach* and re-charts the event's course on a phase-to-phase basis from "execution of the partisans" to "the final suppression of the riot" (Greatrex 1997, 67–83). Approaches aside, the riot was, for Weston Barnes, "a test unlike any other", which "threatened to depose and even destroy the new regime on behalf of the mob passions of the Blues and Greens" (Barnes 2019, 126). The Blues (*Venetoι*, Βενετοί) and Greens (*Prasinoι*, Πράσινοι) were both "factions originating from the supporters of the competing chariot races of the Hippodrome" with the former being "the faction of the aristocracy, the nobility, the wealthy, and the entitled" and the latter being "the faction of the 'people' of the City, the mercantile middle classes, the

industrial, the civil service, the lowest statuses" (Barnes 2019, 93; brackets mine; see also McCormick 1991, 773–774 on the other factions, the Reds and the Whites). Gregory offers the following useful synopsis of the revolt's cause where both factions united against Justinian to express their dissatisfaction with the emperor's unresponsiveness to their requests to have their condemned factioneers pardoned:

The events of the revolt are all but certain, recorded in detail by the historians Prokopios and Malalas. Difficulties began on 10 January 532, when the Prefect of the City arrested some members of the factions for violence and arranged to have them hanged. Fortunately for the condemned, the execution was botched, and two of them survived, one a member of the Blues and one of the Greens, and they were taken off to temporary safety in a nearby monastery. Three days later, when the races were held again, the factions asked the emperor for clemency on behalf of the condemned, and when he failed to respond, the Blues and Greens unexpectedly united and raised the cry of revolt. (Gregory 2005, 126)

Regardless of when exactly in January the Nika Riot started, Procopius, in his *Persian Wars*, attributes the insurrection's cause to factionalism. The author records that on the sixth day of the riot, "the whole population [...] declared Hypatius emperor and prepared to lead him to the marketplace to assume the power" finally "plac[ing] a golden necklace upon his head and proclaim[ing] him Emperor of the Romans" (*History of the Wars*, I.XXIV in Dewing 2006, 227, 229; brackets mine). Afterwards, "the emperor [Justinian] and his court were deliberating as to whether it would be better for them if they remained or if they took to flight in the ships" with "many opinions [...] expressed favouring either course" (*History of the Wars*, I.XXIV in Dewing 2006, 231; brackets mine). The Empress Theodora then voiced her position to remain:

My opinion then is that the present time, above all others, is inopportune for flight, even though it bring safety. For while it is impossible for a man who has seen the light not also to die, for one who has been an emperor it is unendurable to be a fugitive. May I never be separated from this purple, and may I not live that day on which those who meet me shall not address me as mistress. If, now, it is your wish to save yourself, O Emperor, there is no difficulty. For we have much money, and there is the sea, here the boats. However consider whether it will not come about after you have been saved that you would gladly exchange that safety for death. For as for

myself, I approve a certain ancient saying that royalty is a good burial-shroud.  
(*History of the Wars*, I.XXIV in Dewing 2006, 231, 233)<sup>21</sup>

Consequently, Theodora's words "stunned [her] audience [who] agreed to stay and Belisarius was ordered on the spot by Justinian to make an assault on the rioters and their imperial choice, Hypatius, using imperial troops" (Barnes 2019, 127; brackets mine; see also *History of the Wars*, I.XXIV in Dewing 2006, 233, 235, 237). But "before the imperial troops entered the Hippodrome to begin the massacre", according to Michael Whitby, "Justinian had, through bribes distributed by [General] Narses, lured some of the Blues faction back to their traditional allegiance to him" (Whitby 2009, 243 citing Malalas 476.5–476.8; brackets mine). Justinian was ultimately victorious with over 30,000 dead among the rioters; as for Hypatius and Pompeius (i.e., the "nephews of the late emperor, Anastasius"), the emperor's soldiers "killed both of them [...] and threw their bodies into the sea" with Justinian "confiscat[ing] all their property for the public treasury, and also that of all the other members of the senate who had sided with them" (*History of the Wars*, I.XXIV in Dewing 2006, 227, 237, 239; brackets mine). The Nika Riot, however brutal, was not an isolated event given that, according to Whitby, there was a precedent in the factional uprising that occurred in Constantinople in 445 AD during the reign of

Theodosius II:

From then is the earliest record of factional acclamations, at the erection of equestrian statues of Theodosius II and his father Arcadius – there was a large distribution of corn, particularly to the Green faction, while the people chanted 'The offspring of Theodosius has surpassed Constantine'; it witnessed the first faction riot in Constantinople, in 445; and the participation of Blues and Greens in repairing the city walls in 447 is recorded. (Whitby 2009, 237)

Another precedent entails, according to Greatrex, the Greens faction rioting during Anastasios' reign in 498 AD:

Even closer to the situation in 532 was that faced by Anastasius in 498, when the Greens appealed to him during the chariot-races to release some members of their

faction who had been imprisoned by the city prefect 'for throwing stones'. Anastasius' reaction was more stolid than Justinian's: he refused their demands, and immediately sent in the troops when the factions then proceeded to riot. The crowd in the hippodrome was surrounded by the soldiers and resorted to extensive incendiarism. Although much of the centre of the city was damaged, many were arrested and punished; Anastasius sensibly offered a sop to the Greens, however, by replacing the previous prefect with Plato, their patron. (Greatrex 1997, 68; see also Haarer 2006, 226)

Years after the Nika Riot, "Justinian punished the Blues" when "during a bread shortage in 556 the factions chanted against the emperor at Constantinople's anniversary games in May, when a Persian ambassador was Justinian's guest"; the "public disruption to imperial diplomacy resulted in the arrest and punishment of leading Blues" (Whitby 2009, 243 citing Malalas 488.6–488.14). The activities of the Blues and Greens during the Nika Riot lend credence to the following historical assessment by Alan Cameron:

Unquestionably changes did take place between the age of Augustus and the age of Justinian. The Blues and Greens who terrorized the great eastern cities in the fifth and sixth centuries were a far cry from the modest fan clubs of the first four centuries of the [Roman] Empire. But both the character and the causes of these changes are very different from what has generally been assumed. The assumption which I wish particularly to combat is that these changes represent a growth of popular sovereignty. [...] It must be stated right away that such an interpretation of the character and role of the factions of the late Empire is pure modern hypothesis, wholly unsupported by contemporary evidence. (Cameron 1976, 3; brackets mine)

*Pure modern hypothesis* is what best describes the coupling of popular sovereignty with Constantinopolitan factionalism. And to Cameron's point, more broadly, the coupling of Rousseau's *general will* with the Byzantine citizenry, either in part or in whole, constitutes an *anachronistic abstraction* that the historical evidence marshaled so far has shown and the following counterfactual will further demonstrate.

The fourth counterfactual to the republican model involves the *imperial elimination of political opposition* such as Justinian I's suspension of the Byzantine Senate. The turbulent relationship between Emperor Justinian and the Byzantine Senate echoes the tensions between

Emperor Diocletian, who reigned from 285 to 305 AD, and the Roman Senate. In his *Chronographia*, the 10th-century Greek historian Theophanes Confessor records that in 300/301 AD "Diocletian demanded that the Senate make obeisance to [Maximianus Galerius for his successful military campaigns against the barbarians] and not merely salute him as protocol had previously required" (Annus Mundi 5793 in Mango and Scott 1997, 12; brackets mine). The Byzantine Senate itself was established, again according to Theophanes, in 328/329 AD by Emperor Constantine who "while founding Constantinople, decreed that it [i.e., the City] was to be styled 'New Rome' and *ordered it to have a senate*" (Annus Mundi 5821 in Mango and Scott 1997, 46; brackets and emphasis mine). In 590/591 AD, the Senate, along with the empress and the Patriarch of Constantinople, "begged the emperor [Maurice] not to conduct the war [against the Avars] in person but to entrust it to a general" and Maurice "*did not accept this*" (Annus Mundi 6083 in Mango and Scott 1997, 391; brackets and emphasis mine). But during Justinian's reign from 527 to 565 AD, the emperor stripped the Byzantine Senate's powers as cynically reported in the *Secret History* (*Avékδoτα, Anekdotota*) composed by the 6th-century Greek historian Procopius:

Many times matters which had been sanctioned by the Senate and the emperor came to another and final judgment. For the Senate sat as if in a picture, possessing no control over its vote, nor over the public welfare, and was convened only for the sake of appearance and of conformity with ancient law. It was absolutely not allowed for anyone of those assembled there to discuss anything [seriously]. Rather the *basileus* and his consort usually pretended to be of divided opinion concerning the matters which were in dispute, but, in these cases, that opinion prevailed which had been agreed upon by both of them in advance. (Geanakoplos 1984, 89; Geanakoplos' emphasis, brackets and translation of Procopius' *Anecdota* XIV.8)

But despite the castration of the Byzantine Senate's *corporeal body*, the same Senate's *symbolic body*, or its "prestige" according to Deno J. Geanakoplos, endured and remained "an important influence on the common people" (Geanakoplos 1984, 89). Geanakoplos excerpts Theophanes'

*Chronographia* where it states that in 560 AD "it was reported in Constantinople that the emperor [Justinian] had died" and afterwards "the demes suddenly seized bread from the bakers and street vendors" and the "workshops were closed" (Geanakoplos 1984, 89; Geanakoplos' brackets). Theophanes also reports that "disorder in the city was averted" when "the Senate was convoked and the eparch was dispatched to have lights lit in the entire city [signifying] that the emperor was well" (Geanakoplos 1984, 89; Geanakoplos' brackets). The Byzantine Senate later used its *symbolic body* again when, according to Geanakoplos, it "played a major part in 610 in persuading the exarch of Africa, Heraclius [the Elder] to attempt to overthrow the tyrant Phocas" (Geanakoplos 1984, 90; brackets mine). Geanakoplos again excerpts the *Chronographia* where Theophanes states that in 608/609 AD "Heraclius, the strategos of Africa, impelled by the Senate, armed his son Heraclius and sent him [by sea] against Phocas the tyrant" (Geanakoplos 1984, 90; Geanakoplos' brackets; see also *Annus Mundi* 6101 in Mango and Scott 1997, 426). The Senate later reconstituted its *corporeal body* when in 640/641 AD, according to Theophanes, it "deposed Heraclonas", the son of Emperor Heraclius, "along with his mother Martina and [general] Valentine, and they [by order of the Senate] cut off the tongue of Martina and the nose of Heraclonas, and expelling them, they [the Senators] raised to the throne Constans [II], the son of Constantine [and] grandson of Heraclius" (Geanakoplos 1984, 90; Geanakoplos' brackets; see also *Annus Mundi* 6133 in Mango and Scott 1997, 475). After the Senate deposed Heraclonas and gave Constans II the throne, Constans himself made the following speech as recorded in Theophanes' *Chronographia*:

"I am the son of my father Constantine, who was son of his father, my grandfather Heraclius, who [Constantine] ruled with Heraclius a long time and after Heraclius, he also ruled for a very brief time. The jealousy of Martina, his stepmother, when it was aroused, took his life, and this for the sake of Heraclonas, born of her and Heraclius's lawlessness [incest]. Your decree [of the Senate] with the help of God justly deprived her and her child of the empire, because the senators, who were well known for their

outstanding piety, could not endure lawlessness in the empire of the Romans. Therefore, I call on you to act as the advisers and judges for the common good of the subjects [of the empire.]" (Geanakoplos 1984, 91; Geanakoplos' brackets; see also Annus Mundi 6134 in Mango and Scott 1997, 475–476)

After the above speech was made, Theophanes reports that Constans "gave the senators abundant gifts and dismissed the Senate" (Geanakoplos 1984, 91; see also Annus Mundi 6134 in Mango and Scott 1997, 476). So even though the Byzantine Senate used its *symbolic body* to reestablish its *corporeal body*, its restored authority in the Eastern Roman polity was short-lived given the 9th-century laws of Emperor Leo VI (i.e., *Novellae*) where, according to Geanakoplos, "the Senate's authority was revoked and [...] lost, even in theory, virtually all of its authority" (Geanakoplos 1984, 91; brackets mine). But whatever its final fate, the Byzantine Senate's symbolic and corporeal agency did not translate into a *sovereign senatorial will*, or *senatorii qua senatorii*, since the Senate failed to prevent Emperor Justinian from stripping its powers and failed to stop Emperor Leo VI's *Novellae* from taking effect (never mind the fact that the Senate was established by Constantine's kingly powers). In other words, the monarchical overruling of senatorial authority shows that the presence of non-monarchical political agency in the Eastern Roman polity, however active, neither proves nor reveals the presence of political sovereignty be it senatorial or, for Kaldellis, popular.

The fifth counterfactual to the republican model involves *military coups* such as the (successful) overthrow of Emperor Maurice (reign: 582–602 AD) by General Phocas and the (ultimately failed albeit initially successful) overthrow of Emperor Justinian II by General Leontios. When Maurice succeeded Tiberius as emperor in 582 AD, he "found the treasuries empty" and "was forced to adopt a policy of severe restraint" (Whitby 1988, 18 citing John of Ephesus). Said policy resulted in opposition by civilian and military strata of Byzantine society. Among civilians, Maurice "was fiercely mocked and ridiculed by the multitude, loaded with

abuse, and called greedy, mean, and ungenerous" (Whitby 1988, 18 quoting John of Ephesus). Said abuse was (and still is) unfair not only because Maurice's thriftiness was defined and driven by circumstances, but also because Maurice did exercise *philanthropia*, in spite of his policy of frugality, when he, according to Theophanes, "consoled the crowds of the poor with silver" upon arriving at Rhesion in Thrace in 590/591 AD (Annus Mundi 6083 in Mango and Scott 1997, 391). Among soldiers, there were "mutineers in the eastern Roman army in 588 who, incensed at an attempt to reorganize or reduce military pay, overturned the icons of Maurice, chanting that they would not endure to be ruled by a shopkeeper" (Whitby 1988, 18 citing Theophylactus Simocatta). And despite "giv[ing] thirty 'talents' for the repair of Constantinople's aqueducts and grant[ing] a one-third remission of taxes", the *ochlos*, or mob, in Constantinople "chose to insult Maurice in 602 with the chant 'Maurice the Marcianist'" (MAYPIKIE MAPKIANISTATA with Marcianism being an anti-charity Christian heretical sect) (Whitby 1988, 19 citing Theophylact Simocatta and Theophanes; brackets mine). Later "bouts of popular unrest and hostility towards Maurice [were] provoked by the Avar invasions of 587 and 598 AD" (Whitby 1988, 24 citing Theophylact Simocatta and Theophanes Confessor; brackets mine). The popular riot of 598 AD, specifically, was caused, according to Walter Kaegi, by the Byzantine "soldiers' discontent with [General] Comentiolus" prefaced by "Maurice refus[ing] to ransom the 12,000 (!) Byzantine prisoners of wars whom the Avar Khan held" (Kaegi 1981, 109 citing John of Antioch, Theophanes and Georgios Monachos; brackets mine). Theophylact Simocatta offers the following report on Maurice's response to the riot:

[...] the Roman forces in Thrace sent ambassadors to the emperor Maurice with accusations of treachery against Comentiolus the general. Then fierce dissension arose in the royal city [i.e., Constantinople], and the emperor appointed arbitrators for Comentiolus and the ambassadors; in fact, when the judicial assembly took place, and the emperor pleaded with the ambassadors, the indictment received a check and Comentiolus again became general. When summer came round, he left the city; since

the Romans had resolved their grievance with the general, Comentiolus collected the army, came to the river Ister, and united with Priscus at Singidunum. On the fourth day, an assembly of the armies was held, and after Priscus had made a speech the peace between Avars and Romans was severed: for the emperor Maurice had ordered the generals by royal command to contravene the treaty. (*History* 8.1.9–8.2.1 in Whitby 1986, 210; brackets mine)

That Maurice responded to the rioters in Constantinople neither proves nor reveals that the Eastern Roman polity was a monarchical republic. How so? Because if Byzantium were a republican monarchy, then Maurice would have also responded to the plight of the Byzantine prisoners of war by paying the ransom "even when the Khan reduced his price from one *nomisma* each to one-half *nomisma* and then finally to four *siliqua*" rather than have all the prisoners ultimately killed by the Avars (Kaegi 1981, 109; Kaegi's emphasis). In other words, imperial response was not guaranteed and *ignorance/negligence* on the part of the emperor can serve as a source of discord rendering Byzantium, as stated earlier, a messy monarchy:

Fiscal exigencies alone cannot explain the failure of Maurice to ransom the Byzantine prisoners, because he had sufficient money to purchase peace from the Avar Khan. Sheer ignorance of the true situation in the Balkans may have been partly responsible for this decision. Whether or not Maurice believed that the soldiers were not worth ransoming, or even if he believed that they endangered the empire because of their seditiousness, their slaughter indubitably raised hatred against him both inside the army and among the civilian population. Maurice supposedly repented for his refusal to ransom the soldiers; he gave money to monasteries and allegedly experienced ominous dreams. (Kaegi 1981, 109–110)

In February of 602 AD, rioting broke out again in Constantinople "the direct cause being a famine that perhaps had its origin in civil unrest in Egypt" (Whitby 1988, 24 citing Theophylact Simocatta, Theophanes Confessor and John of Nikiu). Whatever caused the riot of 602, the emperor's "half-hearted punishment of the rioters may have been interpreted as a sign of weakness" compounded by the unpopularity of Constantine Lardys (or Lardos), the praetorian prefect and *logothete* or civil administrator (Whitby 1988, 24–25 citing Theophanes Confessor; see Kazhdan 1991, 1247 on the logothetes' functions). Constantine Lardys, according to

Theophylactus Simocatta, was "a very distinguished member of the senate [...] who some time before had received from the emperor the control of the taxes of the east", a "man Maurice had retained among the foremost men of power" (*History* 8.9.6 in Whitby and Whitby 1986, 223; brackets mine). Theophylact and Theophanes both report the populace destroying Lardys' domicile where the former states that "on a senseless impulse the masses madly burnt down with all-consuming fire the house of Constantine" (*History* 8.9.5 in Whitby and Whitby 1986, 223) and the latter states that "the Green faction set fire to the house of Constantine" (Annus Mundi 6094 in Mango and Scott 1997, 413). In the Byzantine army operating on the Haemus frontier, or Balkan front, Maurice's "continued support for the unpopular general Comentiolus [...] caused resentment which then broke out into open mutiny over the order to winter north of the Danube" (Whitby 1988, 25 citing Theophylact Simocatta; brackets mine). Said mutiny initially was about "obtaining improvements in military service" (Whitby 1988, 25 citing John of Nikiu). The rebellious Eastern Roman army, except Maurice's brother General Peter and high-level officers, later "*congregated and put up the centurion Phocas as their leader, and having raised him on a shield, they acclaimed him as leader*" (Annus Mundi 6094 in Mango and Scott 1997, 412; emphasis mine). When notified about the rebellion by Peter, Maurice "tried to keep it secret from the people" but on the next day when the emperor "held the chariot races", a dialogue ensued between the Greens, the Blues and Maurice indicating that news of the revolt spread; the dialogue occurred in 601/602 AD with the Greens first shouting at the emperor, and then Emperor Maurice responding to the Greens and the Blues later responding in defense of the emperor (Annus Mundi 6094 in Mango and Scott 1997, 412):

Greens (faction): 'Constantine and Domentziolos, O thrice-august master of the Romans, are vexing your own colour so that Kroukes may become our manager, for the sins we have committed. But God, the creator of everything, will subject to you without bloodshed every opponent and enemy both at home and abroad.'

Maurice: 'The unruliness and indiscipline of stupid soldiers should not disturb you at all.'

Blues (faction): 'God, who commanded you to be emperor, will subject to you all who fight against your realm. If there is a Roman who is ungrateful to you, God will subject him to your service without bloodshed.'

Afterwards, Maurice commanded the Blues "to guard the city walls with the demarchs" after "having armed them and calmed them with soothing words" (Annus Mundi 6094 in Mango and Scott 1997, 412). The Greens, however, "honoured the usurper Phocas with great acclamation" (Annus Mundi 6094 in Mango and Scott 1997, 413). The factions afterwards *warred* "over the positions of their precincts" with Phocas having "sent out his fellow rebel, Alexander, to calm the factions" resulting in "Alexander c[oming] to blows with Kosmas, demarch of the Blues, whom he shoved and insulted" (Annus Mundi 6094 in Mango and Scott 1997, 413–414; brackets mine). Then the Blues faction "out of annoyance began chanting 'Go away and learn the protocol. Maurice is not dead.'"; upon hearing the chants, Phocas "made ready to murder Maurice" and "sent out some soldiers" who "brought [Maurice and his family] to the harbour of Eutropios at Chalcedon" with Maurice repeating his final words: "Righteous art thou O Lord, and upright are thy judgements" (Annus Mundi 6094 in Mango and Scott 1997, 414; Mango and Scott's brackets). In 602 AD, Phocas finally succeeded in overthrowing Emperor Maurice and killing his brother Peter, members of his government (i.e., Constantine and George), and all his children including his successor, Theodosius, as explained in a letter composed by Pope Gregory the Great on April 25th, 603 AD:

In the name of our Savior, Jesus Christ

During the sixth indiction on the twenty-third day of the month November, in the time of his Lordship, the most blessed Pope Gregory, Phocas was crowned with the Empress Leontia, in the seventh region, in the palace called Secundias, and the Emperor Maurice was killed with all of his male children, that is Theodosius crowned, Tiberius, Peter, Paul and Justinian, as well as Peter, brother of the above-mentioned Emperor Maurice. But also killed were some of the noblemen who were attached to

him, that is Constantine, the patrician in charge of the palace of Placidia, and George, the emperor's notary. (Appendix 8 in Martyn 2004, III, 886)

Maurice's death was regicide executed by a general with support from a fraction of the Byzantine military who gained the support of a fraction of the Byzantine populace. This is evident not only because of the division among the *demes* with the Greens faction promoting Phocas and the Blues faction defending Maurice but also in the division between the Byzantine army stationed in the Haemus peninsula, or Balkans, and the Byzantine army stationed in North Africa. The latter division is important since Heraclius the Elder was appointed *exarch* (ἑξάρχος, provincial governor "holding both civilian and military power" per Kazhdan and Papadakis 1991, 767) of Byzantine North Africa by Maurice and was displeased upon learning about Maurice's demise (Pringle 2001, 44). Unbeknownst to Phocas, Heraclius the Elder made secret plans to overthrow Phocas and actualized them by first severing supplies to Constantinople in 608 AD and then by obtaining the support of Byzantine Egypt in 609 AD, which paved the way for his son, Heraclius the Younger, to become emperor in 610 AD:

Heraclius [the Elder] is unlikely to have received favourably the news of the murders of Maurice and his family. While others in Constantinople and the east openly displayed their opposition to the new regime of Phocas, however, the exarch bided his time, but maintained secret contact with members of the [Byzantine] senate and with the comes excubitorum Priscus. Either because he suspected nothing or, more probably, because he still hoped for Heraclius's support and foresaw difficulties if he tried to dismiss him, Phocas retained the exarch in office. In 608, however, Heraclius decided to act. After cutting Constantinople off from its supplies of African corn and oil, he made Egypt his first military objective. In the autumn of 609, an army under Nicetas, the son of Gregory, supported by the Egyptian party which opposed Phocas, took and successfully defended Alexandria. By spring of the following year, the whole of Egypt was in Nicetas's hands. The merchant fleets of Africa and Egypt were now put to a new use as troops and volunteers were gathered from the provinces to take part in a sea-borne expedition. The fleet sailed in the spring or summer of 610, under the command of Heraclius's son, also named Heraclius. On 2 October it reached Constantinople and penetrated the Sophiana harbour. Three days later, Phocas was beheaded and, later the same day, the young Heraclius was crowned emperor in the palace church of St. Stephen and acclaimed by the senate and the army in St. Sophia. (Pringle 2016, 44; Pringle's underlining, brackets mine; *comes*

*excubitorum* is the leader of the excubitors, "a body of palace guards, probably created by Leo I" according to Mango and Scott 1997, 348 footnote 7)

The above summary of events between Maurice's murder and Phocas' execution offered by Denys Pringle is based on the Byzantine historical accounts of Nicephorus, John of Antioch, Leo the Grammarian, Theophanes and John of Nikiu (see Pringle 2001, 378 notes 4–10). But said summary, more importantly, contradicts Kaldellis' assertion that the "transference [of power] could be accomplished only by popular acclamation (and [that] the people could take back those rights through 'de-acclamation')" (Kaldellis 2015, 44; brackets mine). Heraclius the Younger, as a case in point, was crowned emperor by the Patriarch of Constantinople, Sergius I,<sup>22</sup> and *backed primarily, if not exclusively, by the aggregated strength of the Byzantine army and the Byzantine Senate with an aggregation of acclamations* from the military, Senate and the populace (see Christophilopoulou 1957, 67 for details on Heraclius' coronation). Thus a norm, if not *the* norm, in Byzantine politics entails the *aggregation of Byzantine power through the aggregation of Byzantine factions* applicable not only to the specific case involving Heraclius the Younger's rise to power, but also to the much broader phenomenon entailing the transfer of power from Maurice to Phocas, via military coup, and again from Phocas to Heraclius, via military counter-coup. Said *unrepublican* norm not only reinforces the counterfactual on *factionalism* covered later in this project's historical survey but is also evident in the following case of Justinian II whose rise, fall and return to the throne all occurred outside of the Maurice-Phocas-Heraclius political cycle.

The ouster of Justinian II by General Leontios, unlike what happened to Maurice, was initially successful but ultimately failed as the deposed emperor reclaimed the Byzantine throne, which Justinian first inherited from his father Emperor Constantine IV in September 685 (see Haldon 1990, 70–74 on Justinian II's first reign). That ouster began with the backdrop to, and the aftermath of, the battle of Sebastopolis. According to Theophanes Confessor, Emperor Justinian

II moved many Slavs from the Haemus peninsula (Balkans) to Asia Minor after he and his forces mobilized against them on their way to the Greek city of Thessalonica during the late 680s AD:

In this year Justinian made an expedition against Sklavinia and Bulgaria. He pushed back for the time being the Bulgars who had come out to oppose him and, having advanced as far as Thessalonica, took a multitude of Slavs, some by war, while others went over to him. He made them cross by way of Abydos and settled them in the area of Opsikion. On his return, however, he was waylaid by the Bulgars in the narrow pass and was barely able to make his way, after suffering the slaughter of his army and many wounded. (Annus Mundi 6180 in Mango and Scott 1997, 508; see also Turtledove 1982, 62)

Justinian II's military campaign is verified in an imperial edict from 688 AD inscribing "the exact fact of the Emperor's entry into Thessalonica after his smashing victory over the Slavs" (Vasiliev 1943, 5–6, 8). Furthermore, the emperor's expedition and population transfer are confirmed by the 9th-century Byzantine historians George the Monk (*Chronicon* 729–731 in de Boor and Wirth 1978) and Patriarch Nikephoros of Constantinople, the latter attributing both events to Justinian II "br[eaking] the peace that had been concluded with the Bulgarians" by Constantine IV (*Short History* 38 in Mango 1990, 92–93; brackets mine). Afterwards, in the early 690s AD, Justinian II militarily organized the resettled Slavs, selected a man named Neboulos to lead them, and then mobilized them with a contingent of Eastern Roman cavalrymen against the Arabs at Sebastopolis in Asia Minor:

In this year Justinian made a levy among the Slavs he had transplanted and raised an army of 30,000, whom he armed and named 'the Chosen People'. He appointed Neboulos to be their leader. Being confident in them, he wrote to the Arabs that he would not abide by the written peace treaty. So, taking along the Chosen People and all the cavalry *themata*, he advanced to Sebastopolis, which is by the sea. Now the Arabs feigned to be unwilling to break the peace, which they were obliged to do by the emperor's fault and rashness; and, having also armed themselves, they came to Sebastopolis, protesting to the emperor that the mutual agreements made under oath should not be dissolved; otherwise, God would judge the guilty and take revenge on them. Since the emperor would not even suffer to hear such things, but was pressing for battle, they unfolded the written peace treaty and hung it, instead of a standard, from a tall spear which they carried in front of them, and so rushed against the Romans under the leadership of Mouamed and joined battle. At first the Arabs were

defeated. Mouamed, however, won over the commander of the Slavs who were fighting on the Roman side by sending him a pouch full of gold pieces and, after deceiving him with many promises, persuaded him to join their side together with 20,000 Slavs; and in this way he caused the Romans to flee. Thereupon Justinian killed the rest of them, together with their wives and children, at a rocky place called Leukete near the gulf of Nicomedia. (Annus Mundi 6184 in Mango and Scott 1997, 511; Mango and Scott's emphasis; "special army" in Turtledove 1982, 64; *themata* refer to military provinces governed by generals in Kazhdan 1991, 2034–2035)

The battle of Sebastopolis, despite scholarly debate on its logistics, resulted in a Byzantine retreat when the Arabs, unable to win by force, used guile by bribing Neboulos to switch sides (see Brooks 1909 on debate surrounding Sebastopolis' specific location in Asia Minor). The "Chosen People", or "special army", joining the Arabs was a betrayal for Justinian II who then brutally exterminated all the remaining Slavs of the Opsikion province in Bithynia, northern Asia Minor (see Foss 1991, 1528–1529 on Opsikion). Events prior to, during and after the battle are confirmed, again, by Patriarch Nikephoros (*Short History* 38 in Mango 1990, 92–93) and George the Monk (*Chronicon* 729–731 in de Boor and Wirth 1978); both authors record Justinian II declaring his Slavic corps as the "Chosen People" (Nikephoros: "λαὸν ἐκάλεσε περιούσιον", George: "περιούσιον ἐκεῖνον λαόν") though George describes the corps as "rather unholy" (*mallon de anosion*, "μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνόσιον") given Neboulos' treason (see *Chronicon* 730 in de Boor and Wirth 1978). Interestingly, George's negative description allows for a brief segue regarding the Byzantine worldview where civilized Byzantines contraposed themselves against barbaric non-Byzantines, including Slavic peoples, as explained by Ihor Ševčenko:

By the ninth century, the following truths were held to be self-evident in the field of culture: *the world was divided into Byzantines and barbarians, the latter including not only the Slavs—who occupied a low place on the list of barbaric nations—but also the Latins*; as a city, the New Rome, that is, Constantinople, was superior to all others in art, culture, and size, and that included the Old Rome on the Tiber. *God has chosen the Byzantine people to be a new Israel: the Gospels were written in Greek for the Greeks; in His foresight, God had even singled out the Ancient Greeks to cultivate the Arts and Sciences; and in Letters and Arts, the Byzantines were the Greeks' successors.* 'All the arts come from us,' exclaimed a Byzantine

diplomat during a polemical debate held at the Arab court in the fifties of the ninth century. A curious detail: this diplomat was none other than the future Apostle of the Slavs, Constantine-Cyril. Cyril's exclamation implied that Latin learning, too, was derived from the Greeks. The Greek language, the language of the Scriptures, of the church fathers, also of Plato and Demosthenes, was rich, broad, and subtle: the other tongues, notably the Slavic, had a barbaric ring to them; even the Latin language was poor and 'narrow.' *The Byzantines maintained these claims for almost as long as their state endured.* (Ševčenko 1984, 290; emphasis mine)

If Ševčenko is correct, then the imperial elevation of Slavic tribes would have run *counter* to the general will, if existent, of the Byzantine populace. This despite the fact that "[t]he Slavs whom Justinian transplanted to Asia Minor in 688 were already Christians" with "a bishopric [...] established for them in Asia Minor" (Vasiliev 1943, 8; see also Komatina 2014; brackets mine). For Elias Anagnostakis, the *Chosen People* from Biblical history constituted a "consoling refuge for [Byzantine] people who were agonizingly experiencing the Slavic raids and the expansion of the Arabs" during Justinian II's reign (Anagnostakis 2001, 330: "παρηγορητικό καταφύγιο στους ανθρώπους που εναγώνια βιώνουν τις σλαβικές επιδρομές και την επέλαση των Αράβων"; brackets and translation mine). Getting back to the battle of Sebastopolis, there is scholarly debate surrounding the historicity of the conflict's aftermath involving Justinian II's wrath against the remaining Slavs of the Opsikion province.

The massacre of Opsikion's Slavic element has generated differing views among 20th-century historians some of which dispute the event and, by extension, the extent of Justinian II's power. The historians in question include John Haldon, George Ostrogorsky, Andreas N. Stratos, and Constance Head. But however compelling the following historical views are, it is Nicolas Oikonomides' analysis of Byzantine seals that not only tempers, yet substantiates, Theophanes' account but also captures the concreteness of the *emperor's wrath* reflecting an aspect of, as stated earlier, the *unrepublican* relationship between the emperor and his subjects.

According to John Haldon's view, Justinian II's eradication of the Bithynian Slavs "seems

to be a later and not very reliable accretion to the account [of Theophanes]" (Haldon 1990, 72; brackets mine), a position that George Ostrogorsky also shares in stating that "[i]t is not of course possible to credit Theophanes when he says that in revenge Justinian II ordered all the Slavs in Bithynia to be massacred" (Ostrogorsky and Hussey 1968, 131–132; brackets mine). But given, in Haldon's own words, "Justinian's desire for military glory" (Haldon 1990, 72), it is unsurprising for Justinian to exact revenge against those who frustrated said desire especially given the emperor's vengeance against General Leontios' seizure of the Byzantine throne.

Though Haldon and Ostrogorsky doubt Theophanes, Andreas N. Stratos and Constance Head *reject* Theophanes. For Stratos, "Theophanes' account about the massacre of the Slavs is erroneous" (Stratos 1980, 38), a position based on a Byzantine "seal [...] which belonged to the imperial delegate who governed the region where the Slavs had settled, bearing the title of the consul" that "mentions 'the mercenaries, the Slavs of the province of Bithynia' and bears the date Indiction 8'" (Stratos 1980, 37 quoting Schlumberger 1903; brackets mine). Constance Head also dismisses Theophanes' account on the same grounds (along with evidence of the massacre's absence in Patriarch Nikephoros' "'713 source'" and Michael the Syrian's *Chronicle*): "This indisputable evidence [i.e., Byzantine seal dated to 694/695 AD] of a flourishing Sklavinian corps in Bithynia at a time *after* Theophanes' report would lead us to think they were wiped out assures us almost beyond a doubt that the tale of the emperor's terrible vengeance is without foundation in fact" (see Head 1972, 43–44; Head's emphasis, brackets mine). Nicolas Oikonomides finds correct Theophanes' account, albeit exaggerated, offering a more nuanced and accurate analysis of what happened to the Bithynian Slavs while explaining the aforesaid Byzantine seal, part of a series of seals "bear[ing] the name George apo hypaton, a well-known kommerkiarios of the first reign of Justinian II, attested from 690/91 to 695/96" (Oikonomides

and Zachariadou 2017, Chapter VIII, 53; brackets mine):

[...] the historian [i.e., Theophanes] uses here the word ἀνεῖλεν [*aneilen*], the common meaning of which is "killed" but which can also mean "uprooted." It is possible that some executions or massacres of Slavs may have occurred in order to quell the emperor's thirst for revenge; but of course one cannot believe that a whole population of thousands had been exterminated while they were at the emperor's mercy and could be used in a more productive—and profitable—way: be sold as slaves. The Byzantine defeat at Sebastopolis occurred in summer 692. The emperor's revenge may have taken place in 693 and 694. Before the beginning of the eighth indiction, that is, before 1 September 694 George apo hypaton had a seal carved, on which he mentioned the Slav slaves of the province of Bithynia. It is too much of a coincidence not to link the two facts closely: George was in charge of selling the Bithynian Slavs on behalf of the state (who was their owner, since they had been "confiscated" by imperial order). [...] So George was granted the concession to exercise this same trade in several other provinces. [...] This procedure also explains why the imperial portrait appears on the seals of those who operated the business: it guaranteed that the sale was properly authorized; probably, the seals were placed at the bottom of the deed of sale accompanying each slave, if not directly on his chains. (Oikonomides and Zachariadou 2017, Chapter VIII, 53; brackets mine; see also Kazhdan and Oikonomides 1991, 1141 and Oikonomides 1985, 21 on the *kommerkiarioi* defined in the latter source as "(customs officials) who controlled the movement and sale of certain merchandise in the provinces.")

And contrary to Stratos and Head, other Byzantine seals from the Opsikion theme make no mention of any enduring Slavic presence in Bithynia after the battle of Sebastopolis (see Schlumberger 1884, 248–251 and Nesbitt and Oikonomides 1996, 55–73). All this to show that Justinian II's wrath was not a product of historiographical fantasy but rather an historical reality reflecting a real facet of the *unrepublican* relationship between the emperor and his subjects in the messy monarchy that is the Eastern Roman polity. More importantly, for any polity that can one day arbitrarily grant special status to a portion of its non-citizen population and then, upon suffering treason, either massacre and/or enslave that same population cannot qualify as a republic, monarchical or otherwise. This is not to say that republics and their proponents do not punish traitors. Rather, a polity's conversion of *non-citizens into citizens with extra-legal rights* only to later re-convert them into *enemies of the polity stripped of all rights* is not of the same

quality, broadly speaking, as republicanism's powers of rights-granting/rights-stripping where the goal presumably is to add to or subtract from, depending on the circumstances, the body-politic's established pool of civically/legally equal members. And as the following events will show, it is the *will to the throne* that defines the reign of Justinian II especially the second reign where the emperor, deposed by the usurper General Leontios, overcame obstacles to his return to power and exacted revenge against Leontios.

Around one year after the Byzantine retreat at Sebastopolis, Justinian II appointed Stephen the Persian and Theodotos, two morally dubious individuals, whose oppressive activities resulted in corruption in the Eastern Roman government. Their actions, including torture, property seizure, and imprisonments, caused resentment towards the emperor:

As for Justinian, he busied himself with constructions in the palace. He built Justinian's Hall, as it is called, and the circuit wall of the palace. He appointed as supervisor of works, as lord and master his treasurer and chief eunuch, Stephen the Persian, a most bloodthirsty and cruel man who, not content with punishing the workmen pitilessly, used to stone them as well as their foremen. The emperor being absent, this wild beast even dared to have his mother, the Augusta Anastasia, whipped with a strap as if she were a child. *Having done much evil in these respects as well as to the entire body of citizens, he caused the emperor to be hated.* Furthermore, Justinian appointed as head of the State treasury a certain monk called Theodotos, who had previously been a hermit on the Thracian side of the Bosoporus, a terrible and savage man who, quite gratuitously and without cause, inflicted demands, exactions and confiscations on many dignitaries of the state and prominent men, both among the administrators and the inhabitants of the City, whom he hanged from ropes, placing smoking straw beneath them. In addition, the prefect, by imperial command, threw many men in prison and caused them to be confined for several years. *All these acts increased the people's hatred of the emperor.* (Annus Mundi 6186 in Mango and Scott 1997, 513, emphasis mine; see also Turtledove 1982, 65)

The ruthlessness of the appointed ministers, along with Justinian II commanding Stephen "to kill at night the people of Constantinople starting with the patriarch", set the stage for Justinian's ouster from the throne by General Leontios who became emperor with the support of Paul the Monk, Gregory the Cappadocian, and *his own men* (see Annus Mundi 6187 in Mango and Scott

1997, 514). Paul, "monk of the monastery of Kallistratos", Gregory, "a *kleisourarch* [who] later became monk and abbot of the monastery of Florus", and other "[c]lose friends [...] frequently visited [the imprisoned Leontios] and assured him that he would become Roman emperor" stating: "Do but hearken to us and follow us." (Annus Mundi 6187 in Mango and Scott 1997, 514; the *kleisourarch* was "an officer [...] who commanded a strategic pass" according to Mango and Scott 1997, 490, footnote 2; Mango and Scott's emphasis, brackets mine).

Once freed, Leontios immediately released prisoners, both soldiers and noblemen, and even persuaded the Patriarch of Constantinople to support him; the people in the capital, as the following detailed report from Theophanes shows, mutilated Justinian and exiled the emperor to Cherson (i.e., ancient Greek colony under New Roman suzerainty briefly controlled by the Khazars, see APPENDIX V for details), then punished Theodotos and Stephen the Persian by publicly burning them, and finally declared Leontios king:

Leontios went in, opened the prison cells, and released the prisoners, a numerous band of brave men, most of them soldiers, who had been confined six or eight years. He gave them arms and went to the Forum with them, shouting, 'All Christians to St Sophia!' He also sent emissaries to each region with orders to proclaim the same call. The populace of the City was perturbed and hastily gathered in the atrium of the church. Leontios himself, together with his friends, the two monks, and some of the more prominent men that had come out of prison, went up to the Patriarchate to see the patriarch. Finding him equally perturbed by the order given to the patrician Stephen Rousios, he persuaded him to come down to the atrium and cry out, 'This is the day that the Lord hath made!' Then the whole multitude raised the shout, 'May Justinian's bones be dug up!' And so all the people rushed to the Hippodrome. When it was day, they brought Justinian out into the Hippodrome through the Sphendone and, after cutting off his nose and tongue, banished him to Cherson. The mob seized both the monk Theodotos, who was logothete of the *genikon*, and the *sakellarios* Stephen the Persian, and after tying ropes round their feet, dragged them through the main street to the Forum Bovis and burnt them there. And thus they proclaimed Leontios emperor. (Annus Mundi 6187 in Mango and Scott 1997, 515; Mango and Scott's emphasis, brackets mine; see also Turtledove 1982, 66–67; the *genikon* refers to the "major fiscal department that dealt with assessment of land and other taxes, maintaining the lists of taxpayers, and collecting payments" per Kazhdan 1991, 829–830; the *sakellarios*, "in the early period", was "connected with the care of the imperial bedchamber" per Kazhdan and Magdalino 1991, 1828–1829)

When Justinian, refusing to accept his fate as an exiled ex-emperor, openly declared to return to power, efforts were made by his enemies, some of whom he personally strangled with a cord, to stop Justinian from reclaiming the Byzantine throne (see *Annus Mundi* 6196 in Mango and Scott 1997, 520–521). The enemies in question included Apsimaros who contacted the Chagan, the leader of the Khazars, "promising him many gifts if [he] would send him Justinian alive" (and "if not, at least his head") with the Khazar ruler "yield[ing] to this request" after initially having "received [Justinian II] with great honour and g[iving] him in marriage his own sister Theodora" (*Annus Mundi* 6196 in Mango and Scott 1997, 520–521; brackets mine). The Chazarian Chagan's duplicity forced Justinian to covertly escape via fishing vessel during which he had a brief dialogue with Myakes, his servant:

Myakes: "Behold, O lord, we are about to die. Make a promise to God for your salvation, so that, if He gives you back your empire, you will not take revenge on any of your enemies."

Justinian II: "If I spare one of them, may God drown me right here!"  
(*Annus Mundi* 6196 in Mango and Scott 1997, 521)

The ex-emperor then sent one of his men, Stephen, to request aid from Lord Terbelis of Bulgaria in exchange for gifts and Justinian's daughter as a bride (*Annus Mundi* 6196 in Mango and Scott 1997, 521; see also Turtledove 1982, 70–71). In around 704/705 AD, Justinian arrived at Constantinople with the assistance of Lord Terbelis' forces, finally returned to the Byzantine throne, and exacted a savage vengeance upon his enemies per God's sign of not drowning him during the storm he encountered while secretly escaping his exile by boat (see *Annus Mundi* 6197 in Mango and Scott 1997, 522–523). Theophanes details the extent of Justinian's wrath:

As for Apsimaros and Leontios, he caused them to be paraded in chains through the whole City; and while games were being held in the Hippodrome and he himself was sitting on the throne, they were dragged publicly and thrown at his feet; and he trod on their necks until the end of the first race while the people cried, 'You have set your foot on the asp and the basilisk, and you have trodden on the lion and the serpent!' He

then sent them to the Kynegion to be beheaded. He blinded the patriarch Kallinikos and banished him to Rome; and in his stead he appointed Kyros, who had been a hermit on the island of Amastis, for having predicted to him his restoration to a second reign. *He also destroyed a numberless multitude from both the civilian and military registers; some he threw into sacks and caused to die painfully in the sea; others he invited to lunch or to dinner and, as soon as they rose from the table, either impaled them or beheaded them. So everyone was seized by great fear.* (Annus Mundi 6197 in Mango and Scott 1997, 522–523; emphasis mine; see also Turtledove 1982, 72)

The restored emperor had General Leontios, along with Apsimaros, humiliated and beheaded, the Archbishop Kallinikos blinded and exiled to Rome, and killed many others, both civilians and martialmen, *ultimately terrifying all*. The people, at least in Constantinople, were fickle as they went from chanting "May Justinian's bones be dug up!" to chanting, upon Justinian's return, "You have set your foot on the asp and the basilisk, and you have trodden on the lion and the serpent." More importantly, the people's mercuriality reveals a *compliance* to the political will of Justinian II out of fear of the emperor's wrath as opposed to anything constituting or even akin to political autonomy. Constance Head states that "the Byzantine chroniclers have exaggerated the extent of Justinian's reprisals" (Head 1970, 15), which occurred during the emperor's second reign beginning in 705 AD (see Head 1969); for example, Justinian II spared Theodosius, the son of his predecessor Emperor Tiberius Apsimar, and made "friendly diplomatic overtures toward the Umayyad Caliphate, traditionally one of Byzantium's worst enemies", by "set[ting] free about six thousand Arab prisoners of war held in custody by his predecessors, Leontios and Apsimar" (Head 1970, 15–17; brackets mine). Embellishments notwithstanding, the effect of Justinian II's reprisals is unquestionable: the Byzantine populace, factional or otherwise, was *terrified into obedience*. This, as a result, refutes Kaldellis' monarchical republicanism model where "the emperor had to cultivate public opinion and keep it on his side" as his "hold on the throne was always a function of public opinion" and that the people "could take matters into their own

hands" (Kaldellis 2015, 117, 154). Also, Justinian II's double reign confirms this project's critique of said model's underlying assumption of Byzantium having such a thing as public opinion (see CHAPTER II, pages 67–69).

On a broader level, Kaldellis' monarchical republican reading conflates factional reactionism with public opinion. He does so in cases where Byzantine provincials "protest burdensome tax increases" such as the "people of Larissa" did in 1066 AD "against [Emperor] Konstantinos X" (Kaldellis 2015, 154; brackets mine).

Dimitris Krallis, another proponent of the *critical view*, states, citing Kekaumenos, that "the main reason for the [11th century rebellion of the people of Larissa and their Vlach neighbors] had been generalized dissatisfaction with newly imposed taxes" with the "people demonstrat[ing] a capacity to mobilize manpower for the defense of local interests" (Krallis 2018, 20 and footnote 28; brackets mine). But the *critical view* exaggerates and misframes Kekaumenos' account of events involving the Larissan uprising. Kekaumenos recounts that Nikoulitzas the Larissan first told Emperor Doukas about the revolt only to be silenced by him:

'Sacred master, a revolt is due to take place in Hellas, and, if you command, I shall recount to you how it is due to take place'. But he instructed him to be silent. [...]. (Nikoulitzas), partly grieved, because the Emperor had not wished to talk with him, and partly afraid, both because of the ominous rumours, and because of the appearance of this sort of star [i.e., a comet], left. (Kekaumenos and Roueché 2013; brackets mine)

Upon his return to his native Larissa, Nikoulitzas discovered more about the conspiracy from its leaders, John Gremianetes and Gregory Bambakes, and then feigned support by stating:

"Certainly, if you do anything, I will do it too." (Kekaumenos and Roueché 2013). Kekaumenos then reports the following dialogue between Nikoulitzas and the emperor:

Kekaumenos: 'I certainly told you, by word of mouth, that a revolt was due to take place, and I wrote to you again about this when I came to my home; and now I declare to your Serenity - at least believe me now - that they have revolted, and made

me their head. So thank God that I have the people safely, and am in a position to destroy this revolt, if you will hear me, and will cancel the tax-increases and tax-declarations that you have created for them'.

Emperor Doukas: 'Whatever I have created since the day that I became emperor, and until today, I remit it all. No man from your side will be banished or exiled, or be sued for any public or private damage, but I remit everything, in the fear of God'. (Kekaumenos and Roueché 2013)

The Larissan rebels, whose stronghold was the "fortress of Servia", attempted an insincere capitulation but were ultimately defeated by Nikoulitzas' loyalist forces (Kekaumenos and Roueché 2013). More importantly, they were *not* political mobilizers exhibiting some underlying quality of democratic sovereignty as they offered to *submit themselves* to "Emperor" Nikoulitzas despite said offer being a ruse: "ourselves as your servants we are, and upon your command we polychronize <you> now" ("ἡμεῖς δοῦλοι σου ἐσμεν, καὶ εἰ κελεύης πολυχρονίζομέν <σε> νῦν"; to *polychronize* means to declare someone emperor wishing him a long reign; Greek text from Kekaumenos and Roueché 2013; English translation mine). And it was ultimately the emperor who altered the cumbersome policies affecting the citizenry and only *at the request of his loyal servant Nikoulitzas who suspected the revolt against the crown from the outset*. As best summarized by Weston Barnes, Konstantinos X Doukas' "reign [from 1059 to 1067 AD] made clear that the bureaucrat party was now to be in power and the people would have to support it as they could not handle the financial tensions and sacrifices needed to strengthen the army against invaders" (Barnes 2019, 519; brackets mine).

Justinian II's second reign lasted until he was executed in 711 AD by a Byzantine general named Philippikos, the first of "three successful usurpers [who] ascended the throne: Philippikos Bardanes (711–13), Anastasios II Artemios (713–15) and Theodosios III (715–17)" (Penna and Morrison 2013, 28; brackets mine). The last of the usurpers, Theodosios III, was interestingly supported by the same Opsikion theme whose Slavic inhabitants betrayed the Byzantines, and by

extension Justinian II, at the battle of Sebastopolis: "in 715 it revolted and installed Theodosios III as emperor; it was the base for the revolt of Artabasdos, its former commander, in 742; its *komes* David suffered blinding for opposing Constantine V in 766; and its troops supported Michael II against Thomas the Slav in 821" (Foss 1991, 1528–1529). It is not only the history of usurpations (i.e., coups and counter-coups) in the Eastern Roman polity that render anachronistic Kaldellis' monarchical republicanism model but also the following counterfactual.

The sixth counterfactual to the republican model involves *factionalism* such as what transpired when different classes in the Eastern Roman polity ousted Michael V and put Zoe back on the throne. After Emperor Romanos III Argyros was drowned to death in 1034 AD, his wife, Empress Zoe, "immediately took control of affairs, apparently under the impression that she was the rightful heir to the throne by divine permission" though in reality "all her efforts were directed to securing the crown for [her second husband] Michael [IV the Paphlagonian]" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 87; brackets mine). Efforts were made to have Zoe change her mind, but "she persisted in her support of Michael, with unwavering loyalty" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 87). Michael's supportive older sibling, John the Eunuch, privately conversed with Zoe and reinforced the empress' position:

Michael's elder brother approached her on the subject privately (he was the eunuch John, a man of outstanding intellect, as well as a man of action). 'We shall die,' he argued, 'if there is any further delay in promoting Michael.' Zoe, now completely won over, at once sent for the young man, clothed him in a robe interwoven with gold, placed on his head the imperial crown, and set him down on a magnificent throne, with herself near him in similar dress. She then issued an order that all those who were living in the palace were to prostrate themselves before both of them and hail them both as sovereigns in common. Of course, the order was obeyed, but when news of it reached those outside the palace also, all the city wanted to share in the rejoicings at her command. *To flatter their new monarch, the majority feigned approval of the proceedings.* (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 88; emphasis mine)

It was ultimately Zoe's power, and neither Roman law nor Roman popular consensus, that made

Michael emperor. The empress' *command* to have her and Michael IV recognized as rulers was *followed unconditionally* by both elites and non-elites with the latter exhibiting flattery towards their new king. How? By virtue of Zoe *being sovereign*, legitimate via tradition *as* legality (i.e., *empsychos nomos*), and by virtue of Zoe's *philanthropy* that, with or without ulterior motives, made her subjects love their queen (i.e., award from the crown priming reciprocity in the form of loyalty to the crown). This is made clear by Psellos when John the Eunuch convinced Michael IV to grant their nephew, Michael Kalaphates, the rank of *Kaisar* (i.e., second-in-command of state affairs) admitting that Zoe has sovereign power in the Eastern Roman polity:

'You know, Sir, that *the Empire belongs by inheritance to Zoe, and the whole nation owes greater allegiance to her, because she is a woman and heir to the throne. Moreover, being so generous in her distribution of money, she has won the hearts of the people completely.* I suggest, therefore, that we should make her mother to our nephew – if she adopts him it will be more propitious – and at the same time persuade her to promote him to the dignity and title of Caesar. She will not refuse. Zoe is accommodating enough, and in any case she cannot oppose us in any way.' (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 100–101; emphasis mine)

After the death of Michael IV in 1041 AD, his nephew, Michael Kalaphates, succeeded him as Michael V. During his short reign, Michael V had Empress Zoe "condemned [...] as a poisoner", had "[w]itnesses suborned to give false evidence", "proceeded to question her on matters of which she knew nothing", "compelled [her] to account for her actions and [...] then convicted [her] of the most abominable crimes" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 134–135; brackets mine). Zoe was then "put on board ship, together with certain persons who were given full liberty to insult her" and was ultimately "[e]xiled from the palace" to the island of Prinkipo (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 134–135; brackets mine). The empress' exile was *not* well-received:

Throughout the city, however – and I am speaking here of persons of every kind and fortune and age – a feeling of dissatisfaction and confusion gradually became more apparent. It was as if the natural harmony of the city had been interrupted. There was at first an undercurrent of anxiety which slowly made itself felt everywhere. Everyone was concerned over the empress's conviction. Deep in their hearts men had

grim forebodings and they began to speak freely about them. As the story of her new position in the State became generally known, the whole city quite obviously went into mourning. [...] On the second day no one any longer held his tongue. The ruling classes, the clergy, even the emperor's family and household staff, were talking about it. Those engaged in business, too, prepared themselves for deeds of daring, and not even the foreigners and allies whom the emperors are wont to maintain by their side – I am referring to the Scyths from the Taurus – were able to restrain their anger. *The indignation, in fact, was universal and all were ready to lay down their lives for Zoe.* (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 137–138; brackets and emphasis mine)

Disparate members of the Eastern Roman polity united against Michael V not as a *demos qua demos*, but as *defenders of Zoe as the true ruler of their domain*. The "common mob" was "greatly stirred at the prospect of exercising tyranny over him who had himself played the tyrant" where "[e]very man was armed" though "the bulk of the mob [...] ran in general disorder" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 138; brackets mine). But what did the people *say*? Psellus, as an eyewitness, recorded the following *lamentation* from the women:

And the women – but how can I explain this to people who do not know them? I myself saw some of them, whom nobody till then had seen outside the women's quarters, appearing in public and shouting and beating their breasts and lamenting terribly at the empress's misfortune, but the rest were borne along like Maenads, and they formed no small band to oppose the offender. 'Where can she be,' they cried, 'she who alone is noble of heart and alone is beautiful? Where can she be, she who alone of all women is free, the mistress of all the imperial family, the rightful heir to the Empire, whose father was emperor, whose grandfather was monarch before him – yes, and great-grandfather too? How was it this low-born fellow dared to raise a hand against such a woman of such lineage? How could he conceive so vile a thought against her? No other soul on earth would dream of it.' (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 138–139)

Getting back to the mob, it "decided first to attack the emperor's family and tear down their proud and luxurious mansions" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 140). The emperor himself "sat in the palace, at first by no means alarmed at the course of events [...] but when the revolution was afoot beyond all doubt and the people adopted military formations [...] then he was fearfully troubled" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 140; brackets mine). Michael V was surrounded and "was at a loss what to do" and "had no ally in the palace nor could he send out for help" though help did

finally arrive in the form of the Nobilissimus and his "armed [...] household staff" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 140; brackets mine; the *Nobilissimos* or *Nobelissimus* is "a high-ranking dignity" that before the mid-11th century AD "was reserved for members of the imperial family (e.g., Michael V's uncle Constantine)" according to Kazhdan 1991, 1489). Both the emperor and the Nobilissimus made the following key decision that would only galvanize the people's rage:

*They determined then to recall the empress from exile at once – it was through her that the mob had broken out in revolt and the war was being fought on her behalf.* (Psellus and Sewter 1979, 141; emphasis mine)

Zoe returned only to concur with "[e]very proposal [the emperor] offered" as she "feared punishment still more awful at the hands of the wicked Michael" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 141–142; brackets mine). She was taken to "a balcony on the Great Theatre" and displayed before the rebels though "the people were in no hurry to recognize the lady" with "[t]hose who did know her [being] all the more incensed at the tyrant's stratagem" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 142; brackets mine). Afterwards, the rebels developed "a new plan" since they were "afraid lest the combined efforts of Michael and Zoe might yet prove their undoing" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 96). The rebels planned to locate Zoe's sister, Theodora, and did so in an organized manner by appointing Constantine Cabasilas "to act as general at the head of their column" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 144 and footnote 1). Upon finding her, Theodora's reaction towards the rebels was less than welcoming:

Astounded by the unexpectedness of this sight, she refused at first to give way to their pleading and shut herself up in the church, deaf to every entreaty. The citizen army, however, giving up all hope of persuasion, used force, and some of their number, drawing their daggers, rushed in as if to kill her. Boldly they dragged her from the sanctuary, brought her out into the open, and clothed her in a magnificent robe. Then they made her sit on a horse, and forming a circle all about her, they led her to the great church of St Sophia. Homage was paid to her, not now by a mere fraction of the people, but by all the *élite* as well. Everyone, with utter disregard for the tyrant and loud applause for her, proclaimed Theodora empress. (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 144; Sewter's emphasis, brackets mine)

That the citizens "proclaimed Theodora empress" was because she was "the second child of an emperor" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 144). When Michael V received word of what transpired, he "embarked on one of the imperial ships and landed with his uncle at the holy Studite monastery" where "he laid aside his emperor's garments and put on the clothes of a suppliant and refugee" (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 144–145). The absence of the emperor and his closest supporters was felt throughout the polity:

As soon as their flight became known in the city, the hearts of all men, hitherto filled with fear and grim forebodings, were now relieved of anxiety. Some made thank-offerings to God for their deliverance, others acclaimed the new empress, while the common folk and the loungers in the market joined in dancing. The revolution was dramatized and they composed choral songs inspired by the events that had taken place before their eyes. More numerous still was the crowd that rushed in one wild swoop upon the tyrant himself, intent on cutting him down, on slitting his throat. (Psellus and Sewter 1966, 145)

For Kaldellis, the emperor was legitimate because of popular "acclamations at his accession" and illegitimate when "the 'entire people' reached a point of consensus against an emperor" exhibited in the people "shouting the rallying cry 'Dig up his bones'" and "chant[ing] 'Unworthy (ἀνάξιος),' that is, of the throne" (Kaldellis 2015, 92–93; brackets mine). But what Kaldellis downplays is the fact that the people's consensus against Michael V was a *product of Zoe's philanthropy and so the people were primed to fight for Zoe qua Romanía-Graikía* when Michael exiled Zoe to Prinkipio (and *not* for themselves as *demos qua demos*). The fight was ultimately in the name of monarchy evident in the people locating Zoe's sister, Theodora, and forcing her to govern the polity. Kaldellis also omits Constantine Cabasilas in his historiographical narrative regarding Michael V. Had the people "flipped the script" of their polity from monarchy to a republican monarchy, then they would have appointed Cabasilas emperor and not Theodora from the House of Basil Bulgarslayer. But *why* Cabasilas? Because the people were organized well enough to grant him command with nothing preventing them from appointing Cabasilas their champion

save their own beholdeness to their mission of *locating an unthroned sovereign worthy of saving their throned sovereign from the tyranny of a usurper*. Moreover, Cabasilas was chosen because the people, as Queen Zoe's loyal followers, saw him as "first among subjects" meaning a subject able to fulfill a quasi-military leadership role (i.e., column general). What this means, broadly, is that even though the Byzantine populace was capable of improvising, its improvisations were dedicated to the imperial throne with column generals like Cabasilas existing as pro-monarchical means designed to serve pro-monarchical ends. And with respect to acclamations, Miguel Vatter correctly notes "Giorgio Agamben's point, that the acclamation is a politico-theological device of imperial sovereignty, and not a republican institution" (Vatter 2021, 502).

The seventh counterfactual to the republican model entails the Eastern Roman citizenry's *general acceptance of imperial socio-economic policies* such as those implemented by Leo III the Isaurian (717–741 AD), Irene the Athenian (797–802 AD), and Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118 AD). The policies of Nikephoros (802–811 AD) are also mentioned but only to illustrate what happens when people challenge the emperor's socio-economic vision. Beginning with Leo III, Salvatore Cosentino, citing Theophanes Confessor, states that "as a retaliation against Rome, the [Byzantine] emperor imposed a capitation tax on one third of the inhabitants of Sicily and Calabria, seized the landed patrimonies of the Roman church in those regions and ordered the new-born male infants to be registered in a fiscal register" (Cosentino 2021, 46; see also Barnes 2019, 219; brackets mine). The cause for such onerous policies, beknownst to Consentino (see Consentino 2021, 46), was Leo's anger towards the Papacy for severing Rome and Italy from Byzantine jurisdiction as the following passage from Theophanes makes clear:

Now the emperor [i.e., Leo III], who was furious with the pope for the secession of Rome and Italy, fitted out and dispatched against them a great fleet under the command of Manes, *strategos* of the Kibyraiots. The wretched man was, however, put to shame when the fleet was shipwrecked in the Adriatic Sea. Then God's enemy

[i.e., Leo III] became even more furious: possessed by his Arab mentality, he imposed a capitation tax on one third of the people of Sicily and Calabria. As for the so-called Patrimonies of the holy chief apostles who are honoured in the Elder Rome (these, amounting to three and a half talents of gold, had been from olden times paid to the churches), he ordered them to be paid to the Public Treasury. He also decreed that watch should be kept to have new-born male infants entered in a register as the Pharaoh had aforetime done in the case of the Jews—something that not even his mentors the Arabs have ever done to the Christians in the East. (Annus Mundi 6224 in Mango and Scott 1997, 568; Mango and Scott's emphasis, brackets mine; see also Turtledove 1982, 101)

Theophanes refers to Leo III's "Arab mentality" though "'Saracen-minded' (Gk. *sarakēnophrōn*)" (Sahner, 2021, 536; Sahner's emphasis) is the more accurate translation meaning "influenced by the Arab Muslims" (Haldon and Brubaker 2011, 422). Either way, Theophanes' description of Leo III's mind was, according to Christian C. Sahner, a "slanderous claim" that "circulated alongside stories claiming that the Jewish magician who had inspired Yazīd [of the Umayyad Caliphate] eventually bolted for Byzantium, where his ideas came to influence the emperor and his court" (Sahner 2021, 536; brackets mine). Furthermore, as Stephen Gero notes, the "accusation *Σαρακηνόφρων*, <<Saracen-minded>>, levelled at the iconoclasts is conspicuously absent from the works of John of Damascus, and Theosebes, the author of the *Νουθεσία*, both of whom wrote in Muslim territory" (Gero 1973, 61; Gero's emphasis). Said stories, according to Mike Humphreys summarizing Gero's position, constitute "an iconophile calumny" since "Iconoclasm began as a conservative, rigorist movement under Leo that was entirely about the Old Testament's commandments against idolatry" (Humphreys 2021a, 8; brackets mine). But the aim of this survey's particular counterfactual is neither to examine Iconoclasm's causes nor lend credence to Theophanes' iconophile biases but rather to illustrate the general acceptance of Leo's cumbersome socio-economic policies.<sup>23</sup>

According to Salvatore Consentino, Leo's imperial policies against Sicily and Calabria (i.e., "capitation tax", "seiz[ure] of landed patrimonies", "fiscal register[ing]" of "new-born male

infants") "ha[ve] been the subject of much scholarly debate" (Cosentino 2021, 46; brackets mine).

But scholarly debate aside, the Byzantine capitation tax, at the very least, was onerous given its subjection to imperial forgiveness and generally paid by the Papacy until Gregory II's boycott according to Ian Wood citing both the *Liber Pontificalis* (*Book of the Pontiffs*) and Theophanes:

We get some sense of the burden from the *Liber Pontificalis*, where we hear that Justinian II remitted the *annonocapita/annonacapita* (poll-tax) for Sicily and Calabria during the pontificate of John V (685–686), and 200 *annonocapita* for Brutium and Lucania during that of Conon (686–687). In the account of this last pontificate we also hear of the return of the dependents of the Roman patrimony taken as a pledge for the payment of tax arrears. A further indication of the significance of the tax paid by the papacy to the empire is to be found in Gregory II's threat of a tax boycott in c. 724–726, recorded by the *Liber Pontificalis*, and by Theophanes, who notes: 'When Gregory, the Pope of Rome, had been informed of this [the removal of the holy and venerable icons], he withheld the taxes of Italy and Rome and wrote to Leo a doctrinal letter.' The pope subsequently distributed particularly large amounts of money to the poor, to prevent the Exarch Eutychius getting hold of it. (Wood 2022, 170–171; Wood's emphasis and brackets)

But one could argue that the Papacy's response to Leo's imperial policies constitutes an *external affair* and therefore inapplicable to this counterfactual's focus on *internal affairs* meaning the Byzantine response to Byzantine imperial policies. With that said, there is evidence from Theophanes that Leo's policies were not limited to fits of imperial rage. In 739/740 AD, Constantinople's fortifications were felled by a massive earthquake that struck the city resulting in the emperor to raise taxes for repairs, *which the people accepted*:

In the same year a violent and fearful earthquake occurred at Constantinople on 26 October, indiction 9, a Wednesday, in the 8th hour. Many churches and monasteries collapsed and many people died. [...] The quakes continued for twelve months. On seeing that the walls of the City had fallen down, the emperor [Leo] addressed the people saying: 'You do not have the means to build the walls, so we have given orders to the tax collectors to exact according to the register one additional *miliaresion* for every gold piece. The imperial government will collect that and build the walls.' *So started the custom of paying two extra carats to the tax gatherers.* (Annus Mundi 6232 in Mango and Scott 1997, 572; brackets and emphasis mine)

Leo, specifically, "imposed an increment of one silver *miliaresion* per gold *nomisma* of tax (that

is, an increase of 8.33%)" giving, according to Nicolas Oikonomides, "the impression that at least part of the tax must have been collected in money" (Oikonomides and Solman 2002, 981). If Oikonomides is correct and Leo's tax increase was collected, albeit in part, then that means that the Byzantine citizenry generally paid regardless if they loved or loathed the emperor. Oikonomides later cites the Byzantine chroniclers Theophanes and Nikephoros with respect to Leo III's successor, Constantine V, who "like 'some new Midas,' resolved to collect all the precious metals of the empire; the farmers, who did not possess gold coins, were ruined, for they were compelled to sell their harvest off cheaply so as to be able to pay their taxes, while in the cities goods were plentiful and cheap" (Oikonomides and Solman 2002, 981).

With respect to our next example, Irene the Athenian's policies, Weston Barnes states that the empress responded to "economic downturns" in the Byzantine polity by "redistributing wealth as a temporary fix and remitting taxes and other fees to monasteries that remained the corner-stone of her political support" (Barnes 2019, 261). She used "bribery as a method of distributing wealth to the citizens of Constantinople" and in 799 AD "appeared from the Church of the Holy Apostles in a golden chariot drawn by generals and city officials" (Barnes 2019, 261). The empress later "rescind[ed] [...] the *commercias* tax on customs and duties in March of 800 in Constantinople, Abydos, and Heira" and "forg[ave] municipal taxes in the City" (Barnes 2019, 261; Barnes' emphasis, brackets mine). But Irene's "commercial tax policy was a problem for the businessmen and officials who depended on it for transporting imports and exports", which was an "unwise decision [as it] led to loss of valuable revenue and was a virtual nightmare for the region's commercial economy" (Barnes 2019, 262; brackets mine). And in her attempt "[t]o gain a popularity that she already had in monasteries", Irene "return[ed] icons to the monks" and "eased considerably the duties and taxes they had to pay, especially for the Studites of

Constantinople who practiced strict discipline in Christian education" (Barnes 2019, 262; brackets mine). But Irene seeking popularity is *not*, contra Kaldellis, proof that "the [Byzantine] throne was always a function of public opinion" (Kaldellis 2015, 117; brackets mine). In other words, Irene's policies were not, broadly speaking, an indication of "how concerned emperors were to gain and keep public opinion on their side" (Kaldellis 2015, 140) but rather indicative of political calculations on the part of emperors to use their powers of majesty to secure, or further secure, their place on the throne by politically aggregating and subsuming different Byzantine factions.

As for the policies of Alexios I Komnenos involving taxation, their enforcement by tax collectors was met with acceptance, or at least an absence of resistance, on the part of Byzantine payees beginning with the imperial debasement of Eastern Roman currency. According to Alan Harvey, the gold *nomisma* (νόμισμα, "coin") during the early years of Alexios' rule was already debased, a process that "had begun in the reign of Michael IV (1034–41)" (Harvey 1993, 142). The *nomisma* "was worth in real terms only a third of its full nominal value", which "brought great confusion to the [Byzantine] taxation system, as powerful landowners insisted on paying their taxes in the most heavily debased coinage, effectively paying less in real terms than their full obligation" (Harvey 1993, 142; brackets mine). And "[i]t was common for the collection of taxes to be farmed out to individuals who were obliged to meet their targets in full" such as Nikephoros Artabasdos who was responsible for "the collection of the taxes in the provinces of Macedonia and Thrace" in 1105–1106 AD (Harvey 1993, 142–143; brackets mine). Artabasdos "reported that there were great differences in the payments made by individual villages and these variations had been established long enough to have been customary" with "[s]ome villages ha[ving] been compelled to pay three or four times their theoretical obligation" (Harvey 1993,

143; brackets mine). Drawing from "the archives of the monasteries of Mount Athos", Harvey finds that "[t]he imperial administration had reacted to the debasement [of "the 1070s and 1080s"] by making new tax assessments" with "Lavra and Docheiariou [...] hold[ing] on to all their land without paying any increase" whereas "several estates belonging to the monastery of Iviron were *confiscated and then handed over to members of the Komnenoi family*" (Harvey 1993, 143; emphasis mine, brackets mine). But what happens when the Byzantine citizenry, or a segment of it, challenges their emperor's socio-economic vision? Brutal consequences as the following facts from Nikephoros I's reign will show.

During the reign of Nikephoros I, "a clerical plot was instigated [in 808 AD] with the Quaestor Arsaber in the City to displace the [...] *Basileus*" (Barnes 2019, 273; Barnes' emphasis, brackets mine). Nikephoros, as a result, "punished these men with beatings, confiscation, and a tonsuring for the unfortunate Arsaber in Bithynia" (Barnes 2019, 273). In the same year, "radical new economic reforms by the *Basileus* [...] caused dissension in ecclesiastical circles concerning taxation" and consequently "the Studite monks, led by their founder Theodore and heading 700 monks, rebelled and instigated a plot against the throne using disenfranchised civil servants and clergy" (Barnes 2019, 273; Barnes' emphasis, brackets mine). Nikephoros ultimately "foiled this" second plot, "demanded Theodore take communion from the Patriarch Nicephorus who succeeded Tarasius in 806", and when Theodore "refused twice", the emperor "exil[ed] the first Studite in January, 809" after "h[olding] a brief Synod" (Barnes 2019, 273; Barnes' emphasis, brackets mine). But events covered in this historical survey address the subject of Byzantine monarchical republicanism primarily from the perspective of the Christian Greeks themselves. Which is why it is important in the next section to address the aforesaid subject from the perspective of early modern English scholars familiar with monarchical republicanism itself.

*Byzantium in Early Modern Scholarship on Monarchical Republicanism*

At this point, one must ask whether Byzantium qualified as a monarchical republic to 17th-century English humanists such as George Abbott, John Milton and Thomas Fuller. The reason, as stated earlier, is because of their familiarity with Greek historians *from* the Eastern Roman polity *regarding* the Eastern Roman polity, and because of their first-hand experience with pre-modern republics and those who advocated for republican fidelity to, or rebellion against, a monarch. Milton, for instance, was selected on account of his Greek philological and literary education in England, as well as on account of his access to, and conversance with, texts composed by the Byzantine Greek historians Sozomen and Nicetas Choniates. Had Byzantium been a monarchical republic, we must have expected those with some concrete experience with the concept to have recognized its existence as such. But the better question to posit is what *justified* the disqualification of the Eastern Roman polity as a republic, monarchical or otherwise, by said humanists?

Beginning with John Milton, he "was born in London in 1608, the son of a relatively well-to-do scrivener", and "[i]n 1620 [...] entered St Paul's School" (Dzelzainis 1991, ix; brackets mine). He received a classical education while attending St Paul's, a school "founded on the humanist principles of Erasmus and [English scholar-theologian, John] Colet" (Campbell and Corns 2008, 20; brackets mine; see also Dzelzainis 1991, ix–x). Specifically, Milton studied *Greek* (i.e., Homer, Hesiod, Isocrates, Euripides, Aratus, Theocritus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, "and possibly Demosthenes"), *Latin* (i.e., Virgil, Horace, Sallust, Cicero, Juvenal, Persius, "and possibly Martial"), and *Hebrew* (i.e., "the Hebrew Psalter") (Campbell and Corns 2008, 21). The Greek aspect of Milton's classical education included "Attic and *koiné* Greek", which was later "supplemented by the principal Greek dialects (Aeolic, Doric, and Ionic) and literature written in

those dialects" (Campbell and Corns 2008, 21; Campbell and Corns' emphasis). Milton wrote a *commonplace book* (i.e., a text that "offered a system of recall such that excerpted arguments could be easily accessed under topical headings") that "[s]tudents in English schools [including St. Paul's] were trained to keep [...] as a way of building a structured system of information that would help in the construction of an argument of any sort" (Fulton 2010, 48, 56; brackets mine). Said book, titled *A Common-Place Book*, does not focus on Roman history but cites the 13th-century Greek historiographer Niketas Choniates and states the following regarding the seizing of shipwrecked property in Byzantium:

*The evil custom in England of seiseing all shipwrack as forfeit to the Lord of the Mannor or the inhabitants of that shoar where the ship was wrakt, was also among the Greeks of Constantinople, but condemn'd and forbidden by a severe edict of Andronicus Comnenus the Emperour, though otherwise a most cruell tyrant. See Nicetas Choniates in his life, page 209<sup>th</sup> of his history. (Milton 1630–1650, 58; Milton's emphasis)*

In using the phrase "the Greeks of Constantinople", the author is referring to the Eastern Romans holistically as a Hellenic nation (*not* as a modern nation-state) by juxtaposing them to the entirety of England. Yet, the passage contains an element of nuance where the aforesaid Greeks also constitute a popular class, or *demos*, within the Byzantine capital via Milton's distinguishing the popular custom of seizing shipwrecked property from its elite/governmental opposition. And even though Milton agrees with Comnenus' edict, the Eastern Roman polity is disqualified as a monarchical republic because its main institution, the emperorship, is tyrannical *in se* or runs the risk of becoming tyrannical.

Roman emperorship as a disqualifier for Byzantine monarchical republicanism is also evident in Milton's *A Defence of the People of England*. The text was first published in Latin under the title *Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio* in February 1651 AD and "contains a detailed, moral justification for deposing a tyrant"; it was specifically "a tract commissioned by the new

[English] government" where Parliament, after King Charles I's trial and execution in 1649 AD, "establishe[d] the Council of State to rule in place of the monarch and the House of Lords" (Dobranski 2022, xviii–xix; see also Fulton 2010, 188 and Dzelzainis 1991, xix–xx; brackets mine). The *Defence*, including the following passage relevant to Roman emperorship, was again published in 1692 AD, eighteen years after Milton's death, by English compiler Joseph Washington:

The Soldiers made *Constantine* what he was. But our Laws have made our Parliaments equal, nay, superior to our Kings. The Inhabitants of *Constantinople* resisted *Constantius* an *Arrian* Emperour, by force of Arms, as long as they were able; they opposed *Hermogenes* whom he had sent with a Military power to depose *Paul* an Orthodox Bishop; the house whither he had betaken himself for security, they fired about his ears, and at last killed him right out. *Constans* threatned to make War upon his Brother *Constantius*, unless he would restore *Paul* and *Athanasius* to their Bishopricks. You see those holy Fathers, when their Bishopricks were in danger, were not ashamed to stir up their Prince's own Brother to make War upon him. Not long after, the Christian Soldiers, who then made whom they would Emperors, put to death *Constans* the Son of *Constantius*, because he behaved himself dissolutely and proudly in the Government, and Translated the Empire to *Magentius*. (Milton 1692, 106; Milton's emphasis)

The Eastern Roman polity established by Emperor Constantine is ultimately derived from the Roman military and, more importantly, is *unlike* England with its laws rendering its Parliaments equal to, and even greater than, the English monarchs in terms of authority. And with respect to the death of Emperor Julian the Apostate, who ruled from 361 to 363 AD, Milton goes so far as to quote Sozomen, the 5th-century Greek Church historian:

Nay, is it not reported, that a Christian Soldier in his own Army was the Author of his Death? *Sozomen*, a Writer of the Ecclesiastical History, does not deny it but commends him that did it, if the fact were so;

For it is no wonder, *says he*, that some of his own Soldiers might think within himself, that not only the *Greeks*, but all Mankind hitherto had agreed that it was a commendable action to kill a Tyrant; and that they deserve all mens praise, who are willing to die themselves to procure the liberty of all others; so that the Soldier ought not rashly to be condemned, who in the cause of God and of Religion, was so zealous and valiant.

These are the words of *Sozomen*, a good and Religious man of that age; by which we may easily apprehend what the general opinion of pious men in those days was upon this point. (Milton 1692, 107; Milton's emphasis, brackets mine)

Sozomen, a Constantinopolitan lawyer from Palestine and author of the *Ecclesiastical History*, is important not because he commands Milton's respect but because the historian offers a nuanced insight into Byzantine political life (see Croke 2007, 576–577 and Chesnut 1977, Chapter VIII on Sozomen's background). That insight entails the relationship between the Roman army and the Roman emperor whereby the army's martial will exists and operates as an extension of the emperor's political will though the latter, at least in Julian's case, is beholden to the former. And so if an emperor is unable to secure the loyalty of his own military, then his substantively leading the entire polity becomes a serious challenge. Of course, the subject of Roman soldiers *making* and *slaying* Roman emperors is not treated *in passim* by Milton:

[...] the Soldiers and Commanders of the Army, as oft as they pleased themselves, created new *Emperors*, and sometimes killed good ones as well as bad. I need not mention such as *Verannio*, *Alaximus*, *Eugenius*, whom the Soldiers all on a sudden advanced and made them Emperors; nor *Gratian*, an excellent Prince; nor *Valentinian* the younger, who was none of the worst, and yet were put to death by them. (Milton 1692, 109; Milton's emphasis, brackets mine)

For the author, any lordship appointed or supported *by* the military is vulnerable *to* the military's caprices and thus *imperiled by brutal coups* regardless if the polity's lord is "an excellent Prince" or "a Tyrant" worthy of assassination (i.e., tyrannicide). More importantly, Milton *undeniably separates* the Byzantine polity from monarchical republicanism whereby England's legislative body is *either sovereign or as sovereign as the English imperial throne* (i.e., the King is never above the Law). Milton's monarchical republicanism is evident in his respect for Philo Judaeus and, more so, Aristotle both of whom distinguish kingship from tyranny:

Another *Jewish Author*, *Philo Judaeus*, who was *Josephus* his Contemporary, a very studious man in the Law of *Moses*, upon which he wrote a large Commentary; [...]

The same Author in his second Book, *Allegoriar. Legis*,

A King, says he, and a Tyrant are Contraries. And a little after, A King ought not only to command, but obey.

All this is very true, you'll say, a King ought to observe the Laws, as well as any other man. But what if he will not? What Law is there to punish him? I answer, the same Law that there is to punish other men; for I find no exceptions [...] *Aristotle*, a most exact writer of Politicks, affirms that the *Asiatique* Monarchy, which yet himself calls Barbarous, was according to Law: Politic. 3. [...] For the law, *Aristotle* says, is order. [...] But first let us define a Tyrant, not according to vulgar conceits, but the judgment of *Aristotle*, and of all Learned Men. He is a *Tyrant* who regards his own welfare and profit only, and not that of the people. (Milton 1692, 19–20, 24, 61, 228; Milton's emphasis, brackets mine)

Milton obviously uses Aristotle and Philo, along with other authorities from the Greco-Roman and Biblical traditions (see Fulton 2010, 191), "in rebuttal to the *Royal Defense (Defensio Regia)* written on behalf of Charles II by the then internationally famous French scholar, Claudius Salmasius" (Miller 1973, 108; Miller's emphasis). But *why* Salmasius? Because a key theme, if not *the* key theme, of the Salmasius-Milton dialogue is *regicide* including its justification. As best explained by Stephen B. Dobranski, Salmasius was *against regicide via popular revolt because the people have absolutely no right to go against God's will on Earth*:

Salmasius in his tract sounds morally outraged by the king's trial and sentencing. He decries Charles's execution as "savag[e]," "iron-hearted," "bereft of all sense of humanity," and a "miserable and marvelous murder." For mere men to question a semidivine figure—a monarch ordained by God—and then to condemn and sentence him was, in Salmasius's view, an "atrocit[y]," an act of "wickedness," and something to be "mentioned among the disgraces of the century." *If Charles had been a bad king, Salmasius argues, then the blame lies with the English people. God gives people good kings as a reward; bad kings are a form of divine punishment.* (Dobranski 2022, 84; emphasis mine)

Salmasius' question seeking justification for Charles' death (i.e., "By what right or law?") was ultimately met with Milton's response whereby "bad leaders must always be deposed" (i.e., "By that law of Nature and of God which holds that whatever is for the safety of the state is right and just") (Dobranski 2022, 85). Milton, specifically, designed his work "in the manner of Cicero's

*Philippics*" opposing the *Royal Defense's* "two absolutist propositions; that the people are not the origin of kingly power, which derives directly from God; and that the king is *legibus solutus* (i.e., above all positive laws), and therefore accountable to God alone" (Dzelzainis 1991, xix–xx; Dzelzainis' emphasis). Rebuttal aside, there is, on a broader level, an unbridgeable chasm in *A Defence of the People of England* between Byzantium and *all* republics including the *Hebraic Republic*. But what exactly is a "respublica Hebraeorum" for Milton? It is, according to Nathan R. Perl-Rothman, "the original form of government given by God to the Israelites [which] was a kingless republic" (Perl-Rothman 2009, 541, footnote 8; brackets mine). The definition is part of the larger current of "English Hebraic republicanism [that] first emerged in the seventeenth century" with "roots in a sixteenth-century tradition of scholarship on the Hebrew Republic" (Perl-Rothman 2009, 537; brackets mine). The English "Hebraists [...] were supercessionists who believed that they, not modern Jews, were the true heirs of the biblical Israelites" (Perl-Rothman 2009, 538; brackets mine). For them, "the Hebrew Republic stood as the ancestor of modern (Christian) states and [...] offered a divinely instituted model for the organization of political power" (Perl-Rothman 2009, 538; brackets mine). But where does Milton *fit* in the historical milieu of English Hebraic republicanism? Perl-Rothman is clear:

John Milton, seeking to vindicate the kingless government created by the execution of Charles I, drew on this scholarly tradition to sketch out an argument for republican exclusivism. He first made the argument that kingless republics were the only (or exclusive) legitimate type of government in a 1651 polemic, *A Defence of the People of England* (originally published in Latin as *Pro populo anglicano defensio*). The crux of Milton's case was an account of the Hebrew Republic drawn from new interpretations of two chapters of the Bible: Deuteronomy 17 (which contains a list of laws for Israelite kings) and I Samuel 8 (the account of God's angry response to the Israelites' request for a king). [...] Milton reinterpreted these chapters as a divine condemnation of kingship. (Perl-Rothman 2009, 538–539; Perl-Rothman's emphasis)

But Biblical reinterpretations aside, Milton does not mince his words when *disjustifying kingship*:

*That a Commonwealth is a more perfect form of Government than a Monarchy, and*

*more suitable to the condition of Mankind; and in the opinion of God himself, better for his own people; for himself appointed it [...] As if it were a kind of idolatry to ask for a King, that would even suffer himself to be ador'd, and assume almost Divine Honour to himself. And certainly, they that subject themselves to a worldly Master, and set him above all Laws, come but a little short of chusing a strange God: And a strange one it commonly is: brutish, and void of all sense and reason. (Milton 1692, 48; brackets and emphasis mine; see also Perl-Rothman 2009, 539)*

What the above passage means, as correctly explained by Perl-Rothman, is that "[c]hoosing monarchy was a sin not just when the Jews did it but when anybody did it" (Perl-Rothman 2009, 539; brackets mine). Milton's political thought may have evolved, or motioned, from monarchical republicanism (i.e., law-beholden kingship) to Hebraic republicanism (i.e., kingless commonwealth) broadly mirroring England's political turbulence during the Civil Wars of 1642 to 1651 AD. Or perhaps Milton was always intellectually aligned entirely with English Hebraic republicanism given "the strongly antimonarchical conclusions he drew [...] in another pamphlet, *Readie and Easie Way to establish a free Commonwealth*" (Perl-Rothman 2009, 539; Perl-Rothman's emphasis, brackets mine), which was published in February 1660 "in an effort to preserve England's republican government and avoid a return to monarchy" (Dobranski 2022, xxi). Regardless, Milton's position towards the Eastern Roman polity is *consistent*: as an emperorship controlled by the military, Byzantium has absolutely no place among republics, Hebraic or otherwise. But what about *Byzantine regicides*? Are they republican? Per Milton's reasoning *and* knowledge of history, an unrepublican "tree", as a metaphor for a polity, bears unrepublican "fruit" and so regicides in Byzantium, even if justified against tyrants, do not constitute expressions of, for Milton, God-blessed republican action. And like Milton, George Abbott nowhere classifies the Eastern Roman polity as a republic of any sort. But unlike Milton, Abbott, as the following will show, has a favorable disposition towards Roman emperorship, especially Constantine's.

George Abbott, a "forty-eight year old bishop of London", was appointed by King James I (reign: 1603–1625 AD) "to the archbishopric of Canterbury on 4 March 1611" succeeding Archbishop Richard Bancroft who died in 1610 (Holland 1987, 172). During his tenure, Abbott and the Greek monk Metrophanes Kritopoulos became friends the latter of whom "arrived in London [...] in June 1617" with "a letter of recommendation [...] from Loukaris who [...] was still Patriarch of Alexandria" (Haynes 1979, 181; brackets mine; see also Browning 1975b). And "[b]efore their friendship ended", the Archbishop "presented [Kritopoulos] with a number of Greek books, including [English scholar Sir Henry] Savile's eight-volume edition of John Chrysostom published in 1612" (Haynes 1979, 181; brackets mine; see also Browning 1975b). In his work titled *A Briefe Description of the whole World*, Abbott stated the following regarding the Byzantine polity in the section titled "Of Greece, Thracia, and the Countries neere adjoining":

Here on the edge of the sea-coast very near unto Asia standeth the City called *Bizantium*, but since *Constantinople*, be cause *Constantine* the Great did new build it, and made it an Imperiall City. This was the chiefe residence of the Emperour of *Graecia*, sometimes called *New Rome*, and the glory of the East; where the generall Council was once assembled; and one of the seas of the *Patriarks*, who was called the *Patriark of Constantinople*. (Abbott 1664, 86; Abbott's emphasis)

In fact, Abbott does not classify the Eastern Roman polity as a monarchical republic since its establishment was predicated on the actions of a single *princeps*. Therefore, the state's sovereignty is derived from Constantine and the Eastern Roman polity only falls under the category of *foundational monarchies*. Interestingly, the author neither downplays nor denies the Byzantine polity's duality: its Greekness, in terms of country, and its Romanness, in terms of civics (i.e., *Greek earth, Roman kingdom*). Thomas Fuller, like his contemporary Abbott (see Holland 1987, 172 citing Fuller's *Worthies*), also classifies the Eastern Roman polity as a foundational monarchy in his satire of Oliver Cromwell, a 17th-century English statesman who opposed King Charles I and, with his supporters, overthrew the monarchical House of Stuart (see

New 1972, 9–13 for a chronology of Cromwell's life; see also Hutton 2021, 39ff on Cromwell's Christian "religious milieu", Woodford 2013 for a detailed treatment of Cromwell's rule as Lord Protector, and McMains 2000 on Cromwell's demise and its historical aftermath).

Thomas Fuller, according to Morris Fuller, "entered [Queen's College] on Friday, June 29th, 1621" and was a student there for eight years (1621–1628) (Fuller 1886, 66–67; brackets mine; see also Patterson 2018). While attending Queen's, he learned Greek, Latin, Hebrew, logic, ethics, rhetoric, mathematics, history, and chronology (Fuller 1886, 53–55; see also Patterson 2018). Later in 1646, Fuller published his *Andronicus, or, The vnfortunate politician shewing sin stoutly punished, right surely rescued*, which was later translated into Dutch in 1658–1659 by John Crosse, "a royalist British printer in Holland" (Helmets 2015, 57). Crosse's "central image on the Dutch title page" depicts "a beheading as the worst of [Byzantine emperor] Andronicus' many crimes" that, according to Helmer J. Helmers, "was an unmistakable sign that the book was intended to be interpreted as a comment on Cromwell's regicide, a 'sin' that had only been 'stoutly punished' ten years after the fact, when Cromwell had died and his son deposed" (Helmets 2015, 58; brackets mine). In *Andronicus*, Fuller refers to "the City of Constantinople" as "the chief seate of the Grecian Empire" (Fuller 1646, I.4). More importantly, the author offers a detailed description of Isaac II Angelos' coronation (reign: 1185–1195, 1203–1204 AD):

By this time Isaacius was brought by Basilius the Patriarch unto the Throne, and placed thereon with all solemnity: then the Crowne was put upon his head, on the top whereof was a Diamond-Crosse, (greatnesse and Care are twins) which Isaacius kissed: *I welcome thee*, said he, *though not as a stranger, who have been acquainted with Crosses from my Cradle: Thou art both my Sword and my Shield; for hitherto I have conquered with suffering*. Then weighing the Crowne in his hand; it is (faith he) *a beautifull burthen, which loads, more than it adornes*. (Fuller 1646, 6.11; Fuller's emphasis)

Immediately afterwards, Fuller provides the following "Sermon-like Oration" made to Isaac by the Patriarch of Constantinople, Basileios II Kamatēros:

Here Basilus the Patriark made a Sermon-like Oration unto him, which, as it was uttered with much Gravity, so it was heard with no lesse Attention, and embraced by the Emperour, with great Thankfulnes. *Not presuming, Sir, to teach you what you doe not know, I am incited by my Calling, and encouraged by your Clemency, to put you in minde, of what otherwise you may forget. This Crowne and Sceptre were sent you from Heaven; onely we have done our duty in delivering them unto you. And now me thinks, that Divine Majesty perfectly shines in You his Image. These our Eyes upheld, & folded hands, and bared heads, and bended knees are due from us to God, and wee pay them to him, by paying them to you his Receiver. And wee doubt not, but you will improve the Power and Honour bestowed on you, for the protection of the people committed unto you. In a mans body, whilst naturall Heat and radicall Moisture, observe their limits; all is preserved in health: if either exceeds their bounds, the body either drownes, or burnes. It fareth thus in the constitution of the State, betwixt your Power, and our Prosperity; whilst both agree, they support one another: but, if they fall out, about Masterie, even that which over-comes, will be destroyed in a generall confusion. And, if you should betray your Trust, though we bow, and beare, and sigh, and sob, armed with Prayers and Teares; yet know, that our sad Mournings will mount into that Court, where lye the Appeales of Subjects, and the Censures of Soveraignes, which will heavily bee inflicted by him, whom you represent. Speake I not this, out of any distrust of your Justice, but out of earnest desire of your happinesse, wishing, that the greatnesse of Constantine, Founder of this place, the goodnesse of Jovian, the successe of Honorius, the long life of Valens, the quiet death of Manuel, the immortal fame of Justinian, and what soever good was singl'd on them, may joyntly be heaped upon you, and your Posterity.* (Fuller 1646, 6.12–13; Fuller's emphasis)

The main takeaways from the above oration are three-fold: 1) the Eastern Roman monarch's powers come directly from God (i.e., "*Crowne and Sceptre were sent you from Heaven*"), 2) the Byzantine emperor is, as monarchy in principle demands, a guardian of the people (i.e., "*for the protector of the people committed unto you*") meaning a defender of an elect nation beholden to God through His vicar on Earth (i.e., "*our Eyes upheld, & folded hands, and bared heads, and bended knees are due from us to God, and wee pay them to him, by paying them to you his Receiver*"), 3) the polity of New Rome, established by Constantine himself (i.e., "*the greatnesse of Constantine, Founder of this place*"), exists and operates as an Aristotelian *organon* predicated on the vertical, though complementarian, relationship between ruler and ruled with *eudaimonia*, or holistic well-being, as the polity's *telos*, or good/purposeful end (i.e., "*in the*

*constitution of the State, betwixt your Power, and our Prosperity; whilst both agree, they support one another"). The emperor as marvel is not only evident in Kamatēros' sermon to Isaac, but also documented centuries earlier in the *Antapodosis* of Lombard diplomat and historian Bishop Liutprand of Cremona. Liutprand, who visited the Eastern Roman polity in the 10th-century AD, reported the relationship, albeit distant, between the Byzantine king and his subjects:*

When the soldiers had gone away, the emperor called out to his jailer, "Phile mou [My friend], do you know the emperor Leo?" "How could I know him," the man responded, "a man I do not remember having seen?" Certainly, on public occasions when he passes by, I have seen him from a distance (for I was unable to get close), but I felt I was looking at a marvel and not a man." (Geanakoplos 1984, 25; Geanakoplos' emphasis and brackets)

Assuming Liutprand's account is accurate, the main takeaways from the above passage are Emperor Leo's brutal mistreatment by his own guards and the jailer's perception of the Byzantine monarch as *a symbolic force rather than a flesh-and-blood human*. The latter takeaway supports Ernest Kantorowicz's *theory of the King's Two Bodies* or at least the element of the theory involving the monarch's "mystic fiction" where, according to Conrad Leyser, "the body of the ruler must assume social and political weight" given "the relative absence of infrastructure" (Kantorowicz 2016, xix). But the weight of the monarch's "mystic fiction", at least in the Greek East, may not have been dependent on physical infrastructure given, for instance, the "repairs [made] to the coast road in Cilicia Prima by a Roman commander [...] recorded in 519" AD (Salway 2018, 1290; brackets mine) and the city of "Thessalonica retain[ing] its Roman infrastructure" (e.g., cisterns, roads, aqueducts) during Late Antiquity and the Byzantine era (Bakirtzis 2018, 1493; brackets mine). Infrastructure aside, the Eastern Roman emperor as essentially a *marvel to his own subjects* indicates, or possibly betrays, that he was neither a product of a Rousseauian *general will* nor beholden to one if it ever existed. And the emperor's "mystic fiction" even extended to foreign affairs when, as mentioned earlier, Emperor Manuel II

Palaeologus (reign: 1391–1425 AD) "travelled into western Europe [...] in order to solicit help against the Turks who were besieging Constantinople" (Thomson 1904, 219, footnote 3; brackets mine). In the next chapter, this dissertation circles back to Byzantine monarchical republicanism by explaining the causes of its reception in modern academia and by focusing on the discussion between Oleg Kharkhordin, Miguel Vatter and Anthony Kaldellis regarding Russia as the self-proclaimed successor, or "Third Rome", of the Eastern Roman polity.

## CHAPTER IV – RECEPTIONS OF BYZANTINE REPUBLICANISM

What is behind the wide academic reception of Kaldellis' republican model of the Eastern Roman polity? In other words, why does the *res publica Byzantina* attract both positive and negative scholarly attention? In this chapter, I will consider the answers offered by John Haldon, Miguel Vatter and Oleg Kharkordin.

One answer to the above questions is essentially linked to a methodological *Zeitgeist* in Western scholarship and is provided by John Haldon's observations:

[...] Byzantine studies in the mid-1980s was in the process of what T. S. Kuhn would have called a 'paradigm shift', that is to say, a process through which a traditional set (or sets) of assumptions and priorities, as well as theories and approaches, is replaced by different sets of ideas. While the changes in the nature of the subject that have occurred since then have not been particularly marked, there have nevertheless been some interesting and important developments that have altered the framework within which some ways of looking at the medieval eastern Roman world are carried on. The so-called 'linguistic turn', for example, pushed Byzantinists, in particular, scholars of Byzantine literature and visual culture, to grapple with various aspects of what might very broadly be termed post-modernist and post-structuralist theory. This is evident in some of the writing and publishing of the later 1980s and 1990s in particular, and in some respects has now been incorporated into our 'ways of seeing' the Byzantine world. In particular issues of intertextuality, of authorial intention, of reception, and of the relativizing of cultural interpretive possibilities (in respect of our own perspective) have become part and parcel of scholarly discourse [...] Represented by more recent work in literary studies and art history especially, I believe this shift also facilitated a much greater degree of cross-disciplinary reading, comparative thinking, and in respect of historical context and setting, a generally more open approach to the medieval west and the Islamic world in terms of both material and method. (Haldon 2016, 4–5; brackets mine)

But what evidence exists, other than Haldon himself, connecting Byzantinology's linguistic turn to Kaldellis' scholarship broadly? The *focus on reception* as expressly conveyed in Kaldellis' *Hellenism in Byzantium* that "looks closely at the reception of the classical tradition" in the

Eastern Roman polity (Kaldellis 2007, i; emphasis mine). Said focus is further illustrated by Kaldellis emphasizing Josephus' admission of "'Helleniz[ing] the names of people in his work 'for the pleasure of my readers'" as an example of "Hellenization through market pressure, of how *readers* were active agents in the assimilation of *writers*" (Kaldellis 2007, 27; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine). With respect to the subject of Byzantine republicanism, Haldon states that "we owe thanks to Kaldellis for his provocative challenge to many aspects of the established assumptions" within modern Byzantine scholarship (Haldon 2016, 7). Specifically, Haldon makes reference to *The Byzantine Republic* authored by Kaldellis who "argues that the eastern Roman empire should not be understood as a theocracy, but rather as a 'republican monarchy' in which the people was politically sovereign" and "further argues that the role of Christianity occupied a less significant place both ideologically and in practice in terms of political action" (Haldon 2016, 7). Haldon's synopsis of Kaldellis' main arguments concords with Oleg Kharkhordin's description of *The Byzantine Republic* as a text that covers the timespan "from the fourth century, when the capital moved from Rome to Constantinople, [...] all the way until the Fourth Crusade in 1204" where "the political system of the New Rome included elements of popular sovereignty" (Kharkhordin 2021, 473; brackets mine). Miguel Vatter's summary of *The Byzantine Republic* also concords with both Haldon's and Kharkhordin's descriptions despite Vatter admitting that he is neither a historian of Russia nor Byzantium (Vatter 2021, 498). Specifically, Vatter's synopsis constitutes part of his response to Kharkhordin's article titled "Authority and Power in Russia":

Oleg Kharkhordin's essay can be read as an attempt at deconstructing the (Pan-)Slavic myth of Moscow as a "Third Rome," as the authentic inheritor of the legacy of the Roman Empire after Constantinople. This political myth is usually based on an asserted continuity in the so-called Caesaro-Papist form of government, typically said to characterize Byzantium and the tsarist regime. In his *The Byzantine Republic* Anthony Kaldellis has tried to strike a blow to this historiographical commonplace,

by arguing that Byzantium *was* a "republic" in the recognizable Roman form, and that, if Ceasaro-Papism existed, it did so more as the ideology of the emperor's court than as a characteristic of the Byzantine polity. (Vatter 2021, 498; Vatter's emphasis)

Vatter views *The Byzantine Republic* as "an interesting attempt to push back against the tide" of Byzantium's absence in "western histories of republicanism" with Kaldellis "argu[ing] that Byzantium was always characterized by a republican organization, and not by a fusion of imperial power with Christian religion" (Vatter 2021, 498; brackets mine). In his own response to Kharkhordin, Kaldellis outlines the "four criteria" constituting the "threshold for 'republican monarchies' in the Roman tradition" (Kaldellis 2021, 489). The criteria, previously mentioned (see CHAPTER I, pages 43–44), involve: 1) "a robust conception of the public interest and public property to which the monarch is subordinated in normative texts", 2) "a conception of a legally or ethnically-defined populace whose material wellbeing forms the sole legitimating factor for the operation of government", 3) "historical instances of popular intervention in the sphere of politics that were accepted by elites as legitimate, indeed often as constitutive of their own power and positions", and 4) "documented continuity between th[e] [Byzantine] polity and the ancient Roman *res publica*, coupled with awareness of that continuity" (Kaldellis 2021, 489; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine). The aforesaid criteria overlap with Vatter's statement that "Kaldellis deploys a number of distinct arguments, among them the claim that the people of Byzantium always understood itself as a *Roman* people, even if they spoke Greek and were Christian" (Vatter 2021, 498–499; Vatter's emphasis). But however compelling Kaldellis' criteria are, they are predicated on James Hankins' revisionist *exclusionary republicanism*, addressed by Vatter, and a misunderstanding of Giorgio Agamben's *state of exception*, addressed by Kharkhordin. Beginning with Kharkhordin, the author provides a historical summary behind Agamben's *stato di eccezione* while critiquing Kaldellis' monarchical republican framework:

Kaldellis bases his theory of the state of exception that a Byzantine emperor represented by his very existence (and in which the Byzantine people can similarly find itself under certain circumstances) on a book by Giorgio Agamben. Of course, Agamben made a detailed analysis of *stato di eccezione* not because he was interested in Byzantium, but rather because he was offering a genealogical account of a condition in which modern democracies frequently found themselves lately. [...] Agamben wrote his book on the state of exception following a special military decree of President George W. Bush Jr. that, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 2001, allowed the detention of whole categories of combatants captured in Afghanistan and the Middle East. These detainees, held in custody on military bases like Guantanamo, are neither prisoners of war according to the Geneva Convention nor people accused of crimes according to US laws. Rather, they represent "a legally unnameable and unclassifiable being" in that they do not have juridical status; hence they cannot get counsel, right of appeal, or a legal defense. Agamben was thus in general concerned with the steady growth of such spaces in modern liberal democracies, not subject to legal regulation." (Kharkhordin 2021, 476; Kharkhordin's emphasis, brackets mine)

Agamben went "[l]ooking for the roots of the state of exception" by "go[ing] deep into Roman history" and coming across "a special condition that was designated under the name of *iustitium*, under which all laws came to a standstill and courts stopped their normal functioning" (Kharkhordin 2021, 476; Kharkhordin's emphasis, brackets mine). The Roman *iustitium*, previously discussed in this dissertation's third chapter, was a "stoppage of law [...] authorized by an injunction from the Senate that stipulated that all previous magistrates [...] should band together with arms in their hands to eliminate a very serious threat to Rome's existence, while the current powers of the present-day consuls or other magistrates had to be annulled or suspended" (Kharkhordin 2021, 476–477; brackets mine). Kharkhordin offers a briefer description stating that "the reason for the introduction of *iustitium* was a condition called *tumulti*, internal or external disorders that threatened to topple *res publica* altogether" (Kharkhordin 2021, 477; Kharkhordin's emphasis). Afterwards, the author illustrates how Agamben and Kaldellis differ on the Roman state of exception:

Agamben reminds us of what Kaldellis does not. The state of exception, or *iustitium*, was ushered into Rome during the pre-imperial days by authority of the Senate, not by decision of the consuls or the people. Therefore, after a transfer of *auctoritas* from the Senate to the emperor, he became the living embodiment of the right to declare the state of exception in order to save *patria* from collapse. [...] One should underline that the state of exception in pre-Caesarean Rome was introduced by the authority of the Senate, and during what we usually call the Roman empire this was done by the authority of the emperor, not by the power of consuls or imperial magistrates. In Rome before Caesar, the consuls and tribunes were endowed with power (*potestas* and *imperium*, granted to them by the people), but it was the Senate that held *auctoritas*. Octavian Augustus stressed that in his famous statement that in his power (*potestas*) he was not that much different from other magistrates; however, he had surpassed all others in *auctoritas*. (Kharkhordin 2021, 477–478; Kharkhordin's emphasis, brackets mine)

Afterwards, "[t]he authority of the emperors was soon rekindled [...] because with Christianity becoming the official religion of *res publica*, emperor Constantine could no longer bear the title *divus*, or 'divine', for obvious reasons of blasphemy" (Kharkhordin 2021, 478; Kharkhordin's emphasis, brackets mine). The Byzantine king's *auctoritas* "had become tied with Christ, who, as it was eventually interpreted, gave this authority to the emperors even if the divinely determined status of the emperor might have been revealed itself through the this-worldly election of the emperor by the army or people's laudatory acclamations" (Kharkhordin 2021, 478).

Moving on to Vatter, the author critiques Kaldellis' *The Byzantine Republic* due to its seeming reliance on James Hankins' assault upon *exclusionary or exclusivist republicanism*:

The problem is that since at least the Renaissance it has been an assumption of the republican tradition that a "republican monarchy" is a contradiction in terms. This understanding has recently been called into question by James Hankins. Hankins argues, instead, that the antithesis between republican and monarchy is a much later product of the American and French Revolutions who invent an "exclusionary republicanism," namely, by defining republic as excluding the monarchic form of government. [...] Kaldellis' entire book seems to be premised on accepting Hankins's terminological revision. The key argument here, for Hankins and Kaldellis, is that the Roman *res publica* translated the Greek *politeia*, itself defined as the "unity of all citizens in a shared civic community" such that "*res publica* referred to the public affairs...regardless of the type of political regime". In this way it is possible to have a republic that is also a monarchy, if one takes monarchy to refer simply to one type of government or regime (as opposed to aristocracy or democracy) and "republic" to

stand for a polity where state power pursues the "common good" and is based on "popular sovereignty" no matter who exercises government. (Vatter 2021, 499; Vatter's emphasis, brackets mine)

Vatter then correctly notes "book 3 of Aristotle's *Politics*" where "one realizes immediately that for Aristotle, at least, a change in the form of regime *is* a change in the city itself, in the *politeia*: Athens governed by one man is *not* the same *politeia* as Athens governed by the 'noble' (*aristoi*) or Athens governed by the 'people' (*demos*)" (Vatter 2021, 499; Vatter's emphasis). Like Jean Bodin, Vatter states that "[t]he Greek term *politeia* is badly translated by 'constitution' precisely because our modern distinction between constitution and government was non-existent for the Greeks" though the idea was present given the fourth book of Plato's *Laws* (Vatter 2021, 499; Vatter's emphasis, brackets mine). Vatter correctly "doubts whether anyone, Greek or Roman, ever believed that 'the *res publica* [or *politeia*] itself was what underlay regime change" since "[i]f that was the case, there would have been no need to develop the republican theory of a so-called *mixed constitution* that included all three forms of government being exercised *simultaneously*" (Vatter 2021, 499; Vatter's emphasis, brackets mine). More importantly, the author accurately mentioned that the mixed constitution was "theorized by Plato and Aristotle" and that, according to the Greek historian Polybius, it was "realized only by the Roman republic *once it got rid of its kings*", a "feature that gave Rome the title of being a true republic" (Vatter 2021, 500; Vatter's emphasis). The Republic of Venice would later invoke "this [Roman] mixed model" in its "claim[ing] to be an authentic republic" (Vatter 2021, 500; brackets mine). As for Russia, Vatter notes that "Kharkhordin's decisive blow against the Kaldellis thesis of a 'republican' Byzantium (and by extension, of a 'republican' tsarism) turns on the claim that the form of government represented by the tsar was decisively influenced by Byzantine thinking" (Vatter 2021, 502–503). The author then notes, accurately, that "Byzantine emperors were

officially titled *autokrator kai basileus* from the ninth century onward" with "Ivan modell[ing] himself after this autocratic idea" and "critics of Ivan Groznyi like Andrei Kurbskii [...] find[ing] it necessary to appeal to Cicero in order to speak of Ivan's autocracy as an 'a-legal' (*a-nomia*) form of government: a rule based on the state of exception as opposed to a rule of law" (Vatter 2021, 503; Vatter's emphasis, brackets mine). For Vatter, the *a-legality* of government "perhaps [...] has returned to Russia if [...] the constitutional amendments of 2020 have placed the Constitutional Court under the authority of the President, thus undercutting any real separation of power and checks and balances, the signal characteristic of republicanism" (Vatter 2021, 503; brackets mine).

Vatter's mention of Ivan offers a segue into critical historical analyses of Russia as the "Third Rome". But what does Russia as the "Third Rome", or *Russianland*, mean exactly? It essentially constitutes an ideological narrative involving a second *translatio imperii* from Constantinople to Moscow. And said narrative has two distinct starting points (i.e., Ivan III's marriage to a Byzantine noblewoman and the *Tale of the White Cowl*) and one source of justification (i.e., *Tale of the Princes of Vladimir*). According to John Meyendorff, "Third Rome" is a theory made by "[s]ome Muscovite ideologists" where "true Christianity had been betrayed in the 'Old Rome', whereas the 'Second Rome' – Constantinople – had fallen under Muslim domination" with "Moscow alone now remain[ing] as the last refuge of Orthodoxy" (Meyendorff 1988, 14–15; brackets mine). Said ideology was inspired by Ivan III's marriage to a member of the Palaeologan dyansty, specifically "the niece of the last Byzantine emperor", along with Ivan's "import[ing] to Russia some symbols of Byzantine imperial tradition" (Meyendorff 1988, 14; brackets mine). Historically, Ivan's Russia as the successor of the Eastern Roman polity "was already an anachronism" since "the Byzantine wife of Ivan III had been educated in Italy and the

new Kremlin was built by Italian architects" (Meyendorff 1988, 15). Furthermore, "when the Muscovite grand-prince finally assumed the title of *tsar* – the Slavic equivalent of *Caesar* or 'emperor' – he never pretended to be 'emperor of the Romans', as the Byzantine emperors did, but only '*tsar of all Russia*'" (Meyendorff 1988, 15; Meyendorff's emphasis). Meyendorff is mistaken in his assertion regarding the Byzantine emperors as they were neither pretending nor operating under any illusions given that they were *genuinely and legitimately Roman emperors politically via Constantine's translatio imperii*. But that is not material here. What *is* material is that Russia claims a civic continuity with the Eastern Roman polity. Said continuity is examined by George P. Majeska whose starting point for the idea of Russia as the "Third Rome" is the *Tale of the White Cowl* composed around 1500 AD the "original moral [of which] was that the Novgorodian archbishop should not be subordinated to the metropolitan at Moscow" (Majeska 1988, 22; brackets mine). Majeska offers the following synopsis:

According to the "Tale," Emperor Constantine the Great gave a white cowl to Pope Sylvester of Rome when the Emperor moved the capital to "New Rome"; it was "more honorable than the crown of the emperor." Eventually, when the Roman Church fell into heresy, this white cowl came to Constantinople, whence, the Pope Sylvester insisted in a dream, the Byzantine Patriarch had to send it to the Archbishop of Novgorod, for Constantinopolitan Orthodoxy was now also found wanting. [...] In the later form in which we have, this 'Tale' also has Pope Sylvester recounting to the dreaming patriarch of Constantinople that 'by the will of Constantine, Emperor of the Earth, the imperial crown of the imperial city is destined to be given to the Russian tsar.' (Majeska 1988, 22; brackets mine)

Ultimately, "[t]he first *translatio imperii* to Russia [...] was religious" and later "Moscow appropriated the idea, applying it to the political realm (to the eventual detriment of, among others, Novgorod)" (Majeska 1988, 22; Majeska's emphasis, brackets mine). Conversion from religion to politics was made possible by a Russian man named Nestor Iskander:

Nestor Iskander, that unlikely Russian eyewitness of the actual siege of Constantinople in 1453, seems (at whatever time the text which bears his name was put together) to have sensed the basic lines of the myth that would legitimize

Moscow's imperial future. First, the divine protection of the Holy Spirit (in the form of a bright light which visibly quit the dome of St. Sophia) had visited Constantinople shortly before the city's capture, apparently seeking a new home. Second, a partially misread supposed prophesy by Methodius of Patara and Emperor Leo the Wise, that a "fair people" [...] will triumph over the enemies of Constantinople, suggested whither the Empire's protective power had fled. Finally, Nestor's text notes, Christianity will eventually triumph over Islam (the imperial eagle over the Turkish serpent, in his borrowed metaphor). (Majeska 1988, 23–24; brackets mine)

How was the conversion from religion to politics *justified*? Since "Muscovy [...] *never claimed* that this imperial status was willed by the Empire at Constantinople", its "change of status from local principality to realm of an emperor (a 'tsardom') evoked a considerable literature of theoretical justification" in the form of the *Tale of the Princes of Vladimir* (Majeska 1988, 24; Majeska's emphasis, brackets mine). The tale goes as follows:

According to this work, at the division of the Roman Empire under Augustus, the emperor's (heretofore unknown) brother Prus was assigned the northern climes which had their center around the Vistula and Nieman rivers, the area thereafter called "Prussia" after him. Rurik, the traditional founder of the Russian state and progenitor of the grand princes of Moscow, was a descendant of the Roman imperial prince Prus. The Muscovite prince, then, descended from the great imperial family of Rome. The Muscovite prince was also tsar, it is claimed in this work, by descent from Vladimir the Saint who converted Russia to Christianity in the tenth century. Finally, and most intriguingly, he is tsar by descent also from the Russian Grand Prince and "Tsar" Vladimir Monomach. This prince, the reader is informed in the "Tale of the Princes of Vladimir," got his Byzantine imperial name not from his mother, a relative of the Byzantine emperor Constantine Monomach, as others had thought previously, but from the fact that the Emperor Constantine Monomach (died 1055) sent the Russian prince (ruled 1113–1125) his own imperial crown and regalia together with an embassy to crown Monomach's "free and autocratic empire." (Majeska 1988, 24–25)

Whichever starting point one selects, Russia's claim as the "Third Rome" is treated as a politico-religious mirage outside of Russianland, whatever its justification and geopolitical delimitations and/or aspirations. What remains real, however, is the historical reception of Christian Hellenism by many Slavic nations (i.e., Serbia, Kievan Rus, Muscovy, etc.) who "became excellent pupils of the Byzantines, not only in the field of monastic spirituality, but also art, music and those expressions of the Byzantine civilization which appeal primarily to *religious experience*"

(Meyendorff 1988, 16; Meyendorff's emphasis). And given Vatter and Kharkhordin, said reception with respect to Byzantine politics lends no credence to Kaldellis' monarchical republicanism. Contrary to the *critical view*, this chapter's (unexhaustive) genealogy of Roman succession narratives in the Orthodox Russian imaginary illustrates that *divine right kingship* in Byzantine political culture is the source of inspiration. With that said, the next chapter will offer a synopsis of main points covered in this project along with questions and conclusions that can potentially be drawn from said synopsis.

## CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

This chapter will offer a summary of key points covered in the previous chapters along with any questions and conclusions that can be drawn from said points. The story of this project is a story about primarily the Eastern Roman polity (*Romanía-Graikía*) as a political order and secondarily about the Byzantines (*Romaíoi-Graikoí*) as a people. *Sovereignty* connects questions regarding the Byzantine polity and whether it was a traditional emperorship or a traditional republic with a king, whether Byzantines were politically beholden to a monarch or to themselves, and whether Byzantines ever flipped their political script from kingship to democracy. The two opposing frameworks that address said questions are the *traditional view* and the *critical view*:

- Traditional/"Orthodox" View of Byzantine Sovereignty: The Eastern Roman *monarch is the divinely-mandated authority that the people are beholden to*; the framework's basis entails the establishment and evolution of Greco-Roman *vertical power structures and principles centered around a monarch*. Traditionalists like Ronald Syme treat *monarchy as the alpha and omega of Roman civics with Hellenism as a strictly symbolic/rhetorical force*. Later traditionalists, or *neo-traditionalists*, such as Paul Zanker and Fergus Millar treat the *relationship between Roman emperorship and Greek kingship as historically substantive, or more than symbolic/rhetorical*. Both traditionalists and neo-traditionalists regard the *deification of the Roman emperor* as an important given. Its current champion is Ioannis Stouraitis' *elite-imperial model*.

- Critical/"Heretical" View of Byzantine Sovereignty: The Eastern Roman *populace is the ultimate authority that the emperor is beholden to*; the framework's basis involves the establishment and evolution of Roman *horizontal power structures and principles centered around a demos or populace*. Proponents such as Clifford Ando begin with *consensus/negotiation* between rulers and ruled and then *beholdenness* of rulers to the ruled rendering the latter as *sovereign*. Its current champion is Anthony Kaldellis' *popular-national model*.

For traditionalists (including neo-traditionalists), the *Roman prince* is the source of constituent power as a *sovereign revolutionary* raising the banner of *traditional pambasileia* (i.e., *Roman revolution of the Roman princeps based on Greek kingship refreshing the tradition of Greco-Roman monarchy*). But for opponents of the traditional view, the *Roman populus* (including the later *Byzantine demos*), is instead the source of constituent power as *sovereign traditionalists* raising the banner of revolutionary republicanism (i.e., *Roman tradition of Roman popular sovereignty based on the revolution against the Tarquin monarchy*). And when a polity has a monarch beholden to the people then you have, as the proponents of the *critical view* assert, *monarchical republicanism* at work especially when the people express their dissatisfaction with authorities through regicidal rebellions. But if every monarchy can be threatened by popular opposition and not all monarchies are republican monarchies, then how do the proponents of the *critical view* differentiate republican monarchies from non-republican monarchies? Do opponents of the traditional view subscribe to the belief that *all* monarchies are republican monarchies? Can Kaldellis identify a monarchy that he thinks is *not* a monarchical republic, even though it may have been displaced by popular revolts? If not, then why refer to any monarchy as a monarchical republic in the first place? And if the Eastern Roman polity was a republican

monarchy, then why did the Byzantine *demos* tolerate dynasties of divine-right emperors if it was sovereign?

The above questions are asked to show the importance of *criticizing, or emphasizing the critique of, the critical view* just as: 1) Paul Zanker and Fergus Millar *criticized the traditional view*, 2) Jean Bodin *criticized Aristotle's lack of emphasis distinguishing sovereignty from government*, 3) John Haldon *criticized Anthony Kaldellis' Byzantine republicanism*, 4) Oleg Kharkhordin *criticized Kaldellis' reading of Giorgio Agamben's state of exception*, 5) Miguel Vatter *criticized Kaldellis' reliance on James Hankins' attack on exclusionary republicanism*, 6) Renato Cristi *criticized Andreas Kalyvas' reading of Carl Schmitt's constituent power*, and 7) John Meyendorff and George P. Majeska *criticized Russia's claim as the "Third Rome"*. Take, for instance, Kaldellis' arguments from his 2015 publication *The Byzantine Republic* other than the already addressed claim that Byzantium was a monarchical republic (see CHAPTER II and III). In it, Kaldellis asserts that the Eastern Roman polity was historically "the continuation of the Roman *res publica*; and its politics, despite its changes in institutions, continued to be dominated by the ideological modes and orders of the republican tradition" (Kaldellis 2015, xii; Kaldellis' emphasis). But *which* Roman *res publica* does the Byzantine *politeia* derive its political origins from? Was the Byzantine *politeia* based on Cicero's singular anti-monarchical *res publica*, Seneca's pro-monarchical *dual res publicae* or some combination of the two? For Kaldellis, "Cicero allowed the possibility of a *res publica* governed well by kings, an aristocracy, or a democracy" and "did not view monarchy as incompatible with a *res publica* although he did think that it posed the risk of tyranny and loss of the rule of law" (Kaldellis 2015, 21; Kaldellis' emphasis). But Kaldellis' claim is usefully confronted by Peter Stacey's *Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince* where "Cicero makes *rex* and *princeps* and *tyrannus* and *dominus*

interchangeable terms for an enslaving monarchical figure" (Stacey 2007, 25; Stacey's emphasis). And if monarchy and *res publica* are compatible for Cicero, then how does one explain the fact, again according to Stacey, that "Cicero introduces the view that monarchy is an offence to justice" where "[j]ustice is the quality which [Cicero] upholds as 'the most illustrious of the virtues, on account of which men are called good', and as 'the mistress and queen of virtues'" with *iniuria* (i.e., injustice) undergirding Cicero's "condemnation of monarchy" (Stacey 2007, 25; Stacey's emphasis, brackets mine). One can take things further by offering a three-level *critique of the critical view*:

- Surface Level: pointing out that Stacey's *Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince* germane to discussions on Ciceronian republicanism is absent in *The Byzantine Republic* (evidence of absence on Kaldellis 2015, 280).
- Subsurface Level: pointing out that Kaldellis' 2015 publication neglects to systematically examine the possibility of a Senecan continuity civically informing the Byzantine Greek *demos*, factional or otherwise, opposing the authority of their own rulers (given Stacey's nuanced comparative analysis of Cicero's *De officiis* (*On the Offices*) and Seneca's *De clementia* (*On Clemency*); see Stacey 2007, 23ff).
- Core Level: using Stacey's substantive scholarship to disprove Kaldellis' assertions that: 1) "Byzantium was a Roman and not a Greek [political] culture" (i.e., "in Byzantium [...], 'the Romans never conceived of the *res publica* as culturally Greek, no matter how much Greek cultural forms served to express Roman ideas'") and that 2) "Roman Hellenism 'was colored by distinctly Roman moral debates which find no parallels in the earlier dynastic Hellenism of Ptolemies, Attalids, or Seleucids" (Kaldellis 2015, 55; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine); Stacey, however, shows that: 1) *both* Cicero and Seneca were

substantively informed by the Greek politico-theological philosophy of Stoicism (Stacey 2007, 28–31) rendering the Byzantine *politeia* as a Romano-Hellenistic *res publica* and 2) Seneca's *De clementia* "establish[ed] a conduit for Greek kingship theory [i.e., Isocrates' *Nicocles* and *Ad Nicoclemi*, Xenophon's *Cyropaideia*] into Roman imperial ideology" by "equat[ing] the *princeps* with the heroic figure of the Stoic *vir sapiens*" (Stacey 2007, 32–33; Stacey's emphasis, brackets mine) *rendering Roman Hellenism and Greek Hellenism as a dialectical continuum rather than as two perpetually warring "trenches" separated by the intellectual equivalent to "No Man's Land"*.

But what *justifies* jettisoning the *critical view* other than Peter Stacey? Because it is, upon serious examination, a *Procrustean paradigm* that one-dimensionalizes a three-dimensional subject of inquiry (i.e., reifying and rarifying the *Romaíoi-Graikoí* as just *Romaíoi*).<sup>24</sup> More importantly, the *critical view*, however compelling, is fallacious because it severs and stretches the historical "limbs" of its own subject of inquiry forcing said subject to fit within the arbitrary delimitations of an anachronistic bed of Byzantine monarchical republicanism. So then what exactly was Byzantium (i.e., *Romanía-Graikía*) as a political order? The Eastern Roman polity, or at least its metropole, was a *Christian Greek elect nation operating with-under a monarchy revolutionized by Constantine the Great and founded on Greek kingship altogether refreshing the tradition of Greco-Roman emperors*. Such an answer overlaps with the following description of said polity by Averil Cameron:

By this foundation, however, Constantine did not only create a Christian capital, but a Greek one. It is unlikely that he intended it at the time to rival Rome, though a writer of the late 4th century claims that he did; but in time New Rome, as Constantinople came to be called, was not only to rival but to outlast Rome, and to preserve a Greek empire for another thousand years. It was to be an empire both Hellenic and Christian, even though its citizens called themselves 'Romans' (*Rhomaíoi*). Whatever Constantine's actual intentions (which are so overlaid by bias in the literary sources that we can hardly recover them), the foundation of Constantinople was to guarantee

the survival of Greek culture even when the Roman empire in the west collapsed. It was both the continuation of Roman tradition and, though Constantine could not have foreseen it, the beginning of a new empire. (Cameron 1985, 206; Cameron's emphasis)

Therefore it is not, *contra* Nikos Svoronos, "going too far to say that Byzantium was simply the Greek nation Christianized and Romanized" (Svoronos 1985, 283) for Constantine *simply and decisively went to the Greeks*. And as the New Alexander severing, sword in hand, the Gordian Knot of turbulent 4th-century Europe, *he* was the subject of *re-constituent* power who, *as the embodiment of the Roman capital*, could have conducted his *translatio imperii* anywhere in his Roman domain. It is *undeniable* that there were Armenians, Jews, Syrians, etc. in the Roman, and later Byzantine, polity who were loyal citizens.<sup>25</sup> But did Constantine, the *princeps Greco-Romanus*, go to any of them when establishing the delimitations of what would become the metropole of a new, yet still old, community? No, though *he could have* just like when in the 4th century AD Constantine "describ[ed the city of] Serdica as 'my Rome'" (Millar 1977, 48; brackets mine). But does this project's answer mean that everything regarding Byzantium was correct *before* the critical view? Not exactly. It rather means that both the *traditional view* and the *critical view* of the Eastern Roman polity must be recast, or "rebaptized", by an *originalist view of New Rome* (i.e., *Romanía-Graikía* as *elect polity*, *Romaíoi-Graikoí* as *elect nation/nationhood*) overlapping with the *neo-traditionalist view* and similar to Paul Magdalino's description "of the Byzantines' notion of themselves as the Chosen People (and hence, the 'Holy Nation') [...] quite capable of thinking of themselves as a nation" based on a passage from Constantine Porphyrogennitos' *De Administrando Imperio* (Magdalino 1991, 5; brackets mine).<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, the answer is not the product of either pro-Byzantine or anti-Byzantine views expressed by early modern scholars of monarchical republicanism such as George Abbott, Thomas Fuller and John Milton. Instead, this project's survey of historical events shows that the

New Roman polity was *not* a republic, monarchical or otherwise. This view complements, to some extent, Michael Angold's model of *triangular processualism* in Byzantine politics.

According to Angold, power in the Eastern Roman polity was processually triangular meaning that it was shared between the king (i.e., *basilikos oikos*), the elites of Constantinople, and the Patriarchate:

The political process at Byzantium depended on a triangular relationship, in which the most important elements were the emperor and his household, the Constantinopolitan elite and the patriarchal church. The populace of Constantinople and the army also had roles to play, but rarely did they act independently, and in the case of the populace of the capital its direct participation declined markedly from the eighth century. (Angold 2010, 8–9)

Angold later notes, accurately, that "never was the institution of monarchy called into question" since "[i]t was the lynchpin without which the system would simply collapse" (Angold 2010, 9; brackets mine). This despite Byzantine rulers having failed "repeatedly to check the domination of [aristocratic] families (called *dynatoi*, powerful) by legislation designed to protect the less powerful and to maintain a more equitable distribution of village lands" (Herrin 1985, 245; Herrin's emphasis, brackets mine). But what else is there other than that the Byzantine polity was a *pambasileia* (i.e., *monarchy qua monarchy*) with its core Christian/Christianized Greek inhabitants operating civically as New Romans? A question. What *justifies* Constantine being fitted, respecting his context, into the history of princes as sources of *re-constituent* power? One could approach answering the question by consulting this project's survey of historical events (see pages 79–125) and finding support for the *neo-traditionalist view*. But that approach is limited since said events illustrate the *effects* of Constantine's power. The survey, more importantly, demonstrates how *unrepublican* the Byzantine monarchy, coterminous with the polity, was *refreshing* the following observation-analysis made by the 20th-century Greek historian Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos:

The Byzantine Empire was laid low by the Crusaders from the West, but its structure had already been undermined by a combination of ruinous taxation, rapacious taxgathering, and the consequent decrease in the amount of land owned by peasants. The dislocation of agricultural life brought misery and confusion, and the rapidity with which the Empire collapsed brought on an *acute moral crisis for the Greek population: the choice between submission and loss of freedom, or resistance and loss of property*. (Vacalopoulos 1970, 28; emphasis mine)

Vacalopoulos' *moral crisis of the Christian Greeks* having to select either loss of liberty as a consequence of submission or loss of property as a consequence of rebellion interestingly echoes Ronald Syme's historical treatment of the question the ancient Romans asked themselves: *Pax et Princeps* or *Libertas*, political stability or freedom (*utile* or *dignum*, *anagkē* or *dikē*). But what does Vacalopoulos' moral crisis of the Christian Greeks have to do with Constantine? Said crisis highlights what made Constantine *Constantine* in the first place: his *decisive resolution to the Pax-Libertas Question*, whether posited during his time or not, through the use of his *liberties as prince to free his citizens from the chaos threatening his divinely-mandated polity thus securing the citizenry's liberty to the fruits of prosperity guaranteed by his fatherly protection and philanthropic benefaction*. The assessment overlaps with Peter Stacey's nuanced analysis of the *(Greco-)Roman theory of monarchy* that constitutes "an extended act of conceptual redefinition which has an almost embarrassingly imperial provenance" where "[i]ts vision of a peaceful and happy principate extending across the entire world under the government of the virtuous princeps [...] reveals so frank a commitment to a global hegemony founded upon sovereign reason that it seems scarcely straightfaced" (Stacey 2007, 3; brackets mine). And though Constantine was a traditional Greco-Roman *hegemon* (ἡγεμόνας, *rex*), he was also a *revolutionary* not only because he was revolutionized by Heaven's Chi-Rho but also because his actions upon the Greek earth of Byzantium were transformative speaking to and, through him beholden to God, bringing *glory* (δόξα, *doxa*, *gloria*) to his chosen citizen-subordinates, the *Romaíoi-Graikoí* of *Romanía-Graikía*.

But a narrative about Constantine's *re*-constituent power, however compelling, is insufficient. And so, to avoid the charge of appealing to metaphysics and/or appealing to Constantine's authority, a conclusionary synopsis is in order illustrating how this project's unexhaustive survey of events in Byzantine history renders the critical view, at the very least, *anachronistic* per Kaldellis' four criteria, presented here in question form, of monarchical republicanism:

- Was there "a robust conception of the public interest and public property to which the monarch is subordinated in normative texts" (Kaldellis 2021, 489)? No, both in theory and in practice. Theoretically *no* as the Latin term *res publica* and the Greek term *politeia*, paraphrasing Louise Hodgson's analysis, both mean a *zone within a civic body politic whatever its political organization* lending credence to Benjamin Constant's definition of ancient liberty involving "the sharing of social power among the citizens of the same fatherland" (Fontana 2010, 317). Praxis-wise *no* given, for example, factionalism's recurrence in Byzantine politics evident in the quelling of factional insurrections in 498 AD by Anastasios, in 532 AD and in 556 AD by Justinian I, and in General Phocas' overthrowing Maurice in 602 AD after aggregating the support of the Greens faction and a division of the Eastern Roman army.
- Was there "a conception of a legally or ethnically-defined populace whose material wellbeing forms the sole legitimating factor for the operation of government" (Kaldellis 2021, 489)? Yes and no. There was Christian Greek, or Byzantine, *elect nationhood* but said nationhood was not politically concretized unto itself. Instead, it was circumscribed by, and dependent on, Emperor Constantine whose *re*-constituent power was perpetuated by his successors in the New/Eastern Roman polity rendering *monarchy qua monarchy* as the source of legitimacy animating and justifying government operations.

- Were there "historical instances of popular intervention in the sphere of politics that were accepted by elites as legitimate, indeed often as constitutive of their own power and positions" (Kaldellis 2021, 489)? Yes and no. Popular rebellion against elites, especially the emperor, did occur in Byzantium but said rebellion was not legitimate unto itself as it did not automatically embody and did not translate into a *pouvoir constituant*. This is evident in the Byzantine populace's behavior towards Emperor Justinian II: disdainful after General Leontius overthrew Justinian and then terrified into obedience after Justinian returned to the throne and punished his enemies. This is also evident in the Byzantine populace's behavior towards Michael V and Zoe, hating the former but loving the latter; Zoe was so loved that the populace used Theodora, Zoe's sister, to help restore Zoe's rightful place on the throne. All in all, the populace, factional or otherwise, was behaving in a manner that reveals a beholdeness to a monarchical paradigm.
- Was there "documented continuity between th[e] [Byzantine] polity and the ancient Roman *res publica*, coupled with awareness of that continuity" (Kaldellis 2021, 489; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine)? Yes and no. For the Christian/Christianized Greeks of the Eastern Roman polity, the old Roman civic past was important insofar as it was distinguished from their own new Roman civic present. In other words, their political precedent began with Roman Imperialship and not with the Roman Republic, the latter acknowledged only because it was transformed, body and form, by the former. And though Old Rome was originally Latin and anti-Christian, New Rome was defined by emperors in the Roman world mapping themselves after King Alexander of the Hellenic world and ultimately *re*-defined by King Constantine embracing the Christian world.

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## PREFACE TO THE APPENDICES

This preface, as a disclaimer, will explain what the following five appendices *do* and *do not do*. What each appendix *does*, or intends to do, is provide supplementary background details germane to topics, concepts/terms and recorded events covered in this dissertation. The aforesaid details are organized in different ways such as tables, excerpts, answers to questions, lists of historical facts, and critical examinations of oft-repeated scholarly assertions. Although deeds are prioritized by proponents of the *critical view*, it is important to be fair to the subject of inquiry not just with respect to its own deeds (*praxis*) but also with respect to its own abstractions (*theory*), whatever the medium, by presenting them as accurately as humanly possible. Because to examine degrees of enmeshment, or degrees of detachment, between the principles and practices of any subject, living or deceased, first requires an acknowledgment of both. But as far as this project is concerned, the *subject of inquiry's words have their place* regardless if they are valued more than, valued less than, or valued just as much as, the same subject's actions. Finally, what all the appendices *do not do*, or intend not to do, is beg the question, prioritize words over deeds, or treat words as deeds.

## APPENDIX I – ELEMENTS OF BYZANTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT

The two tables in this appendix provide a detailed synopsis of the Eastern Roman polity's worldview. Said tables were developed *not* with reductionistic intent, but rather to organize seminal treatments of Byzantine political thought and life (potentially) for future pedagogical use.

Table 3: Milton V. Anastos' sources of Byzantine politics

SOURCES OF BYZANTINE POLITICS	DETAILS (MILTON ANASTOS' EXEGESIS)
Greek Philosophy (Plato's <i>Republic</i> , <i>Statesman</i> , <i>Laws</i> ; Aristotle's <i>Metaphysics</i> , <i>Politics</i> )	In the context of Byzantine state authority, the emperor/empress is, or should strive to be, a <i>philosopher-king</i> or a "wise monarch who governs justly and seeks nothing but the welfare of the people" (Anastos 1978, 16). And despite "conced[ing] that the ideal [polity] is unattainable", Aristotle, like Plato, finds that "whenever a man of outstanding virtue and political skill can be found [...], he must rule with absolute and unquestioned power and is entitled to a position above and superior to all law" (Anastos 1978, 17; brackets mine).
Alexander the Great (Hellenistic Kingship)	To the Byzantines, "it ma[de] no difference whether or not Alexander's brand of absolutism can be traced back to Aristotelian precepts" since "Alexander did in fact rule as an absolute monarch [...], was acclaimed as a god, and received cult after his death, if not during his lifetime" (Anastos 1978, 19; brackets mine). Also, they depended upon the "Neopythagorean trio [i.e., Ecphantus, Diotogenes, Sthenidas] for their general view of the relation of the emperor to God, the cosmos, and his subjects"; they "inherited from Plato and Aristotle <i>via</i> the Neopythagorean exegesis, the emperor as animate law [being] chosen by God, whom he imitates in virtue, power, and concern for mankind" (Anastos 1978, 22; Anastos' emphasis, brackets mine). Continuity and change are found in the Byzantines inheriting the Greek precept of the emperor's divinity and "purg[ing] [...] its pagan elements" while "retain[ing] the rest of the [ <i>nomos empsychos</i> ] system intact" by emphasizing, "as did the philosophers, on the high moral standard to which the emperor was expected to conform, his passion for justice, and his zeal for the welfare of his subjects" (Anastos 1978, 22; brackets mine).
<i>Corpus Iuris Civilis</i>	The <i>Corpus Iuris Civilis</i> was "the great code of [Roman] law compiled by Tribonian and his staff of jurisconsults under the direction of the Emperor Justinian I in the sixth century" containing the <i>Institutes</i> , the <i>Digest</i> , the <i>Codex of Justinian</i> , and the <i>Novels</i> (Anastos 1978, 26; brackets mine). More importantly, the "philosophical definition of the ruler as law incarnate ( <i>nomos empsychos</i> ) was accepted by Roman jurists at least by the time of Justinian I (527-65), if not before; [...] Plato, Aristotle, the Neopythagoreans, and the other philosophers [...] were in part responsible for the acceptance of this autocratic aphorism by the jurists" (Anastos 1978, 27; Anastos' emphasis, brackets mine).

Table 4: Paul Magdalino's sources of Byzantine politics

SOURCES OF BYZANTINE POLITICS	DETAILS (PAUL MAGDALINO'S EXEGESIS)
<p>Greek Philosophy, Rhetoric, History, Literature, Mythology</p>	<p>"From Greek antiquity and the constitutions of the classical <i>polis</i>, the Byzantines derived the philosophical terms and the rhetorical tools for idealizing monarchy in relation to other forms of constitution, for defining the qualities of the ideal monarch and his antithesis, the tyrant, and for framing the justification of all political decisions. Greek history and mythology also provided Byzantium with archetypes of monarchy or tyranny, the most illustrious being Alexander the Great, who was widely known not only from the history books, but also from a romantic, legendary biography that circulated in multiple versions and many languages. [...] Largely via Alexander, Byzantines continued to regard the Persian monarchy both as the barbarian 'other' and as the prototype of their own court culture of luxurious, hierarchical magnificence. Their fascination with Persia as the ancient monarchy par excellence was reinforced, for the classically educated, by Xenophon's <i>Education of Cyrus</i>" (Magdalino 2017, 577–578; Magdalino's emphasis, brackets mine).</p>
<p>Roman Institutions, Law, History, Monuments</p>	<p>"Greek ideas of <i>basileia</i> reinforced the values of the Roman institutional tradition that was the second main strand of Byzantine identity. The Byzantine polity derived its secular constituents entirely from the Roman empire: the ritual election of the emperor by the army and by the senate and people of Constantinople, which was officially designated New Rome very early in its history and imitated Rome in its monumental topography. The legal system, as reissued by Justinian in the <i>Corpus juris civilis</i>, was entirely Roman, and the same was believed of the monetary and fiscal system. Byzantium inherited the Roman cult of military Victory as the decisive attribute of the legitimate emperor. The title of <i>autokrator</i>, which the Byzantine emperor used in his official signature along with that of <i>basileus</i>, was the equivalent of the Roman <i>imperator</i>. Like Greek history, the history of ancient Rome provided Byzantines with exempla and precedents, including the knowledge that the Roman monarchy had originated in the constitution of the Roman Republic" (Magdalino 2017, 578; Magdalino's emphasis).</p>
<p>Judeo-Christian Religious Texts, Hymns, Sermons, Catechisms</p>	<p>"[T]he third important cultural source for Byzantine ideas of <i>basileia</i>: the Septuagint Greek version of the Jewish Bible, its Christian supplement, the non-canonical Scriptures, and the whole subsequent literature of scriptural imitation and exegesis, in which the authors canonized as Church Fathers were highly influential. [...] It was from exegesis of the Book of Daniel that the Byzantines ultimately derived their idea of world history as a succession of global empires, in which their own state, the Roman empire, was to be the greatest and the last. Most importantly, the Bible introduced them to the monarchy that they regarded as the prefiguration of their own: the Davidic Kingdom of Israel, whose heritage they claimed as the Chosen People of the New Testament. From the Books of Kings, they took the positive images of David and Solomon, the negative exempla of sinful kings such as Saul, Ahab, and Manasseh, and the deplorable precedent of a kingdom divided in two; they also retained the role of the king as the builder of the Temple and, more generally, the ideal kingdom as a collaboration between the kingship and the high priesthood. [...] [I]t is a truism that Byzantine court ceremonial sought to imitate the order and harmony of the Kingdom of Heaven, and that Byzantium aspired to appear as heaven on earth [...]" (Magdalino 2017, 578–579; Magdalino's emphasis, brackets mine).</p>

## APPENDIX II – GREEK NATIONHOOD

*...assertions have been repeated many times, as though it were sought by repetition to evade the necessity for proof.* – Norman H. Baynes, *Byzantium: An Introduction to East Roman Civilization*, xx

The above quote from Baynes reflects the two main aims of this appendix. The first aim is to chart the academic trend of a de-Hellenized and/or non-Hellenic Byzantium by presenting elements from 20th and 21st-century scholarship discussing Byzantium specifically and/or Greek history broadly. The second aim is to marshal counterfactuals, focusing on the Greek tribonym *Graikoi*, to said trend supplementing the historical facts on Greek nationhood/ethnicity already covered in this dissertation's Introduction (see pages 31–33). As an outgrowth of said aims, this appendix will also provide: 1) a brief history of the Byzantine (and post-Byzantine) use of the Greek autonoms *Hellenes* and *Ausones/Ausonians* with a critical analysis of modern perspectives on the aforementioned autonoms (e.g., Kaldellis' "Romanogenesis"), 2) the wider implications generated by the counterfactuals with respect to Greek nationhood *in toto*, and 3) a theory as to *why* Byzantines, broadly speaking, saw themselves as Greeks, Christians and Romans.

With that said, the notion of a *de-Hellenized and/or non-Hellenic Byzantium* is a current in 20th and 21st century scholarship that stretches back, as far as this dissertation has discovered, to the early 1960s. This is evident in the following passages from modern academic texts that, as this appendix's counterfactuals will later show, constitute historically dubious scholarly opinions framed as fact:

- Paul J. Alexander's assertion that the terms "*Graecia* and *Graeci* were used [by the Byzantines] occasionally in a neutral or favorable sense but normally they too had an

uncomplimentary meaning" since "*Graecia* was meant and felt to be a denial of all the positive values evoked by the term *Romania*" (Alexander 1962, 340–341; Alexander's emphasis, brackets mine),

- Donald M. Nicol's statement that *Graikoi* is "a word seldom found in Byzantine literature" and that "Greece was an abstraction" for the Byzantines who "did not think of themselves as being Hellenes in any racial sense" (Nicol 1971, 7–8),
- N. Patrick Peritore's assertion that "the very term 'Greek' was introduced by the Franks and bore a pejorative connotation" (Peritore 1977, 173),
- Sarah F. Green's claim that "[a]mong Greek-speaking populations, the word [*Graikos*] slowly fell out of common use during the Byzantine and Ottoman periods, until it was briefly revived by some members of the Greek revolutionary movement during the nineteenth century" (Green 2005, 81–82; brackets mine),
- Anthony Kaldellis' position that "the Byzantines were Romans who happened to speak Greek and not Greeks who happened to call themselves Romans" where "the Greeks had no collective identity but only a geographical one" (Kaldellis 2007, 113, 115),
- Gill Page's position that *Graikos* was a "term derived from the Latin name for the ancient Hellenes" that "from the ninth century onwards [...] fell into disuse" (Page 2008, 66; brackets mine),
- Claudia Rapp's claim that "Greekness" was "safely reclaimed [by the Byzantines] as a cultural marker" with *Graikos* being "a calque from Latin" (Rapp 2008, 139–140; brackets mine),
- Florin Curta's conclusionary statements where *Graikoí* was "[a] Latin name with pejorative connotations" referring to "half-civilised inhabitants of the Empire" with "no

special homeland" (Curta 2011, 292–293; brackets mine),

- Tassos A. Kaplanis' position that "*Graikoi* was used by a limited number of intellectuals and in very specific contexts which relate it in one way or another to the West" (Kaplanis 2014, 87; Kaplanis' emphasis),
- Clemens Gantner's assertion that *Graikos* was never a self-designator and a derivative of the Latin *Graecus* with the use of *Graikoi* as a self-designator limited to an amalgamated Greco-Slavic populace residing on the Balkan fringes of the Eastern Roman sphere of influence (Gantner 2014, 72; the claim of mass Slavic amalgamation, including the claim that the "old homeland of the Hellenes" was "completely Slavized" [Jenkins 1963, 39] with Greek demographics being "brutally interrupted" [Smith 1991, 29], *debunked* by Hopf and Zambades 1872, Kyriakides 1947, 3–105, Constantelos 1970, Argyropoulos et al. 1989, Papagrigrakis et al. 2014, and Stamatoyannopoulos et al. 2017),
- Ioannis Stouraitis' claim that "the rare use of the ethnonym *Graikoi* by Byzantine authors [...] was not intended to designate the Eastern Romans in a collective manner" and that "[t]he ethnonym *Graikoi* as a designation of a part of the eastern Roman masses in Byzantine texts [...] cannot be considered as evidence that these populations identified themselves with the Ancient Hellenes and their historic culture" (Stouraitis 2018, 129 including footnote 30; Stouraitis' emphasis, brackets mine),
- Douglas Whalin's position that "'Greek' is very rare as a term of cultural or political self-appellation in the early medieval centuries" when "[c]ompared to 'Christians' (Χριστιανοί) or 'Romans' (Ῥωμαῖοι)" (Whalin 2020, 20; brackets mine),
- George Steiris' assertion that "[t]here is no evidence that the ethnonym *Graeci* signified any kind of self-identification with the ancient Greeks" (Steiris 2020, 2; Steiris' emphasis,

brackets mine), and

- Dimitris Krallis' position, in a dismissive response to this dissertation's prospectus stage of development, where "Byzantium was still very Roman in the 13th c. when supposedly everyone turns magically Greek" and that "you need way more than 4, 5, even 10 references to Graikoi" (Dimitris Krallis, email message to author, March 23, 2021).

Contrary to the above assertions/positions, the tribonym (i.e., tribal endonym, εθνώνυμο) *Graikoí* was neither an anti-Greek pejorative *ab initio*, nor derived/adopted from Latin *Greci*, nor defined by arbitrary academic goal-setting that smacks of the quantitative, or McNamara, fallacy (i.e., "if it cannot be measured, it is not important", see O'Mahony 2017, 281). Said tribonym was, and still is, used by Greeks for Greeks in their own literature evident in Aristotle's *Meteorology*, the *Parian Chronicle*, Pseudo-Apollodorus' *Library* and Constantine Cavafy's *In the Church*.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, it was used before, during and after the establishment of Latin literature by the Greek slave Lucius Livius Andronicus in the 3rd century BC (see Fantham 2013, 19ff, Zoch 1998, 136 and Conte and Solodow 1994, 39–42 for details on Andronicus<sup>28</sup>). Lastly, *Graikoí* was neither limited to culture nor an expression of reclaimed culturality as the following references derived from Byzantine primary texts, tied to events, attest.

In 431 AD, the Third Ecumenical Synod was held in the city of Ephesus organized by Emperor Theodosius II (see Millar 2006, 15–16ff and Davis 1990, Chapter 4); present there were the Greek theologian-bishops Cyril of Alexandria and Akakios of Beroea the latter of whom, in response to the former, stated: "he [i.e., Bishop Paulinus] followed the western God-loving bishops because of the Latin expression, and its inability to express three *hupostaseis*, compared to our Greek idiom" (McEnerney 2007, 76; McEnerney's emphasis, brackets mine; original Greek in Schwartz 1927, 99: "ἠκολούθησε δὲ τοῖς Δυτικοῖς θεοφιλέσιν ἐπισκόποις τῷ

ἔστενῶσθαι τὴν Ῥωμαικὴν φωνὴν μὴ δύνασθαι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν τῶν Γραικῶν φράσιν τρεῖς ὑποστασεις λέγειν"). At Attila the Hun's court, the 5th-century Greek historian Priskos recorded his encounter with a Hunnic-clothed man who greeted him in Greek; when asked by Priskos where he learned Greek, the man, a tradesman captured by the Huns when they razed the Eastern Roman city of Viminacium in 441 AD, laughed and responded: "I am Greek by birth" (Carolla 2008, 34: "Γραικὸς μὲν εἶναι το γένος"; see also Svoronos 1985, 284, Patouras 1983, 347, Jones 1964, 516, and Thompson 1948, 80, 184–185).<sup>29</sup> In his *ΕΚΦΡΑΣΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΝΑΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΑΓΙΑΣ ΣΟΦΙΑΣ* (*Description of the Church of Holy Wisdom*), the 6th-century Greek poet Paul the Silentiary calls his Greco-Christian contemporaries *Graikoῖsi* ("Γραικοῖσι") who themselves call the interior of the restored Church of Saint Sophia in Constantinople *narthex* ("νάρθηξ") (see Niebuhr 1837, 22 for original Greek: "χῶρος ὃδε Γραικοῖσι φατίζεται ἀνδράσι νάρθηξ"; see also Baldovin 2006, 80 and Mango 1986, 82 for English translation: "this space is called narthex by the Greeks"). During "the Sixth Ecumenical Council (680–1), Greek patristic texts were referred to as βιβλία τῶν Γραικῶν" (Magdalino 1991, 9 citing the *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio* XI). In the 8th/9th century AD, the Christian Greek scholar-saint Theodore the Studite referred to his New/Eastern Roman community as *Graikía* (i.e., "Γραικία" meaning "Domain of the [Christian] Greeks" or "Greekland") in a letter to his contemporary Naukratios (Letter 145 in Fatouros 1991, 260–261) and his kinsmen/countrymen as *Graikoí* in another letter (i.e., "ἐν Γραικοῖς") (Letter 419 in Fatouros 1991, 586–588). In the 9th/10th-century *Life of Saint Euthymios the Younger* composed "by a disciple of the saint, Basil, who subsequently became a bishop in the region of Thessalonike" (Greenfield 2017, 247), God's enfranchisement of Michael the Excubitor allowed Michael to then take "possession of the scepter of the Roman empire" (Greenfield and Talbot 2016, 12–15, Chapter 4: "τῶν Ῥωμαίων βασιλείας τὰ σκῆπτρα τότε

κατέχοντος"; see also Petit 1904, 17) with the Arabs later having "encountered Greek biremes" (Greenfield and Talbot 2016, 76–77, Chapter 25: "διήρων γὰρ αὐτοῖς συναντησάντων Γραικῶν"; see also Petit 1904, 36 and Charizanis 2013–2014, 132–133). In the 11th/12th century *Life of Saint Clement of Ohrid*, Theophylakt of Ohrid, the Greek archbishop of Bulgaria, referred to the Byzantine emperor as "Michael, king of the Romans" (IV.15: "τῶν Ῥωμαίων βασιλέως Μιχαήλ"), Greek literature as "books of the Greeks" or "Greek books" (IX.30: "τῶν γραικῶν βιβλίων"/"τῶν γραικικῶν βιβλίων"), the Byzantine language as "Greek" (XII.35: "Γραικικὴν"), and Byzantine territories as "land of the Greeks" (XXIII.68: "τῶν Γραικῶν χώρας") (Anastasiou 1967, 166, 173–174, 181; Iliev 1995, 85, 92–93, 102; see also Constantelos 2017). In the 13th century AD, Ioannes Apokaukos, a self-admitted "Hellene and Graikos" ("<< Ἑλληνα και Γραικόν >>" in Dēmou 1992, 283; Dēmou's emphasis), was "a leading clergyman in the independent principality of Epiros" (Macrides 1991, 135); Apokaukos wrote a letter to his contemporary George Bardanes describing the Byzantine city of Vonitsa (Bonditsa), part of the Metropolitan of Nafpaktos in Aetoloakarnania, as superior to the Byzantine city of Grevena in Epirus "in its complete Hellenic culture, in the middle of which resides [the community] of the Greeks" (Vassilievsky 1896, 252: "τῶν Γρεβενῶν τῆς Βονδίτζης [...] τὸν πάντα ἑλληνισμόν και τὸ μέσον κεῖσθαι Γραικῶν"; English translation mine, brackets mine; see also Dēmou 1992, 287). In his *Fourth Lenten Sermon* of 1215 AD, the Byzantine archbishop Nicholas Mesarites posited two questions in response to the Patriarch of Constantinople's misplaced ire towards him for being called "archbishop of the Greeks" by a Latin cardinal and thus "glorified [...] as patriarch and teacher of more or less the whole ecumene" (Angold 2017, 251; brackets mine); Mesarites' questions, rhetorically asked, were: "For which of the ecumene's climes was not home to the Greeks? Did the language of the Greeks not spread throughout Libya, Europe, and Asia?"

(Angold 2017, 289, §51; Heisenberg 1923b, 47: "ποῖον γὰρ κλίμα τῆς οἰκουμένης τῆς τῶν Γραικῶν ἀναστροφῆς ἀμοιρεῖ; καὶ οὐ Λιβύη Εὐρώπη τε καὶ Ἀσία τῆς τῶν Γραικῶν διαλέκτου πεπλήρωται;").

The facts covered in this appendix and in the Introduction (pages 31–33) show a pattern whereby the use of *Graikós/Graikoί/Graikón* by Greek people from the Eastern Roman polity before, during and after the 7th–9th centuries (either as a standalone autotribonym or as a synonym for *Romaíoi* and *Christianoí*) is an emic, steady and well-documented historical phenomenon. Said phenomenon refutes Dimiter Angelov's assertion that "[i]n early and middle Byzantium the word *Graikoi* [...] is rarely attested" (Angelov 2019, 261; Angelov's emphasis, brackets mine). More importantly, it illustrates, as stated earlier, the historical dubiousness of the modern scholarly notion of a de-Hellenized and/or non-Hellenic Byzantium. Byzantines, for all intents and purposes, used the autonoms *Romaíoi*, *Graikoί*, and *Christianoί* well enough to satiate two sets of universally asked questions: 1) "Who are we?" and "Where did we originate?" (questions from *oneself/we-self* to *oneself/we-self*), and 2) "Who are you?" and "Where did you originate?" (questions from *others* to *others*). The questions are important because they are based on the universal reality of *anthropic curiosity of anthropic life* (i.e., "Know Thyself", ΓΝΩΘΙ Σ[Ε]ΑΥΤΟΝ) reflecting, at least partly, Alistair McIntyre's *life as a medieval quest*: "For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from the past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships" (McIntyre 2007, 221). Part of McIntyre's *life as a medieval quest* is relevant because it *renders notions of, and appeals to, quantitative rarity reificatory*. Specifically, quantitative rarity, a refrain exhibited in the modern academic texts critiqued in this appendix, falsely assumes that the Byzantine Greeks, given the *qualitative*

*nature* of their own productions, historically concerned themselves with the numerical frequency of their use of their own collective autoclassificatory appellations. Said qualitative nature is illustrated through the *interchangeability* of the aforesaid Byzantine autonoms, similar to the interchangeability shown in the Mycenaean-based Homeric epics with regards to the Greek group-level autonoms *Achaeans*, *Danaans*, *Argives* and *Pan-Hellenes* (e.g., "Πανέλληνας και Ἀχαιοῦς" in Homer's *Iliad*, II.2.530; see also Lee 1959, Bonfante 1996, 115–116, Latacz 2004, 216–218, Parker 2007, 17–22 and Shear 2000, xiff on the Homeric epics).

On a sidenote, the term *Hellenes* (as a tribal endonym and not in reference to inhabitants of the Byzantine province of Hellas) underwent a *semantic split* during Late Antiquity due to its synonymity with the term *Gentiles* used for non-Abrahamic religionists. Although Walter Pohl is accurate in stating that the "eastern Romans [...] were the descendants of the ancient 'Hellenes'", he is inaccurate in his assertion that their "identity was [...] contradictory" on account of *Hellenes* being "hardly used for self-identification since it had come to be understood as a synonym for 'pagans'" (Pohl 2012, 7; brackets mine). The tribal dimension of *Hellenes* was historically used in *contradistinction* to the same term's religiously pagan/non-Christian dimension (see Tsougarakis 2006, 28 on *Hellene* as *Gentile*). Case in point, a Christian Greek prayer to God from the Byzantine city of Corinth (c. 800 AD) makes reference to the *Hellenes* as a chosen nation echoing the *elect nation model* derived from the Old Testament (see Eshel 2018, Chapters 1–2, on the Israelite concept of the "Chosen People"). The prayer, despite its gaps, is clear:

⊕ ὁ θεός τῆς δίκης τῆς δικα-  
ζούσης, ὀρθῶς φλα[γέλ]ωσον τὰ ᾿σχροῦ {ἔσχροῦ = αἰσχροῦ}.  
τοὺς Ἑλληνας π[ροαι(?)]ροῦ ποτε κ(αὶ) ἀπώ-  
λεσον τοὺς ἐχθ[ροὺς — —]ηρου κ(αὶ) Μαρίνου  
[— —] ρίῳν [τοῦ δεινός κ]ουρέος. ⊕  
(Kent 1966, 210; Hondius 1923–1954, Volume 11, 109)

‡ O God of justice that giveth judgment,  
rightly scourge evil. Ever [prefer?] the Greeks,  
and destroy the enemies of [— —]ēros and Marinos,  
[— —] the sons of the barber. ‡  
(Kent's translation in Kent 1966, 210)

‡ The God of justice who passes judgment,  
rightfully flagellate the evils. The Hellenes ever you [choose]  
a(nd) eliminate the adversaries of [— —]ēros a(nd) Marinos,  
[— —] the sons [of the such-and-such b]arber. ‡  
(English translation mine)

One could argue that the barber's sons used *Hellenes* in reference to residents of the Byzantine province (or *theme/thema*, θέμα) of Hellas of which the Peloponnese in southern Greece was a component of since the late 7th century AD (Gregory 1991b, 1620–1621). The Christian Greek prayer, however, was from early 9th-century Corinth, a city that at the time was no longer part of the Hellas province upon becoming the capital of the Byzantine theme of the Peloponnese in circa 800 AD (Gregory 1991b, 1620–1621). If the barber's sons wanted God in the early 800s to exclusively elect the residents of their own Byzantine province, then the term *Peloponnesians* would have been used and not *Hellenes*. Ultimately, the 9th-century appearance of *Hellenes* in a contemporary, non-academic, unironic, and non-pagan context used to convey Byzantine elect nationhood undermines, or at least challenges, John C. Skedros' conclusionary position that "[f]or Byzantine society, prior to 1204, Hellenism was a cultural and intellectual pursuit of a minority of highly educated individuals" and "was not a marker of ethnic identity" (Skedros 2010, 362; brackets mine). In around 802 AD, the anonymous Byzantine author of the *Apocryphal Apocalypse of Daniel* synonymizes his own (New) Roman realm, *Romanía*, with "land of the Hellenes" as in territory inhabited by Greek people and *not* pagans (Vassiliev 1893, 48: "χώρα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἤτοι Ρωμανία"; see Congourdeau 2016, 994–996 and Kraft 2018, 88 on text's date of composition); "land of the Hellenes" (i.e., "Ἑλλήνων χώραν") also appears in the 7th-century

*Miracles of Saint Demetrios* (Migne 1891, 1293), which, given the aforesaid *Apocryphal*, renders historically false Kaldellis' claim that the phrase refers to "Roman territory of Greece" (Kaldellis 2007, 114–115). Later, Michael of Anchialos, the *hypatos ton philosophon* (ὑπάτος τῶν φιλοσόφων, "the greatest of the philosophers") who became Patriarch of Constantinople from 1170 to 1178 AD, presented an "inaugural lecture [...] in the presence of the emperor Manuel Comnenus" referring to Manuel's Roman domain as *Panhellenion* ("Πανελλήνιον") meaning "realm of the Pan-Hellenes" or "All-Greek community" (Browning 1961, 173, 197; brackets mine). Anchialos' *Panhellenion* is not simply a rhetorical device but rather evidence of an *active* and *organic* usage of the tribonym *Hellenes* challenging, if not contradicting, Christos Malatras' assertion that 12th-century Byzantine scholars "never called themselves *Hellenes* and they never seem to share this [ancient Greek] past" (Malatras 2011, 426; Malatras' emphasis, brackets mine). Afterwards, Gregory II of Cyprus, the Patriarch of Constantinople from 1283 to 1289 AD, wrote a laudatory speech dedicated to Saint George mentioning the "land of the Cappadocians" in Asia Minor, which "appeared rich in inhabitants who were by origin Hellenes, a tribe dedicated to the nature of words" (Gregorii Cyprii 1865 [1280s], 304: "Τῆς Καππαδοκῶν χώρας [...] οικήτορας ἐφάνη πλουτήσασα τὸ ἀνέκαθεν Ἑλληνας, γένος ἀφωσιωμένον τῇ τῶν λόγων φύσει"; translation mine, brackets mine). In the 14th-century AD, Nicholas Kavasilas Chamaëtos, "a native of Thessalonica" who was a "layman and probably a lawyer", "wrote three encomia to St Demetrius" (Russell 2010a, 31–32; see also Talbot 1991b, 1088); in one of his encomia titled *Address to the In-Glory-of-Christ Megalomartyr Demetrios the Myroblite* where Kavasilas honors the historical *and* living continuity of Hellenism in his beloved city of Thessalonica:

Οὐκουν οὐκ' ἔστιν οὐδεις, οἶμαι, τῶν νῦν ἅπανταχοῦ τῆς ἡμετέρας Ἑλλήνων, ὃς οὐχ ὥσπερ εἰς πρόγονον τὴν πόλιν ἀνάγει, καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ μούσης μητέρα τίθεται, καὶ γε σεμνὸς ἠγεῖται δόξειν, τὸ γένος εἰπών. Ῥήτορας δὲ ἀγαθοὺς, ἢ τοὺς Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρους, τίς οὕτω πασῶν ἐκάστοτε τίκει [...] Τοιοῦτον ἡμῖν τῇ πόλει

τὸ ἦθος, καὶ οὕτως ἀκριβῶς καὶ μετὰ παντὸς τοῦ γιγνομένου, τοὺς Ἑλλήνων ἔσωσε νόμους [...] ("ΠΡΟΣΦΩΝΗΜΑ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΝΔΟΞΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΜΑΡΤΥΡΑ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΝ ΤΟΝ ΜΥΡΟΒΑΗΤΗΝ", 4 ἐν Ιοαννου 1884, 70· ἀγκύλες δικῆς μου· δέξ ἐπίσης Politis 1901, 127 καὶ Tafrahi 1913, 150, υποσημείωση 1)

Νομίζω [...] ὅτι δὲν ὑπάρχει οὔτε ἓνας ἀπὸ τοὺς σύγχρονους Ἕλληνας παντοῦ σὲ ὅλη τὴν χώρα μας, ποὺ νὰ μὴν τιμᾷ τὴν πόλιν μας σὰν πρόγονο, θεωρώντας τὴν μητέρα τῆς παιδείας ποὺ κλείνει μέσα του· καὶ ὁ καθένας νομίζει πὼς θὰ φανῆ σπουδαῖος, ἂν πῆ ὅτι κατάγεται ἀπ' αὐτήν. Καὶ γεννᾷ κάθε τόσο γιὰ ὅλους, πότε ρήτορες ἄξιους, πότε συντρόφους τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλη [...] Τέτοιος εἶναι ὁ χαρακτήρας τῆς πόλης μας καὶ μὲ τέτοια ἀκρίβεια σὲ κάθε τι ποὺ γινόταν διαφύλαξε τοὺς νόμους τῶν ἀρχαίων Ἑλλήνων. (Vacalopoulos 1974, 98· μετάφραση τοῦ Βακαλοπούλου, ἀγκύλες δικῆς μου)

I think that there does not exist in the whole of Greece [...] a single Greek who does not honor this city and who does not feel within his heart that it has assumed the mantle of cultural leadership. There are even those who believe their stature is increased merely by saying that they come from Thessalonica. This is the city which produces worthy orators and students of Plato and Aristotle [...] No city has preserved so faithfully the laws of the ancient Greeks [...] (Vacalopoulos 1970, 50; Vacalopoulos' translation, brackets mine)

As accurately asserted by Eugenia Russell, "Kavasilas' work draws richly on both Christian and classical sources of inspiration" that "is not [...] just classical window-dressing" but "a deliberate and careful mixing of Christian and classical motifs"; for example, Kavasilas "calls St Demetrius 'ἰσόθεον φῶτα' (a man equal to god)", "a Homeric description of distinguished heroes", and "emphasizes the monk-like purity of St Demetrius" with "[e]ven Christ Himself [...] awarded a Homeric epithet by being called *Olympian*: 'Χριστὸς ὀλύμπιος'" (Russell 2010b, 130, 133; Russell's emphasis, brackets mine). Steven Runciman is therefore correct in succinctly stating that "[t]he Byzantines had always been conscious of their Greek past" (Runciman 1970, 14; brackets mine). And George Every complements Runciman by accurately asserting that "[t]he Hellenes, as the Byzantines called the pagan Greeks, were unbelievers, but ancestors" where "[e]very educated Byzantine could catch an allusion to Homer, and many [Byzantines] were familiar with Plato, Aristotle, and Pindar" (Every 1947, 20; brackets mine). Sture Linnér later

complements both Runciman and Every by stating that the Byzantines "had always been aware of their Greek past" with Hellenism as the basis of Byzantine natural science along with poetry (i.e., Homer), philosophy (i.e., Plato and Aristotle), language, and literature (Linnér 1995, 211: "De hade alltid varit medvetna om sitt grekiska förflutna."; translation mine). Further evidence supporting Runciman, Every and Linnér comes from the Byzantine church of the Virgin of Skripou in Boeotia, which was constructed in 873–874 AD and "occupies the site of ancient Orchomenos, one of the famed, wealthy cities of the Greek mainland that thrived and prospered from the Mycenaean period onward" (Papalexandrou 2003, 67). The church's patron, Leo the Protospatharios (πρωτοσπαθάριος, "prime spatha-bearer"), "not only appropriated some essence of the past, but in owning and consuming the bounty of the site, he has fully vanquished the heroic city of his (pagan) predecessors [...] becom[ing] its new, overtly Christian commander-in-chief" (Papalexandrou 2003, 63, 67; brackets mine; the *protospatharios* was "a dignity of the imperial hierarchy" according to Kazhdan and Cutler 1991, 1748). This is evident in the following "dedicatory inscription immured in the west facade" of the church "written in epic hexameters, [...] inscribed in the ancient manner [...] and [...] is replete with classical allusion and metaphor, including a reference to the Virgin as *Iphianassa*, the Homeric Iphigeneia" (Papalexandrou 2003, 67; Papalexandrou's emphasis, brackets mine):

+ Neither envy nor time eternal will obscure the works  
of your efforts, most wonderful one, in the vast depths of oblivion;  
Because your works roar out, even though they are mute  
and you have brought to completion this famous precinct  
of the Virgin Mother, of the Mighty Goddess who received God,  
which is a delightful thing, gleaming on all sides with lovely radiance;  
And on either side of Christ stood both the apostles,  
the hallowed dust of whom a clump of Roman earth covers;  
Among the bountiful creatures through the endless cycles of time,  
o highly praised Leo the great protospatharios,  
rejoicing in your property and in your most excellent offspring  
while you command the area of the legendary Orchomenos. +

(Papalexandrou 2001, 279; see also Papalexandrou 2003, 67)

All in all, *Greek ancestor veneration*, albeit tempered, is an important dimension of Byzantine life despite the Byzantines' use of *Hellenes* as an umbrella term for non-Christians (see Papadopoulou 2015, 98–102, Gounaridis 1999, 55–56 and Svoronos 1985, 283 on Hellenism as paganism). Said veneration existed well after Byzantium's geopolitical dissolution as shown in "one of the most popular Greek chapbooks of the sixteenth century, the *Ριμάδα περί Βελισσαρίου*, a version of the original late fourteenth-century *History of Belisarius*, contain[ing] the remarkable line 'Ἑλλήνων παῖδες εἴμεθεν, ὡς Ἕλληνας φανώμεν/θανώμεν', in which Byzantine Greeks are called 'sons of Hellenes', and where Belisarius is portrayed as a classical Greek hero" (Stouraiti 2014, 31; Stouraiti's emphasis, brackets mine). In Christian Greek churches of the post-Byzantine period, the walls were painted with portraits of pre-Christian Greeks, each described as "Ο ἙΛΛΗΝ" (i.e., "The [Ancient] Greek"), such as Homer, Socrates, Pythagoras, Solon, Cleanthes, Sophocles, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Galen, Plutarch, Sibyl, Philo, Aialia (Hypatia), Cheilon, etc. (see Spetsieres 1963–1964, 387–419, Spetsieres 1973–1974 and Vacalopoulos 1976, 170–171). And like their Byzantine-era predecessors, Christian Greeks of the post-Byzantine era used *interchangeably* the civic autonym *Romaíoi* (despite New Rome's geopolitical downfall) and the ethno-cultural autonyms *Graikoí* and *Hellenes* with notable examples including the 15th-century poet Anonymous (*Secret Lamentation on the Fall of Constantinople*), the 16th-century historian Ierakos (*Chronicle on the Kingdom of the Turks*), the 16th-century epistolographer Theodore Zygomalas (*Epistola Theodori Zygomalaē*), and the 17th-century Orthodox Metropolitan Myreon Mathaios (Constantelos 2001–2002; see also Papadopoulos-Kerameus 1901, 268 and Lambros 1886, 821–825 on Anonymous, Sathas 1872, 245 on Ierakos, and Hopf 1837, 236–237 on Zygomalas). Said examples are complemented by

the following facts:

- John Argyropoulos, a "writer and teacher in Constantinople and Italy" who "emigrated in 1456 to Florence" (Talbot 1991a, 164), says the following in his monody about Byzantine emperor John VIII Palaeologos who died on 31 October 1448 AD: "such you pass over the common eye of the Hellenes. Oh, sun king of Hellas" ("οἷον ἐξεῖλες κοινὸν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ὀφθαλμόν. ὦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἤλιε βασιλεῦ" in Lambros 1910, 7; see also Politis 1901, 127 and Sathas 1880, 11; for the monody's historical background, see Lambros 1910, xi; English translation mine),
- The Trebizondians (i.e., Christian Greeks of Byzantine Pontus), in one their laic songs from 1462 on the Trebizondian Empire's fall, refer to their own fighters as *Hellenes* ("Ἑλλενοί"), their own strongholds as *Hellenic castles* ("Ἑλληνικὰ τὰ κάστρα") and their own weapon as *Hellenic spear* ("τ' Ἑλλένικον τὸ κοντάρην") (Politis 1901, 15–16 citing Ioannides 1870, 287; translation mine); another Trebizondian laic song also references *Hellenic speech* ("Ἑλληνικὸν λαλίαν"), *Hellenic warriors* ("τ' Ἑλλέγκα παλληκάρια") and synonymizes *young Hellenes* with *Roman warriors* ("νέους Ἑλλενους, Ῥωμαῖκα παλληκάρια") (Ioannides 1870, 286; translation mine; see also Sathas 1873, 43),
- Thomas of Argos, a Greek mercenary captain "who led a detachment of Argive mercenaries" in Scotland "presumably to assist the Earl of Hertford in his autumn campaign of 1545" (Eichholz 1947, 80), saying "For we are children of the ancient Greeks" (i.e., "Ἑλλήνων γὰρ ἐσμὲν παῖδες", *Hellēnon gar esmen paides*) in a speech recorded by his contemporary, the Greek historian Nicander Noukios (Moustoxydes 1856, 222; translation mine; see also Cramer 1841, 90–95 and Kostaridou 2005, 15),
- Michael Hermodoros Listarchos from Zakynthos who composed "a hortatory epistle

- (1562) addressed "To those clever and noble youths who partake in and are taught Greek lessons" (Kakkoura 2022, 1940) where the students in Chios were described as, and understood themselves to be, "Hellenic youth" (i.e., "Ἕλληνες νεανία", *Hellēnes neaniai*) with "remembrance of ancient Greece" (i.e., "τῆς παλαιᾶς μνημονεύοντας Ἑλλάδος", *tēs palaiās mnēmoneuontas Ellados*) (Paranikas 1876–1877, 44–45; translation mine),
- Michael Argyros from Kerkyra who composed a letter to Pope Gregory XIII in 1581 seeking aid against the Ottomans on behalf of the village inhabitants of Chimarra who defined themselves as a "Greek race [i.e., Hellenic kinship-nation]" (Theiner and Miklosich 1872, 57: "τὸ γένο μας τῶν γρεκῶν", *to geno mas ton grekon*; translation and brackets mine) of "Romans and Arvanites [i.e., Greeks from outside and within the Arvanon region respectively]" (Theiner and Miklosich 1872, 58: "ἴμεσθε πλήθως Ῥωμέοι καὶ Ἀρβανῆτες", *imesthe plythos Romeoi kai Arvanites*; translation and brackets mine),
  - George Kontares, a priest from Sérvia, published in 1675 his *Ancient and altogether beneficial histories of the famous city of Athens* (Ἱστορίαι παλαιαὶ καὶ πάνυ ὠφέλιμοι τῆς περιφήμου πόλεως Ἀθήνης) referring to the Greeks of his time as "new Hellenes" (νέοι Ἕλληνες) whose relation to the ancient Greeks/Hellenes is, according to Demetris G. Apostolopoulos, "direct and organic [...] because they belong to the same race [i.e., kinship-nation]" (Apostolopoulos 2005, 87, 89–90: "Ἄμεση καὶ ὀργανικὴ [...] διότι ἀνήκουν στὸ ἴδιο γένος"; translation and brackets mine); Kontares himself states: "because we are descendants of those great and wise men [i.e., ancient Greeks], it is necessary that we mirror them in all good principles" ("ἐπειδὴ εἴμεσθεν ἀπόγονοι τοιούτων μεγάλων καὶ σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρέπον εἶναι νὰ τοὺς μιμούμεσθεν εἰς ὅλα τὰ καλὰ ἤθη", *epeidē eimesthen apogonoi toiouton megalon kai sophon andron, prepon*

*einai na tous mimoumesthen eis ola ta kala ēthē*; see Apostolopoulos 2005, 90 quoting from pages 7–8 of Kontares' *Ancient and altogether beneficial histories*; brackets and translation mine), and

- the Eastern Orthodox Patriarchs who in 1716 AD defined themselves and their flock as follows in response to their Anglican contemporaries: "in ancient times indeed Hellenes, but now Greeks and new Romans through New Rome so called" (Karmirē 1953, 789: "πάλαι μὲν Ἑλλήνων, νῦν δὲ Γραικῶν καὶ νέων Ρωμαίων διὰ τὴν νέαν Ρώμην καλουμένων", *palai men Hellēnon, nyn de Graikon kai neon Romaion dia tēn nean Romēn kaloumenon*; translation mine).

The aforesaid notable examples also consequentially refute the following:

- John Th. Kakridis' assertions that "the term 'Hellene' [...] fell into oblivion" and "only in the twenties of the nineteenth century [...] came again into current use" (Kakridis 1963, 251; brackets mine),
- N. Patrick Peritore's framing of Hellenic ethnic continuity, emphasized by the 15th-century Byzantine political theorist Gemistos Plethon, as a "national myth" that is "largely spurious" (Peritone 1977, 174),
- Dennis Skiotis' framing of 19th-century Greeks as people who "would hardly have recognized the term Hellene as applying to them" where "the 'Hellenes' were nothing more than a legendary race of giants—handsome and heroic—from an obscure and indeterminate past" (Skiotis 1978, 157),
- Clifton R. Fox's statement that "the politics of modern nationalism" caused modern Greeks to "switch from 'Romaioi' back to 'Hellene'" (Fox 1996),
- Agis Marinis' assertion that "the Greek idea of the nation developed within the

framework of the Romantic movement and on the basis of the connection between 'us' and 'the Ancients'" (Marinis 2019, 168),

- Stephanos Katsikas' position, framed as fact, that "[a] few Greeks [...] appropriate[d] 'Greeks' (Graikoi) to denote Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians" and that "[t]he names 'Graikoi' (Greeks) and 'Ellines' (Hellenes), [...] prior to the eighteenth century, were used as identification terms by a few educated Greek-speaking and Hellenized Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire" (Katsikas 2021, xxiii, 38; brackets mine), and
- Christopher J. A. Blyth's assertions that "'Graikos' was rarely used by Greeks themselves" limited "to people who belonged to a Greek Church (in the liturgical sense)" and that *Hellenes* underwent transitions both in literary and vernacular circles (Blyth 2022, 80, 82).

The implication of the facts covered in this appendix is that *Hellenic/Greek nationhood is ancient preceding the modern nation-state of Hellas as a kinship network conscious of its own ethno-cultural origins and civilizational history* refuting Tassos Kaplanis' claim of an "emerging [Greek] national identity" where one "finds the *Hellenes* as a term of self-definition" only "until the publication in 1791 of the *Geografia Neoteriki* by Philippidis and Konstantas" (Kaplanis 2014, 93; Kaplanis' emphasis, brackets mine); said nationhood is *neither* a socio-political construct from the 18th/19th-century (e.g., Enlightenment, Romanticism, Napoleonic Wars), *nor* a creatio ex nihilo of modern Greek nationalist historiography (e.g., Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos), *nor* a product of Western European neo-classicism, *nor* a product of "warring" academic dogmas (e.g., primordialism versus social constructivism, modernism versus post-modernism, essentialism versus anti-essentialism, structuralism versus post-structuralism, continuity versus discontinuity, positivism versus anti-positivism, etc.).<sup>30</sup>

As for the autonym *Ausones* (or *Ausonians*), Kaldellis states that "[j]ust as the Byzantines

referred to foreign peoples by classical names, making the Goths into Skythians and the Arabs into Medes, so too did they regularly call themselves Ausones, an ancient name for the original inhabitants of *Italy*" (Kaldellis 2007, 63; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine). In other words, *Ausones* for Kaldellis was "the standard 'classicizing' name that the Byzantines used for themselves, not 'Hellenes'" and so "the Byzantines did not typically figure *themselves* in classicizing terms as Greeks" (Kaldellis 2007, 63, 221; Kaldellis' emphasis). It is true that "the name of the Ausonians, who were by definition Italians, could be borrowed to refer to the new Romans" as illustrated in "[a]n epigram in celebration of Porphyrius' role in overthrowing a usurper [that] calls the Constantinopolitans Ausonians (*Anth. Pal.* 16.350)" (Bowersock 2016, 45; Bowersock's emphasis, brackets mine). However, "[t]he usage 'Ausonian' = 'Byzantine' first appeared in the twelfth century, when [Emperor] Constantine Manasses applied 'Ausonian' to the Byzantine emperors and to the Byzantine army" where "calling the Byzantines 'Ausonian' or 'connected with (ancient) Italy' helped legitimize the plans of the Byzantine emperor to regain their former territories in Italy from the Normans" (Fisher 1979, 445; brackets mine). More importantly, the term was "derived from the eponymous [Greek] hero 'Auson', son of Odysseus and Circe" as mentioned by the 12th-century Byzantine Greek scholar, John Tzetzes (Fisher 1979, 445; brackets mine). And since Greek mythology/mytho-history was a key perennial theme exhibited in Byzantine art (see Weitzmann 1949, Weitzmann 1984, Epilogue), Byzantine book illumination (see *Ilias Ambrosiana* in Weitzmann 1977, 44–51; see also Bandinelli 1955), Byzantine tools (e.g., griffin lamps, Athena-Minerva weights, see Gonosová and Kondoleon 1994, 242–245, 250–251) and Byzantine attire (e.g., griffin and Heracles motifs on Byzantine belt-buckles, see Bonde et al. 1987, 48–51), the term *Ausones* used by the *Romaíoi-Graikoí* for themselves *neither* proves any standalone non-Greekness of the Byzantines *nor* proves that

Hellenism was subsumed by a civic-qua-ethnic Romanism in the Eastern Roman polity. Said Romanism, in fact, fails to explain, unlike the following accurate assessment by Kurt Weitzmann, *why*, for example, the historical relationship between the Byzantines and their art existed the way it did:

The Byzantines, like their forebears of ancient Greece, were never satisfied with a play of forms alone, but, stimulated by an innate rationalism, endowed forms with life by associating them with a meaningful content. The change from Olympian religion to Christianity did not alter this basic attitude towards art. *After all, the Byzantines were Greeks.* (Weitzmann 1960, 68; emphasis mine; see also Kitzinger 1963)

Weitzmann's outsider perspective is complemented by the following observation-analysis of Byzantine art from Nikos H. Ghikas constituting valuable insider perspective:

For us Greeks, the other side is still living: the Byzantine tradition. The very one that is mocked and reviled by the 'moderns' like Sassetta or Giotto. [...] Byzantine art is unique and unequalled in that it devised forms that were tantamount to transcendental symbols of timeless mysteries, liturgical narratives based on an unearthly geometry, reflections of heavenly visions, conceptual archetypes [...] It is Aristotelian logic, an unforgettable algebraic equation. [...] Indeed, Byzantine art has faithfully preserved the lesson of Hellenistic art. Beneath its austere, stern, harsh presence you will find, if you dig, knowledge of planes, axes, composition, chiaroscuro and relief, on the ancient system. [...] They [i.e., Byzantine artists] were not content with adopting the knowledge of colour, the Classical line, the concept of composition. They also took over some conceptual principles that go back to two sources: on the one hand to the mathematical and scientific achievements of the mathematician Hero, such as the *Pneumatica*, *Belopoeica* ('Manufacture of Missiles'), and *Dioptra* ('Theory of Reflection'), and on the other to the metaphysical and aesthetic theories of Plotinus, and through him to Plato's theory of ideas. This profound, complete system of knowledge was preserved by Byzantine art and transmitted to many other arts, above all to the infant art of the West. (Ghikas 1996; brackets mine)

Lastly, Kaldellis' "case of 'Romanogenesis'" involving the Pelasgians "of the city of Tralleis in Asia Minor" being "turn[ed] [...] into Romans" (Kaldellis 2019, 55; brackets mine) constitutes a reification of Agathias, Agathias' historiographical predecessor Prokopios, and Herodotus as Agathias' source. In his *Histories* 2.17, the qualifier *astoi* (ἄστοι), bekownst to Kaldellis as "townspeople" (Kaldellis 2019, 55), is used by Agathias to describe the Pelasgians of Tralleis:

νῦν οὖν οἱ ἐκεῖνη ἀστοὶ Πελασγοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ἂν δικαίως κληθεῖεν, Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ μᾶλλον, εἰ καὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἐς τὸ ἐλληνικόν τε καὶ ἀττικώτερον μετεβάλοντο. (Αγαθίου Σχολαστικού Μυριναίου. *Ἱστορίων*, II.17 ἐν Dindorfius 1871, 208)

Now therefore those urbanites [are] Pelasgians truly if no longer justly called [Pelasgians], Romans rather [they are], even if their Hellenic speech also changed to Attic. (Agathias Scholasticus Myrinaeus. *Histories*, II.17; translation and brackets mine)

The passage above illustrates the Pelasgians (i.e., primeval/native Greeks; broadly "proto-Greek" for Ellis 2023, 129) as *city-dwellers who underwent a shift in their quality of urbanity and not a shift in their ethnicity/tribality*. Agathias parallels the aforesaid shift to *civic* Romanness with the earlier shift the Pelasgians underwent, echoing Herodotus' *Histories* 1.56–1.58 (i.e., Pelasgians and Hellenes as respectively stationary and mobile modalities of Greek tribality), when they altered their own Hellenic idiom by using another dialect of Greek (i.e., Herodotus: from "barbaric" Pelasgian, meaning "uncivilized" pre-Heraclid/non-Doric Greek, to post-Heraclid Hellenic; Agathias: from non-Attic Hellenic to Attic Greek) (see also "Pelasgians and Tyrants" in Georges 1994, 130–143). Kaldellis projects his misreading of Prokopios' *Secret History* into Agathias in order to validate his "Romanogenesis" argument that *misequates* Roman political integration (e.g., Caracalla's *Constitutio Antoniniana*) with Roman ethno-cultural assimilation (e.g., Latinization of the Western Roman provinces). Specifically, the author reads and treats a phrase in *Secret History* 6.23 (i.e., "'fell upon the entire race (ὅλω τῷ γένει)") as evidence of an exclusively *Roman race* due to "'[n]o Roman man' manag[ing] to escape" from Emperor Justinian I's wickedness (Kaldellis 2019, 55; brackets mine). But given Prokopios' *consistent disdain for Justinian*, the aforesaid phrase contextually means the *whole human race* that Justinian threatens, synonymous with the phrase "to human beings" (εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, *eis tous anthropous*), as Prokopios makes clear in *Secret History* 18.1:

Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ δαίμων τις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀνθρωπόμορφος ἦν, τεκμηριώσαιτο ἂν τις τῷ μεγέθει σταθμώμενος ὧν εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κακῶν ἔδρασεν. (Procopius and Krascheninnikov 1899, 111–112)

That the Emperor was not a human being but, as stated, a demon in human guise could be demonstrated by considering the magnitude of the calamities which he brought on the human race. (Procopius, Williamson and Sarris 2007, 68)

The above passage concords with the more accurate translation of *Secret History* 6.23 where Justinian was "like any other visitation from heaven falling on the *entire human race*" in that "*he left no one completely untouched*" (Procopius, Williamson and Sarris 2007, 33; emphasis mine). Had there been a "Romanogenesis", then the 4th-century historian Ammianus Marcellinus, "born in a Greek-speaking milieu of the Near East" who "acquired Latin as a second language" (Mitchell 2015, 23), would not have *paralleled* his martial Romanness with his culturo-tribal Greekness in his *own* words ("ut miles et Graecus"; see Nobbs 2012, 81). Instead, Marcellinus, "a senior army officer (a *protector domesticus*) under Constantius and Julian" (Mitchell 2015, 23; Mitchell's emphasis), would have subsumed his Greek ethnic background into his Roman military foreground to the point where the former would have been erased by the latter, an event that never occurred; he was not just "Roman in outlook" (Kaldellis 2007, 115, footnote 224) but *Greco-Roman* in life, the Greek part of which was an important given. And if "Romanogenesis" had ever occurred, then why would Byzantines preserve and use the Homeric epics instead of Virgil's *Aeneid* as a key, if not *the* key, standard for educating themselves and their progeny? An answer is offered by Margalit Finkelberg:

Over two millennia, from the emergence of historical Greece in the 8th century B.C.E. up to the dissolution of Byzantium in the fifteenth century C.E., the Homeric poems acted as the privileged text of Greek civilisation. Just as their pagan forefathers, the Byzantines not only saw the Homeric poems as essential to the education of their children but they also perpetuated the pagan Hellenic tradition of studying and interpreting the text of Homer. *The reason for this unique symbiosis of Homer with the Bible is obvious: the Byzantines regarded themselves as both Christians and Greeks, and Homer was perceived as an integral component of their national identity*

*thus understood*. It is not by mere chance, then, that it was the Byzantines who bequeathed the text of the Homeric poems to modernity. (Finkelberg 2012, 20; emphasis mine)

And prior to Finkelberg, Robert Browning provides a similar response to the same question:

The Byzantines were well aware of the two sources of their culture, Hellenic and Christian. They regularly called them τὰ θύραθεν ('what is from the outside') and τὰ ἡμέτερα ('what is ours'). But for most Byzantine thinkers and writers these were not alternatives, between a choice which must be made. They were rather constituent parts of a common heritage. This consciousness of two pasts emerges at a superficial level in the Byzantine habit of quoting Homer and the Bible side by side to make a point. It is manifest at a much deeper level when men like Michael Psellos or Theodore Metochites or Nicephorus Gregoras express their conviction that the two parts of their culture are compatible if they are understood correctly, and refuse to reject any of the Classical Greek intellectual tradition. A noteworthy example is Psellos' letter to the patriarch John Xiphilinus, who had accused him of being a Platonist rather than a Christian. Ἐμὸς ὁ Πλάτων, he begins, and goes on to declare that syllogistic reasoning is neither contrary to dogma nor the private preserve of philosophers, but a means of discovering truth. (Browning 1983, 122–123)

Both Finkelberg and Browning are later complemented by David Fleming's accurate historical synopsis of the *Progymnasmata* (Προγυμνάσματα, "Preliminary Exercises"):

The *progymnasmata* were rhetorical exercises preliminary to (i.e., *pro-*) the full-scale exercises (or *gymnasmata*) of declamation (i.e., *suasoria* and *controversia*). They were widely used in the literary-oratorical education of adolescents and young adults in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds and in medieval and early modern Europe. [...] *Progymnasmata* were especially prominent in the "public" schools of the Hellenistic, Imperial, and Byzantine Greek worlds, where the most popular collections of *progymnasmata* were developed; but they also had influence on Roman Republican and Imperial schooling and, later, through Latin translations of Greek textbooks, in the European Middle Ages and Renaissance. [...] In the most widely used sequence, there were fourteen exercises, listed here [...] from Aphthonius [of Antioch, a mid-4th-century Greek scholar]: (1) **fable** (*mythos*) [...] (2) **narrative** (*diêgêma*) [...] (3) **saying** (*chreia*) [...] (4) **maxim** (*gnômê*) [...] (5) **refutation** (*anaskeuê*) [...] (6) **confirmation** (*kataskeuê*) [...] (7) **commonplace** (*koinos topos*) [...] (8) **encomium** (*enkômion*) [...] (9) **invective** (*psogos*) [...] (10) **comparison** (*synkrisis*) [...] (11) **characterization** (*êthopoeia*) [...] (12) **description** (*ekphrasis*) [...] (13) **thesis** (*thesis*) [...] and (14) **law** (*nomou eisphora*) [...] The word "*progymnasmata*" first appears in the late fourth century BCE *Rhetoric to Alexander* (1436a25), where it implies some use of "preliminary exercises" in rhetorical education. (Fleming 2016, 126, 128; Fleming's emphasis and boldening, brackets mine; see also Hock 2012, Heath 2003 and Roueché 2003, 28ff)

Additionally, "Aphthonius' account of the exercises [...] was combined with rhetorical treatises [...] by Hermogenes, to create *the standard rhetorical compendium* (the 'Hermogenic corpus') of *late antiquity and the Byzantine period*" (Kennedy 2003, xii; emphasis and brackets mine). In short, "the old classical school never came to an end—in the Greek East; for Byzantine education was a direct continuation of classical education" (Marrou 1956, 340). So *contra* Arnold Toynbee ("a philhellene at heart" according to Paul Magdalino), neither Hellenic paideia was a burden that "Byzantines failed to shake off" nor was the "Byzantine spirit [...] so different from the Hellenic that the Byzantines' legacy from Hellenism was an incongruous element in Byzantine life" (Toynbee 1981, 82; brackets mine; on Toynbee's phil-Hellenism see Magdalino 1991, 19, endnote 1). Hellenism, sans pagan/polytheistic worship, was *familiar*, or *never unfamiliar*, to Byzantines given that "Alexander the Great remained something of a folk hero" (shown by "numerous popular Byzantine and immediately post-Byzantine versions of the Alexander-Romance of Pseudo-Callisthenes") and the Greek tragic hero Achilles also remained popular as "attested not only by the existence of a vernacular Achilleid in two versions – which has nothing to do with the Tale of Troy – but by the extraordinary story of a church in the Troad in the thirteenth century, in the narthex of which there was depicted a young man in military dress and labelled 'The Prophet Achilles'" (see Browning 1983, 125 on Alexander, Achilles and other examples). Even the "Greek essayist and biographer" Plutarch "was highly appreciated and imitated in Byz[antium]" where: 1) "John Mauropous (epigram 43) prayed that God would spare the souls of Plato and Plutarch, whose lives 'in word and character adhere closely to Thy laws'", 2) "[John] Tzetzes, forced by poverty to sell his books, retained only a volume of mathematical texts and his copy of Plutarch's *Lives*" and 3) "Theodore Metochites relied heavily on the 'most learned Plutarch' as a historical source" (Kazhdan and Snipes 1991, 1687–1688; Kazhdan and

Snipes' emphasis, brackets mine). As for Odysseus, "the Siren adventure became a popular moral lesson in the writings of the [Greek] Church Fathers, who compared the homeward journey of Odysseus to that of a Christian to heaven, the Sirens with worldly temptations or heresies, and the mast with the cross [...] recall[ing] earlier Neoplatonic and Neo-Pythagorean treatments of the same myth, wherein Odysseus symbolized the soul" (Gonosová and Kondoleon 1994, 239–240; brackets mine). And if the popularity of Alexander, Achilles, Plutarch and Odysseus is unconvincing, then one must contend with the fact that the Byzantine tradition of orphan care drew from the Bible *and* Homer:

After the Bible, the Homeric poems occupied the premier place in the Byzantine hierarchy of literature. [...] [T]he *Iliad* preserved at the close of Book 22 the passage best known among educated Byzantines as the *typos* of an orphan's suffering. Achilles had just slain Hector and the Greeks were dragging the body of the fallen Trojan hero back to their ships. As Hector's wife, Andromache, watched from the walls of Troy, she lamented the fate of their orphaned son, Astyanax, and presented a vivid picture of the injustices and humiliations he would endure as a fatherless child (*Iliad*, 22.484–506). (Miller 2003, 23; Miller's emphasis and *Iliad* citation, brackets mine)

But *why*, following Finkelberg, did Byzantines know and regard themselves as Christians and Greeks? Because Homo Byzantinus, broadly speaking, *is* Christian *and* Greek (*with* Roman citizenship) exemplified in Empress Athenais-Eudocia, the wife of Emperor Theodosius, whose "journey [...] to Jerusalem (in spring 438) was marked by her visit to Antioch, where she created a great effect by the elegant Greek oration which she delivered, posing rather as one trained in Greek rhetoric and animated with Hellenic traditions and proud of her Athenian descent, than as a pilgrim on her way to the great christian shrine" (Bury 1889, 131; brackets mine). During her visit to the city, "[t]he last words of Eudocia's oration brought down the house—a quotation from Homer, *ὁμετέρης γενένης τε καὶ αἵματος εὐχομαι εἶναι*, 'I boast that I am of your race and blood [i.e., kinship-nation].'" (Bury 1889, 131; Bury's emphasis, brackets mine; "Of your race and

blood I am proud to be" in Whitby 2000, 48). Evagrius Scholasticus, a 6th-century Byzantine historian whose "*Church History* covers in six books the years 431–594" (Baldwin 1991a, 761; Baldwin's emphasis), "explains Eudocia's words to be a reference to the Athenians, who were the founders of the city" (Burman 1994, 81; see also Sowers 2008, 12ff, Whitby 2000, 47–48 and Evagrius I.20 in Bidez and Parmentier 1898, 28–29; on Evagrius' background, see Chesnut 1977, Chapter VIII). Antioch, as accurately noted by British historian John Bagnell Bury, was "[t]he city that hated and mocked the Emperor Julian and his pagan Hellenism [but] loved and fêted the Empress Eudocia with her christian Hellenism" (Bury 1889, 131–132; brackets mine; see also Tsatsos and Demos 1977, 60). More broadly, Bury is accurate in his cogent description of the Eastern Roman polity's underlying Hellenism:

The civilisation of the later Empire, which we know under the name of Byzantine, had its roots deep in the past. It was simply the last phase of Hellenic culture. Alexandria, the chief city of the Hellenic world since the third century B.C., yielded the first place to Byzantium in the course of the fifth century. There was no breach in continuity; there was only a change of centre. And while the gradual ascendancy of Christianity distinguished and stamped the last phase, we must remember that Christian theology had been elaborated by the Greek mind into a system of metaphysics which Paul, the founder of the theology, would not have recognised, and which no longer seemed an alien product. (Bury 1923, 4)

Between Bury and Finkelberg is Robert Browning's study of the Homeric tradition's reception in the Eastern Roman polity where "Homer was always a schoolbook, a prescribed text, from which generation after generation learned to read with understanding" (Browning 1975a, 15; see also Browning 1989). Naturally, Homer was not invulnerable to criticism in Byzantium. According to Browning, "[r]adical monastic writers in the early Byzantine period often condemn study of the poems as at best frivolous and sometimes positively hurtful" (e.g., Saint John the Psychaites in the 9th-century AD and John Cameniates in the 10th century AD) (Browning 1975a, 18–19; brackets mine). Said monastic writers, however radical, were doing nothing new for their critiquing

Homer already had precedents in the Greek world via Plato's *Republic* Book X (see Brownson 1897 and Brisson 2017) and Xenophanes' philosophically monotheistic opposition to Greek polytheistic anthropomorphism (see Recinová 2019 and Drozdek 2007, Chapter 2). Furthermore, Byzantine monastics opposing Homeric poetry never translated to a complete rejection of, or total severance from, their own Greek heritage and provenance evident in the following facts:

- Hellenism, sans polytheistic worship, was Christian *propaideia* (προπαιδεία, "preparatory education") for the Greek Church Fathers (Cavarnos 2004, 18),
- Byzantine hagiology actively drew from the living wellspring of classical Greek mythology, aphorisms, philosophy, and literature examples of which include: 1) the "homily of Theodore Synkellos, a priest on the staff of Hagia Sophia, [...] delivered on August 7, 627, on the occasion of the Avar attack on Constantinople", 2) "Patriarch Nicholas Mystikos' letters" including his "letter of consolation" when "Theodora, the wife of Emperor Romanos I, died on February 20, 922", and 3) the lives of saints literature (e.g., "the Life of St. Nicholas of Bounaine in Thessaly [...], writ[ten] around 985,") where it was "common for Byzantine authors to call upon the ancient Muses and their contemporary saints to inspire them in their writings" (Constantelos 1998, 204–205, 211ff ; see also Detorakis 1986; brackets mine),
- certain superstitions such as the *evil eye* (i.e., μάτι, *mati*) "were transmitted from Greek paganism to Christian Byzantium" (Constantelos 1978, 144; see also Walcot 1978, Chapter 7: 77–90, Lykiardopoulos 1981, Russell 1982, Raftopoulos 1983, and Limberis 1991, 175–180), and
- some Byzantine religious traditions were Christianized continuations of classical Greek religiosity such as the *trichokouría* (τριχοκουρία) or "Christian hair-cutting immediately

following baptism" that "Pseudo-Athanasios confirms [...] was an inheritance from Greek religious practices" (Constantelos 1978, 145; brackets mine).

And if the above facts are unconvincing, then one must contend with the existence of Aesopic references in the Bible (see Reece 2016 and Froelich and Philipps 2019), the Byzantine monastic's primary text, and the fact that Gregory of Nyssa, a Greek Church Father and paragon of Christian asceticism, was immersed in the classical Greek tradition as accurately described by Andrew Radde-Gallwitz:

Gregory's educational achievements can be readily ascertained in various ways. Most obviously, his writings contain citations of and allusions to works by Homer, Sophocles, Euripides, Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, Demosthenes, and Lucian. He refers to the grammarian's instruction and uses examples from such textbooks as Dionysius Thrax's. He cites Aesop's fables. He makes learned references to what he learned from a book of medical art. He knows texts of Plato (minimally *Phaedo*, *Cratylus*, *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, and *Symposium*) and Aristotle (minimally *Categories*), and has a doxographical grasp of the Stoics and Epicureans. He also refers to and uses the work of Philo of Alexandria. (Radde-Gallwitz 2018, 11; Radde-Gallwitz's emphasis)

Even Gregory of Nazianzus (or Gregory the Theologian), another Church Father and one of the Three Hierarchs, wrote an epigram *On Himself* (*Εἰς ἑαυτόν*, *Eis eauton*) in the 4th century AD mentioning his Greek background, among other things, surrendering to Christ the Son of God:

Ἐλλάς ἐμή, νεότης τε φίλη, καὶ ὅσσα πεπάσμην, καὶ δέμας, ὡς Χριστῷ εἶξατε  
προφρονέως. Εἰ δ' ἱερῆα φίλον με θεῷ θέτο μητέρος εὐχή καὶ πατὴρ παλάμη, τίς  
φθόνος; Ἀλλά, μάκαρ, σοῖς με, Χριστέ, χοροῖσι δέχου, καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζοις υἱεῖ  
Γρηγορίου σὺ λάτρι Γρηγορίῳ. (Trypanis 1964, 37; Paton 1919, 434)

My Greece, my dear youth, my possessions, my body, how gladly ye yielded to Christ! If my mother's vow and my father's hand made me a priest acceptable to God, why grudge me this? Blessed Christ receive me in thy choirs and give glory to thy servant Gregory son of Gregory. (Book VIII.80 in Paton 1919, 435; Paton's translation)

That divinely-inspired Hellenism was baptized in the divine waters of Christendom is evident in the continuity and change that the *panēgyris* (πανήγυρις, "agora/fair"; plural: *panēgyreis*), a religio-commerical gathering event, underwent as accurately described by Speros Vryonis Jr.:

Thus the Byzantine *panēgyris* is the pagan *panēgyris* converted and baptised. The pagan-Christian-Jewish *panēgyris* of the Oak of Mamre-Terebinthus is the evolutionary link, in our sources, between the *panēgyris* of Apollo at Delos, the four great *panēgyreis* of Olympia, Nemea, Isthmia, Delphi, of Isis in Titheora and of the goddess of Comana on the one hand, and the Christian *panēgyreis* of Thekla at Seleucia, of Theodore at Euchaïta, of St John at Ephesus, and of St Demetrios at Thessalonica. Obviously the pagan *panēgyreis* continued into the fourth century of the Christian era, but gradually they were absorbed into the Christian cycle of martyr celebrations which were themselves transformed by the form of the pagan *panēgyris*. (Vryonis 2001, 214; Vryonis' emphasis; see Kyriakides 1968, Megas 1963 and Krekoukia 1983 regarding other Greek laic traditions; see Avdikos 2010 for an historical overview of Greek folklore studies)

Continuity and change are also evident in the somber song-tradition of *egkómia* (εγκώμια, "lamentations"). Said song-tradition is still practiced today according to Eleni Psychogiou:

The non-Christian mourning tradition for both mortals and the symbolic daemonic dead is still today so strong among [Greek] women, that they insist on following it even for the dead Christ. They carry out an unauthorised interpolation to ecclesiastical ritual inside Orthodox churches, even though the content of their dirges does not agree with the eschatological content of Christian teaching on salvation and the afterlife. On the night of Good Thursday leading up to Good Friday women, mostly dressed in black, sit around the canopied 'tomb' of Christ (so alike in design to the bier on the Mycenaean krater) all through the night, singing the multi-stanza 'lament of the Virgin Mary', which finds parallels in laments of mothers for their mortal children or in theatrical laments for the sacred, metaphysical, reborn dead. Such laments are also sung by women in church for the 'dormant' Virgin during the feast of the Assumption (in Greek 'Dormition') on the 15th August; for example in the convents of the Makellaria Virgin near Hagia Triada (Boukovina) and the convent at Notena [...]" (Psychogiou 2011, 627; brackets mine)

And if the *panēgyris* and *egkómia* traditions constitute insufficient evidence, then one must contend with the following admission made by the 4th-century Christian Greek historian, Eusebius:

But now that we have made this short introduction, which will not be without advantage, let us go back to the first indictment, and give an answer to those who inquire who we are and whence we come. Well then, that being Greeks by race [i.e., Hellenic kinship-nation], and Greeks by sentiment, and gathered out of all sorts of nations, like the chosen men of a newly enlisted army, we have become deserters from the superstition of our ancestors,—this even we ourselves should never deny. But also that, though adhering to the Jewish books and collecting out of their prophecies the greater part of our doctrine, we no longer think it agreeable to live in

like manner with those of the Circumcision,—this too we should at once acknowledge. (*Praeparatio Evangelica*, I.4–5 in Gifford 1903, 18; brackets mine)<sup>31</sup>

Whether one is a phil-Hellene (φιλέλληνη) or an anti-Hellene (ανθέλληνη), Greek people are both a historic self-preserving nation, spanning millennia, and a living, self-renewing nation despite changes in their political (and even socio-economic) circumstances:<sup>32</sup>

They lost political liberty, first to potentates of their own making, and secondly to Rome. *But they did not lose their being.* (Whitman 1995, 42; emphasis mine)

### APPENDIX III – IDEALS OF HELLENISTIC KINGSHIP

What is *Hellenistic kingship* or *Hellenistic monarchy*? Michel Austin offers the following crisp and accurate exegesis in her historical treatment of kingship from Alexander to Alexander's successors (i.e., Ptolemies, Seleucids, Antigonids) to Rome's conquest of the East Mediterranean:

The Hellenistic kingdoms differed considerably in size and character, though they shared many common features. The kings ruled over large though fluctuating expanses of territory, and over a diversity of peoples, Greek and non-Greek. They were kings not of a particular country, nor of a particular people, but of what they could control at any given moment. This type of monarchy has been described as personal in character, based on the military achievements of the founders of the dynasties, and transmitted to their successors as a family inheritance. [...] Hellenistic kings were in principle absolute rulers, though their effective power varied considerably. The king's personality, his control over the royal family and over his own governing class, time and distance – these were only some of the limiting factors. The institution of monarchy, however, was not on the whole successfully challenged from within. In the east it survived the decline and disappearance of the major kingdoms. *In the west the Roman emperors inherited much from their Hellenistic predecessors.* (Austin 1985, 189–190; brackets and emphasis mine)

Austin correctly notes that "[o]ne-man rule as such was no novelty to the Greeks, and the 4th century had seen the emergence of powerful individual rulers who in their various ways anticipated features of the Hellenistic kingdoms" (Austin 1985, 190; brackets mine). The author also provides a definition of *Hellenistic culture* as "Greek culture in the Hellenistic age, a culture that was largely the work of Greeks, the contribution of hellenized natives being limited in comparison" (Austin 1985, 195). And it was in his *Geschichte des Hellenismus* that the 19th-century German historiographer Johann Gustav Droysen "introduced the word Hellenism to designate the civilization of the Greek-speaking world after Alexander" (Momigliano 1970, 139–140). But *why* Alexander of all Greek historical figures? Because, according to Daniel S. Richter,

he "is a symbol both of the rejection of the 'old' antithetical thinking of the *polis* (Aristotle) and, at the same time, a proleptic exemplum of a 'new' universalism (Zeno)" (Richter 2011, 11; Richter's emphasis). Moreover, "Alexander is the 'ideal type' of the Hegelian 'Great Man of History' (*welthistorische Mensch*): remaining largely ignorant of his pivotal role in the shift from one epoch of human history to another, the Great Man nevertheless possesses a connection to a new nascent *Weltgeist*" (Richter 2011, 11–12; Richter's emphasis). And although Alexander's impact on the world stage is *undeniable*, Aristotle's historical significance is not limited to the *polis* of the classical Greek era for the Stagirite's relationship with Alexander was *not* static. As correctly asserted by D. Brendan Nagle following his detailed analysis of Aristotle's *Politics* III: "Alexander's contribution to Aristotle was to provide him with the impetus to consider more deeply the nature of kingship and ways in which real kings could justly and expediently rule various populations" (Nagle 2000, 132). Obviously, Greek monarchy is *neither* an exclusive Alexandrian product *nor* an import from Persia via Cyrus the Great. Said monarchy's antecedents stretch back to the *wanax* ("great ruler"; Linear B *wa-na-ka*, Homeric *ἀναξ*) and the *g<sup>w</sup>asileus* ("local ruler"; Linear B *qa-si-re-u*, Homeric *βασιλεύς*) of the Mycenaean Greek period regardless if there was "a direct and sudden transfer of power from *wanax* to *basileus*" or "a drawn-out process of upgrading of the *basileus*" (Creilaard 2011, 104; Creilaard's emphasis; see also Hooker 1979, Kilian 1988, Figure 1 on page 93, Parker 2007, 20–21, Kelder 2008, 64–67 and Creilaard 2011, Figure 1 on page 86). In other words, Greek kingship is a *continuum* going back to the Mycenaean Bronze Age as correctly recognized by Chrestos Tsountas and J. Irving Manatt:

We need not repeat what we have elsewhere said of the funeral banquet, the immolation of victims, the burning of raiment — all bearing on the same conclusion and cumulating the evidence that the Greeks of Homer, and so of the historic age, are the lineal heirs of Mycenaean culture. If the proof of descent on these lines is strong, it is strengthened yet more by all we can make out regarding the political and social organization. *That monarchy was the Mycenaean form of government is sufficiently*

attested by the strong castles, each taken up in large part by a single princely mansion. (Tsountas and Manatt 1897, 336; emphasis mine)

As for the table below, it synthesizes, for potential pedagogical purposes, the ideal principles and practices of Greek kingship based on J. Joel Farber's analysis of Xenophon's *Cyropaideia*:

Table 5: Greek kingship ideals (J. Joel Farber's analysis of Xenophon's *Cyropaideia*)

KINGSHIP IDEAL	MEANING IN XENOPHON'S <i>CYROPAIDEIA</i>
<i>aretē</i>	<u>Excellence</u> as "a competitive, not a cooperative [value/practice], [where] rulers not only distinguish themselves from their subjects by being better ( <i>βελτίονας</i> ) than they, but also to blind them by trickery ( <i>καταγοητεύειν</i> , 8.1.40)" (Farber 1979, 500–501; Farber's emphasis, brackets mine).
<i>eusebeia</i>	<u>Piety</u> , or "piety with a purpose", the "utility [of which] is revealed in Cyrus' talk with his father: piety can cause prayers to be answered", "can [...] put one on terms of friendship with the gods" and "may even reveal the future"; however, "a still more practical reason is given for [Cyrus'] piety: by inspiring its imitation in his subjects he may protect himself against revolution" (Farber 1979, 501; brackets mine).
<i>dikē / dikaiosynē</i>	<u>Justice</u> where for Xenophon, Cyrus "is no[t] [...] <i>subject</i> to the law, even publicly" and "differs from his Persian ideal [...] where the 'standard' for the king was not his 'will' but the law, which he is the first to obey (1.3.18)"; so, Cyrus "acquires [...] the authority for dispensing justice (8.3.20), a basic element in the Hellenistic concept [of rulership]", and "certainly presents himself as a model of justice, but with no mention of law (8.1.26)" (Farber 1979, 503; Farber's emphasis, brackets mine).
<i>philotimia</i>	<u>Love of honor</u> that "when attributed to the Hellenistic kings [...] is praiseworthy" and though Xenophon "applie[s] to Cyrus" the term's positive denotation, he uses the term "in its pejorative sense" by "appl[ying] it to Alcibiades and Critias"; <i>philotimia</i> "is more a trait to be found in the ideal officials of the king than in the ruler himself" since "Cyrus [...] wants it in his nobles (8.1.35, 39) and in his army (3.3.10, 59)" (Farber 1979, 505; see also Illaruga 2020, 192–210; brackets mine).
<i>spoudē / prothymia</i>	<u>Earnestness/Zeal</u> where Xenophon has Cyrus exhibit <i>spoudē</i> and/or <i>prothymia</i> "toward Cyaxares (2.4.6 [...])", "toward learning (1.4.7)" and "toward Gadatas (5.3.31)" (Farber 1979, 505–506; brackets mine).
<i>pronoia</i>	<u>Forethought</u> , which "was expected of the Hellenistic kings" by Xenophon; "Xenophon elsewhere refers to [ <i>pronoia</i> ] as an attitude that should be displayed publicly, for it engenders in the followers that <i>εὐνοια</i> which is so essential to effective command"; possession and use of <i>forethought</i> was also "expected of the subordinate Hellenistic officials, [...] Xenophon[s] [...] housekeeper" and even "Cyrus urge[s] it on his army (4.1.6; 6.3.7)" (Farber 1979, 506–507; brackets mine).
<i>epimeleia</i>	<u>Attention</u> , along with <i>phrontis</i> ("care"), is "thoughtful consideration for the management of the affairs of subjects"; Xenophon has Cyrus express <i>epimeleia</i> "for the health of his army (1.6.15)", "for the favor of the gods (1.6.3)", "for his allies, on the grounds of avowed self-interest (4.2.38)", for "his friends, on the same grounds (8.2.13)", "for the quality of his appointees (7.1.12)" and "for the <i>σωτηρία</i> [ <i>sotēria</i> or "salvation"] of his whole empire (8.1.13–15)" (Farber 1979, 506–507; brackets mine).
<i>phrontis</i>	<u>Care</u> , along with <i>epimeleia</i> ("attention"), is "thoughtful consideration for the management of the affairs of subjects"; it "is used in the <i>Cyropaedia</i> only to show how Cyrus employed caution in assessing a military situation (5.2.5)" yet "in [Xenophon's] <i>Anabasis</i> it is the mark of Clearchus' talent for command" (Farber 1979, 506–507; brackets mine).
<i>eunomia</i>	<u>Good will</u> where Xenophon has "Cyrus distribut[ing] to his friends his excess wealth, thereby gaining their good will and through this securing his own safety (8.2.22)"; Cyrus' <i>eunomia</i> is also exhibited in the following ways: 1) "encourages by dinner invitations those who honor him with the most good will (8.4.1)", 2) "servants who show good will [are] forgiven even when they make mistakes (3.1.28)", 3) "wins [ <i>eunomia</i> ] from his domestics by sending them food from his table (8.2.4)", 4) "confident that his army feels [ <i>eunomia</i> ] toward him (1.5.13)" (Farber 1979, 508; brackets mine).
<i>philanthropia</i> <sup>33</sup>	<u>Love of humanity</u> where in "two cases (8.7.25 and 8.4.7f) it seems to spring from purely disinterested motives, with no indication that Cyrus hopes to gain anything from being <i>philanthropos</i> "; for Farber, the cases selected show Cyrus as "attributing [ <i>philanthropia</i> ] to himself in <i>public</i> " where the Persian king's "benevolence ha[s] a secretly pragmatic motive" (Farber 1979, 509; Farber's emphasis, brackets mine).
<i>katoiktisis</i>	<u>Compassion</u> , or <u>pity</u> , which "describe[s] Cyrus' attitude toward [Panthea] (6.1.47) [as] he weeps at, pities, and laments the subsequent fate of her husband and herself (7.3.8–16)" (Farber 1979, 510; brackets mine).
<i>praotēs</i>	<u>Gentleness</u> or <u>meekness</u> to denote a positive characteristic "attributed to Cyrus by the Armenians (3.1.41)" and "Araspas (6.1.37)", as well as "a quality [that] Cyrus wishes to instill in his officers in their relations with their men [...] (2.3.21)" (Farber 1979, 510; brackets mine).
<i>sotēria</i> <sup>34</sup>	<u>Salvation</u> , "a public meaning [that denotes] victory, the preservation of life, or simply 'safety'" as illustrated, for instance, by Gadatas stating that "he has been 'saved' by Cyrus (5.4.11)" (Farber 1979, 511; brackets mine).
<i>euergesia</i>	<u>Benefaction</u> where "it is always Cyrus who is the benefactor and always the purpose is [...] to win friends and thus become secure" (Farber 1979, 512; brackets mine).
<i>voēthos</i>	<u>Helper</u> where the "conception of the king as helper is common in the Hellenistic petitions" with "no cult implications" though "it appear[s] in petitions to officials"; Xenophon "extensively employs it" with a case example of Artabazus the Mede calling Cyrus a <i>helper</i> (5.1.25) "when [...] trying to persuade the Medes to remain under Cyrus' command" (Farber 1979, 513; Farber's emphasis, brackets mine).

#### APPENDIX IV – SALIENCE OF EMPERORSHIP IN THE BYZANTINE WORLD

The *salience of emperorship* in the Roman, and later Eastern Roman, polity was not limited to palatial and/or Constantinopolitan politics. It extended to various aspects of Byzantine life as will be illustrated in this section through the following series of Greek primaries. Said primaries include excerpts from Eusebius' *Life of Constantine*, the *basilikoi logoi*, Synesius' *On Kingship*, Kyrillos' *Apologia*, Anonymous' *On Political Science*, Agapetus' *Exposition of Articles of Advice*, Byzantine economic transactions, Paul the Silentiary's *Description of the Church of Hagia Sophia*, John Lydos' *On the Magistracies*, Byzantine military/battle exhortations, Emperor Maurice's *Strategikon*, Byzantine legal texts (i.e., *Ecloga*, *Epanagoge*), Cassia's *Hymn to the Birth of Christ*, Emperor Leo's *Novellae*, Photios' letter to Prince Michael of Bulgaria, Emperor Constantine Porphyrogennitos' *Book of Ceremonies*, Anonymous' *Word of Advice to the King*, Eustathios Rhomaios' *Peira*, Michael Attaleiates' *Ponema*, Byzantine fable literature, Michael Psellos' *Chronographia*, Byzantine seals, Theodore Prodromos' *Poor-Forerunner Poems*, Niketas Choniates' *Oration to Theodore Laskaris*, Nikephoros Blemmydes' *The Statue of a King*, George Akropolites' *Funeral Oration to John III Vatatzes*, Theodore Metochites' *Miscellanea*, Manuel Philes' beggar poetry, Mazaris' *Journey to Hades*, and John Argyropoulos' *On Kingship*.

##### 4th century AD: Emperor Constantine's Letter to King Sapor of Persia

In his *Life of Constantine*, Eusebius "quotes the text of a letter Constantine sent, at an uncertain date after 324, to [Sapor] the king of Persia" (Carriker 2003, 294; brackets mine). According to Andrew Carriker, "Eusebius could have obtained the letter from a friend in the

government (or from a friend of a friend), though he may have done so while near the capital (at Nicaea in 325, or at Constantinople in 335–336)" (Carriker 2003, 295). For Norman H. Baynes, Constantine's correspondence with Sapor constitutes "[a] remarkable letter, an improbable letter" for "already the reader feels himself in the atmosphere of the Middle Ages" (Baynes 1929, 365):

By keeping the Divine faith, I am made a partaker of the light of truth : guided by the light of truth, I advance in the knowledge of the Divine faith. Hence it is that, as my actions themselves evince, I profess the most holy religion; and this worship I declare to be that which teaches me deeper acquaintance with the most holy God ; aided by whose Divine power, beginning from the very borders of the ocean, I have aroused each nation of the world in succession to a well-grounded hope of security ; so that those which, groaning in servitude to the most cruel tyrants, and yielding to the pressure of their daily sufferings, had well nigh been utterly destroyed, have been restored through my agency to a far happier state. This God I confess that I hold in unceasing honor and remembrance ; this God I delight to contemplate with pure and guileless thoughts in the height of his glory. (*Life of Constantine IV*, Chapter IX in Schaff and Wace 1890, 543; Ernest Cushing Richardson's translation)

#### 4th century AD: *Basilikoi Logoi*

The Byzantine emperor as Plato's philosopher-king, albeit Christianized, appears in the Greek tradition of the *basilikoi logoi* (βασιλικοί λόγοι, "kingly words/speeches"). According to Nina Radošević, 4th-century Greek rhetoricians such as Themistios, a contemporary of Emperor Julian the Apostate (reign: 361–363 AD), excessively appealed to a key element of Platonic political theory:

[O]ne of the most important Platonic themes of the ruler-philosopher, inherited from rhetorical practice through cynico-stoical tradition, was profusely used by the fourth-century panegyrists, who, although pagans themselves, praised the first monarchs of the new Christian empire. Their literary work is inseparable from the cultural heritage of antiquity. The notion of the union of philosophy and imperial office, brought up to date by polemic on the role of the still-living Hellenic, pagan culture in the life of the empire, which was Roman in its organization and conception of ruling and Christian in its ideology and spirit, represents the thematic framework of almost all *basilikoi logoi* written by Themistios, the most prominent rhetorician of this period. The notion of the emperor who 'takes part in philosophy' had several levels of meaning. First of all, it implied an ideally wise ruler who took right measures and made right decisions, thanks to his traditional education. An excellent knowledge of classical literature and

close resemblance to the ideal of antique heroes were preconditions for good ruling. In his eulogy of the emperor Constantius, Themistios' contemporary, the future emperor Julian, maintains that he recognizes in the emperor's conduct the fruits of an education based on Homer (*he homerike paideia*). Wise decisions of the emperor-philosopher, however, were not always directly linked with the fact that he was well read. They could have been inherited from famous ancestors, acquired through close contact with his imperial parent, or inspired by God, the model for each emperor. Plato's ideal of the philosophical ruler is not restricted to the fourth century; it is also encountered in later, completely different epochs. (e.g., Areth. Or. 5, 28 sqq.; Georg. Tornik.; Gr. Cyp., Andr. 387, etc.). (Radošević 1993, 268; Radošević's emphasis, brackets mine)

Radošević correctly states that "Plato's ideal of the philosophical ruler" goes beyond the 4th century AD. In fact, the author goes so far as to mention Nikephoros Gregoras, a 14th century Greek scholar-theologian from Heraclea Ponticus, who "devoted a whole speech solely to the theme of the emperor as a Platonist", as well as "the [anonymous] rhetorician of the last decade of the empire's existence [who] saw in his ruler the realization of Plato's dream" (Radošević 1993, 268 citing Gregoras' *Orationes* I and Anonymous I, 205; brackets mine). Interestingly, the above passage shows a veritable continuity of the Greek panegyric/rhetorical tradition in the Byzantine polity.

#### 4th century AD: Synesius' *On Kingship*

Beginning with Synesius of Cyrene, the Christian Greek scholar and bishop of Ptolemais composed *On Kingship* providing a detailed treatment of Roman political history during the reign of Emperor Arcadius (reign: 395–408 AD). According to Timothy D. Barnes, "[r]ecent scholarship has been almost unanimous in its belief that Synesius came to the imperial court [in Constantinople] in 399 and delivered that extant speech *On Kingship* to Arcadius' face in or about August 399, while his patron Aurelianus was in power" (Barnes 1986, 105; Barnes' emphasis, brackets mine). However, the author argues that such a "hypothesis is hardly plausible, for the speech not only insults the emperor but also attacks his ministers" (Barnes 1986, 106).

And although "[t]he speech *On Kingship* proclaims itself a *logos stephanotikos*, a speech intended to accompany the presentation of the *aurum coronarium* from Cyrene", Barnes states that "neither its form nor its content reflects the norms of the genre" based on "one of the two rhetorical treatises that pass under the name of Menander the Rhetor" (Barnes 1986, 106; Barnes' emphasis, brackets mine). Nevertheless, Barnes' positivist historicism, criticized by Lester L. Field Jr. for treating "discourse as epiphenomenal" among other issues (Field 2009, 2ff), neither alters nor mitigates the clarity of Synesius' description of monarchy via its contrast from tyranny:

Equally divided stand the king and the tyrant, I assert, and yet Fortune's gifts are alike to each. Each of the two rules over many men, but he that disposes himself for the manifest good of the governed, and is willing to suffer that there may be no suffering for them, and to encounter danger that they may live without fear, and to keep night vigils, and to sup with care at his board, that day and night they may have rest from anxieties, this is a shepherd amidst his sheep, a king amongst men. But whoso exploits his leadership for luxury's sake, whoso squanders his resources in revelling, esteeming that he must needs gratify all his desires, considering that what makes the subject class suffer is the guerdon of his rule among many, and that the pleasure of his soul is to be served by many, and in a word, he who does not fatten his flock, but himself desires to be fattened by it, that man I call a butcher amongst his cattle, and I declare him to be a tyrant whenever that which he rules over is a people endowed with reason. (*On Kingship*, 3 in Fitzgerald 1930, 113–114)

More importantly, Synesius *distinguishes the long history of the Roman republic from the recent history of the Roman monarchy*:

[T]his very title of king, I will show to be recent; for it had become a dead letter to the Romans from the time when the people drove out the Tarquins. For it is from this source that while we call you kings, while we deem you worthy of the title, and write you down as such, you, whether you know it or not, yielding to established custom, seem to evade the dignity of the title. And so, when you write to a city, or to an individual, to a viceroy or to a foreign ruler, you have never shown pride in the title of king, but rather you make yourselves absolute rulers. Now absolute ruler is the designation of a military chief who undertakes to do all things, and Iphicrates and Pericles sailed from Athens as generals with absolute power, nor did the title wound that people, free from tyrants though it was; for the people itself made appointments to this generalship, as being constitutional. It is true that in Athens there was a certain individual called king who occupied a petty post, and was accountable for his administration; the people, I suppose, having him this name in jest, for they were an uncompromisingly free people. Their 'absolute ruler,' however, was not a monarch,

and both the title and the office were respected. Is not this, then, clear evidence of a wise policy in the Roman constitution, that although it has manifestly developed into a monarchy, it is cautious in so asserting itself by reason of its hatred of the evils of tyranny, and employs the title of king sparingly. For tyranny makes monarchy to be detested, whereas kingship makes it to be loved; and Plato calls this a divine good amongst men. (*On Kingship*, 13 in Fitzgerald 1930, Volume I, 130–131; brackets mine)

The mutual exclusivity of monarchy and democracy is further supported in the sixth section of *On Kingship* where Synesius states that "with God's guidance the king ought first to be king of himself, and to establish a monarchy in his soul" ultimately "destroying the mob rule and democracy of the passions" (*On Kingship*, 6 in Fitzgerald 1930, 118–119).

5th century AD: Kyrillos of Alexandria's Apologia to Emperor Theodosius II

In 431/432 AD, Kyrillos of Alexandria composed a "λόγος ἀπολογητικός, an apologetic argumentation, directed at the Emperor Theodosius II" (Bredenkamp 2003, 66). According to Francois Bredenkamp, the composition "constitute[d] an *official* letter, originating out of the specific practical situation of the events of the Council of Ephesus, and directed at an official, in this case, the emperor, to explain those events and certain decisions reached" (Bredenkamp 2003, 67; Bredenkamp's emphasis, brackets mine). Furthermore, Kyrillos' "letter was clearly intended to be read out loud at court, hence, too, the many rhetorical devices it employs in the form of extended citations from scripture" (Bredenkamp 2003, 67). In the third section of the *apologia*, "the earthly emperor enjoys power over all earthlings and should extend peace and tranquility on earth" as an "imitation of God and Christ" (Bredenkamp 2003, 67–68):

Therefore, a calm and mild spirit befits those of exceedingly high station; indeed, this preferred attitude is present in the Divine and most high Being, and, in imitation thereof, also in your rule, Christ-loving emperors, because as a model of the heavenly Kingdom and as an imitation for earthlings, you alone have inherited power over all things and preserve subjection to it through fear and mildness; you extend tranquility over everything under the heavens as something shining and peaceful. (Bredenkamp 2003, 70–71)

Bredenkamp correctly asserts that "Kyrillos' logos apologetikos is replete with elements of **early Byzantine political theory** – that implicit set of principles in terms of which Orthodoxy chose to arrange their relationship with the secular power of the day" (Bredenkamp 2003, 87; Bredenkamp's bolding). Moreover, the author states that "Kyrillos' defensive argument in fact signals the transition to a situation where the emperor, in this particular case the emperor of the Greek eastern half of the Roman Empire, assumes the very important role of doctrinal arbiter among (politically) contending Christian points of view" (Bredenkamp 2003, 87–88). Kyrillos' *apologia*, of course, was not created in a vacuum as "[h]is contribution to the formation of early Byzantine political theory was a continuation of a tradition started by his predecessor, the illustrious Athanasius" (Bredenkamp 2003, 88; brackets mine).

6th century AD: Agapetus' Exposition of Articles of Advice

Agapetus, "a deacon of the Great Church in Constantinople" (i.e., The Hagia Sophia, a monumental domed church designed by Greek scientists Isidore of Miletus and Anthemios of Tralles<sup>35</sup>), composed during the 6th century AD a text that falls under the Mirror for Princes category titled *Exposition of Articles of Advice* (*Ἐκθεσις κεφαλαίων παραινετικῶν*, *Ekthesis kefalaion parainetikon*) (Henry III 1967, 282ff; see Gregory 2010, 129 on Isidore and Anthemios). In it, Agapetus offers the following advice to his audience, Emperor Justinian:

Having a dignity which is set above all other honours, Sire, you render honour above all to God, who gave you that dignity; inasmuch as He gave you the sceptre of earthly power after the likeness of the heavenly kingdom, to the end that you should instruct men to hold fast the cause of justice, and should punish the howling of those who rage against that cause; being yourself under the kingship of the law of justice and lawfully king of those who are subject to you. (Barker 1957, 54–55)

Like the man at the helm of a ship, the mind of the king, with its many eyes, is always on the watch, keeping a firm hold on the rudder of enforcement of the law and sweeping away by its might the currents of lawlessness, to the end that the ship of the State of the world may not run into the waves of injustice. (Barker 1957, 55)

The divine lesson which we first learn, O men, is that man should know himself. For he who knows himself will know God: he who knows God will become like God; a man will become like God when he becomes worthy of Him; and a man becomes worthy of God when he does nothing unworthy of Him, but thinks the things that are God's, speaks what he thinks, and does what he speaks. (Barker 1957, 55)

The soul of the king, full of many cares, must be wiped clean like a mirror, that it may always shine with divine illumination, and attain thereby to knowledge of affairs. For there is nothing which has such power to make a man see what is right, as to keep the soul always pure and clean. (Barker 1957, 56)

Just as, on a voyage, the error of a sailor does little damage to the passengers, but when the steersman himself commits an error it causes the destruction of the whole ship; so in States—when a subject does wrong, he does not injure the community so much as he injures himself, but when the ruler himself does wrong, he inflicts injury on the whole State. Since, therefore, he will render a solemn account if he neglects to do anything which he ought to do, let him always speak and act with strict diligence. (Barker 1957, 56)

There has been revealed in our age that time of felicity which one of the writers of old prophesied as coming to pass when either philosophers were kings or kings were students of philosophy. Pursuing the study of philosophy, you [Justinian] were counted worthy of kingship; and holding the office of king, you did not desert the study of philosophy. Now if the love of wisdom is what makes philosophy, and if the beginning of wisdom is to fear God—Who is always present in your heart—then what I say is clearly true. (Barker 1957, 57; Barker's brackets)

I reckon you as indeed a king because you have the strength to be king and master of your passions, and because you wear the crown of temperance and are clothed with the purple of justice. Other sorts of authority have death for their heir; but kingship such as *this* endures for ever and ever. Other sorts of authority end with this life; but *this* is saved from the pains of eternal punishment. (Barker 1957, 57; Barker's emphasis)

Kingship in you is rightly to be revered, because it exhibits its authority to foes, and makes kindness the portion of its subjects. Subduing foes by the force of its arms, it is vanquished itself by the unarmed love of its subjects. As far as the wild beast is from the sheep, so great does it count the difference between the two [i.e. the difference between foes and subjects]. (Barker 1957, 57; Barker's brackets)

In the nature of his body the king is on a level with all other men, but in the authority attached to his dignity he is like God Who rules over all; for he has no man on earth who is higher than he. Therefore, like God, he must never be angry, yet as a mortal man he must never be lifted up in conceit; for if he be honoured by being in the divine image, he is also involved in the earthly image whereby he is taught his equality with other men. (Barker 1957, 57)

Being entrusted by God with the office of kingship on earth, do not employ wrong-doers in the management of affairs; for he who has given wrong-doers their power will owe an account to God for what they have wrongly done. Therefore let the appointment of officials be made after strict examination. (Barker 1957, 58)

Consider yourself to be surely and truly a king when you rule with the consent of your subjects. For a subject people which is unconsenting revolts when it finds an opportunity; but a people which is attached to its sovereign by the bonds of good will keep firm and true in its obedience to him. (Barker 1957, 58)

In order that you may keep the authority of kingship in good repute, you must hold it for true that your subjects will feel as much indignation against you, if you do wrong, as you do against them when they offend. For no man has the power to instruct a person vested with such authority [as yours]: only the reflection of the wrong-doer himself, proceeding from himself can do that. (Barker 1957, 58–59)

He who has attained to great authority should imitate, so far as he can, the Giver of that authority. If in any way he bears the image of God, Who is over all, and if through Him he holds rule over all, he will imitate God best if he thinks that nothing is more precious than mercy. (Barker 1957, 59)

Kingship is the most honoured of all things; and it is so most especially, when the person who is vested with this authority does not incline to self-will, but keeps his mind fixed on equity; turning away from inhumanity as a thing that is bestial, and showing forth humanity as a quality that is God-like. (Barker 1957, 59)

As the eye belongs to the body, so the king is fitted to the world, and given to it by God for the rendering of benefits. It is therefore his duty to take thought for all men, as if they were his own limbs, to the end that they may advance in things good and not in things evil. (Barker 1957, 59)

Guide your kingdom aright here below, that it may become for you a ladder to the glory above. Those who govern well an earthly kingdom are deemed worthy also of the heavenly; and they are good governors of the earthly kingdom who show a paternal affection to their subjects and receive from them in return the awe which is proper to rulers—preventing them by threats from stumbling, and not bringing trials upon them by punishments. (Barker 1957, 60)

The king is sovereign over all; but he is also, along with all, the servant of God. He will most especially be called sovereign when he is master of himself, and not a slave to improper pleasures; when, having as his ally pious reflection, which is the unconquered lord of irrational passions, he conquers the all-powerful affections [of the senses] with the panoply of temperance. (Barker 1957, 61; Barker's emphasis)

6th century AD: Anonymous' On Political Science

The Eastern Roman monarch as a Christianized form of Plato's philosopher-king appears in "the fragments of an Anonymous dialogue entitled *On Political Science*, which was written probably in Constantinople during [Emperor] Justinian's time from the viewpoint of the senatorial class" (Fotiou 1985, 17; Fotiou's emphasis, brackets mine). Specifically, the unknown Christian Neoplatonist composed in the 6th century AD a political treatise in order "to offer a written constitution or suggestions for a Byzantine constitution and thus put order to the chaotic conditions which often prevailed during the election of a new emperor" (Fotiou 1985, 18). In the treatise's fifth book titled *On Kingship*, the "definition of kingship is written in Platonic language and content" where the "king (*basileus*) [...] is selected from among the class of the best men because of his high qualifications: virtue, expertise in public affairs, rank, suitable age, and dignity" (Fotiou 1985, 20–21; Fotiou's emphasis, brackets mine). Furthermore, the author "borrow[s] Plato's identification between political and kingly philosophy" where the monarch must imitate "the image and even likeness (*homonoia*) of God on earth" since it is the king's *obligation* as head of state to do so (the concept of *divine mimesis* is delineated in Plato's *Statesman* "where the analogy of God and the perfect king is discussed") (Fotiou 1985, 20; Fotiou's emphasis, brackets mine).

In the sixth book of the treatise, there is an "investigation into the imitation of God by the king [...] on the basis of the Platonic language of *doxa* (opinion) and *episteme* (scientific knowledge)" (Fotiou 1985, 20–21; Fotiou's emphasis, brackets mine). For the author, not only must the ideal monarch imitate the divine virtues of "goodness, justice, wisdom, powerfulness, and foresight" but "[l]ike his Platonic counterpart, the Byzantine king, being good, should inculcate virtue in his subjects though his own example, in word and deed" and "like a father [...]"

benefit [his subjects] as much as possible" (Fotiou 1985, 21; brackets mine). And out of all the cardinal virtues in Plato's *Republic*, the anonymous Christian Neoplatonist treats *justice* as the "most important virtue [that] the king [...] possess[es] and practice[s]" exhibited in the concept "permeat[ing] the entire fragmentary treatise and becom[ing] the *sine qua non* requirement by which power and honour are distributed to the citizens" (Fotiou 1985, 21; Fotiou's emphasis, brackets mine). The monarch's justice in the treatise "is conceived in exactly the same terms as that in Plato's ideal statesman" with the Byzantine author "drawing heavily upon Plato's threefold division of the soul in the *Republic*" and "mak[ing] the soul the foundation of his just [Byzantine] state and society" (Fotiou 1985, 21; Fotiou's emphasis, brackets mine).

There are distinctions between the *ideal state* as defined in the fourth and ninth books of Plato's *Republic* and the Byzantine polity as described by the anonymous Christian Neoplatonist. This project illustrates, for potential pedagogical purposes, the aforesaid distinctions in the table below that draws from and organizes Fotiou's analysis of *On Political Science* (quotes in the table are from Fotiou 1985, 19–20, brackets mine):

Table 6: Plato's *Republic* and Byzantium (A. S. Fotiou's analysis of *On Political Science*)

CLASS (ΤΑΞΗ)	PLATO'S IDEAL STATE (ΚΑΛΙΠΟΛΙΣ)	BYZANTIUM (ΡΩΜΑΝΙΑ-ΓΡΑΙΚΙΑ)
TOP: GUARDIANS (PHYLAKAS)	<i>RULERS (ARCHONTES)</i> <u>Predominant Virtue:</u> Wisdom <u>Function:</u> Solely a "legislative body"	<i>BEST MEN (ARISTOI)</i> <u>Predominant Virtue:</u> Wisdom <u>Function:</u> Legislative body with "certain 'best men' [being] assigned administrative, military and financial functions"
MIDDLE: GUARDIANS (PHYLAKAS)	<i>SOLDIERS (POLEMIKOI)</i> <u>Predominant Virtue:</u> Courage <u>Function:</u> "[R]esponsible for the security of the state" <u>Composition:</u> "Exclusive and separate group of warriors placed close to the Rulers' class"	<i>SOLDIERS (STRATIOTIKOI)</i> <u>Predominant Virtue:</u> Courage <u>Function:</u> "[R]esponsible for the security of the state" <u>Composition:</u> "[O]nly the high ranking Guardians are drawn from the class of the <i>aristoi</i> , while the rank and file are recruited from the lowest class"
BOTTOM: PRODUCERS (DEMIOURGOI)	<i>ARTISANS, FARMERS (CHEIROTECHNOI, GEORGOI)</i> <u>Predominant Virtue:</u> Temperance "over their predominant appetitive drives" <u>Function:</u> "[P]roduce enough to satisfy their own physical needs and those of the upper classes"	<i>PRODUCERS (TAGMATA/SYSTEMATA)</i> <u>Predominant Virtue:</u> Temperance "over their predominant appetitive drives" <u>Function:</u> "[P]roduce enough to satisfy their own physical needs and those of the upper classes"

6th century AD: Byzantine Transactions

According to Basil G. Mandilaras, a Greek papyrus dated 19th of March 535 "concerns a loan of money (or wheat)" that was "issued by the debtor, *Aurelius Abraham*, to the lender, [Aurelius X] son of *Papnuthius*" with Abraham being "accompanied by his guarantor, *Aurelius Makare*" (Mandilaras 1993, 60; Mandilaras' emphasis and brackets). The document clearly expresses deference to Emperor Justinian (reign: 527–565) via the epithets *despotou ēmon* (δεσπότης ἡμῶν, "our master"), as well as *aioniou Augoustou kai Autokratoros* (αἰωνίου Ἀυγούστου καὶ Ἀυτοκράτορος, "eternal Augustus and Autocrat"):

After the consulship of our master, Flavius Iustinianus eternal Augustus and Emperor, for the 4th time, and of Flavius Paulinus, the most glorious, in Phamenoth

23rd of the 13th indiction. Aurelius Abraham, son of Papnuthius, whose mother is Nonna, with me Aurelius Makare, son of Victor, whose mother is . . . acting as guarantor, and undertaking the obligation of the payment of everything together with the guarantee and the repayment of the debt stated next, both from the village Magdola of the Megas of the Hermopolite nome to Aurelius . . . son of Papnuthius, the camel-driver . . . of the monastery of Abba Apollos [greetings. (Mandilaras 1993, 61; Mandilaras' ellipses signifying gaps in papyrus)

Another Greek papyrus contains a partially preserved contract dated 19th of January 544 and "issued by a woman named Aurelia Leia(?), daughter of Ammonius" (Mandilaras 1993, 71; Mandilaras' parentheses). In it, the contract exhibits deference to Emperor Justinian via the epithets *theiotatou ēmon despotou* ("our most divine master", θειοτάτου ἡμῶν δεσπότης) and, as in the previous papyrus, *aioniou Augoustou kai Autokratoros* ("eternal Augustus and Autocrat", αἰωνίου Αὐγούστου καὶ Αὐτοκράτορος):

In the 17th year of the reign of our most godly master Flavius Justinianus the eternal Augustus Imperator . . . after the consulship of Flavius Basileius the allpraiseworthy, Tybi 23, of the 7th Indiction. Aurelia Leia daughter of Ammonius and whose mother is [ . . . ] represented by Phoebammon son of Phibis . . . (Mandilaras 1993, 72; Mandilaras' ellipses and brackets)

#### 6th century AD: Paul the Silentiary's Description of Hagia Sophia

Paul the Silentiary, or Paul Silentiarios, was a 6th-century Greek poet and official of Justinian I's palatial court (see Croke 2018, 1152, Baldwin and Cutler 1991b, 1609). He composed the *Description of Hagia Sophia* in honor of Emperor Justinian restoring the Church of Saint Sophia or Church of Holy Wisdom. According to Mary Whitby, "[t]he Theodosian church of S. Sophia had been one of the victims of the Nika Riot of A.D. 532, when many of the buildings in the central palace area of Constantinople were burned down" (Whitby 185, 215–216). Around five years later (537 AD), "Emperor Justinian inaugurated his great new church, whose dome, however, collapsed at the eastern end in May 558, after the severe earthquake which struck Constantinople in December 557" (Whitby 1985, 216). When "[t]he church was

restored, [it was] re-dedicated on 24th December 562, and some days later, perhaps on the Feast of Epiphany (6th January 563), Paul declaimed his poem as part of an extended series of festivities" (Whitby 1985, 216; brackets mine). The following excerpts from the *Description of Hagia Sophia*, translated by Peter N. Bell, are dedicated to Emperor Justinian who for Paul is the *Best of Men* worthy of admiration and, like God (i.e., *divine mimesis*), makes laws, establishes cities, builds churches, wages war (out of necessity), grants clemency altogether contributing to the overall salience of emperorship in Byzantine society:

Is it possible to find a day greater than today, on which both God and Emperor are honoured? It is impossible to name one. We know that Christ is Master; yes, we know it absolutely. For you make this known by your words, Mightiest One, even to barbarians. From this, you have Him to hand as a collaborator in your deeds: in making laws, founding cities, raising temples, taking up arms (should the need arise), arranging truces and checking conflicts. From this, victory is inherent in your labours like an emblem. [...] From this, as one would expect, you always pass by hidden dangers with knowledge, Almighty, protected not by spears or shields, but by the very hand of God. I admire you, Almighty One, for your good courage. I admire you for your judgement and your faith. [...] With compassion for the errors of life, you have groaned often at our transgressions, Best of Men. Often you moisten your kindly eye with tears, as kings will, grieving on our behalf. Especially when on seeing lack of self-control, life's housemate, you release everyone from their evil debts, like God, and hasten to forgive. [...] Does he not take up arms against God Himself, the man who is not willing for this Emperor to rule, a man who is gentle and kindly, and who gives benefits in moderation to friends and enemies alike? This is your salvation. This, Mighty Master, makes the soul of the empress, she who is blessed, all-excellent, lovely and all-wise, to intercede with God on your behalf, she who was your pious collaborator when alive. [...] Evidence of the outstanding greatness of your marvels is the great love which the whole city nurtures for you, Mightiest King, and for your temple. For when you were celebrating the festival, as was fitting, immediately all the people, the senate and those who pursue the safe middle way of life, begged you to extend the days of the festival; you agreed; the days ran out; they begged again; again you agreed. By doing this repeatedly, you richly extended the festival." (*Description of Hagia Sophia*, Bell 2009, 189–193; Bell's translation, brackets mine)

6th century AD: John Lydos' On the Magistracies

John Lydos, the 6th-century "scholar, bureaucrat, and writer", composed *On the Magistracies*, "a history and description of late Roman bureaucracy" where the "treatise is both interestingly antiquarian and a mirror of the social and intellectual life of [John's] day" (Baldwin 1991b, 1061; brackets mine). In the composition, the Greek bureaucrat makes a clear distinction between Roman constitutional monarchy, Roman tyranny, and Roman emperorship:

For the dignity of constitutional kingship is one thing, that of tyranny is another, and that of emperorship is still another; and as to how, I shall explain briefly. A king is one who, by having been chosen as first by the vote of his own subjects for a base, as it were, or foundation, is allotted a station in life superior to that of the rest; as Sophocles said of Ajax, that he held the foundation of sea-girt Salamis. It is characteristic of a king to jar absolutely none of the state's laws but to preserve steadfastly the form of his own state by his kingship, and to do nothing outside the laws by absolute authority but to ratify by his personal decrees whatever the best men of his state conjointly resolve, di[s]playing towards his subjects the affection of simultaneously a father and leader, such as God and the felicity of circumstance have granted us. But the tyrant will not treat thus those who have fallen under his sway but will do by his power rashly whatever at all he precisely wishes, not deigning to respect laws, nor tolerating to enact them in consultation with a council, but being led on by his own impulses. For, while the law is a king's way, a tyrant's disposition is law. (Lydos I.3 in Bandy 1983, 13; brackets mine)

For Lydos, a monarchy is a *constitutional monarchy* (έννομου βασιλείας, "kingship in and of the law") or a political ontology predicated on *laws/principles* whereby: 1) a king is selected and granted overarching powers by the governed, 2) a king maintains the integrity of his polity in accordance with the polity's laws, 3) a king enforces the resolutions of the most qualified men-of-state. On the other hand, a tyranny is defined by the arbitrary whims and passions of the tyrant (το τυραννίδος, "the strongman") exhibiting a *limits-be-damned attitude* where legal and/or advisory constraints are rejected. Now with respect to emperorship, Lydos states the following:

As for the cognomen *Caesares*, or rather supreme commanders, it is not indicative of kingship, nor even, however, of tyranny, but rather of absolute rule and absolute authority for better controlling the disturbances that arise against the republic and for commanding the army how it is *to* fight with adversaries; for "*to* command" is

rendered by the Italians *imperare*, from which *imperator* is derived. That the name "supreme commander" or "*Caesar* cannot be indicative of kingship is perfectly clear by the fact that both the consuls and the *Caesares* after them received the cognominai title of *imperatores*, so-called. For the office of *Caesares* did not manifestly use the insignia of the tyrants but merely the purple robe whenever they went up to the senate of the Romans and whenever they directed the forces under arms with supreme power, as I said. For this reason the Romans also called them *princeps*, that is to say, "chief head of the entire state." For the name *Caesar* indicates family descent from the first Caesar, just as do the names *Fobii*, *Cornelii*, *Flavii*, and *Anicii*. This practice had been devised earlier by the barbarians, for the Egyptians used to call their own kings Pharaohs after the first Pharaoh, and Ptolemies after the first one. This kind of orderliness, then, of *Caesares* was preserved by the Romans down to the time of Diocletian, who, because he had put on his head a diadem consisting of precious stones and had adorned his dress and feet with gems, was the first to turn to the custom of kings or, truth to tell, to that of tyrants, and to survey the continent and burden it with taxes. (Lydus I.4 in Bandy 1983, 15; Lydus' emphasis)

The *princeps*, or supreme head-of-state, is neither a king nor a tyrant since his undisputed power over the army is based on, if not justified by, the threat that enemies pose to the polity's integrity. If Lydos' account is accurate, then the order of the *Caesares*, or *princeps lineage*, began with Caesar and continued until Diocletian (reign: 284–305 AD) *transformed* Roman emperorship into Roman tyranny by imposing onerous tax policies upon his domain. This would mean that the Roman polity had ceased existing and operating as a constitutional monarchy (or republican monarchy) centuries *before* Lydos' lifetime in the 6th century AD. That Lydos "associates the word 'freedom' only with the period of the Republic and locates the origin of imperial rule in the violence and tyranny of the late Republic" (Kaldellis 2005, 1), does not necessarily render the author's "politics [as] 'republican'" (Kaldellis 2005, 1; brackets mine). In fact, how republican was Lydos given, for instance, his blatant respect for the emperor Hadrian (reign: 117–138 AD) as "Hadrian the upright" (Lydus 3.53 in Bandy 1983, 213–214: Ἀδριανῶ τῶ χρηστῶ, "Adriano to chrēsto")? To be fair, Kaldellis is correct to point out, if not partake in, the *Greek parallelism tradition* by juxtaposing Lydos with Plutarch where the former mentions "a time [...] when the [Roman] prefect 'wisely recognised that he ruled over free men (*eleutheroi*)', but now 'things

have changed for the worse" and the latter "draw[s] a contrast between the freedom of the ancient Greeks and their modern descendants who live under the 'Roman boot'" (Kaldellis 2005, 9; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine). Nevertheless, Lydos is clear with respect to his overall intentions with or without subversive panegyric clichés directed at whomever:

If my account, however, as it slowly proceeds, because of my zeal for common freedom shall in any way perchance have upbraided rather sharply anyone of those who have not executed their magistracies in accordance with the intent of the emperor's nobleness, let those who prudently evaluate matters not impute their vexation to the magistracies themselves but to those who have made improper use of them. For my account has not merely dared to expose the wicked but has also lauded men of merit, if even not according to their worth. For thus, while those who fail to recognize the limitation of the magistracy will be made to feel ashamed to outrage freedom and to rend the subjects, those, too, who emulate the emperor's gentleness will hasten with speedy course to meet also his other virtues. (Lydos 3.39 in Bandy 1983, 192–195)

#### 6th century AD: General Justinian's Battle Exhortation

In his *History*, the 7th-century Greek scholar Theophylact Simocatta records a battle exhortation made, according to Simocatta, by "Justinian, who was the son of Germanus and [...] was appointed general" (Simocatta 3.12.6 in Whitby and Whitby 1986, 91; brackets mine). This Justinian, according to Michael and Mary Whiby, "was a great-nephew of the emperor Justinian and a distant cousin of [emperor] Justin II" (Whitby and Whitby 1986, 91, footnote 59; brackets mine). Whatever his pedigree, General Justinian uttered the following words to his (New) Roman soldiers during the wars between the Eastern Roman polity and the Sassanid Persians:

"The day now present, Romans, will be the beginning of great benefits for you, if you are persuaded by my words. Arm your spirits, I say, before your body; let your hearts do battle before your hands. Let each brave danger for another, and you are saved. Philosophers (for I call you philosophers or soldiers, since you alone have death as your profession), demonstrate to the barbarian that your zeal is immortal. [...] Comrades—you are my comrades both in toils and tumults because of the war—the engagement is established as the test of courage and cowardice, and is the arbiter of souls: for this day will either convict us of effeminate cowardice, or with garlands and glorious triumphs will proclaim our manly bravery. [...] The Persians do not have an

immortal nature; Median luck is not immovable; barbarian hands are not tireless; the Parthians do not have an advantage in limbs or possess double souls; their bodies are not adamant. [...] The Romans have hired Justice as an ally, since they have once again sought peace; the Medes have marshalled Justice in opposition to themselves, since they abhor peace virtually always and honour belligerence like an auspicious god. Ours is not a false religion, nor have we set up spurious gods as leaders; we do not have a god who is scourged, since we do not elect a horse for worship; we do not do obeisance to a god that turns to ashes, who is now ablaze but is soon not even visible; smoke and fuel do not constitute religion, but their fading proves their falsehood. [...] Be Spartans in combat. Let each man be a Cynegirus, even though he has not boarded ship. Nothing is more effeminate than flight, nothing is more abominable than capture. Therefore it is fitting either to die or to shape hopes of victory. Contemplate the newly-sown recruitments of the Caesar. No reject has been implanted among the companies, and the array is undefiled: for thus was the emperor's ambition contented. Then I, the orator, will be the first to take war in hand, and in my disdain at avoiding suffering I will eagerly engage the hands of all for suffering. [...] Come then, let us put an end to words with deeds, and let us divert contemplation towards engagement.' (*History* III.13.1–III.13.21 in Whitby and Whitby 1986, 92–94; brackets mine)

The main takeaways from the above passage are four-fold: 1) Justinian separating his own *pious and peaceful (New) Romans* from the *unpious, belligerent non-Romans* is based on, or at least influenced by, the Greek division between *Hellenes* (i.e., Greek or Pan-Greek nation/nationhood, *not* nation-state) and *barbaroi* (i.e., barbarians in the sense of non-Greeks and not in the sense of non-Athenian Greeks deemed "uncultured" by Athenian Greeks), 2) courage is the cardinal virtue of the (New) Roman military and cowardice is its cardinal vice, 3) the (New) Romans are Greeks, at least in terms of martial culture and ethos, as Justinian bluntly tells his soldiers to *embody the Spartan lifeways of Cynegirus* who, according to Michael and Mary Whitby, "was killed during the fight over the Persian ships which concluded the battle of Marathon" (Whitby and Whitby 1986, 93, footnote 64), 4) there is a *direct relationship between the army's organization and the army's ability to ultimately satiate the will of the emperor*.

6th century AD: Emperor Maurice's Strategikon

In Maurice's *Strategikon* (Στρατηγικόν, "On Strategy"), George T. Dennis states that the text "contains firsthand information about the characteristics of various peoples" and "[t]he actual organization, armament, and tactics of the armies of the period are accurately presented" (Dennis 1984, xvi; brackets mine). Moreover, "[s]cholars are generally agreed that the *Strategikon* was composed between 575, when hostilities were renewed with the Persians, and 628, when they were finally defeated" (Dennis 1984, xvi; Dennis' emphasis, brackets mine). With respect to authorship, Dennis states that the composition was developed, citing the *Ambrosian Codex*, by Emperor Maurice (reign: 582–602 AD) who "had extensive military experience in the East against the Persians and along the Danube against the Slavs" or, citing John Wiita (1977), "may have been written by Philippicus, general and brother-in-law of Maurice" who "seems to have served with Maurice on the eastern frontier in 577–82, and in 583 became supreme commander in those regions (*magister militum per orientem*)" (Dennis 1984, xvi–xvii and footnote 5; Dennis' emphasis). But whether the *Strategikon* was composed by Maurice or Philippicus, the text is unambiguous with respect to the relationship between the divine and the secular whereby the former takes precedence over the latter:

"LET WORD AND DEED BE GUIDED BY THE ALL HOLY Trinity, our God and Savior, the steadfast hope and assurance of divine assistance, who directs important and beneficial undertakings to a favorable conclusion. Well aware of our own weakness, we have been motivated solely by devotion to the nation. If, then, what we have written should be deficient, the Holy Trinity will put it in order, turn it to our advantage, and provide guidance for those who may read it. May this come about through the intercession of our Lady, the immaculate, ever-virgin Mother of God, Mary, and of all the saints, for blessed is our God for never-ending ages of ages. Amen. [...] First, we urge upon the general that his most important concern be the love of God and justice; building on these, he should strive to win the favor of God, without which it is impossible to carry out any plan, however well devised it may seem, or to overcome any enemy, however weak he may be thought. For all things are ruled by the providence of God, a providence which extends even to the birds and the fishes. [...] Armed with the favor of God and, without pausing to rest, employing his

tactical and strategical skills, he manages the army entrusted to him with confidence and is able to counter the various machinations of the enemy." (Preamble of the *Strategikon* in Dennis 1984, 8–9; brackets mine)

And in the section titled "*Using Speeches to Encourage the Troops*", Maurice's *Strategikon* states the following:

At some convenient time the troops should be assembled by meros [i.e., *μέρος*, "military division"] or moira [i.e., *μοίρα*, "military divisions"], not all at once in one place. Suitable speeches should be given to encourage them, recalling their former victories, promising rewards from the emperor, and recompense for their loyal service to the state. Written orders should then be communicated by the proper officers to each tagma [i.e., *τάγμα*, "military formation"]. (*Strategikon*, 6.4 in Dennis 1984, 66; brackets mine)

Whatever one's position regarding the *Strategikon*, it is uncompromisingly *Trinitarian* with an unflinching advocacy of *Divine Providence* (*Theia Pronoia*, "Θεία Πρόνοια"). The text's invocation of divine providence, or God's cosmic order/governance, embodies the convergence of Greek philosophy and Christian revelation. It reflects the Christianization of Heraclitus' divine, transcendent and immanent *Logos* ("Word/Reason"), overlapping with Stoicism's strictly immanent *Logos Spermatikos* ("Seminal Reason"), where in the Gospel of John (1:1) Jesus Christ is the enfleshed *Logos-kai-Soter* (*Word-and-Savior*, "Λόγος και Σώτηρ") who as the transcendent Son of God, or Second Person of the Holy Trinity, *confirms* Heraclitus' *Logos* and *refutes* Stoic pantheism where nature is God.

#### 8th–9th centuries AD: Byzantine Law (*Ecloga*, *Epanagoge*)

In the 8th-century *Ecloga* (*Εκλογή*, "Selection"), it is, according to Ernest Barker, "a brief code of forty titles issued in Greek by the emperor Leo the Isaurian" dated to "*circa 726*" AD (Barker 1957, 84; Barker's emphasis). The code defines itself as "'a selection of laws, made in an abridgement, by Leo and Constantine [the son and successor of Leo], our wise and pious emperors, from the Institutes, Digest, Code, and Novellae of the great Justinian" with "'a revision

issued with a view to greater humanity (*eis to philanthrōpōteron*)" (Barker 1957, 84; Barker's emphasis and brackets). More importantly, it defines kingship as follows:

'Since God has put in our hands the imperial authority, according to His good pleasure, and given us therein an acknowledgment of the love which we cherish towards Him in reverence—bidding us after the manner of Peter, the head and chief of the Apostles, to feed His most faithful flock—we believe that there is nothing higher or greater that we can do in return than to govern in judgment and justice those who are committed by Him to our care, to the end that the bonds of all manner of injustice may be loosened, the oppression of covenants imposed by force may be set at naught, and the assaults of wrongdoers may be repelled, and that thus we may be crowned by His almighty hand with victory over our enemies (which is a thing more precious and honourable than the diadem we wear) and thus there may be peace in our palace and stability in the state of our realm (*politeuma*). (Barker 1957, 84–85; Barker's emphasis)

As shown in the above passage, the polity's power is solely and entirely held in the grasp of the emperor bequeathed to him by God *without*, or *despite*, popular mandate. Yet, the emperor is a *monarch qua monarch* since he seeks "peace in [the] palace" (*contra* Kaldellis' republican anachronization) *and* "stability in the state of [the] realm" (*contra* Stouraitis' imperial rarification). Essentially, the Byzantine emperor is, or must be, *responsible for operating as a caretaker of his subjects who depend on him just as the emperor depends on God*:

'[...] [B]ending our mind in vigilance to the discovery of whatsoever is pleasing to God and good for the common weal; honouring justice above all things earthly, since she is the guardian of things heavenly, and sharper than any sword to repel all adversaries by virtue of the power of Him who is revered in her; knowing that the laws set forth by those who were emperors before us have been recorded in many volumes, and being assured that the meaning and intention of these laws is difficult of understanding for some, and beyond all understanding for others, especially those who do not live in our God-guarded and imperial city [...]' (Barker 1957, 84–85; Barker's emphasis, brackets mine)

The passages from the *Ecloga* support the following passage from Joan M. Hussey regarding the *justification for imperial policies*:

In the legal code, the *Ecloga*, promulgated just before his iconoclast measures, Leo III made clear his views on his own position. He was acting in the Byzantine tradition as the Viceroy of God. He had been handed the power of sovereignty and had been

commanded, in the words of St Peter, to 'tend the faithful flock'. This applied not only to the promotion of justice in the spirit of a Moses or a Solomon but equally to matters of faith, and Leo, like other Byzantine rulers, felt responsible for the good conduct of ecclesiastical as well as secular affairs. This Byzantine conception of the ruler's divinely appointed mission was further reinforced by the Graeco-Roman tradition of an Emperor cult which had been adapted within the Christian framework, again stressing the Emperor's direct relationship to God. (Hussey 2010, 44; Hussey's emphasis)

Hussey's assessment is complemented by, or overlaps with, Mariana Goina's *Mirror of Princes* historical contextualization of the "Wallachian treatise on education, the *Teachings of Neagoe Basarab to His Son Theodosie* [...] written at the beginning of the sixteenth century for the son of the ruling prince, Neagoe Basarab (1512–21)" (Goina 2014, 25–26; Goina's emphasis, brackets mine); said contextualization is as follows:

The image of the God-ordained monarchy found in Neagoe's mirror is characteristic of all Byzantine works of the same genre. Its roots are to be found in the principles of Hellenistic kingship as adapted to Christianity by Eusebius of Caesarea. In Late Antiquity, the emperor was described both as the image of god and as god on earth; however, with Christianity becoming the state religion, Eusebius and other Christian theologians transformed the emperor into the vice-regent of God, divinely appointed, inspired and endowed with a whole catalogue of virtues. Eusebius's formulation of the emperor's central role in the world order was to remain normative throughout Byzantine history and found its expression typically in the literary genre of the *speculum principis*. (Goina 2014, 31; Goina's emphasis, see also Milton V. Anastos' classic study on "the ancient Greek philosophical presuppositions of Byzantine absolutism" in Anastos 1965, 90ff)

As for the *Epanagogē* (*Επαναγωγή*, "Return to the [Legal] Point"), it is a 9th-century Byzantine legal text, also known as the *Eisagogē tou Nomou* (*Εἰσαγωγή του Νόμου*, "Introduction to the Law"), that constitutes "'a revision of the ancient laws' made in the reign of Basil I and his son and successor Leo VI" (Barker 1957, 89). In it, the emperor and his powers are defined:

§ 1. 'The Emperor (*Basileus*) is a legal authority, a blessing common to all his subjects, who neither punishes in antipathy nor rewards in partiality, but behaves like an umpire making awards in a game.' (Barker 1957, 89; Barker's emphasis)

§ 2. 'The aim of the emperor is to guard and secure by his ability the powers which he already possesses; to recover by sleepless care those that are lost; and to acquire by

wisdom and by just ways and habits those that are not [as yet] in his hands.' (Barker 1957, 89; Barker's brackets)

§ 3. 'The end set before the Emperor is to confer benefits: this is why is he called a benefactor; and when he is weary of conferring benefits, he appears, in the words of the ancients, to falsify the royal stamp and character [i.e. he is guilty of the offence of *paracharaxis*, which was charged against Diogenes the Cynic]. (Barker 1957, 89–90; Barker's brackets and emphasis)

§ 4. 'The Emperor is presumed to enforce and maintain, first and foremost all that is set out in the divine scriptures; then the doctrines laid down by the seven holy [general] Councils; and further, and in addition, the received Romaic laws [i.e. the Byzantine law as codified by Basil I and Leo VI]. (Barker 1957, 90; Barker's brackets)

§ 5. 'The Emperor ought to be most notable in orthodoxy and piety, and to be famous for holy zeal, both in the matter of the doctrines laid down about the Trinity, and in the matter of the views most clearly and surely defined about the nature of its being [in the Greek *oikonomia*] in virtue of the nature of the being of our Lord Jesus Christ according to the flesh. (Barker 1957, 90; Barker's brackets and emphasis)

§ 6. 'The Emperor must interpret the laws laid down by the men of old; and he must in like manner [or 'on the analogy'] decide the issues on which there is no law. (Barker 1957, 90; Barker's brackets)

§ 7. 'In his interpretation of the laws he must pay attention to the custom of the State [in the Greek *polis*]. What is proposed contrary to the canons [of the Church] is not admitted as a pattern [to be followed]. (Barker 1957, 90; Barker's brackets and emphasis)

§ 8. 'The Emperor must interpret the laws benevolently. For in cases of doubt we allow a generous [in Greek *philokalos*] interpretation. (Barker 1957, 91; Barker's brackets and emphasis)

§ 9. 'He must not alter rules which have a clear interpretation. (Barker 1957, 91)

§ 10. 'As concerns matters on which there is no law in writing, the Emperor must pay heed to habit and custom; and if this too fails, he must follow precedents analogous to the case in question. (Barker 1957, 91)

As the above sections illustrate, the *Epanagogē* frames the Eastern Roman monarch as a legal mediator, as well as an enforcer and defender of Trinitarian Orthodoxy. Granted, the king *must* (meaning *expected to*) "interpret the laws laid down by the men of old", "not alter rules which have a clear interpretation", "pay attention to the custom of the State", and "interpret the laws

benevolently." However, the legal obligations of the emperor are not absolute due to: 1) the allowance of "generous interpretation" in "cases of doubt", and 2) the absence of punishments in case the emperor ignores, defies, haphazardly adheres to, or alters out of necessity, the aforesaid obligations. Interestingly, the *Epanagogē* discusses the relationship between the Eastern Roman monarch and the Patriarch of Constantinople:

§ 8. 'As the constitution [in Greek *politeia*] consists, like man, of parts and members, the greatest and the most necessary parts are the Emperor and the Patriarch. Wherefore the peace and felicity of subjects, in body and soul, is [i.e. depends on] the agreement and concord of the kingship and the priesthood in all things. (Barker 1957, 92, Barker's brackets and emphasis)

As the above passage illustrates, the people are *dependent* on the emperor's dominance of the Byzantine polity's secular domain and *dependent* on the Patriarch's dominance of the Byzantine polity's religious/spiritual domain.

#### 9th century AD: Cassia's Hymn to the Birth of Christ

In the 9th century AD, the Christian Greek poetess Kassia (or Kassiane) composed the *Hymn to the Birth of Christ*. According to C. A. Trypanis, "Cassia [...] was the offspring of a noble family — her father was a *Candidatos* at the imperial court — who, after the end of the icon controversy, became a nun" (Trypanis 1981, 445; Trypanis' emphasis, brackets mine). And "in about 843, she founded a convent, where she spent the rest of her life composing religious music and poetry" (Trypanis 1981, 445). The poem's pro-monarchism is evident as follows:

When Augustus became monarch upon earth,  
The multitude of kingdoms among men was ended.  
And when Thou wast incarnate of the Holy One,  
The multitude of divinities among the idols was put down.  
Beneath one universal empire have the cities come,  
And in one divine dominion  
the nations believed.  
The folk were enrolled by the decree of the emperor,  
We, the faithful, have been inscribed in the name of Deity.

Oh, Thou our incarnate Lord.  
Great is Thy mercy, to Thee be glory.  
(Hymn 4 in Tillyard 1911, 427–428)

9th century AD: Emperor Leo VI's Novellae

Emperor Leo VI's (reign: 886–911 AD) *Novella XLVII* and *Novella LXXVIII* led to "the growth of imperial autocracy" and the elimination of "the shadow of that dyarchy of emperor and senate which had been the policy of Augustus I" (Barker 1957, 99). According to Ernest Barker, the *Novellae* was historically part of a Byzantine legal project "promulgated in 888" by Leo VI and overseen by one of his advisors, Stylianos Zaitzes (Treadgold 1997, 461–462). Specifically, Leo established "a legal commission that carried out [Emperor] Basil's intent to codify all of existing Byzantine law" the end-product of which was a "work of 60 books that occupied six volumes, variously called the *Exavivlos* or the *Vasilika (Basilika)*" (Gregory 2010, 227; Gregory's emphasis, brackets mine). The *Exavivlos* "present[ed] in the Greek language all the laws in the Justinianic Corpus" where "Leo himself began this new tradition with a series of 'Novels' (new laws) that dealt with contemporary problems and issues" covering secular and church laws (Gregory 2010, 227). Furthermore, "the *Vasilika* and the Novels [...] did away with most of the [...] outdated institutions such as the city councils (*curiae, voulai*) and the Roman Senate" (Gregory 2010, 227; Gregory's emphasis, brackets mine).

Beginning with *Novella XLVII*, the law delineates the "abolishing [of] *certain powers of the Senate (synklētos) in regard to the appointment of officers*" (Barker 1957, 99; Barker's emphasis and parentheticals, brackets mine). More importantly, it bluntly acknowledges the supremacy of the emperor's wisdom (*sophia*) and makes no mention of a sovereign popular will undergirding either the Eastern Roman polity generally or the Byzantine monarch's authority specifically:

In former times, when the constitution (*politeia*) followed a different system, the order of affairs was also differently arranged. All matters were not then supervised by the emperor's providential care (*pronoia*): there were some matters which it was the business of the Senate to consider and decide; and it was by it that persons [i.e. the officers concerned with such matters] were proposed for appointment. Three praetors were thus appointed by it, in the capital city, for the management of affairs, and this arrangement depended on a legal ordinance. Nor was this only the case in the city [Constantinople] which is the seat of government: in other cities, too, persons bearing the same name of senators appointed the *stratego*i (i.e. the municipal heads) who were different from those now understood by that title, and were of higher standing and charged with different duties. In former times, when affairs were different, such a law as this was necessary. Today, however, everything depends on the wisdom of the emperor, and all things are supervised and managed, with the aid of heaven, by the providential care of his wisdom. This law now fulfils no necessary purpose, and we therefore rule that it should be abolished along with the other laws which have been removed from the constitution; for it follows logically, on the same principle by which the requirements of affairs originally led to the issue of laws which are now in desuetude, that a rule which is no longer of any service for the conduct of affairs should be abolished. (Barker 1957, 99–100; Barker's emphasis, parentheses and brackets)

As for *Novella LXXVIII*, it involves the legal "*abolishing [of] the power of the Senate to issue senatorial decrees (senatus consulta)*" (Barker 1957, 100; Barker's emphasis and parentheses, brackets mine). More importantly, it unabashedly affirms the *taking of power by the emperor himself*:

What we have already done in respect of other laws which were not required by the position of affairs—by this we mean the removal of superfluous matter from the legal system—we now do in the following respect: we ordain that the law which associates the senate with the process of legislation shall be excluded from its place in the body of the laws. The position of affairs has pronounced sentence of condemnation upon that law, ever since the power of the emperor took their management into his hand; and it is therefore inopportune and idle that a law which is no longer of use should keep its place by the side of laws which serve a purpose. (Barker 1957, 100)

There is no doubt that the expansion of the Byzantine emperor's *kratos* (i.e., secular power with or without divine ordainment) occurred at the *cost of the Senate's and with no concern for democratic discourse over, let alone popular ratification of, changes in civic law*.

9th century AD: Photios' Letter to Prince Michael of Bulgaria

Photios was, during the 9th century AD, the "twice patriarch of Constantinople" who was "twice deposed" as patriarch (Barker 1957, 109). He, according to Ernest Barker, "wrote a great number of general letters to the statesmen and churchmen of his day" with one of them being "a notable letter of advice and exhortation, addressed to a Bulgarian prince [named Michael] and modelled on the oration addressed by Isocrates to a Cypriot ruler" (Barker 1957, 111; brackets mine). The aforementioned letter was designed "to offer advice—in a traditional style based on the model of Isocrates' orations addressed to Nicocles and the general pattern of 'Mirror for Princes'—on the moral and political duties of a prince" (Barker 1957, 112). The letter is thematically framed around the question, *What is the function of a prince?*, whereby Photius provides the following answer:

A ruler must have great goodness and along with his other qualities he must be well-ordered in point of morals: wherefore it is said, "Rule proves the man", and, again, "as gold is tested on whetstones, so is the mind of man on acts of government and the feelings of subjects" [...] It is your duty to cultivate practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) through all the course of your life. Such wisdom is acquired from the recollection and memory of old achievements; from the conversation and company of men of wisdom who are still living; and from actual experience of the business of life. It is action itself which—gathering strength from imitation, from counsel, and from the handling of affairs—leads to good and useful results if the influences that are above be not adverse. (Barker 1957, 112–113; Barker's emphasis, bracketed ellipsis mine)

In the above passage, Photios clearly draws from the ancient Greek philosophical tradition as indicated in his quoting a maxim derived from, or attributed to, Pittacos (i.e., "Office shows the man", "Ἀρχή ἀνδρα δείκνυσι") who governed the Greek island of Mytilene during the 7th/6th century BC (see Cavarnos 1996, 31–37, 64–65 regarding Pittacos). Furthermore, the author counsels Michael to not only have "great goodness" and "be well-ordered in point of morals" but also "to cultivate practical wisdom", which means that the king's *aretē* ("excellence") must include both *ethically sound principles* and *efficaciously sound practices*. With respect to the

relationship between a monarch and his subjects, Photius states the following:

When a prince rules himself, then you may believe that he really rules his subjects; for when they see that the ruler set over them is the master of his passions and pleasures, they will be moved by their own desire and free will to submit themselves [as he, too, does himself]. But if they see him a slave to pleasure and passions, they will think it is intolerable to be the slaves of a slave. [...] Divert disputes among your subjects and turn them against your enemies; make them into struggles in defence of the fatherland. It is a mark and feature of tyrannies that their subjects should be engaged in civil broils; for tyrants find their safety in a general policy of destruction and division. But the duty and office of a ruler and king is to keep concord among his subjects undisturbed by sedition; for it is in the security of his subjects that the foundation of his authority is established. (Barker 1957, 112–113; bracketed text Barker's, bracketed ellipsis mine)

Ultimately, Photius neither conceptualizes nor renders the relationship between a monarch and a monarch's subjects as anything involving the former being beholden to the political power of the latter, sovereignty notwithstanding.

9th century AD: Emperor Constantine Porphyrogennitos' Book of Ceremonies

In his *Book of Ceremonies*, Emperor Constantine Porphyrogennitos, who ruled from 913 to 959 AD, records the relationship between Emperor Michael III and the *demes*, or popular factions, of Constantinople. Said *demes*, according to Porphyrogennitos, danced for Emperor Michael III, who reigned from 842 to 867 AD, during his birthday celebration:

Concerning the dance[.] It should be known that at the dance for the said birthday the two factions of the Blues and Greens of the City body never used to dance. When the *praipositos* [πραϊπόσιτος] advised the emperor of this the emperor commanded that they dance. On the said day the two factions went in in the fourth and fifth body in the dance and ended the dance and received a purse. (Moffatt 1996, 263 citing Porphyrogennitos' *Book of Ceremonies* II.35; Moffatt's emphasis, brackets mine)

According to Ann Moffatt, the *praipositos* was "the eunuch official who acted as an intermediary in dealings with the emperor" (Moffatt 1996, 257). But what is more important than the function of the *praipositos* in the Byzantine court is the *enmeshment of imperial command and imperial benefaction the latter of which is extended to subjects who adhere to the former*.

11th century AD: Anonymous' Word of Advice to the King

The *Logos Nouthetētikos pros Basilea* (Λόγος Νουθετητικός προς Βασιλέα, "Word of Advice to the King") was composed, according to Ernest Barker, by Nikulitzas "some time after 1080" whose intended audience was "the new emperor Alexius Comnenus and the new dynasty inaugurated by his accession" (Barker 1957, 121). However, Deno J. Geanakoplos states that the text was incorrectly attributed to Nikulitzas and that it was composed by an "anonymous author of the eleventh century" (Geanakoplos 1984, 20). In examining the text, its title clearly includes the Greek possessive term *ANΩNYMOY* (meaning "Of Anonymous") while the text's body mentions the author's own grandfather as Nikulitzas (i.e., "ὁ πάππος μου ὁ Νικουλιτζᾶς") (Wassiliewsky and Jernstedt 1896, 91, 96). But authorship issues aside, the composition clearly advises the Eastern Roman monarch on the relationship between rulership and law:

Some affirm that the emperor is not subject to the law but is the law. And I say the same. However, whenever he acts and legislates, he does well and we obey him. But if he should say, "Drink poison," you will of course not do so. And if he should affirm, "Go to the sea and cross it like a diver," neither can you do this. From this, know that the emperor, being a man, is subject to the laws of piety. For this reason we write this treatise for the pious and Christian emperors who will follow. Holy Lord, God has elevated you to the imperial authority and has made you by his grace, as you are called, a god on earth, to do and to act as you will. Let then your acts and your deeds be full of understanding and truth, and may justice dwell in your heart. Look, therefore, and act toward all—toward those who are in a position of authority and toward all others—with an equal eye. And do not evilly coerce some while bestowing benefits on others against just reason. But let there be equality for all. . . . The emperor is the model and example for all, and all men look up to him and imitate his conduct. And if his ways are good, men are eager to follow him quickly; but if they are bad and worthy of blame, men will do the same. Therefore, I beg you, take hold of and adopt the four virtues: courage (I mean that of the soul), justice, temperance, and wisdom. (Geanakoplos 1984, 20 translating Wassiliewsky and Jernstedt's 1896 edition of *Cecaumeni strategikon et incerti scriptoris de officiis regis Libellus*, Geanakoplos' ellipses; see similar translation in Barker 1957, 125–129)

The above passage clearly shows that the *Logos Nouthetētikos pros Basilea*, like Kekaumenos' *Strategikon*, falls well within the *Mirror of Princes* literary genre the history of which Waller R.

Newell accurately states "recognized [Xenophon] as one of the originals" with Scipio, for example, treating Xenophon's *Cyropaideia* as "a *vade mecum*, always at his side" (Newell 2013, 147; Newell's emphasis, brackets mine). More importantly, the anonymous Byzantine author defines kingship as a nexus point between the physical and metaphysical planes constituted by the following principles already known in the Greek world during the Hellenistic period and Late Antiquity: 1) the emperor as the *nomos empsychos* or "living law" (see Anastos 1978, 20–24), 2) *divine mimesis* where the king imitates, or must imitate, God while governing and, for example, be "merciful [i.e., *eleemosyne*], [just] as [the] Heavenly Father is merciful" (Constantelos 1968, 19ff; brackets mine), and 3) the emperor as embodying the four cardinal virtues of the ideal soul/state obviously derived from Plato (see *Republic* 4.427e and Cavarnos 1989, 29–31).<sup>36</sup>

#### 11th century AD: Eustathios Rhomaios' Peira

The mid-11th century *Peira* (Πείρα) is a "collection of excerpts from the statements of verdicts (*hypomnemata*) and special treatises (*meletai*) of Eustathios Rhomaios [...] compiled by an unknown colleague of Eustathios" (Simon 1991, 1617; Simon's emphasis, brackets mine). Said colleague, "a 'pupil' or 'assistant' of the still alive Eustathios", mainly "reports the verdicts reached by important judges of his times, essentially by his hero, Eustathios Romaios" (Oikonomides 1986, 169–170). According to Dimitris Krallis, the book's "introduction [...] state[s]: Those things are *demosia* (public), which are called *demosia*, which the *demos* had and enjoyed before there was an emperor and which passed to the empire once it had been constituted" (Krallis 2009, 51; Krallis' emphasis, brackets mine). For Krallis, the "text recognizes that the Roman polity predated the imperial office and, as a consequence, circumscribed the emperor's field of action by virtue of its antiquity" with "the *demosia*, [...] conceive[d] as independent of imperial power, [being] those that pertain to the *demos* (*demosia ta tou demou*

onta)" (Krallis 2009, 51; Krallis' emphasis, brackets mine). Assuming the *Peira* is accurate, how exactly does the Roman polity circumscribe an imperial office that it predates? Moreover, how was the emperor's activities limited by the *demosia* if the *demosia* "passed to the empire once it had been constituted"? Lastly, what does the phrase *demosia ta tou demou onta* ("public is being of the people") mean exactly? Does it mean that the *demos* embodied Rousseau's *general will* or a *will of all*? If anything, the phrase appears to constitute the Greek version of the Latin *res publica* that, as stated earlier, Louise Hodgson demonstrated refers *not* to any Roman "corporate identity", or Roman system of governance between the Tarquins and Augustus Octavian, or even a republic where the people are sovereign (Hodgson 2017, 4). Rather, the *demosia ta tou demou* is the Eastern Roman variant of Hodgson's definition of the ancient Roman *res publica* as "the internal political space (however it may be organized) of a given civic community" and "something that should be managed *for* the public good, but need not necessarily be managed *by* the public and certainly should not be read as synonymous *with* the public" (Hodgson 2017, 4; Hodgson's emphasis). This is complemented by Timothy Miller's analysis of Late Byzantine financial offices based on a distinction made by Emperor John VI Katakouzenos' (reign: 1347–1354 AD) between "<< [...] the public (δημόσια) and imperial (βασιλικά) treasuries >>" (Miller 1978, 171; brackets mine). For Miller, "*demosia* or *demosion* are used in Byzantine sources to refer to taxes on land (the *jugatio*) and on agricultural workers (the *capitatio*) and to the treasury where these revenues were collected" (Miller 1978, 173; Miller's emphasis). Moreover, "*demosia* represents the financial office which collected the *capitatio-jugatio*, the ancient complex of agricultural levies which had been the fiscal backbone of the Romano-Byzantine state" (Miller 1978, 173; Miller's emphasis).

11th century AD: Michael Attaleiates' *Ponema*

Michael Attaleiates was an 11th-century Eastern Roman scholar who "served as a military judge under Romanos IV Diogenes" (Neville 2018, 151). According to Dimitris Krallis, Attaleiates was indebted to "Roman 'republican' and 'democratic' ideas" that he "most likely encountered in the works of Plutarch and Polybios, as well as his readings about Roman law" (Krallis 2009, 35). But *how indebted* was he to Roman republicanism, at least in theory, given his statements in his *Ponema Attaleiotou* ("Opus of Attaleiates", Πόνημα Ἀτταλειώτου)? In the *Ponema*, a "short history and summary of Roman law" (Krallis 2009, 35, footnote 3), there is an epigram where Attaleiates refers to Emperor Michael VII Doukas (reign: 1071–1078 AD) as "The people-pleasing branch of the Doukas clan, The All-Greatest Emperor Michael" and kingship generally as "of wise monarchy" (i.e., respectively "Ὁ κοσμοτερπῆς τοῦ Δουκῶν γένους κλάδος, Ὁ παμμέγιστος Μιχαῖλ αὐτοκράτωρ" and "τῆς σοφῆς μοναρχίας" in Zepos and Zepos 1931, 410; English translation mine). One could argue that the epigram is rhetorically formulaic and reveals little to nothing in terms of Attaleiates' genuine politico-legal views since it, along with the rest of the *Ponema*, was composed under the "request of the king Michael of Douka" (i.e., *keleusē tou basileos Michael tou Douka*, "κέλευση τοῦ βασιλέως Μιχαῖλ τοῦ Δουκᾶ" in Zepos and Zepos 1931, 411). But despite his admission of monarchical influence, Attaleiates states in the section of the *Ponema* titled "On the Justice of Law [...]" ("Περὶ δικαιοσύνης νόμου [...]") that "[t]he king does not submit to the laws" (i.e., "Ὁ βασιλεὺς τοῖς νόμοις οὐχ ὑπόκειται" in Zepos and Zepos 1931, 497; English translation and brackets mine). Such a position is sincere given its congruity with Attaleiates' discussion of the relationship between rulers and ruled in the section on human nature:

Πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἢ δοῦλοί εἰσιν, ἢ ἐλεύθεροι. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οὐδένα ἔχουσι τὸν ἐξουσιάζοντα αὐτῶν· οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι τοῖς δεσπόταις καὶ τῇ τούτων ἐξουσίᾳ

ὑπόκεινται. ("Περὶ καταστάσεως ἀνθρώπων, καὶ διαιρέσεως προσώπων" ἐν Ζέπος καὶ Ζέπος 1931, 418)

All humans are either servants or free. On the one hand, those who are free are not under the authority of any person, but, on the other hand, servants are subject to their masters and their authority. ("On the condition of men, and the division of personalities" in Zepos and Zepos 1931, 418; English translation mine)

Contextually, the above passage "investigates book 46 of the *Basilika*" according to Attaleiates (i.e., "Ζήτην βιβλίον τῶν Βασιλικῶν μς" in Zepos and Zepos 1931, 418; emphasis mine). In Byzantine law, the *Basilika* (i.e., τὰ Βασιλικά, "the Monarchics") is "an extensive collection of laws divided into six volumes or 60 books, begun under Emp[eror] Basil I and completed in the first years of the reign of Leo VI" (Schmink 1991, 265; brackets mine).

#### 11th century AD: Byzantine Fable Literature

Elements of kingship theory appear in Byzantine fable literature such as *Stephanites and Ichnelates*, which was translated into Greek from the Arabic *Kalilah and Dimnah* in circa 1080 AD (Barker 1957, 141). According to Ernest Barker, "[t]he framework in which *Stephanites and Ichnelates* is set is that of a series of conversations between a king and a philosopher, with the king asking brief questions and the philosopher answering at length by a parable (or parables) in which animals play chief part" (Barker 1957, 142; Barker's emphasis, brackets mine).

Historically, the aforesaid "framework of questions and answers was an old device which had been applied to problems of government as long ago as the beginning of the second century B.C." making an "appear[ance] in 'the Question of Menander'" and "also appears in the document called the *Letter of Aristeas*" (Barker 1957, 142; Barker's emphasis). In *Stephanites and Ichnelates*, there is "The Fable of the Lion, the Ox and the Jackals" that uses, just like in the Aesopic tradition familiar to both pagan and Christian Greeks (see Papademetriou 1983, 125–127 and Karla 2016, 313, 325–326, 329–332), anthropomorphic animals designed to convey

wisdom on essential life-related subjects. The aforesaid fable first covers a monarch's selection of ministers:

'When Ichnelates saw that he had won the favour of the lion, he said: "Sire, the subjects of the king should refer to him all things needful; for then he can award to each the honour that is his due. [ . . . ] He must not put on a man's feet the ornament meant for his feet. The man who sets a sapphire and precious pearls in lead does more dishonour to himself than to the pearls. A ruler must discriminate among his subjects, as a general must among his soldiers, or a high priest among men of learning and virtue. Leaders of the people do not succeed in their policies by the number [of their ministers], but by making the best choice. [ . . . ] Men in authority should promote not only those who are eminent in birth, but also those who are men of consideration and able to render service. They must not be content to employ only those who are about their person or who serve as their attendants; they must summon to their service men who come from a distance and are renowned for their understanding and learning. Nothing is closer to a man than his own body; but when illness comes upon him, the man who is ill will seek to get medicine from a distance. Mice often live in the palaces of kings; but they are not to be honoured above the rest of their fellows simply because they are near kings. Consider wild birds: is not the hawk summoned by the king to his service because of his intrinsic value, and is not that the reason why he takes him and carries him on his arm?"' (Barker 1957, 143–144; all brackets Barker's)

As the above passage shows, the *demos* depends on the *basileus* who is clearly defined as a ruler who "mak[es] the best choice" with respect to public policy and not with respect to his strict reliance on the will of the populace (sovereign or otherwise). Afterwards, the same fable delineates the forces that endanger a monarch's reign:

'Ichnelates said, "The lion has now become altogether the tool of the ox, and despises all other advisers. But there are six things which cause a king to be despised and destroyed. The first of them is failure to follow the policies that suit circumstances: to be weak where severity is needed, and to be harsh where flattery is in place. The second is a lack of adequate and wise followers and proper advisers. The third is sedition among his subjects. The fourth is his succumbing to irrational appetites: the fifth his yielding to anger; the last his giving way in the face of changing circumstances.'" (Barker 1957, 144)

So according to the passage above, there is a total of six threats to a monarchy only one of which entails "sedition among [a king's] subjects." Naturally, sedition is treated seriously in the fable though it is evidently *not the only threat that a ruler must be mindful of*. In fact, the sequence of

perils indicates that popular sedition comes *after* a king's *lack of situational phronēsis* and *after* a monarch's *ministerial deficiency*. In other words, popular sedition appears as part of a *cascading effect caused by the failures of monarchy*, which reveals, at the very least, a tacit acceptance of kingship (with or without divine right) since the idea and/or existence of even an inchoate Byzantine *general will* would render popular sedition as the first peril in the sequence or the main rising force undergirding the sequence overall. Of course, such a critical analysis rests on the fact that *Stephanites and Ichneutes* was developed to cater to "the future emperor Alexios Comnenus" (Barker 1957, 141). But even if the aforesaid analysis is incontrovertibly inaccurate, then *why would the alpha and omega of threats to monarchical rule involve circumstances?* If there is an answer to such a question, then it could potentially entail the fact that the monarch is neither primarily nor strictly beholden to the equivalent of an *omnis populus*, but rather *plainly beholden to political reality in toto*.

#### 11th century AD: Michael Psellos' Chronographia

In the 11th century AD, the Christian Greek scholar Michael Psellos composed a historical work titled the *Chronographia* (Kazhdan 1991, 1754–1755; see also Jeffreys and Lauxtermann 2017). In it, the author states the following regarding the reign of Emperor Constantine IX:

Naturally I would have wished that my favorite emperor had been perfect, even if such a compliment was impossible for all the others, but the events of history do not accommodate themselves to our desires. [...] Now two things in particular contribute to the hegemony of the Romans, namely, our system of honours and our wealth, to which one might add a third: the wise control of the other two, and prudence in their distribution. Unfortunately Constantine's idea was to exhaust the treasury of its money, so that not a single *obol* was to be left there, and as for the honours, they were conferred indiscriminately on a multitude of persons who had no right to them, especially on the more vulgar sort who pestered the man, and on those who amused him by their witticisms. [...] Constantine had no very clear conception of the nature of monarchy. He failed to realize that it entailed responsibility for the well-being of his subjects, and that an emperor must always watch over the administration of his realm and ensure its development on sound lines. To him the exercise of power meant

rest from his labours, fulfilment of desire, relaxation from strife. He had entered the harbour of the palace, so to speak, to enjoy the advantages of a calm retreat and to avoid the duties of helmsman in the future. As for the administration of public affairs, and the privilege of dispensing justice, and the superintendence of the armed forces, they were delegated to others. Only a fraction of these duties was reserved for himself. Instead, he chose a life of pleasure and luxury, as if it were his natural right (not without some justification, for he had inherited an innate predilection for such things). Now, having acquired supreme power, he had greater opportunity for pleasure, and he indulged himself more than ever. (Geanakoplos 1984, 29–30; Geanakoplos' emphasis, brackets mine)

Given the above passage, it is apparent that Psellos bases the "hegemony of the [New or Eastern] Romans" on a tri-partite schema consisting of *honour, wealth, and phronēsis in leadership with respect to managing honours and wealth*. Now if the polity of *Romanía-Graikía* is unequivocally defined by its hegemony, and the polity's hegemony is not predicated on a Rousseauian *general will* (or *demos qua demos*), then it stands to reason that *Romanía-Graikía* as a polity is not undergirded by a Rousseauian *general will* and is therefore not a republican monarchy. This is confirmed in *Chronographia* 7.1 where the security of the Byzantine emperor was not limited to the people or based on a sovereign populace but rather to different *classes* or *factions*:

the security of these [i.e., Byzantine emperors] depended on three groups: the common people, the senatorial order, and the army (Anastos 1993, 31, 41 translating Psellos' "ἐν τρισὶ δὲ τούτοις τῆς φυλακῆς αὐτοῖς ἰσταμένης, δημοτικῷ πλήθει, καὶ συγκλητικῇ τάξει, καὶ συντάγματι στρατιωτικῷ")

Getting back to Constantine IX's reign, Psellos' brutally criticizes his own monarch for failing to comprehend, let alone live up to, the rigorous standards of monarchy *in se*. In other words, the author neither doubts nor denies the king possessing ultimate authority in political matters, but laments that Constantine is abusing his powers and neglecting his duties so as to live the Byzantine equivalent of a hedonistic lifestyle. For Psellos, the monarchy is *not* a monarchical republic since the king is, in terms of sovereignty, not an exclusive, or substantive, outgrowth of the *demos qua demos* but is rather defined by and beholden to the *master-art of helmsmanship*

*designed to benefit all citizens and not a particular class be it popular, commercial, military, ecclesiastical, or senatorial* (i.e., politics as "master [...] craft", or "κυριωτάτης [...]

ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς", in Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* I.1; brackets mine). Psellos' position on monarchy is derived from, or directly impacted by, Plato's position on politics:

οὐδὲ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστίν, τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖνῳ συμφέρον καὶ πρέπον, καὶ λέγει ἃ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ ἅπαντα. (*Πολιτεία* I.342ε ἐν Burnet 1905)

neither does anyone in any office of rule in so far as he is a ruler consider and enjoin his own advantage but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft, and he keeps his eyes fixed on that and on what is advantageous and suitable to that in all that he says and does (*Republic* I.342e translated by Shorey 1937, 63).

Interestingly, Psellos' political views precede and are complemented by Frederick the Great's position on politics involving the *enlightened despot*:

The sovereign is attached by indissoluble ties to the body of the state; hence it follows that he, by repercussions, is sensible of all the ills which afflict his subjects, and the people, in like manner, suffer from the misfortunes which affect their sovereign. There is but one general good, which is that of the state. [...] I once more repeat, the sovereign represents the state; he and his people form but one body, which can only be happy as far as it is united by concord. The prince is to the nation he governs what the head is to the man; it is his duty to see, think, and act for the whole community [...] watch[ing] over morals [...] improv[ing] the national education [...] [and] ought on all occasions to be the last refuge of the unfortunate [...] (*Essay on Forms of Government* in Rosen and Wolff 1999, 95; brackets mine).

### 11th/12th century AD: Stephanos Physopalamites' Alphetikon for Alexios I Komnenos

According to Nicholas Zagklas, Stephanos Physopalamites was "an otherwise unknown figure of the [Komnenian] court" who "composed two poems for [Emperor] Alexios" (Zagklas 2019, 241; brackets mine). Said poems were "written in the *politikos stichos*: the first poem is an encomium of Alexios in the form of alphabet, while the second celebrates the reconquest of a fortified settlement during the fight against the Normans" (Zagklas 2019, 241; Zagklas'

emphasis). With respect to the *alphabetikon* specifically, it outlines Alexios' qualities as *divine-like and divine-right monarch* with King David as an explicit paragon and King Alexander, the conqueror of Persia, as an implicit paragon. Physopalamites, upon observation, uses the alphabet to frame Alexios as an imitator of Christ the King of Kings, from **A** to **Z** (from Alpha to **Ω**mega):

**A**ll kings' proud boast, enkindler and bearer of light,  
**B**eauty's bloom you are, delight of rulers.  
**C**ountries all rejoice in your successes;  
**D**avid most gentle can lawfully be likened to you.  
**E**ver our hope (after God), our strength &  
**F**astness, ceaselessly plucking from the storm  
all who are beneath your hand,  
**G**leaming sun, star of the inhabited world,  
**H**appily flourishing & revelling always in all your virtues,  
**I**nstructing Christ's armies with inspired command,  
**J**ostling, you trampled upon the ranks of the barbarians.  
**K**ill the insolence of the children of Hagar;  
**L**ift yourself on high when you have annihilated them;  
**M**ake a trophy for victory as conqueror three times over  
Now you have made your enemies exiles from their own land,  
**O**verwhelmed in grief for their enslavement by your divine power.  
**P**reviously they rebelled against your inheritance,  
**Q**uestioning it in murderous ways, words and deeds,  
**R**uler, great Komnenian bringer of light,  
**S**upporting pillar of piety, kings' proud boast,  
**T**aming with your sword & awful bow  
**U**nruled tribes of strange-tongued Persian barbarians  
**V**ictoriously rejoicing that they are below the yoke of your  
power most divine.  
**W**ith David that we should all sing  
**X**cellent hymns of praise – for this, emperor Alexios,  
**Y**ou prepare, whom we call upon  
**Z**estfully to live for many years.  
(Mullett and Smythe 1996, vi; Mullett and Smythe's boldening, M. J. McGann's translation).

11th–13th/14th centuries AD: Byzantine Seals

Emperorship is evident on multiple Byzantine seals. Beginning with a Byzantine seal from the 11th century AD, there is an inscription that reads:

---|ΘΚΕΡ,Θ,|ΝΙΚΗΤΑΠΡΙ|ΚΡΙΤΗΤΥΡΗΛ,|ΡΟΛΕΡΥCTPV|ΜΟΝ,ΣΘΕCΑΛ,|  
ΝΙΚ,ΣΑΝΘΥΤΥ|Ρ,ΗΜ,ΤΥΑ|–Γ,–

Θ(εοτό)κε β(οή)θ(ει) Νικήτα π(ατ)ρι(κίω), κριτῆ τοῦ βήλ(ου) Βολεροῦ, Στρυμόν(ος) (καὶ) Θεσσαλ(ο)νίκης (καὶ) ἀν(θρώπ)ου τοῦ β(ασιλέως) ἡμ(ῶν) τοῦ ἁγ(ίου). (Nesbitt and Oikonomides 1991, 61, Seal 18.26)

Mother of God help Niketas the patrician, judge of the velum [i.e., Greek *βήλος* "threshold", Latin *velum*, "veil"] of Boleron, Strymon and Thessalonika and man of our holy king. (English translation mine; brackets mine)

According to John Nesbitt and Nicolas Oikonomides, the individual mentioned in the above seal "may be the patrikios Niketas who was judge of Boleron, Strymon, and Thessalonika shortly before February 1062" and "calls himself 'the emperor's man,' an appellation that was widespread during the reign of members of the Doukas family" (Nesbitt and Oikonomides 1991, 61). And by *judge of the velum*, the seal refers to a low-level Byzantine judicial position. According to Andreas Gkoutzioukostas, both the "*judges of the hippodrome* and the *judges of the velum* were [...] 'small' or inferior judges who sat as commissioned judges or assessors, since they had legal training and belonged to the class of professional judges"; they "could also be sent from Constantinople to the *themes* by the emperor or other officials, in order to examine some cases and then return to the capital" (Gkoutzioukostas 2010, 69–70; Gkoutzioukostas' emphasis, brackets mine). But whatever the historical jurisdiction of the *judge of the velum*, what is important is the seal's epithet *man of our holy king* as it conveys *both deference for and closeness to the Eastern Roman emperor*.

Another Byzantine seal from the 12th century AD has an inscription addressed to the emperor Alexios. The inscription reads:

ΚΕ·ΡΟ–ΗΘΕΙ ΑΛΕΞΙΩ ΜΕΓΑΛΩ–ΡΑCΙΛΕΙΤΩ ΠΟΡΦΥΡΟΓΕΝΗΤ

Κ(ύρι)ε βοήθει Ἀλεξίω μεγάλω βασιλεῖ τῷ πορφυρογενήτ(ω)  
(Nesbitt and Cécile 2009, 184–185, Seal 94.1; Nesbitt and Cécile's parentheses)

Lord help Alexios the great king born in the royal purple  
(English translation mine)

The Alexios referred to in the above seal is "Alexios II Komnenos, born in 1169 and crowned co-emperor in 1171" who "succeeded his father, Manuel I, in 1180" (Nesbitt and Cécile 2009, 184). And despite the seal's supplication to Jesus Christ, Alexios' "short, troubled reign ended in the autumn of 1183 when he was strangled following the elevation of Anrdonikos Komnenos, a cousin of Manuel I, to the position of co-emperor" (Nesbitt and Cécile 2009, 184).

Lastly, a Late Byzantine seal "dated [by A. Wassiliou-Seibt] either to the 13<sup>th</sup> or the 14<sup>th</sup> century" contains "on the front the archangel Michael" and a sentence on the back (Rhoby 2011 68; brackets mine). The sentence reads:

Ἀρχιστράτηγε ταγμάτων οὐρανίων / Ἀνδρόνικον σκέποις με τὸν βασιλέα

First commander of the heavenly brigades, protect [i.e., *skepois*, "cover"] the emperor  
Andronicus  
(Rhoby 2011, 68; Rhoby's translation, brackets mine)

The first phrase of the above seal, "first attested in a hymnus of Romanos Melodos", refers to (or is ascribed to) the Archangel Michael and the second phrase of the same seal "means that Andronikos II, III or even IV could possibly have been the emperor in question" (Rhoby 2011, 67–68). But regardless of whichever Andronikos is being referred to, the seal *unambiguously parallels the divine (ierakon) with the secular (thyrathen) while acknowledging and treating the former as superior to the latter by imploring the power of God's holy defender to extend his guardianship to the king*. Such a compelling series of symbols and text expressed on and through a non-discursive metallic slate altogether embodying the reality of mediums of portable

protection defies *in se* any one-dimensionalization of said series as either expressing superficial deference to the emperor or expressing vacuous sycophancy.

12th century AD: Theodore Prodromos' Poetry

The 12th-century Greek poet Theodore Prodromos composed the following regarding the Emperor Manuel Komnenos (reign: 1143–1180 AD) in his *Ptochoprodromika Poiēmata*

(*Πτωχοπροδρομικά Ποιήματα*, “Poor-Forerunner Poems”):

Ὦ τῆς χριστομιμήτου σου σοφῆς μακροθυμίας!  
Ὅντως τυγχάνεις Μανουήλ, θεὸς τοῖς ἐπιγείοις  
ὃ Μανουήλ παμβασιλεῦ καὶ γόνε τῆς πορφύρας,  
καὶ γάρ ἡ κλήσις ἄνωθεν ἐδόθη φερωνύμως.  
Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὁ δοῦλος σου ὡς ἔχουσι προσλέγω.

(*Ποιήμα Δ'*, 353–357 ἐν Βαρμάζης, Κατσάρου καὶ Μαυρόπουλου 2020, 186)

Oh, how great is your Christ-like wisdom and magnanimity!  
Verily thou happen to be Manuel, god upon the earth  
oh Manuel king-of-all and child of the royal purple,  
for, indeed, your calling was granted to thee from above reflecting your namesake.  
And I, your servant, say these things to thee as they are.

(*Poem IV*, 353–357 in Barmazēs, Katsaros and Maupoulos 2020, 186; English translation mine)

According to the above stanza, Theodore Prodromos refers to himself as a *doulos* ("servant") and expresses flattery, or at least exhibits a pro-monarchical tone, towards the emperor through his use of the Greek epithets *christomimētēs* ("christ-imitator") and *pambasileus* ("king-of-all").

Both epithets are not Prodromos' coinages since the former term appears in a 9th-century Byzantine poem dedicated to the emperor Basil I ("τῷ χριστομιμήτῳ", Line 119 in Markopoulos 1992, 231) and the latter term appears, as this section will later show, in Aristotle's *Politics*. But flattery aside, the presence and use of *christomimētēs* in the 12th-century *Poor-Forerunner Poems* complements and supports Ernst Kantorowicz's analysis of "an anonymous mediaeval [Norman] author" who in around 1100 AD "had developed some curious ideas about the 'twinned' person of a king" (Kantorowicz 2016, 42; brackets mine). More specifically, *The*

*Norman Anonymous* states the following:

We have to recognize [in the king] a twin person, one descending from nature, the other from grace . . . ; one through which, by the condition of nature, he conformed with other men: another through which by the eminence of [his] deification and by the power of the sacrament [of consecration], he excelled all others. (Kantorowicz 2016, 500; Kantorowicz's ellipses and brackets)

According to Kantorowicz, the "king is the perfect impersonator of Christ on earth" for *The Norman Anonymous* and "[s]ince the king's divine model is at once God and man, the royal *christomimētēs* has to correspond to that duplication" (Kantorowicz 2016, 58; Kantorowicz's emphasis, brackets mine). As for the use of *pambasileus* in the *Poor-Forerunner Poems*, the term is derived from the *pambasileia* in Aristotle's *Politics* 3.1287a:

περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει πάντων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς. (*Πολιτικά*, 3.1287a)

but we have now to discuss what is called Absolute Monarchy, which is the monarchy under which the king governs all men according to his own will. (*Politics* 3.1287a translated by Rackham 1944)

But even if Theodore Prodromos was unfamiliar with Aristotelian theoretics, he was conscious of, and substantively connected to, Hellenism as a *living* culturo-civilizational continuum as exhibited in a later stanza where the poet regards Hippocrates of Kos as an undisputed source of medical knowledge and even goes so far as to parallel classical Greek scientists, specifically Galen and Aristotle, with the medieval Greek scientists Ioannes Zachariou (referred to in the stanza by his Roman civic title "Actuarius") and Nicholas Kallikles (see *Poem Delta*, 601–606 in Barmazēs, Katsaros and Mauropoulos 2020, 208). And for Prodromos, the Roman polity of his time was *not* the Old Roman Republic centered in the Italian city of Rome, but the New Roman Monarchy centered in Constantinople founded upon the Greek colony of Byzantium: Ρώμης τῆς νέας τῆς χρυσοῦς, τῆς Κωνσταντίνου Ρώμης, "Rome the new the golden, Constantine's Rome" (*Poem III*, 18 in Barmazēs, Katsaros and Mauropoulos 2020, 132; English translation mine). Of

course, the poet takes for granted the *translatio imperii* confirmed independently in the "so-called *Versus Romae*, an anti-Roman poem probably of the late ninth century" (Kantorowicz 2016, 82; Kantorowicz's emphasis). The following excerpt from the aforesaid poem is clear:

Deseruere tui tanto te tempore reges, [Roma,]  
Cessit et ad Graecos nomen honosque tuus. [...]  
Constaninopolis florens nova Roma vocatur:  
Moribus et muris, Roma vetusta, cadis.  
(Traube 1896, 555–556 and Hammer 1944, 54; brackets mine)

'Thine emperors have, so long ago, deserted thee, Roma,  
And to the Greeks there has vanished thy honor and name . . .  
Flowering Constantinople is now styled the newer Roma,  
Moral and mural collapse is, ancient Roma, thy lot.'  
(Kantorowicz 2016, 82; Kantorowicz's ellipses)

And if the *Versus Romae* constitutes insufficient evidence, then another independent and unambiguous confirmation of the same *translatio imperii* can be found in the *Chronicon* of 14th-century Welsh historian, Adam Usk:

O Deus!, quam dolenter jam ecclesia duobus, et imperium tribus, presidentibus mutuis se infestant et devastant cladibus. Et presertin Grecorum, ex genere Constantini magni, Brutonum regis, et Sancte Elene filii radicatum, imperium, per ipsum a Romanis in Grecos et demum a Grecis per Stephanum papam in Germanos translatum, Turcis et Tartaris noscitur desolatum. ("A.D. 1403" in Thomson 1904, 77)

My God!, how grievously are church and empire harassed and laid waste with internecine slaughters, the one with two, the other with three rulers. And specially that empire of the Greeks—founded by the race of the great Constantine, who ruled in Britain, the son of the holy Helena, and first by him transferred from the Romans to the Greeks, and lastly by pope Stephen from the Greeks to the Germans—is now, as all men know, laid waste by Turks and Tatars. ("A.D. 1403" in Thomson 1904, 246)

### 13th century AD: Niketas Choniates' Oration to Theodore Laskaris

In 1206 AD, Niketas Choniates made a speech directed to the Nicaean emperor Theodore Laskaris "celebrat[ing] [...] Laskaris' resistance against the Latins and his victory over David Komnenos, brother of the ruler of Trebizond Alexios I, at Bithynia and Paphlagonia" in 1205 AD

(Chryssis 2019, 255; brackets mine). According to Nikolaos G. Chrissis, "[a] significant part of the oration is dedicated to praising Theodore for winning over the allegiance of the soldiers of Trebizond" and "stresses that Theodore accepted their 'return' eagerly, instead of punishing them for not heeding his calls" (Chryssis 2019, 255–256; brackets mine). Chryssis quotes and translates the following passage from Choniates' oration arguing that Laskaris' clemency was exercised "precisely because [the soldiers of Trebizond] were part of his own people, over whom he had been appointed to rule" (Chryssis 2019, 256; brackets mine):

You have shown mercy [to them], as your allotted portion, both ancient and powerful, and a crucial part – which ought not to be rejected – of the people under your authority; you do not look at how they became apostates, but you are glad that they [eventually] recognised their sovereign and understood the fraud to which they had previously given themselves (Chryssis 2019, 256; Chryssis' brackets)

For Chryssis, Choniates' oration overall contains "elements of what can be called proto-nationalism" (Chryssis 2019, 255). Moreover, the author concludes from the above passage that the soldiers of Trebizond "as members of the flock, therefore, is not the result of their subjection to the emperor's rule, but rather the opposite: because they are considered to be Romans too, they ought to be subject to the emperor" (Chryssis 2019, 256). Proto-nationalism, however, is not what Choniates is expressing. Instead, the orator is conveying a galvanized continuation of an existing Byzantine elect nationhood where the *Romaíoi* (used synonymously with *Hellenes*) are a nation (*genos/ethnos/phyle*), not proto-nation-state, of Christian Greeks beholden to God through the Roman emperor whose *powers of clemency, per divine mimesis, is already part of the traditional repertoire of Greek kingship and good rulership*. The people as a flock, lost or found, is *one* component and not *the* component in the paradigm of the *Good Shepherd*, a Greek cultural motif (e.g., *Hermes Kriophoros*, Ερμής Κριοφόρος, "Hermes the Ram-Bearer/Calf-Bearer") the true and ultimate version of which being *Jesus Christ the Son of God, Holy Redeemer* that the

emperor imitates per a pre-existing and, by Laskaris' time, long-standing tradition of kingship.<sup>37</sup> This is shown in Choniates' choice of terminology with respect to reflecting the relationship between Laskaris and his people (e.g., *πραότητι πνεύματος*, *praotēti pneumatōs*, "gentle spirit"), as well as the relationship between Laskaris and Choniates himself (e.g., "θεσπέσιε βασιλεῦ", *thespesie basileu*, "divine king") (see Choniates' "ΛΟΓΟΣ ΙΔ" in van Dieten 1973, 143).

### 13th century AD: Nikephoros Blemmydes' *The Statue of a King*

In circa 1250 AD, Nikephoros Blemmydes composed a "treatise on monarchy, addressed to his pupil Theodore Lascaris II (who reigned in Nicaea from 1254 to 1258), [and] is entitled 'The Statue of a King' (in the Greek, *Andrias Basilikos*)" (Barker 1957, 152–153; Barker's emphasis, brackets mine). In the text, the author defines monarchy as follows:

'It is first of all necessary to offer a definition of kingship. Kingship is the immovable foundation of a people, a foundation not exhibiting, in hypocrisy and deceit, deeds which are contrary to its nature, and not contradicting in any way its own high name. How can the king be justly termed a basis and foundation [of his people] if he falls into irrational desires and is the victim of disorderly and unseemly passions? Instead of being a foundation, he becomes the author of confusion and hindrance; for he is by his nature a model, and as such he is followed by his subjects, who are compelled and naturally endeavour to imitate his ways. So what befits a king is, first of all, that he should be king and master of himself, and, next to that, that he should be king of all his people; for how can a man who is not able to manage the one concern of his own household be truly called, with any justice, the autocrat [which literally means 'the self-ruler'] of cities and peoples? (Barker 1957, 92, Barker's brackets and emphasis; Barker's brackets)

So according to Blemmydes, a monarch is defined by *the principle of political self-governance existing and operating as a paragon for subjects to emulate thus extending the delimitations of the monarch's self-governance and justifying the monarch's rule over his subjects*. But what makes a king a "master of himself" and thus worthy to rule over others? According to Blemmydes, it is his *rational faculties*:

What beseems a king above all is [to use] the rational remedy (which is like that

given to Odysseus by Hermes) consisting in the wisdom of reason; a remedy potent against the unbridled force of pleasure, even as the herb called Moly was potent in the story. Nay, it also becomes a king to use the two-edged sword [with which Odysseus threatened and overcame Circe], the sword which, with the aid of wise counsel, divides the good from the bad. . . . Indeed it becomes the king not only to keep himself free and safeguarded from all pleasures, but also to liberate others, both by word and example, and to listen constantly to holy hymns. (Barker 1957, 155–156; Barker's ellipses and brackets)

Essentially, a monarch is a monarch *via his possession and use of reason to protect himself and liberate others against the destructiveness of human vices.*

13th century AD: George Akropolites' Funeral Oration to John III Vatatzes

In 1254 AD, George Akropolites delivered the following speech at the funeral of John III Vatatzes (reign: 1222–1254 AD) who was the emperor of the Nicaean state originally established in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade when the Latins captured Constantinople in 1204 AD:

'It was not from riding or archery or other such exercises . . . that the emperor [John III] first set out on his way: those were things which he had long reckoned as toys, even if they were practised to the point of perfection. It was from lectures and books and the study of philosophy itself: it was from studies and the highest knowledge of the nature of being. When that happens, the truth of the old saying must needs be seen—the saying of one of the wise men of old—that states will have rest from their evils, and be compassed about with blessings, when kings become philosophers or philosophers become kings. In him both of these things were realized; he was a king, and he pursued philosophy to the heights; he sought to become a philosopher, and he became all the greater as king. Do you not see for yourselves that he was even more eminent than the Agamemnon of Homer, who is described as being like Zeus the Thunderer in his look and his countenance . . .? For myself I would not say that he was like a king among men: I would rather hesitate, in the manner of the Delphic priestess, whether to call him God or man. But the alternative that carries the day with me is to say that he had the nature, and bore the name, of a god. By his love of philosophy he showed himself god-like—as by his birth he showed himself a king, by his nature he showed himself strong, by his virtue he showed himself brave, and by his management of affairs he showed himself the best among us all.' (Barker 1957, 160; Barker's ellipses and brackets)

According to the above oration, Akropolites pays his respects to Vatatzes by paralleling the emperor to great figures from Greek epic and mythology (i.e., "Agamenon of Homer", "Zeus the

Thunderer") so as to render him superior to said figures. More importantly, the author draws from Plato's paradigm of kingship whereby Vatatzes *is*, or rather *became*, a philosopher-king through his pursuit of philosophy *as* king (despite the fact that Vatatzes' rule historically existed before the restoration of the Eastern Roman polity in 1261 AD when the Nicaean Greeks reclaimed Constantinople).

13th/14th century AD: Theodore Metochites' Miscellanea

In the 13th/14th-century, the Christian Greek scholar Theodore Metochites composed the *Hypomnēmatismoi*, or *Miscellanea*, that falls under the category of Byzantine political theory. According to Ernest Barker, Metochites "served under the emperor Andronicus II from 1290 onwards, attaining the dignity of Grand Logothete, and was a member of a literary circle which included, among others, Thomas Magister" (Barker 1957, 173). He later "retired into a monastery in Constantinople" upon "the death of Andronicus in 1328" (Barker 1957, 173). In the *Hypomnēmatismoi*, Metochites defines kingship as follows:

The best constitution is a monarchy, under a king; a monarchy governing according to law, and exercising a paternal authority which is also an authority to issue commands and is subject to no responsibility. [...] Moreover, under a single person, the divine laws of our Christian religion, which includes in its perfect wisdom both things divine and things human, will also best keep their place and their effective power. (Barker 1957, 176; brackets mine)

One can argue that Methochites is contradicting himself in the above passage. How exactly can a monarchy be the greatest of body-politics if the king "govern[s] according to law" yet "is subject to no responsibility"? More importantly, how does one reconcile the idea of a monarch ruling in adherence to laws and yet simultaneously not being bound by them? The answer, if any, is that the king *is* the law similar (though unidentical) to Thomas Hobbes' *Sovereign*:

This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak

more reverently) of that *Mortal God* to which we owe, under the *Immortal God*, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that by terror thereof he is enabled to conform the will of them all to peace at home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the commonwealth, which (to define it) is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence. And he that carrieth this person is called SOVEREIGN, and Sovereign, and said to have Sovereign Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT. (*Leviathan* XVII.13–14 in Curley 1994, 109; Hobbes' emphasis)

The difference, however, between the Hobbesian *sovereign-as-leviathan* and the Christian Greek *basileus-as-politeia* is that the former is based on the reality that the *state of nature is the state of war* whereas the latter is predicated on the reality that the *state of nature is the state of justice* (i.e., the soul as foundation of Byzantine state and society per Fotiou 1985, 21). For Hobbes, "[f]orce and fraud are in [the state of] war the two cardinal virtues" (*Leviathan* XIII.13 in Curley 1994, 78; brackets mine) respectively echoing Machiavelli's lion, embodying strength, and Machiavelli's fox, embodying cunning, in *The Prince* (see Machiavelli 1998, 69) both derived from, or influenced by, stock characters in the Aesopic tradition (see Lukes 2001, 567ff). In the state of justice (*dikē*), however, the cardinal virtues (*aretē*), both as principles (*archē*) and as practices (*phronēsis*), are wisdom (*sophia*), temperance (*sophrosyne*), and courage (*andreia*) all of which seek harmony (*harmonia*). And if the aforesaid difference constitutes a false assessment, then one can at least distinguish the *sovereign-as-leviathan* and the *basileus-as-politeia* on historical grounds whereby the former arose in the milieu of England's 17th-century civil wars whereas the latter emerged in the context of Emperor Constantine's *translatio imperii* embodying the culmination of processes going as far back as Alexandrian antiquity (for said processes, see historical facts covered in this dissertation's Introduction, pages 13–16). Returning to Metochites, the author bluntly justifies his conceptualization of, and support for, kingship via the benefits that

monarchy provides to the citizenry:

Moreover, as concerns the subjects of a monarchy, they can obey a single person more easily than they can a number: they will by his means, I hold, have some one standard of judgment and conduct in consonance with which they can guide and steer their action. This is something they could no longer do if they had many rulers. They could not in that case be moulded into the likeness of the many: they could not share their numerous and various attributes [...]; they could not receive all the different dyes, colours, and designs of their various ways of life. . . . With a king it is different [...]: he sits on high as a judge of good actions like an umpire at the games, and he awards the prizes due to such actions. (Barker 1957, 176; unbracketed ellipses Barker's, bracketed ellipses mine)

Of note are Metochites' negative views of Genoese democracy, which are very similar to Plato's negative views of Athenian democracy:

The defects of democracy can not only be illustrated by a mass of evidence from ancient history: we can also find a number of modern instances. There are many cities in Italy now living under democratic government which suffer from the diseases that, as I have argued, attend on such constitutions. No small measure of confirmation and proof is afforded at the present time by the city of Genoa, which is vexed by sedition, and internally divided, in consequence of the defects of its civic body. It is exposed to extreme danger, which threatens it with utter destruction and decay beyond the reach of all medical skill and power [...] It has to its credit astonishing victories over its enemies, which can challenge comparison with those of antiquity; but it is none the less in evil case owing to its extreme system of democracy and to the irrational, illimitable, and inopportune spirit of self-seeking and cult of liberty which reigns among all its members. The conduct of public affairs shows itself at its worst in their unbridled ambition and contentiousness, and their thoughtlessness and heedlessness of all the requirements of the common weal. But they also suffer individually, and in their private lives, to a disgraceful and dangerous degree—the good at the hands of the bad; those who are eminent from those who are of no standing; and those who are sage and dexterous in all things from those who are utterly ignorant of all matters whether public or private. They have neither associations with one another—those sure covenants and compacts that unite men by general human bonds—nor any with their neighbours, or with any other communities [...] with which they have common dealings and some occasion for intercourse and co-operation. (Barker 1957, 175; brackets mine)

According to Ernest Barker, the above opposition to "[t]he 'democracy' of Genoa seems to be a figment of [Metochites'] imagination" since the Republic of Genoa's "power lay in the hands of a number of noble families, such as the Dorias and the Grimaldi" (Barker 1957, 175; brackets

mine). Whether or not Metochites erred in his analysis of Genoese republicanism, the fact remains that he historically treated democracy, both direct and indirect, as the *polar opposite of monarchy* or at least as a type of body-politic that must be avoided because of its *innate civic defectiveness or proclivities towards civic defectiveness*. And if monarchy and democracy are mutually exclusive, then it is fair to infer that Metochites would have ultimately deemed *any conceptualization of monarchical republicanism as oxymoronic*.

#### 14th century AD: Manuel Philes' Beggar Poetry

Emperorship appears in non-elite Byzantine poetry, specifically beggar poetry composed in the Greek vernacular (*ρωμείκα-γραικικά, romeíka-graikiká*). In an excerpt from his *Begging the King for Winter Clothes*, the 14th-century Greek poet Manuel Philes composed the following lines that, as the title reveals, express a need for garments via a poetic supplication appealing to the emperor's beneficence:

Αὐτοκράτορ μέγιστε, δεῖ δὴ μοι σκέπης·  
καὶ γὰρ ὁ χιτῶν ἐκτριβείς διεθρύβη,  
καὶ θριξ̄ λεοντῆς εὐγενῶς κεκαρμένη  
χειμῶνος ἡμῖν συσταλεῖσιν ἐφθάρη.  
(Trypanis 1964, 50)

Greatest Emperor, I certainly do need a cover ·  
for, indeed, my chiton [i.e., tunic] is threadbare and full of holes,  
and even the hair of the lion mane that was skillfully shorn  
is worn out for me who cowers from the winter cold.  
(English translation mine, brackets mine)

#### 15th century AD: Mazaris' Journey to Hades

Byzantine emperorship appears in the *Journey to Hades* composed by Mazaris, a Greek satirist from the early 15th-century AD. According to Lynda Garland, the *Journey to Hades*, "written between January 1414 and October 1415", constitutes "[o]ne of the last major works of

Byzantine learned humor" and "purports to consist of a satirical attack by an author called Mazaris on his colleagues and contemporaries in the imperial service, who either have recently died or are still in office" (Garland 2007, 183; brackets mine). In it, Mazaris ascribed the following favorable epithets to the Eastern Roman monarch: *theiotatou* ("Most Divine"), *gennaiotatou* ("Most Courageous"), and *hypsēlotatou* ("Most High") (Mazaris 1975 [1414–1415], 80: "Τοῦ θειοτάτου καὶ γενναιοτάτου καὶ μάλα ὑψηλοτάτου αὐτοκράτορος").

### 15th century AD: John Argyropoulos' On Kingship

John Argyropoulos was "a philologist, teacher, and humanist from Constantinople" who wrote the *Basilikos e peri basileias* (Βασιλικός η περί βασιλείας, "On Kingship") "and gave this text as a speech to Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos (1448–1453)" (Prinzing and Ruickbie 2023, 123; see also Giannouli 2013, 217). Said speech was made after Constantine XI "had travelled from his coronation in Mistras to Constantinople, arriving there on 12 March 1449" (Prinzing and Ruickbie 2023, 123; brackets mine). For context, Mistras was a "fortress and city in the Peloponnesos" serving as the "capital of the despotate of Morea" (Gregory and Ševčenko 1991, 1382) where "[a]ccording to the memoirs of [the Greek historian] George Sphrantzes, [...] Constantine XI was crowned emperor [...] on the 6th of January 1449" (Giannouli 2013, 217–218; brackets mine; on Sphrantzes' background, see Talbot 1991c, 1937). The following is a useful synopsis of Argyropoulos' "On Kingship" offered by Antonia Giannouli:

As an expert in ancient Greek philosophy, Argyropoulos opens his oration with a philosophical consideration of kingship, praising it as the best political system and setting forth its advantages. This first part occupies almost half of the roughly 390 lines of the text and corresponds to the second half of the title of the speech: "On kingship". In the next part, Argyropoulos explicitly addresses an *andrias* to the emperor, an image of the ideal king, expressing the wish that it will serve as a model for the emperor. Emphasis is laid on the imitation of God in terms of charity and magnanimity and on the four cardinal virtues. This second part, which has a

deliberative aim, occupies more than one third of the oration. In the final, shorter part, Argyropoulos admits that the present circumstances oblige him to be brief, and for this reason he will depict the critical political reality without embellishing it. He deplores the fact that the Greek people, deprived of territories, sea, towns, money and every resource, without allies and friends, are now afraid of losing this one City, the hearth (*hestia*) and refuge of their race. But, as he painfully emphasises, the worst thing of all is the internal conflict and hatred—purportedly, in the name of a faith and piety inherited from their ancestors. Meanwhile, there is an urgent need for an alliance with the West, in order to combat the danger of the invading Turks. Thus, he concludes with an old proverb, which goes back to Theokritos, wishing the emperor good luck in hazarding a last move to ensure the freedom of the Greeks. Argyropoulos points back to the encomiastic way in which the emperor is addressed as *rex ex machina* at the beginning of his oration. (Giannouli 2013, 219; Giannouli's emphasis)

## APPENDIX V – CHERSON: GREEK DEMOCRACY UNDER ROMAN MONARCHY

The history of Cherson (Χερσών) is interesting not only because Justinian II was exiled there but because the ancient Greek *polis* serves as a lens through which to see the subject of the Byzantine *oikoumene's* sovereignty at work (see map of "tenth-century Byzantine geopolitics" in Papadopoulos 2016, 146). According to Andreas N. Stratos, "Cherson, which originally was named Chersonesos, was an old colony of Megara" (Stratos 1985, 103). Megarans "at first occupied and colonised Heracleia which lay on the Black Sea in Asia Minor" but "the city fell under the authority of the aristocrats who deported the democrats" in 559 BC (Stratos 1985, 103). Said democrats "found refuge in Crimea where they built and colonised Cherson [...] near contemporary Sebastoupolis" (Stratos 1980, 103; brackets mine). In the 2nd century AD, Cherson was "a part of Roman Lower Moesia" with Christianity later being "firmly established there by the beginning of the 4th [century AD]" (Papadakis and Pritsak 1991, 418; brackets mine). It was in the 8th century AD that the ancient Greek colony fell "under the rule of a Khazar governor (*tudun*)" though "Byz[antine] rule was reestablished by Emp[eror] Theophilos who, ca.832, created the theme of Klimata" (Papadakis and Pritsak 1991, 418–419; Papadakis and Pritsak's emphasis, brackets mine). The following passage from Stratos highlights the distinction between *political administration* and *political sovereignty* where the Chersonites were *democratic insofar as their polis was subject to the power of the (New) Roman monarchy*:

The inhabitants of Cherson, though subject to Constantinople, had preserved their old customs on the basis of which they administered their affairs. Due to the privileges which Constantine the Great and Diocletian had granted to the city because of the assistance Cherson offered during the war against the Bosphorus and Sarmata, the administrative system was purely democratic. Thus, the Chersonites preserved the

democratic traditions of ancient Greece. Three hundred notables, elected yearly and headed by the "*primus*", governed the region. Cherson was a flourishing merchant city with a great trading activity because of its geographical position. (Stratos 1980, 103; Stratos' emphasis; see also Papadopoulos 2016, 153)

To Stratos' point, the Chersonites according to Constantine Porphyrogennitos "*willingly obeyed the words of the emperor*" when "the emperor Diocletian [...] sent [word] to the Chersonites bidding them to join him in the war and to go and plunder the country of the Bosphorians and Sarmatians and take their families captive" (*De Administrando Imperio*, 53 in Moravcsik and Jenkins 1967, 258–259; Jenkins' translation; brackets and emphasis mine). But Porphyrogennitos makes clear what can happen if the Chersonites were to *disobey the emperor*: "If ever the men of the city of Cherson revolt or decide to act contrary to the imperial mandates, then all Chersonite ships at Constantinople must be impounded with their cargoes, and Chersonite sailors and passengers must be arrested and confined in the gaols" (*De Administrando Imperio*, 53 in Moravcsik and Jenkins 1967, 286–287; Jenkins' translation). Proponents of the *critical view*, however, will state that "[t]he populations of [...], Athens and Cherson, had attacked and even killed regional governors in the 10<sup>th</sup> century when they deemed them overbearing" with the "people demonstrat[ing] a capacity to mobilize manpower for the defense of local interests" (Krallis 2018, 20; brackets mine). Focusing on Cherson, the *critical view* draws specifically from Theophanes' *Chronographia* (see Krallis 2018, 20, footnote 26). But said view reifies Theophanes by reading a *demos* into *Chersonos oikētores* (Χερσῶνος οἰκήτορες, "Chersonite dwellers"), a phrase that refers to *all the inhabitants of Cherson regardless of socio-political status and not popular agents of the sovereign or factional variety* (see Theophanis Continuati Lib. VI, 360.15 in Bekkeri 1838). And so Cherson's history renders anachronistic notions and narratives that monarchical republicanism was a current in Byzantine politics since the colony's history is *one of democracy beholden to monarchy rather than monarchy beholden to democracy*.

## ENDNOTES

1. *Culture* is defined by Walter Goldschmidt as "the shared perceptions of the world of nature and of man which organizes every facet of his actions" where "[e]ach community has its own peculiar and highly elaborate set of perceptions" that are "transmitted by a process of teaching/learning, precept/imitation to infants as they enter the community" (Goldschmidt 1978, 6). And though "the process [of cultural transmission] is entirely different in kind from genetic transmission, it shares with it the fact that much is transmitted directly from parents to offspring" (Goldschmidt 1978, 6; brackets mine). For Goldschmidt, "we cannot understand culture without taking cognizance of the underlying biology and psychodynamics of man" with the author "not[ing] three elements that are part of man's heritage: his dexterity, his capacity for speech, and his ancient biological drive for self-preservation" (Goldschmidt 1978, 7; brackets mine). For example, "[a]daptive flexibility is a very important attribute of human behavior, a necessary condition to make culture possible" though "underlying these adaptive acts is a strong uniformity enforced by biological imperatives, placing limits on the possible and creating special tensions when these limits are approached or transcended" (Goldschmidt 1978, 7). Ultimately, "[c]ultures [...] build upon certain central elements of a biological directive peculiar to an animal with the unique capacity for defining his world—physical, social, and sentimental" (Goldschmidt 1978, 7; brackets mine). Goldschmidt's definition of *culture* overlaps with Patricia Cone's definition of *tribe* as "a species of that genus of societies which create all or most of their social roles by ascribing social importance to biological characteristics, or in other words societies ordered with reference to kinship, sex

and age" (Cone 1986, 48). In a tribe or tribal society, "all typically share the same language, culture and religion" (Cone 1986, 49). For Walter Pohl, Crone's definition of *tribe* "goes beyond the notion of common descent that is a defining feature of *ethnicity*" (Pohl 2012, 11; emphasis mine). Specifically, "[a]n ethnic group may very well regard itself as united by ties of blood without specifying who is related to whom in what way" whereas "[t]ribal systems tend to be constructed much more thoroughly according to genealogical principles, in which families, clans, lineages, subtribes, tribes and groups of tribes are related to each other in a complicated web of kinship" (Pohl 2012, 11; brackets mine). On a sidenote, Goldschmitt's three elements are complemented by the anthropic ability to think recursively, which for Michael C. Corballis "is the primary characteristic that distinguishes the human mind from that of other animals" (Corballis 2011, 1). According to Corballis, the *recursive mind* "underlies our ability not only to reflect upon our own minds, but also to simulate the minds of others"; it "is also the main ingredient distinguishing human language from all other forms of animal communication" (Corballis 2011, 1). Corballis' *recursive mind*, however, has a precedent in Aristotle regarding the Prime Unmoved Mover where God's divine mind is a "thinking of thinking thinking" (*Metaphysics* XII: "νόησις νοήσεως νόησις"; translation mine). That the anthropic recursive mind is *like* God's noesis noeseos noesis is interestingly evidence, if not proof, that man is divinely inspired or a reflection of the divine.

2. According to Milton V. Anastos, the *Letter of Aristeas* is "more properly described as a treatise or monograph" that contains "a lengthy and largely fictitious explanation of how a group of 72 scholars [...] produced the Greek translation of the Old Testament" (Anastos 1978, 22; brackets mine).
3. According to E. B. Fryde, "[Flavio] Biondo was primarily concerned with the Christian West

and he dealt with crusades and other western activities in the eastern Mediterranean in a very biased fashion" (Fryde 1983, 8; brackets mine). In his *Decades*, Biondo "was particularly unfair to the Byzantines [...] reach[ing] monstrous extremes" where "he says nothing about the sack of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade in 1204, but simply remarks that the crusaders 'pacified' the Byzantine capital" (Fryde 1983, 8–9; brackets mine). Other Renaissance scholars were less caustic towards the Eastern Roman polity such as "Lorenzo de Monacis [who] tempers somewhat the fiercely anti-Byzantine bias of his Venetian sources by incorporating a few details from the long eye-witness report of the capture of Constantinople by Nicetas Choniates" (Fryde 1983, 9; brackets mine).

4. In his 1995 publication titled *The Construction of Social Reality*, John R. Searle defines a *social fact* as "any fact involving collective intentionality" (e.g., "the fact that two people are going for a walk together") (Searle 1995, 26). As for *brute facts*, the author defines them as facts that "exist quite independently of language or of any other institution" (e.g., "the fact that there is a certain distance between the earth and the sun"). (Searle 1995, 27). Whether beknownst or unbeknownst to Searle, social facts echo Heraclitus' *Doctrine of Cosmic Flux* (i.e., change is constant) since they are based on the universal reality of *dynamics* (e.g., Plato's *sensible realm*, Aristotle's *pros ti* or "towards what") and brute facts echo Parmenides' *Doctrine of Being* (i.e., change is an illusion) since they are based on the universal reality of *givens* (e.g., Plato's *intelligible realm*, Aristotle's *ousia* or "substance"). But even social facts, however dynamic, are governed by the *given of anthropic self-and-shared consciousness*. Ultimately, social and brute facts are, at least substantively, interrelated (i.e., *socio-brute enmeshment*) since anthropic lifeways are neither limited to the sum of social realities (*nomos*) nor limited to the sum of brute realities (*phusis*).

5. McLean also states that "[n]otwithstanding attempts to discourage a cult of a living emperor, altars and temples were also set up to Tiberius in the east" where "[d]uring his lifetime, he was hailed as 'God,' 'the greatest of gods,' and the 'benefactor and savior of the whole universe'" (McLean 2002, 338; brackets mine). As for Caligula, he "did not [...] impose his worship throughout the empire; however, there was a cult of Caligula in Miletos and in the province of Asia, as there may also have been in Rome" (McLean 2002, 338; brackets mine). And "[n]either Claudius nor Nero were worshipped as gods during their lifetime; but after the death of Claudius, Nero had the Senate institute the rather short-lived cult of *divus Claudius* in Rome" (McLean 2002, 338; McLean's emphasis, brackets mine). Lastly, "[f]rom Vespasian onward, it was customary to deify only deceased emperors, with the notable exception of Domitian, who demanded to be addressed as 'lord and god'" (McLean 2002, 338; brackets mine).
6. Proponents of the *critical view* of the Eastern Roman polity also present evidence from Greek primaries that, for them, broadly shows *Byzantine political horizontality* overlapping variations of which entail *popular sovereignty* and *popular rebellions*. Starting with Anthony Kaldellis, the evidence he presents includes: 1) Syrianos' military manual where the Eastern Roman polity "is imagined as the whole of society under the ideal aspect of the common good, and not independently of the institutions of the state" and "does not view the elements of the *politeia* as constituting a self-standing world of private interests (a 'civil society') over which 'the state' is imposed as a regulatory agency", 2) "the long accession-speech attributed to [Emperor Justin II] by the court poet Corippus" where the emperor "compares the *imperium Romanum* to a single [human] body" where "[i]ts head is the emperor, the senators are the breast and arms, the lower orders are the feet [...], and the treasury is the stomach", 3)

the agricultural treatise of Emperor Constantine VII (i.e., *Geoponika*) where Byzantium is treated as a tri-partite polity consisting of soldiers, agriculturalists and priests, 4) the 11th-century Greek historian Michael Attaleiates "conced[ing] that craftsmen and workmen (βάνανσοι) also contributed useful things to the *politeia*", and 5) the *Taktika* of Emperor Leo VI treating "military science [as] an essential element of the 'affairs of the *politeia*'" (Kaldellis 2015, 16–17; Kaldellis' emphasis, brackets mine). Although the evidence appears compelling, the Byzantine authors cited by Kaldellis are *not* drawing from the wellspring of popular sovereignty, be it in theory or in practice. Instead, the aforesaid authors are *taking for granted or operating within political elements derived from Platonism*. That Syrianos equates his Eastern Roman polity to the "whole of society" does not mean that he equates it with a *demos qua demos*, or something akin to a Sieyèsian "Third Estate", since "the ideal aspect of the common good" is *the point of Plato's political theory* (i.e., a just society is one where harmony exists between the classes), which is hostile to, or at least critical of, democracy. And that Michael Attaleiates historically recognized the contributions of craftsmen, or workmen, neither illustrates nor proves any concession to the Byzantine equivalent of an *omnis populus*. Rather, Attaleiates' *recognition of production* is at least similar to Plato *acknowledging the producers' value in providing for the material needs of the entire polity*. As for the other Byzantine authors (i.e., Michael Attaleiates and emperors Justin II, Constantine VII, and Leo VI), they are, either in part or in whole, alluding to, appealing to, or echoing the tripartite nature of Plato's *body-politic* where the ideal state *is* the ideal soul. And when Leo VI speaks of military science existing and operating for the '*affairs of the politeia*', he is, whether unbeknownst to him or not, the soldiers of Plato's guardian class whose purpose *is* to protect the polity and not merely defend a single section

of it. Another proponent of the *critical view* of the Eastern Roman polity is Dimitris Krallis who offers examples of *popular political violence* drawn from Byzantine historical accounts:

1) "[t]he populations of two cities, Athens and Cherson, had attacked and even killed regional governors in the 10th century when they deemed them overbearing" citing Theophanes Continuatus, 2) rebellion in "Naupaktos during the reign of Konstantinos VIII, when the people killed their governor on account of his exacting ways" citing John Scylitzes, and 3) an "11th century rebellion of the people of Larissa and their Vlach neighbors explaining that the main reason for the uprising had been generalized dissatisfaction with newly imposed taxes" citing Kekaumenos (Krallis 2018, 20 and footnotes 26–28; brackets mine). For Krallis, the events indicate that "people demonstrated a capacity to mobilize manpower for the defense of local interests" (Krallis 2018, 20). Krallis' evidence overlaps with Kaldellis' reference to the Eastern Roman populace revolting against and overthrowing Emperor Michael V in 1042 AD (Kaldellis 2015, 90–94). However, evidence of political anti-verticality in the form of popular mobilizations does not *ipso facto* render said anti-verticality into a form of Byzantine political horizontality that sets the stage for, if not embodies, Byzantine republicanism or popular sovereignty. Popular rebellions in the Eastern Roman polity, even with the presence of Christian Greek nationhood, does not meet Jason Franke's threshold of a *constituent moment* nor embody Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès' *pouvoir constituant* (i.e., the people as subject of constitution-making powers). Said rebellions were, in fact, *reactions to abuses of monarchical power as opposed to proactive opposition to monarchy in se* as already illustrated with the overthrow of Michael V being triggered by his *mistreatment of the rightful queen, Zoe*. This accords with John Haldon's accurate critique of Kaldellis' *The Byzantine Republic* where despite the "frequent and violent demonstrations of

popular opposition to government in Constantinople, or [...] likewise provincial opposition and hostility to the court or to a particular ruler", it is "difficult to maintain" the essential "contention that [the aforementioned demonstrations] were genuinely popular demonstrations that reflected a bottom-up demonstration of the will of the people" (Haldon 2016, 8; brackets mine).

7. For the sake of completion and intellectual candor, it must be noted that this project's position towards the dialogue between Anthony Kaldellis and Ioannis Stouraitis (i.e., *false dilemma* or *false dichotomy*) is not new. Said position was preceded by the Orthodox Outlet for Dogmatic Enquiries, or O.O.D.E., whose anonymous Greek author(s) composed and published an online article on the history of Greek education and identity in the Eastern Roman polity. In the article, the well-read author(s) bluntly commented on the overall Kaldellis-Stouraitis dialogue as constituting "acrobatics" (ακροβασίες, see O.O.D.E. 2017). However, it must also be noted that this dissertation's author *both analyzed on his own terms and established his own conclusions* regarding the intellectual issues surrounding the aforementioned dialogue despite having previously read, or having been previously intrigued by (*with skepticism*), the O.O.D.E.'s article. Said acrobatics, to an extent, are a symptom of a larger postmodernist phenomenon criticized by 20th/21st-century Greek philosopher Kyriakos Katsimanis. The author frames his criticism by delineating what this project calls *Romanist logic* via a condensation of Clifton R. Fox's succinct historical analysis of the Byzantines, that, for Katsimanis, postmodernism has incorporated into its anti-Hellenic historiographical revisionism (Katsimanis 2012, 3). Said logic, based on Fox's "What is, if anything, a Byzantine?" (see Fox 1996 and Katsimanis 2012, footnote 1), is as follows: "1. The citizens of the Byzantine Empire until its fall, in the 15. century, were *Greek-speaking*

*Romans* and nothing else. Therefore, 2. Their consciousness was *exclusively and only Roman*" (Kastimanis 2012, 3: "1. Οι υπήκοοι της Βυζαντινής Αυτοκρατορίας ως την πτώση της, το 15. αιώνα, ήταν *ελληνόφωνοι Ρωμαίοι* και τίποτα περισσότερο. Επομένως, 2. Η συνείδησή τους ήταν *αποκλειστικά και μόνο ρωμαϊκή*"; Katsimanis' emphasis, translation mine). Katsimanis, afterwards, distinguishes his synopsis of Fox's historical analysis from the following postmodernist incorporation of said analysis: "1. *The so-called Greekness of Byzantium must be absorbed, thus, 2. The historic continuity of Hellenism constitutes a myth*" (Katsimanis 2012, 3: "1. *Η δήθεν ελληνικότητα του Βυζαντίου πρέπει να απορριφθεί, άρα, 2. Η ιστορική συνέχεια του ελληνισμού αποτελεί μύθο*"; Katsimanis' emphasis, translation mine). Katsimanis' critique aside, *Romanist logic*, like Fox's historical analysis, is *inaccurate by virtue of being reductionistic* since multiple Byzantine primaries show a *synonymity* of the Byzantine collective autonyms *Romaίοι*, *Graikoί* and *Christianoί* that semantically include, but are not semantically limited to, language-use (see APPENDIX II). To be fair, however, Fox is *partly correct* in stating that the Byzantines "regarded themselves as the authentic continuators of the Roman world: the Romans living in Romania" (Fox 1996); partly correct because the Byzantines were *also* the authentic continuators of the Greek world: Greeks living in Graikia.

8. The question "What is Hellenism?" was consistently asked in the keynote presentation of Archbishop Demetrios Trakatellis with his following responses focusing on *language*: 1) "[I]t is the use of the Greek language and, by extension, the body and culture of people who do so", 2) "It is the blessing of widespread literacy for all the people of the earth: It is God's chosen vessel for the universal spread of knowledge and wisdom, through the invention of the true alphabet by the Greeks", 3) "It is a commitment to excellence and beauty; it is a

sense of stewardship for the divine power of creativity in man starting with language", 4) "It is the world's most exceptional and engaging literature, popular in tone yet profound in meaning, a literature which through a superb language elevated to unheard of heights the human being and thus prepared the world to receive its Savior [i.e., Jesus Christ] when the fullness of time had come", 5) "It is the triumph of wonder and admiration over fear, it is the love of beauty and goodness as one entity; it is the appreciation of the potential of all humans to realize this καλοκαγαθία (*kalokagathia*) within themselves through the process of παιδεία (*paideia*)" (Trakatellis 2010, 268, 271, 273, 275, 279; Trakatellis' emphasis, brackets mine; see also Kepreotes 2012, 57; brackets mine). For Timothy Clark, "Hellenism in the context of the ancient Mediterranean refers to a very specific type of project: the effort to mark the territories of Alexander's empire with Greek literary and cultural norms" (Clark 2010, 282). Of course, Paul L. Gavrilyuk "distinguish[es] between Hellenism as a cultural descriptor, Hellenism as a tag identifying a group of people, and Hellenism as a scholarly construct" where as "a cultural descriptor, Hellenism stands for Greek language, literature, rhetoric, poetry, philosophies, religious practices, social customs, manners, dress codes, family structure, burial customs, hospitality laws, political thinking, moral convictions, and a variety of widely shared unspoken assumptions" (Gavrilyuk 2010, 329; brackets mine; see also Kepreotes 2012, 54). For the purposes of this dissertation, *Hellenism* is defined as a living nation/people, a living culture/civilization, a living language, a living body of literature, a living educational and scholarly tradition. And *Christian Hellenism* entails the fact that "the people who spread the new Christian faith in Greek lands were themselves largely of Greek background" (Kepreotes 2012, 63) overlapping with Hugo Rahner's definition of *Christian humanism* where "[a]ll the lamps of Greece [...] burn for the sun which is Christ" based on

"[t]hose Church Fathers and theologians who still preserved a feeling for the power of classical imagery" such as Clement of Alexandria (Rahner 1971, xviii–xix; brackets mine). When Rahner "speak[s] of Christian humanism", he speaks of that "wonderfully bold and widely ranging gesture of the Hellenic Christian, that gesture whereby he fetches everything home to Christ, the spring of water and the stars, his sea and his swift ships, Homer and Plato and the mystical numbers of the Pythagoreans" for "[a]ll was but a preparation—and so all can serve to make meanings plain" (Rahner 1971, xix; brackets mine).

9. John Haldon, by his own admission, is "not hostile to post-modernist thought" broadly defined as thinking that "promotes a view of *reality as itself constituted by discourse*, by language and representation" with "no extra-discursive, transcendent experiences or perceptions, no grounded theory (or 'metatheory'), to which appeal can be made in order to make comparisons about relative values and judgements" (Haldon 2016b, 5; Haldon's emphasis). Though not hostile, Haldon is, however, *critical* of post-modernism (i.e., "language fallacy") by asserting that "the historical past does possess a meaning or significance in itself (although other significances can be imposed upon it), and that the historian both discovers as well as creates significance" (Haldon 2016b, 10).
10. Due to its extensive length, the passage from Aristotle's *Politics* in the original Greek is provided here:

καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφήγηται τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν: ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον, ὧν ἑτέραν φαμὲν εἶναι ἀρετὴν, οἷον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε φύσει πλείω τὰ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνήρ παιδός, καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. [...] ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστιν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ' ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρεία ἢ δ' ὑπηρετικὴ, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. (*Πολιτικά*, 1.1260a· ἀγκύλες δικές μου)

11. Other reading approaches include: 1) *kenotextualism* (this project's coinage) meaning reading a gap, or *keno* (κενό), in a text, 2) *intertextualism* meaning texts are interconnected and read as such, and 3) *kenosynplirotextualism* (this project's coinage) meaning filling gaps (συνπλήρωση κενών, κενοσυνπλήρωση), or creating and then filling gaps, in a text with forms of misinterpretive violence such as misframings and anachronistic content. The backdrop of said approaches entails the difference between Formalism and Reader Response Theory, synopses of which are provided here for potential pedagogical purposes:

- Formalism: In *The Intentional Fallacy*, both William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley argue that "the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art" defining *intention* as "design or plan in the author's mind" (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1233). This conceptual matrix is predicated on five axioms: 1) the "designing intellect as a *cause* of a poem [does not render] the design or intention as a *standard*", 2) evidence of a poet's intention(s) lies in "the poem itself", 3) the "intention of an artificer" can only be ascertained via the function(s) of the artifact (a "poem can *be* only through its *meaning*—since its medium is words"), 4) a poem "expresses a personality or state of soul rather than a physical object" yet one "ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic *speaker*", and 5) "every author's intention is the same" even if "by revision, [the author] has better achieved his original intention" (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1233–1234; Wimsatt and Beardsley's emphasis, brackets mine). As a logical fallacy, the *Intentional Fallacy* entails a "confusion between the poem and its origins" given that the "poem is not the critic's own and not the author's [since] [...] [i]t is embodied in language, the peculiar possession of the public, and it is about the

human being, an object of public knowledge" (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1234, 1246; brackets mine). And with respect to their work *The Affective Fallacy*, the same authors define the *Affective Fallacy* as "a confusion between the poem and its results (what it is and what it *does*)" challenging "the standard of criticism [based on] the psychological effects of the poem" (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1246; Wimsatt and Beardsley's emphasis, brackets mine).

- Reader Response Theory: In his *Interaction between Text and Reader*, Wolfgang Iser states that "a literary work has two poles" where "the artistic pole is the author's text, and the aesthetic [pole] is the realization accomplished by the reader" (see Leitch et. al. 2010, 1524; brackets mine). Given its bipolarity, Iser argues that a literary work "must inevitably be virtual in character, as it cannot be reduced to the reality of the text or to the subjectivity of the reader, and it is from this virtuality that it derives its dynamism" (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1524). The virtuality of a text is predicated on R. D. Laing's "no-thing" or the invisibility of interpersonal interrelationships where "[a]ll men are invisible to one another" and "[e]xperience is man's invisibility to man" (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1525; brackets mine). Since "a text cannot adapt itself to each reader it comes into contact with" (i.e., "no *face-to-face* communication"), "[c]ommunication in literature [...] is a process set in motion and regulated, not by a given code, but by a mutually restrictive and magnifying interaction between the explicit and the implicit, between revelation and concealment" (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1525–1527; Iser's emphasis, brackets mine). Essentially, "[w]hat is concealed spurs the reader into action, but this action is also controlled by what is revealed; the explicit in its turn is transformed when the implicit has been brought to light" (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1527;

brackets mine). This dynamic of "the reader bridg[ing] the gaps" is when "communication begins" since the "gaps function as a kind of pivot on which the whole text-reader relationship revolves" (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1527; brackets mine). In his *Interpreting the Variorum*, Stanley Fish states that "formal features [in a literary work] do not exist independently of the reader's experience" and that "the reader's experience is itself the product of a set of interpretive assumptions" (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1974; brackets mine). In other words, "the reader's activities are at the center of attention, where they are regarded not as leading to meaning but as *having* meaning" since "they are at every moment settling and resettling questions of value" (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1982; Fish's emphasis). Fish rejects objections of circularity in Reader Response Theory since "the reader's experience, formal units, and the structure of intention are one, that they come into view simultaneously, and that therefore the questions of priority and independence do not arise" (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1984–1986). For Fish, "the choice is never between objectivity and interpretation but between an interpretation that is unacknowledged as such and interpretation that is at least aware of itself" that is the basis for the formation of *interpretive communities* defined by the common interpretive strategies held by readers (see Leitch et al. 2010, 1988–1992).

12. During his reign from 211 to 217 AD, Emperor Antoninus Caracalla *persecuted the Aristotelians*, or Peripatetics, decades before Emperor Diocletian divided the ancient Roman polity into Western and Eastern halves in 285 AD (see Treadgold 1997, 14, 847 on Diocletian's reign). According to Fergus Millar, Cassius Dio mentions "Caracalla abolish[ing] the communal dinners of the Aristotelian philosophers in Alexandria, and remov[ing] their other privileges, on the supposition that Aristotle had been hostile to his model, Alexander"

(Millar 1977, 505; brackets mine). Dio was hostile to Caracalla who, again according to Millar, "persecuted the Peripatetics on the grounds of their supposed part in Alexander's death" (Millar 1964, 151; see also Freyne 2004, 64–65). Caracalla was so beholden to Alexander's legacy, as both warmaster and king, that he not only mistreated the Peripatetics of his time but also organized Greek phalanxes equipped with Greek armaments from the heyday of the Macedonian Empire and went so far as to promote a "Macedonian called Antigonus the son of Philip" to the position of *inter praetorios* (Millar 1964, 151; see also Freyne 2004, 65–66). Caracalla's vision, or "pathological self-proclamation", as Alexander reborn was *non-negotiable* and caused, according to "[a] fourth century anonymous epitomiser", "'by the lies of his flatterers'" (Freyne 2004, 65 quoting Andrew F. Stewart's translation of the *Epitome de Caesaribus Sexti Aureli Victoris* in Stewart 1993, 348; brackets mine). More importantly, his decisions were *unrepublican* as they were executed without any regard for, or appeal to, Roman popular consensus directly and without any regard for, or appeal to, Roman legal norms established and approved by Roman popular consensus indirectly. Interestingly, there is no mention of the Aristotelians exercising their right to redress grievances assuming they possessed such a right as Roman citizens to begin with. The emperor's anti-Aristotelianism, based on a gross misunderstanding of the teacher-student relationship between Aristotle and Alexander, is evidently atrocious assuming the full account provided in Dio's *Roman History* is accurate:

Περὶ δὲ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον οὕτω τι ἐπτόητο ὥστε καὶ ὄπλοις τισὶ καὶ ποτηρίοις ὡς καὶ ἐκείνου γεγονόσι χρῆσθαι, καὶ προσέτι καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ πολλὰς καὶ ἐν τοῖς στρατοπέδοις καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ Ῥώμῃ στήσαι, φάλαγγά τε τινα ἐκ μόνων τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐς μυρίους καὶ ἑξακισχιλίους συντάξαι, καὶ αὐτὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τε ἐπονομάσαι καὶ τοῖς ὄπλοις οἷς ποτὲ ἐπ' ἐκείνου ἐκέχρητο ὀπλίσαι: ταῦτα δ' ἦν κράνος ὠμοβόειον, θώραξ λινοῦς τρίμιτος, ἀσπίς χαλκῆ, δόρυ μακρόν, αἰχμὴ βραχεῖα, κρηπίδες, ξίφος. καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτα μέντοι αὐτῷ ἐξήρκεσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκείνον ἔφον Αὐγούστον ἐπεκαλεῖτο, καὶ ποτε καὶ τῇ βουλῇ ἔγραψεν, ὅτι ἐς τὸ

σῶμα αὐθις τὸ τοῦ Αὐγούστου ἐσῆλθεν, ἵνα, ἐπειδὴ ὀλίγον τότε χρόνον ἐβίω, πλείονα αὐθις δι' ἐκείνου ζήσῃ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς φιλοσόφους τοὺς Ἀριστοτελείους ὠνομασμένους τὰ τε ἄλλα δεινῶς ἐμίσει, ὥστε καὶ τὰ βιβλία αὐτῶν κατακαῦσαι ἐθέλησαι, καὶ τὰ συσσίτια ἃ ἐν τῇ Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ εἶχον, τὰς τε λοιπὰς ὠφελείας ὅσας ἐκαρποῦντο, ἀφείλετο, ἐγκαλέσας σφίσιν ὅτι συναίτιος τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τοῦ θανάτου Ἀριστοτέλης γεγονέναι. (Dio 78.7.1–78.7.3 ἐν Cary και Foster 1957, 292)

He was so enthusiastic about Alexander that he used certain weapons and cups which he believed had once been his, and he also set up many likenesses of him both in the camps and in Rome itself. He organized a phalanx, composed entirely of Macedonians, sixteen thousand strong, named it "Alexander's phalanx," and equipped it with the arms that warriors had used in his day; these consisted of a helmet of raw ox-hide, a three-ply linen breastplate, a bronze shield, long pike, short spear, high boots, and sword. Not even this, however, satisfied him, but he must call his hero "the Augustus of the East"; and once he actually wrote to the senate that Alexander had come to life again in the person of the Augustus, that he might live on once more in him, having had such a short life before. Toward the philosophers who were called Aristotelians he showed bitter hatred in every way, even going so far as to desire to burn their books, and in particular he abolished their common messes in Alexandria and all the other privileges that they had enjoyed; his grievance against them was that Aristotle was supposed to have been concerned in the death of Alexander. (Dio 78.7.1–78.7.3 translated by Cary and Foster 1957, 293)

13. According to George Schwab, Carl Schmitt's conceptualization of the *state of exception*

"includes any kind of severe economic or political disturbance that requires the application of extraordinary measures" (Schmitt 2005, 1 footnote 1).

14. The original Latin address that Agamben quotes from Cicero's *Philippics* is "*tumultum*

*censeo decerni, iustitium indici, saga sumi dico oportere*"; Agamben also states that by "*saga sumere* [Cicero] means roughly that the citizens must take off their togas and prepare for combat" (Agamben 2005, 45; Agamben's emphasis, brackets mine).

15. According to Harrison Hall, there exists "a distinction between the actual truth value of a sentence (whether it is in fact true or false) and the truth conditions of a sentence (what things would have to be like in order for the sentence to be true or false)" (Hall 1982, 2).

Also, "[t]he validity of an argument has nothing to do with the truth of any of the sentences it

contains" since "[v]alidity is a matter of form and not of fact or content, of truth conditions of sentences in an argument, not of their actual truth values" (Hall 1982, 2; brackets mine). And so "[t]he only combination of actual truth and falsity that validity rules out is this: a valid argument cannot have true premises and a false conclusion" (Hall 1982, 3; brackets mine). Of course, an argument's *invalidity* also "has absolutely no connection with the truth or falsity of any sentence in an argument" for it "is entirely a matter of form and places no restrictions on the actual truth values of the sentences in an argument" (Hall 1982, 3).

16. The Chi-Rho is a symbol, consisting of the combined and overlapped Greek letters *chi* (Χ, χ) and *rho* (Ρ, ρ), was initially developed and used by Greek scribes during the Hellenistic period to denote the first two letters of the word *chrēston* ( Χρήστον, χρήστον, χρηστόν) meaning "good/useful"; the symbol was later Christianized and used to represent the first two letters of Jesus' title of *Christós* ( Χριστός, Χριστός) meaning the "Anointed One" (see de Bruyn 2017, 63, Fox 2006, 616, and manuscript no. 58 in Turner 1971, 98–99). With respect to Constantine, the Chi-Rho appears, according to Robin Lane Fox, in "spring 315, when it is shown on a silver medallion as a badge on the Emperor's helmet" (Fox 2006, 616).
17. Attempting to define *monarchical republicanism*, as important as exploring the definitions of *polity* and *nation/nationhood*, is justified per Antisthenes' maxim that the "beginning of wisdom is the investigation of names" (Meijer 2017, 52 citing Epictetus' *Dissertationes* 1.17.10: ἀρχὴ παιδείσεως ἢ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις).
18. By *demos qua demos* (δήμος ως δήμος) and *hyperlaos* (υπέρλαος), this dissertation refers to the fundamental definition of democracy offered in the Greek political pamphlet titled *The Constitution of the Athenians*. The aforesaid pamphlet was composed by Pseudo-Xenophon anytime from the 440s BC to after 400 BC (see Marr and Rhodes 2008, 31–34 for a summary

of composition dates and relevant modern scholarship including Bowersock 1966 and Mattingly 1997). According to Harold B. Mattingly, the author was "not a native Athenian" and "more likely to have been some allied oligarch, accustomed to visiting Athens from time to time, and with useful contacts there" who "may well have become an exile from his city, whether voluntarily or under Athenian pressure" (Mattingly 1997, 355). Athenian or not, Pseudo-Xenophon's definition of a democratic polity serves to distinguish it from Aristotle's other types of polity such as the *pambasileia*, or absolute monarchy, and oligarchy:

περὶ δὲ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πολιτείας, ὅτι μὲν εἴλοντο τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας οὐκ ἐπαινῶ διὰ τόδε, ὅτι ταῦθ' ἐλόμενοι εἴλοντο τοὺς πονηροὺς ἄμεινον πράττειν ἢ τοὺς χρηστούς: διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινῶ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἔδοξεν οὕτως αὐτοῖς, ὡς εὖ διασφύζονται τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τᾶλλα διαπράττονται ἃ δοκοῦσιν ἀμαρτάνειν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλησι, τοῦτ' ἀποδείξω. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτο ἐρῶ, ὅτι δικαίως <δοκοῦσιν> αὐτόθι [καὶ] οἱ πένητες καὶ ὁ δῆμος πλέον ἔχειν τῶν γενναίων καὶ τῶν πλουσίων διὰ τόδε, ὅτι ὁ δῆμός ἐστιν ὁ ἐλαύνων τὰς ναῦς καὶ ὁ τὴν δύναμιν περιτιθεὶς τῇ πόλει, καὶ οἱ κυβερνήται καὶ οἱ κελευσταὶ καὶ οἱ πεντηκόνταρχοι καὶ οἱ πρῶράται καὶ οἱ ναυπηγοί, —οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τὴν δύναμιν περιτιθέντες τῇ πόλει πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ ὀπλίται καὶ οἱ γενναῖοι καὶ οἱ χρηστοί. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶσι τῶν ἀρχῶν μετεῖναι ἔν τε τῷ κλήρω καὶ ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ, καὶ λέγειν ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν πολιτῶν. (Ψεῦδο-Ξενοφώντας. *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία*, I.1–2 in Marchant 1920; see also Marr and Rhodes 2008, 36)

But with regard to the Athenians' constitution, I do not approve of the fact that they have chosen to have this type of constitution, for the following reason, that in making their choice they have chosen that the worthless men should do better than the valuable. That is the reason why I do not approve of it. However, given that they have decided that things should be as they are, I shall demonstrate how effectively they preserve their constitution and also transact their other public business, in those respects in which the rest of the Greeks think that they act mistakenly. First of all, I will say this, that the poor and the *demos* are justified there in having more than the well-born and the rich, because of the fact that it is the *demos* who operate the ships and who confer its strength on the city; the steersmen, the boatswains, the lieutenants, the look-outs and the naval engineers – these are the people who confer its strength on the city, much more so than the hoplites and the well-born and the valuable. Since this is the case, it seems right that everyone should share in the holding of public office, both the allotted and the elective offices, and that any citizen who wishes should be allowed to have his say. (Pseudo-Xenophon. *The Constitution of the Athenians*, I.1–2 in Marr and Rhodes 2008, 37; Marr and Rhodes' translation and emphasis)

And speaking of *oligarchy*, Josiah Ober correctly notes that for Aristotle "oligarchy pertains wherever there exists a property qualification for citizenship, so that the wealthy control the state" (Ober 1989, 7 citing *Politics* 1279b17–1280a4, 1309b38–1310a2 and *Rhetoric* 1365b31–33). Specifically, Aristotle's "oligarchy is defined by birth (*genos*), wealth (*ploutos*), and education (*paideia*)" (Ober 1989, 7 citing *Politics* 1317b39–41).

19. Overlapping with the historical survey's overarching argument that Byzantium was a messy monarchy is David Hume's observations regarding the foundations of original contracts:

Almost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people. When an artful and bold man is placed at the head of an army or faction, it is often easy for him, by employing, sometimes violence, sometimes false pretences, to establish his dominion over a people a hundred times more numerous than his partizans. He allows no such open communication, that his enemies can know, with certainty, their number or force. He gives them no leisure to assemble together in a body to oppose him. Even all those, who are the instruments of his usurpation, may wish his fall; but their ignorance of each other's intention keeps them in awe, and is the sole cause of his security. By such arts as these, many governments have been established; and this is all the *original contract*, which they have to boast of. (*Essay XII: Of the Original Contract* in Miller 1987, 471; Hume's emphasis)

Hume's observations, in turn, overlap with Adrastos Omissi's *criteria of imperial usurpation*: "the first is [...] that an emperor [...] is declared while another emperor is still ruling without the express consent of that ruler; the second is [...] if they take power in the wake of an imperial assassination and can be demonstrated to have been involved in that assassination" (Omissi 2018, 34; brackets mine). Said criteria are informed by Omissi's *position on legitimacy*: "a classical concept of constitutional legitimacy—was irrelevant as concerned Roman imperial power" (e.g., "an emperor 'legitimizing himself', which is to say concreting his hold over territory and gaining acceptance of his rule") and so "[f]or the Romans, the difference between a tyrant and an emperor was a fluid one" where "[r]ulers could lose

legitimacy and they could gain it" (Omissi 2018, 34; brackets mine). Of course, Hume's observations and Omissi's criteria do not entirely encapsulate Byzantine life (see endnote 33 and Miller 1997, 8ff regarding Greco-Christian philanthropy).

20. Euphemios was the Patriarch of Constantinople from 490 to 496 AD (Cobham 1911, 91). See Every 1947, Runciman 1968 and Geanakoplos 1990 for historical surveys on the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Patriarchate's origins, accurately summarized by 20th-century Greek scholar Deno J. Geanakoplos, go back to Andrew who was one of Christ's first Apostles:

According to Matthew, Christ said to Peter: "Thou art Peter and on this rock I will build my Church." The Orthodox Church believes that this refers to Peter's *faith* and that this faith is shared by *all* bishops of the Church. Constantinople, too, claims Apostolic foundation since it is believed that the Apostle Andrew, the brother of Peter and himself "the first called" Apostle of Christ, travelled and made many conversions in the area surrounding Byzantium (the ancient Greek name for Constantinople), in parts of Greece and what is today southern Russia. After valuable missionary service, Andrew finally died a glorious martyr to the Christian faith in the Greek city of Patras (in the Peloponnesos) where he was crucified in the manner of a common criminal by order of the pagan Roman governor. Andrew is of course the patron saint of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. (Geanakoplos 1990, 2–3; Geanakoplos' emphasis)

21. The following is the equivalent Greek passage, again from Procopius, containing Empress Theodora's expressed position not to retreat in the wake of the Nika Riot:

ἡγοῦμαι δὲ τὴν φυγὴν ἔγωγε, εἴπερ ποτέ, καὶ νῦν, ἦν καὶ τὴν σωτηρίαν ἐπάγεται, ἀξύμφορον εἶναι. ἀνθρώπων μὲν γὰρ ἐς φῶς ἦκοντι τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ νεκρῶ γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον, τῷ δὲ βεβασιευκότῳ τὸ φυγάδι εἶναι οὐκ ἀνεκτόν. μὴ γὰρ ἂν γενοίμην τῆς ἀλουργίδος ταύτης χωρὶς, μηδ' ἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην βιώην, ἐν ἧ ἡμετέραισι οἱ ἐντυχόντες οὐ προσεροῦσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν σώζεσθαι σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστίν, ὃ βασιλεῦ, οὐδὲν τοῦτο πρᾶγμα. χρήματα <γάρ> τε πολλὰ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν, καὶ θάλασσα μὲν ἐκείνη, πλοῖα δὲ ταῦτα. σκόπει μέντοι μὴ διασωθέντι ζυμβήσεται σοὶ ἥδιστα ἂν τῆς σωτηρίας τὸν θάνατον ἀνταλλάξασθαι. ἐμὲ γὰρ τις καὶ παλαιὸς ἀρέσκει λόγος, ὡς καλὸν ἐντάφιον ἢ βασιλεία ἐστὶ. (*ΥΠΕΡ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΩΝ*, I.XXIV ἐν Dewing 2006, 230, 232)

22. Sergius I, or Sergios I, was the Patriarch of Constantinople from 610 to 638 AD (Cobham 1911, 39). See endnote 20 for information on the Patriarchate of Constantinople's history.

23. *Iconoclasm* refers to "a religious movement of the 8th and 9th C[enturies] that denied the holiness of icons and rejected icon veneration" with "[c]lerical opposition to the artistic depiction of sacred personages ha[ving] its roots in late antiquity" (Hollingsworth and Cutler 1991, 975; brackets mine). But it was not just a movement. Iconoclasm was, as accurately summarized by Alice-Mary Talbot, a "controversy that erupted in Byzantium in the eighth century over the veneration of religious images" where "[a]t stake were basic tenets of Christian theology, especially the doctrine of salvation" (Talbot 1998, viii; brackets mine). Icon veneration "was to be a dominant issue in the Byzantine church for over a century until the restoration of icons in 843 under the empress Theodora" (Talbot 1998, viii). Talbot crisply details the division between the Iconoclasts and their denounciators, the Iconodules:

The iconoclasts, attacking image veneration as an idolatrous practice, claimed that Christ, as divine, could not be circumscribed. If one did depict Him in His human aspect, then he was guilty of separating His two natures. The iconodules argued, on the other hand, that the New Testament, with its teaching of the incarnation of Christ, superseded the prohibition of images in the Old Testament. As John of Damascus stated, since God was made flesh, He could be depicted. If the iconoclasts claimed that Christ could not be circumscribed, then they were denying His humanity and the mystery of the Incarnation through which God became man in order to save mankind. (Talbot 1998, viii–ix)

Talbot's synoptic definition overlaps with Peter Brown's broad, yet critical, definition of Iconoclam: "the Iconoclast controversy was a debate on the position of the holy in Byzantine society" (Brown 1982, 258). For Brown, what "was at stake in the eighth century" was "the identification of the icon with the holy and the rejection of this claim by the Iconoclasts, and not the status of the arts in Byzantine society" (Brown 1982, 264). Moreover, Brown details the relationship of Iconoclasm and Iconodulism along centripetal and centrifugal forces respectively:

For them [i.e., Iconoclasts] Iconodule superstition was simply a haemorrhage of the holy from these great symbols into a hundred little paintings. Iconoclasm, therefore,

is a centripetal reaction: it asserts the unique value of a few central symbols of the Christian community that enjoyed consecration from above against the centrifugal tendencies of the piety that had spread the charge of the holy on to a multiplicity of unconsecrated objects. (Brown 1982, 263; brackets mine)

Aside from definitions, questions have also been posited by Mike Humphreys focusing on Iconoclasm's origins with his answer involving multiple factors both internal (Byzantine) and external (Arab):

Why did iconoclasm start when and where it did? Why did [Emperor] Leo and the other actors involved do what they did? As Humphreys notes, the fundamental answer is simple. The Byzantines believed that their many travails were punishments sent by God because of their sins. The problem is why idolatry was identified as at least one of those sins, and why it happened in the 720s. All sensible answers combine processes internal to Byzantine Christianity, such as the rise in the prominence of the icon, with external forces, such as the massive disruption caused by the Arab conquests. Likewise, long-term factors, for example the latent anti-idolatry strain in Christianity inherited from the Old Testament, and the more immediate context, like the eruption of Thira, both played a role. Legitimate scholarly dispute arises from where one places the emphasis on different factors. (Humphreys 2021a, 73; see also Humphreys 2021b, 325ff; brackets mine)

Although Humphrey's questions are worth asking, this dissertation will not attempt to answer them or explore the implications of Humphrey's response to his own questions. And even though "the Iconoclast controversy is in the grip of a crisis of [academic] over-explanation" (Brown 1982, 254; brackets mine), the following sources, by no means exhaustive, can offer further details on the subject of Byzantine Iconoclasm: Anastos 1968, 7, Gero 1973, 96ff, Gero 1977, 12ff, Mango 1977, 4–5ff, 7, Hollingsworth and Cutler 1991, 975–976, Mango and Scott 1997, 559–560, 563–565, 604–605, 625–627, 632–634 (*Annus Mundi* 6218, 6221, 6257, 6272–6273, 6277), Davis 2007, 19–20 (Gregory III), Louth 2007, 82, Noble 2009, 137–138, Brubaker and Haldon 2011, 5, 151–152, 642, Anagnostopoulos 2013, Cotsonis 2015/2016, Barnes 2019, 229, 239–240, 246, Domínguez 2020, Humphreys 2021b, 325, and Herrin 2021, 393.

24. The Procrustean bed (or bed of Procrustes; κλίνη του Προκρούστη, *clinē tou Procroustē*), paradigm-wise, is also manifest in other works composed by Anthony Kaldellis such as *Hellenism in Byzantium* and *Romanland* the latter of which was praised as "[I]like a Hercules cleaning the Augean stables" (Kaldellis 2019, Backcover; brackets mine). If anything, Kaldellis' overall argument of the absolute Romanness of the Byzantine polity and its core Christian Greek inhabitants constitutes the *modern inverse of the medieval Latin/Frankish argument of the absolute non-Romanness of the Eastern Roman political community*. In simpler terms:

- Medieval Reification: Byzantines are *not* Romans because they *are* Greeks (9th century).
- Modern Reification: Byzantines *are* Romans because they are *not* Greeks (21st century).

Any claim that the above modern (or postmodern) reification of the *Romaíoi-Graikoi* is a strawman argument-wise itself constitutes a strawman that neglects to assess the negative implication of Kaldellis' own argument of the Byzantines as Romans who spoke Greek by happenstance (see Kaldellis 2007, 113). This implication entails a presentist flattening, or arbitrary one-dimensionalizing, of a three-dimensional historical subject that obfuscates our understanding of said subject while offering the illusion of clarity. And by *reification*, this project refers to the imposition of a discourse, idea, and/or model onto any reality, be it form and/or substance, that the reality in and of itself neither justifies nor lends itself to.

25. Millar 2016, 380ff offers a synoptic treatment of the Roman Near East. On the subject of Byzantine Jewish communities, see Horst 1886, 42, Starr 1940, 192, Bowman 1985, 29ff, Sharf 1995, Constantelos 1998, 122, Bonfil et al. 2012, Bell 2013, 146, Domínguez 2013, 283, 286, and Magdalino 2014. On the subject of Armenian people in the Eastern Roman polity, see Charanis 1961, Gero 1985, Toumanoff 1971, Vryonis 1981, and Kaegi 1992,

Chapter 8. For a potentially controversial critique of modern scholarship on Roman-Armenian relations, see Kaldellis' "Armenian fallacy" defined as "the assumption [...] that Armenian identity was propagated genetically and could not be lost through cultural adoption and assimilation" (Kaldellis 2019, 156ff; brackets mine).

26. The passage specifically cited by Magdalino from Porphyrogennitos is as follows:

Ἐκαστον γὰρ ἔθνος διάφορα ἔχον ἔθη καὶ διαλλάττοντας νομοὺς τε καὶ θεσμοὺς ὀφείλει τὰ οἰκεῖα κρατύνειν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔθνους τὰς πρὸς ἀνάκρασιν βίου κοινωνίας ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἐνεργεῖν. Ὡσπερ γὰρ ἕκαστον ζῶον μετὰ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τὰς μίξεις ἐργάζεται, οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον ἔθνος οὐκ ἐξ ἀλλοφύλων καὶ ἀλλογλώσσων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τε καὶ ὁμοφώνων τὰ συνοικέσια γάμων ποιεῖσθαι καθέστηκεν δίκαιον. Ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ καὶ ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμοφροσύνη καὶ συνομιλία καὶ προσφιλεῖς συνδιατριβὴ καὶ συμβίωσης περιγίνεσθαι πέφυκεν· τὰ δὲ ἀλλοτρια ἔθη καὶ διαλλάττοντα νόμιμα ἀπεχθείας μᾶλλον καὶ προσκρούσεις καὶ μίση καὶ στάσεις εἴωθεν ἀπογεννᾶν, ἄπερ οὐ φιλίας καὶ κοινωνίας, ἀλλ' ἔχθρας καὶ διαστάσεις φιλεῖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι. (*De Administrando Imperio*, 13 ἐν Moravcsik καὶ Jenkins 1967, 74)

For each nation has different customs and divergent laws and institutions, and should consolidate those things that are proper to it, and should form and develop out of the same nation the associations for the fusion of its life. For just as each animal mates with its own tribe, so it is right that each nation also should marry and cohabit not with those of other race and tongue but of the same tribe and speech. For hence arise naturally harmony of thought and intercourse among one another and friendly converse and living together; but alien customs and divergent laws are likely on the contrary to engender enmities and quarrels and hatreds and broils, which tend to beget not friendship and association but spite and division. (*De Administrando Imperio*, 13 in Moravcsik and Jenkins 1967, 75; Jenkins' translation)

It is important to note that the above passage is used here *only* to illustrate that nationhood (both ideas and concretes) is *neither* confined to the modern age (e.g., mass industrialization, mass bureaucratization) *nor* a creatio ex nihilo product of modern nation-state discourses.

Porphyrogennitos, of course, is *not* an outlier as the Anonymous' *Logos Nouthetētikos pros Basilea* (*Λόγος Νουθητητικός προς Βασιλέα*, "Word of Advice to the King") makes clear by cautioning against the imperial elevation of foreigners in the Eastern Roman polity:

Τοὺς ἔθνικοὺς εἶπερ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀπὸ βασιλικοῦ γένους τῆς χώρας αὐτῶν μὴ ἀναβίβαζε εἰς μεγάλας ἀξίας μήτε ἐμπίστευε αὐτοῖς μεγάλας ἀρχάς· πάντως γὰρ καὶ σεαυτὸν ἀχρειώσεις οὕτως πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντάς σου τοὺς Ῥωμαίους. [...] πολλὰ γὰρ συμφέρει τῇ Ῥωμανία, δέσποτα, τὸ μὴ τιμᾶν ἔθνικοὺς ἀξίας μεγάλας· (*ANONYMOY* ἐν Wassiliewsky καὶ Jernstedt 1896, 95· ἀγκύλες δικές μου)

If foreigners are not of royal descent in their own country, do not invest them with great honors nor entrust to them high offices. For in doing so you will not help yourself in any way, nor will you please your own officers who are of Byzantine origin. [...] It is in Romania's best interest, O Lord, not to bestow high ranks on foreigners. (*OF ANONYMOUS* in Geanakoplos 1984, 105; Geanakoplos' translation; brackets mine)

And the above Anonymous is later complemented by Theodore II Laskaris of the Nicaean kingdom emphasizing a reliance on forces exclusively composed of native/ethnic Greeks (i.e., *Hellenes*) in a mid-13th century AD letter addressed to the Christian Greek scholar Nikephoros Blemmydes:

κινεῖται γὰρ ἢ ἔχθρα τῶ πληθεὶ καὶ τὰ ἔθνη μάχεται καθ' ἡμῶν. καὶ τίς ὁ βοηθήσων ἡμῖν; Πέρσης πῶς βοηθήσει τῶ Ἕλλησι; Ἰταλὸς καὶ μάλιστα μαίνεται, Βούλγαρος προφανέστατα, Σέρβος τῇ βία βιαζόμενος καὶ ἀλήθειαν· μόνον δὲ τὸ Ἕλληνικὸν αὐτὸ βοηθεῖ εαυτῶ οἰκοθεν λαμβάνον τὰς ἀφορμάς. τὸν στρατὸν ὀριζόμεθα κολοβῶσαι, ἢ τὰ χρήματα, δι' ὧν συνέστηκεν ὁ στρατός; εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ πρῶτον, βοηθοῦμεν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· εἰ δέ γε τὸ δεύτερον, ἐπεὶ τὸ βοηθοῦν τὸν στρατὸν, τὰ χρήματα, καταβάλλομεν, καταβάλλομεν τὸν στρατὸν, καὶ πάλιν λέγω βοηθοῦμεν τοῖς ἐναντίοις. οὐ σοφισμα τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἀληθείας πάσης διαφανέστερον. μία γὰρ ἔμοι ἢ ἀλήθεια, εἷς ὁ σκοπός, ἐν δέ μοι καθέστηκε καὶ τὸ σπούδασμα, τὸ συνιστᾶν ἀεὶ τὴν ποίμνην τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ φυλάττειν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων λύκων αὐτήν. (*Ad Nicephorum Blemmidam, Epistula XLIV* ἐν Festa 1898, 58–59)

When the mob incites to enmity, and other nations war against us, who will come to our aid? How can a Persian help a Greek? Even more, the Italian is furious with us; and most of all, the Bulgarian and the Serb abandon us because they are moved only by force. And he who pretends to be our friend is not in truth our friend. Only the Greek [element] can help itself, finding its energy from within itself. Should we limit the size of the army or the funds through which the army is established? If we do the first, then we help our enemies; if the second, again I say we help our enemies. And this is no sophistry but it is much clearer than any other truth. For the truth is one for me. One is my purpose and one thing I have established as my goal: namely, always to gather together the flock of God and to preserve it from the attacking wolves. (*To Nikephoros Blemmydes, Letter 44* in Geanakoplos 1984, 106; Geanakoplos' translation and brackets)

Even the Byzantine "teacher and philologist" Thomas Magistros, according to Savvas Kyriakidis, "comment[ed] on the employment of mercenaries" in two texts titled "*On Kingship* (*Περὶ βασιλείας*) and *On the State* (*Περὶ πολιτείας*), which he compiled around 1304" (Kyriakidis 2009, 226; Kyriakidis' emphasis, brackets mine). Specifically, "Magistros "argue[d] that the state should maintain sea and land military forces made up of native soldiers" and was "negative towards foreign mercenaries, commenting that [...] foreign mercenaries are not loyal soldiers and although they swear allegiance to the Byzantines, in reality they remain loyal only as long as the Byzantines are victorious against their enemies" (Kyriakidis 2009, 226–227; brackets mine). And so the Greco-Christian position against foreign arms historically exists and operates *between* the classical Greek opposition to mercenaries on ethical grounds (see Plato's *Laws*, I.630b and Aristotle's *Politics*, V.1306a) and the Italian Renaissance opposition to mercenary/auxiliary arms on practical grounds (see Machiavelli's *The Prince*, XII–XIII in Machiavelli 1998, 48–57; see also Dodenhoff's section titled "Machiavellian Admonishment" in Dodenhoff 1969, 92–93).

27. Aristotle's *Meteorology*, composed in circa 340 BC, "is the oldest comprehensive treatise on the subject of meteorology" (Frisinger 1972, 634). In it, *Graikoi* and *Hellenes*, referring to the same Greek people, are equated with the former being the older tribonym of the latter:

αὕτη δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τόπους, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὁ καλούμενος ἐπὶ Δευκαλίωνος κατακλυσμός· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος περὶ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν ἐγένετο τόπον μάλιστα, καὶ τούτου περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τὴν ἀρχαίαν. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ Δωδώνη καὶ τὸν Ἀχελῷον· οὗτος γὰρ πολλαχῶς τὸ ρεῦμα μεταβέβληκεν· ὄκουν γὰρ οἱ Σελλοὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ οἱ καλούμενοι τότε μὲν Γραικοὶ νῦν δ' Ἕλληνας.  
(Αριστοτέλης. *Μετεωρολογικά*, I.XIV ἐν Lee 1952, 114)

This does not always happen in the same region of the earth: for instance, the so-called flood of Deucalion took place largely in the Hellenic lands and particularly in old Hellas, that is, the country Dodona and the Achelous, a river which has frequently changed its course. Here dwelt the Selloi and the people then called Greeks and now called Hellenes. (Aristotle. *Meteorology*, I.XIV in Lee 1952, 115;

Lee's translation)

The *Parian Chronicle* (or *Parian Marble*), whose author is unknown, "is a monumental inscription written in Attic Greek on a stele that was originally over two meters tall" and "dating from some time after 264/3 BCE" (Rotstein 2016, 1). In it, the tribonyms *Graikoi* and *Hellenes* are synonymous:

ἀφ' οὗ Ἕλληνας ὁ Δευκ[αλίωνος Φθι]ώτιδος ἐβασίλευσε, καὶ Ἕλληνας |  
ὠνομάσθησαν τὸ πρότερον Γραικοὶ καλούμενοι, καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα {Παναθηναϊκῶν |  
[- -]ΩΙ [ἔτη] ΧΗΗΓΓΠ, βασιλεύοντος | Ἀθηνῶν Ἀμφικτύονος. (*Μάρμαρο της Πάρου* ἐν Rotstein 2016, 22· ἀγκύλες του Rotstein)

From the time Hellen, son of Deuc[alion], became king of [Phthi]otis—hence they were named Hellenes, being formerly called Greeks—and the contest ..., 1257 years (= 1520/19 BCE), when Amphictyon was king of Athens. (*Parian Marble* in Rotstein 2016, 39; Rotstein's translation and brackets)

(Pseudo-)Apollodorus' *Library* or *Bibliothēke*, written in the 1st century BC, "is a concise but comprehensive guide to Greek mythology" (Hard 1997, vii). The text "covers the full span of mythical history from the origins of the universe and the gods to the Trojan War and its aftermath, and between these limits it tells the story of each of the great families of heroic mythology, and of the various adventures associated with the main heroes and heroines" (Hard 1997, vii). In it, like Aristotle and the unknown author of the *Parian Chronicle*,

(Pseudo-)Apollodorus also equates the *Graikoi* with the *Hellenes*:

Ἕλληνας δὲ καὶ νύμφης Ὀρηίδος Δῶρος Ἰοῦτος Αἰόλος. αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν ἀφ' αὐτοῦ τοὺς καλουμένους Γραικοὺς προσηγόρευσε Ἕλληνας, τοῖς δὲ παισὶν ἐμέρισε τὴν χώραν: καὶ Ἰοῦτος μὲν λαβὼν τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐκ Κρεούσης τῆς Ἐρεχθέως Ἀχαιοὺς ἐγέννησε καὶ Ἴωνα, ἀφ' ὧν Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Ἴωνες καλοῦνται, Δῶρος δὲ τὴν πέραν χώραν Πελοποννήσου λαβὼν τοὺς κατοίκους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ Δωριεῖς ἐκάλεσε, Αἰόλος δὲ βασιλεύων τῶν περὶ τὴν Θεσσαλίαν τόπων τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας Αἰολεῖς προσηγόρευσε, καὶ γῆμας Ἐναρέτην τὴν Δηιμάχου παῖδας μὲν ἐγέννησε ἐπτά, Κρηθέα Σίσυφον Ἀθάμαντα Σαλμωνέα Δηϊόνα Μάγνητα Περιήρη, θυγατέρας δὲ πέντε, Κανάκη Ἀλκυόνην Πεισιδίκην Καλύκην Περιμήδη. (*Ἀπολλοδώρος. Βιβλιοθήκη*, 1.7.3 ἐν Frazer 1921, 56)

Hellen had Dorus, Xuthus, and Aeolus by a nymph Orseis. Those who were called Greeks he named Hellenes after himself, and divided the country among his sons. Xuthus received Peloponnese begat Achaeus and Ion by Creusa, daughter of Erechtheus, and from Achaeus and Ion the Achaeans and Ionians derive their names. Dorus received the country over against Peloponnese and called the settlers Dorians after himself. Aeolus reigned over the regions about Thessaly and named the inhabitants Aeolians. He married Enarete, daughter of Deimachus, and begat seven sons, Cretheus, Sisyphus, Athamas, Salmoneus, Deion, Magnes, Perieres, and five daughters, Canace, Alcyone, Pisidice, Calyce, Perimede. (Apollodorus. *Library*, 1.7.3 in Frazer 1921, 57; Frazer's translation)

Constantine Cavafy, a late 19th-century and early 20th-century Greek poet from Alexandria in Egypt, uses the plural possessive form of *Graikos* (i.e., Γραικῶν, *Graikón*) in his poem

"Στην Εκκλησία" ("In the Church"):

Τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀγαπῶ—τὰ ἐξαπτέρυγά της,  
τ' ἀσήμια τῶν σκευῶν, τὰ κηροπήγιά της,  
τὰ φῶτα, τὲς εἰκόνες της, τὸν ἄμβωνά της.

Ἐκεῖ σὰν μπῶ, μὲς σ' ἐκκλησία τῶν Γραικῶν•  
μὲ τῶν θυμιαμάτων της τὲς εὐωδίες,  
μὲ τὲς λειτουργικὲς φωνὲς καὶ συμφωνίες,  
τὲς μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τῶν ἱερέων παρουσίες  
καὶ κάθε τῶν κινήσεως τὸν σοβαρὸ ρυθμὸ—  
λαμπρότατοι μὲς στῶν ἀμφίων τὸν στολισμὸ—  
ὁ νοῦς μου παίρνει σὲ τιμὲς μεγάλες τῆς φυλῆς μας,  
στὸν ἔνδοξό μας Βυζαντινισμό.  
(Καβάφη, "Στην Εκκλησία" ἐν Σαχπερόγλου 2007, 64)

I love the church—its liturgical fans,  
the silver of the vessels, its candlesticks,  
the lights, the icons, the pulpit.

When I enter there, in a church of the Greeks,  
with its fragrances of incense,  
amid the liturgical voices and harmonies,  
the majestic presence of the priests  
and the stately rhythm of their every move—  
most resplendent in the finery of their vestments—  
my mind travels to the great glories of our race,  
to our illustrious Byzantine past.  
(Cavafy, "In the Church" in Sachperoglou 2007, 65;  
Sachperoglou's translation)

On a sidenote, Leonard Robert Palmer briefly mentions the suggestion that "[t]he very [Latin] name *Graeci* [...] was possibly an Illyrian name for a Greek tribe with whom they [i.e., Illyrians] were in contact in north Epirus" (Palmer 1954, 40; Palmer's emphasis, brackets mine). It is, however, beyond the scope of this project to ascertain whether, or to what extent, Illyrians, an ancient Indo-European tribal confederation from the northwestern Haemus, "acted as intermediaries in the transmission of certain Greek words and culture to Italy" (Palmer 1954, 40; see Hammond 1966 on Illyrians). Nevertheless, any notion or conclusion drawn from Palmer's *The Latin Language* that the Greek emic ethnonym *Graikoi* was originally an etic ethnonym of Illyrian provenance is, to borrow Alan Cameron's words, *pure modern hypothesis*: an historically baseless supposition (i.e., ατεκμηρίωτος λόγος, *atechmēriotos logos*, "word without proof"). Why so? Because the relevant facts, upon examination, neither justify nor lend themselves to *Graikoi* being the direct or indirect product of native Illyrian-speaking cultures whatever their zones of influence (see Myson's wisdom on the nature of truth, or *correspondence theory*, in Cavarnos 1996, 58–60, 76–77).

28. Paula Zoch correctly describes the "Greek slave from Tarentum" Livius Andronicus as "[t]he first Roman poet of record [...] who translated the *Odyssey* into Latin in a rough poetic meter called the Saturnian and adapted the content to Roman ways" (Zoch 1998, 136; Zoch's emphasis, brackets mine).
29. The *Graikos* at Attila the Hun's court was a Greek man *in se* who *ab initio* spoke Greek *with* (ex-)Roman citizenship and *not* just a "Greek-speaking Roman" (Kaldellis 2013, 12). Also, the *Graikos* was *not*, according to Kaldellis following David Sansone's observation, "mostly if not entirely invented" constituting "an inversion of the legendary figure of Anacharsis, a Skythian who adopted Greek customs and thereby enabled Greek authors to ironize their

own position and engage in self-critical autoethnography" (Kaldellis 2013, 12 and endnote 47 on page 193). Whatever creative licenses Priskos took while composing his *Byzantine History*, the historian's admission to having his preconceived notions about Attila's court upended satisfies what this project calls the *criterion of resistance* that follows Nicholas Onuf's *primordial I* based on, or echoing, Aristotle's *Law of Identity* (A = A) (see this project's endnote 32 on *primordial I*). Said criterion means that a historian, inquiring about and mapping causality, is *resisted* by contemporary event-realities that place, or further place, the historian into the flow of causality rendering said event-realities, along with their milieu, true or mostly true by virtue of their actuality. And so, the *Graikos'* voice/story, as an event-reality *resisting* Priskos' *own* observational expectations well enough for Priskos to justify its recording, was *not an ex nihilo literary invention but mostly, if not entirely, the Graikos' own*.

30. One could dismiss upon examination the implication of the existence and perenniality of Greek nationhood/ethnicity on the grounds that it smacks of Jouko Lindstedt's *three fallacies*: 1) the *essentialist fallacy* meaning the "assum[ption] that an identity is based upon the objectively observable properties of people", 2) the *primordialist fallacy* meaning "historical continuity [is] a social construct, not a pre-given historical fact", and 3) the *fallacy of objective language boundaries* meaning the "assum[ption] that every language is defined by an objective set of features" (Lindstedt 2012, 118–119; brackets mine). The aforementioned fallacies, however, are predicated on equally fallacious dogmatics: *essentialist fallacy* (predicate: *anti-essentialism*; fallacy: X is *always* an anti-essence), *primordialist fallacy* (predicate: *social constructivism*; fallacy: X is *always* and *only* the sum of social facts), *fallacy of objective language boundaries* (predicate: *subjectivism/deconstructionism*; fallacy: X is *always* change *contra* continuity). This dissertation's author subscribes to no academic

camp/dogma but respects the following *critical voices*: 1) Rogers Brubaker's critique, on cognitive grounds, of "the ascent of the social constructionist paradigm" and its "dismissive references to 'naturalizing' and 'essentializing' perspectives" (Brubaker 2004, 83), and 2) Miltiades Hatzopoulos' position, on anti-conformist grounds, that "the 'politically correct' antiessentialist view, which reduces group identities to mere inventions constructed on pure discourse, needs to be watered down" (Hatzopoulos 2007, 51).

31. The passage from Eusebius in the original Greek is as follows:

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν ὀλίγῳ τούτων ἡμῖν οὐκ εἰς ἄχρηστον προγεγυμνασμένων ἀνίωμεν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην κατηγορίαν, καὶ τίνες ὄντες καὶ πόθεν ὀρμώμενοι τοῖς διερωτῶσιν ἀποκρινώμεθα. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ γένος Ἕλληνας ὄντες καὶ τὰ Ἑλλήνων φρονοῦντες ἐκ παντοίων τε ἔθνων ὡς ἂν νεολέκτου στρατιᾶς λογάδες συνειλεγμένοι τῆς πατρίου δεισιδαιμονίας ἀποστάται καθεστήκαμεν, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτοὶ ποτε ἀρνηθεῖμεν• ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ταῖς Ἰουδαϊκαῖς βίβλοις προσανέχοντες κακὰ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς προφητειῶν τὰ πλεῖστα τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς λόγου συνάγοντες οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως ζῆν τοῖς ἐκ περιτομῆς προσφιλέσ ἡγούμεθα, καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν αὐτόθεν ὁμολογήσαιμεν. (ΕΥΑΓΓΕΛΙΚΗ ΠΡΟΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΗ, I.4–5 ἐν Mras 1982, 21–22)

32. Greek people described as both a self-preserving and self-renewing nation is *not* an effort by this project towards "subjecting [said people] to a Procrustean homogeneity" *nor* is it part of a modern Greek "process of reaching back from the present into the distant past and hauling features of ancient culture into the present for consumption" (see Mackridge 2012, 36, 40; brackets mine). Furthermore, Greek "postmodern writers and artists" are not, *contra* Peter Mackridge, "more realistic" for subjecting Greek people to a *Procrustean heterogeneity* that revels in reifications of cultural diversity rooted in *discontinuity*, a euphemism for nihilism or relativism leading to nihilism (see Mackridge 2012, 39; for a critique of nihilism, see Rose 1994). Postmodern reifications of anthropic life (e.g., all cultures are equal; see Hicks 2004, 15–18ff, 184), not that modernism is perfect or an alternative, are *incompatible* with Alistair MacIntyre's *life as a medieval quest* whereby variety (ποικίλη, *poikilē*) and tensions are both

*innate to the continuity of life*, qualities of which nations/ethnies that Know Themselves (i.e., self-determination ≠ self-reification) may defy, but do not deny. Worth noting here is Nicholas Onuf's *primordial I*, derived from, or influenced by, Aristotle's *Law of Identity* (A = A): "So long as I am here, now, I can only start with me and the powers that I need to resist a world resisting me" (Onuf 2018, 19). That "there is little direct continuity between modern Greece and Hellenic antiquity" (Mackridge 2012, 40) is thus a baseless assertion for Greek people *who simply are* (*en einai*: ever being, ever evolving, a kind of *primordial We*) or as Nikos Svoronos would say: "the continuity is there" (Svoronos 1985, 283). The diachronicity of Greek nationhood/ethnicity is *neither* an appeal to Romanticism *nor* Hellenocentric conceit but rather a *living reality* that Bernard M. W. Knox, a British scholar of classics (see Easterling 2018 on Knox's background), accurately *observed* during his travels to Greece:

It is, of course, not only in his looks that the modern Greek resembles his ancestors. The men sitting in the *kafeneion* discussing the latest rumors and playing interminable games of *tavli* are no different from the men sitting by the fountain in Corinth playing *pestoi* (it seems to have been almost exactly the same game) from whom the *paedagogos* in Euripides' *Medea* picked up the rumor that his mistress was to be banished. [...] To strike a more serious note, the same touchy sense of personal honor, which is at the root of Achilles' wrath, still governs relations between man and man in modern Greece; Greek society still fosters in the individual a fierce sense of his privileges, no matter how small, of his rights, no matter how confined, of his personal worth, no matter how low. And to defend it, he will stop, like Achilles, at nothing. Even its name is still the same, φιλότιμο, φιλοτιμία. [...] And we know, from the private letters that have emerged, written on papyrus, from the sands of Egypt, that Greeks there in the second century A.D. were speaking Greek that had sometimes startling resemblances to the modern article. A boy's letter to his father, for example, in which the child asks to be taken along on his father's trip to Alexandria, begins, exactly as a modern schoolboy might begin: "Λιπόν, πάτερ μου . . ." "Well, father . . ." Not only is the word λουπον (as it was spelled in fifth-century Athens and still is) used in its modern sense of "Well, . . ."; the boy's phonetic spelling shows that the itacism which is such a pronounced feature of the modern language had already begun. (Knox 1988, 146–147, 149; Knox's emphasis, brackets mine)

And by "spanning millennia", this dissertation is *not* attempting to insert itself into scholarly

discussions on Greek prehistory. A substantive synopsis of said prehistory is offered by Bernard Clive Dietrich (see Dietrich 1970), Victor Parker (see Parker 2007) and Oliver Dickinson (see Dickinson 2016) with Jeanette Forsén providing a detailed treatment (see Forsén 1992) and Bryan Feuer's *Mycenaean Civilization* annotating an extensive roster of scholarly sources (see Feuer 2004). Feuer, elsewhere, also discusses Mycenaean ethnicity defining *ethnic identity* as "the aspect of a person's self-conceptualization that results from identification with a broader group in opposition to others" (Feuer 2011, 508) with "a useful point of departure" being Klaus Kilian's "criteria for characterizing Mycenaean civilization" (i.e., territory, society, economy, culture) (Feuer 2011, 510 citing Kilian 1990, 445–447). Though beyond the scope of this project, future scholars are justified in examining Feuer's assertion that the "ancestors of the Mycenaeans entered the Greek peninsula in the mid third millennium" (Feuer 2011, 516) for an earlier date of entry, or an earlier date of emergence, given: 1) George S. Korrés' archaeological findings at Pylos (Korrés 1990, 7ff), 2) Carol G. Thomas' brief, yet detailed, historical survey of Greek life before the Bronze Age (Thomas 2014, 9–14), and 3) Jonathan Sherman Morris' abrasive, yet sound, linguistic critique of modern linguo-archaeological models involving the prehistoric origins of the Indo-European language family that includes Greek/Hellenic (Morris 2017, 65ff).

33. Farber's synoptic exegesis of Hellenistic kingship's ideal virtues/practices is useful, but it is inaccurate with respect to its description of philanthropy in the *Cyropaideia* as "benevolence [with] a secretly pragmatic motive" (Farber 1979, 509; brackets mine). *Contra* Farber, Greek/Hellenistic *philanthropia* is neither an extension nor a variation of *virtù* in Machiavelli's *The Prince* (i.e., "public spiritedness" meaning secular power for the sake of political *profit* or profit-driven secular power for the sake of *glory*). Instead, it embodies

*phronēsis* (φρόνησις, "practical wisdom") undergirded by a genuine moral/ethical disposition of a monarch towards his/her subjects (as opposed to the amoral prudence of Machiavellian *virtù* meaning *phronēsis detached* from morality/ethicality). This is shown in Xenophon's *Agesilaos* where "Xenophon relates that philanthropia was a regular policy of Agesilaos, King of Sparta (398–360 B.C.) [who] followed a humane and compassionate policy toward prisoners of war, destitute children, and elderly men" (Constantelos 1968, 8 including footnote 35; brackets mine). In fact, "Agesilaos, by *virtue of his philanthropia, was described as a fortress impregnable to assault*" (1.21–22: καὶ τῶν κατὰ κράτος ἀναλώτων τειχέων τῆ φιλανθρωπία ὑπὸ χεῖρα ἐποιεῖτο) (Constantelos 1968, 8 including footnotes 35 and 36; emphasis mine). So it is doubtful that Xenophon was inconsistent with respect to his conceptualization of *philanthropy* when composing the *Cyropaideia* and the *Agesilaos*. But even if Cyrus' *philanthropia* in the *Cyropaideia* incontrovertibly embodied the ancient Greek equivalent of Machiavelli's *virtù* does not necessarily mean that Hellenistic kingship *inherited that particular type of "philanthropy"*. According to Demetrios J. Constantelos, "[p]hilanthropia was an ideal as well as a practical virtue of the ancient Hellenes" as shown by "Xenophon [who] projects Heracles [in his *Memorabilia*] as the embodiment of th[e] spirit of humanism [...] add[ing] that 'if one desires the protection of the gods, one must practice piety toward them; if a man would be loved by his friends he must help them; if he would be honoured by a city he must serve it; if he would be admired by all Greece, he must be her benefactor'" (Constantelos 1968, 8–9; brackets mine). This was ultimately the "classical Greek conception of philanthropia [that] was inherited by the Hellenistic world" as accurately stated by Constantelos (Constantelos 1968, 10; brackets mine). But regardless if one subscribes to Farber's or Constantelos' analysis of Hellenistic philanthropy, what is

important to note is that during Late Antiquity, "Christianity adopted the Greek concept of philanthropia" and extended its application "to the underprivileged [...] transcending sex, race, and national boundaries" thus rendering *philanthropy* as "n[either] limited to equals, allies, and relatives, nor to citizens and civilized men, as was most often the case in ancient Greece" (Constantelos 1968, 16; brackets mine). And so, according to Constantelos, the "Greek notion of philanthropia, [as] broadened and deepened both in theory and in practice under the impact of the Christian teaching of *agape*, was adopted by the Byzantine Empire" (Constantelos 1968, 18; Constantelos' emphasis, brackets mine). For the Greeks of the Byzantine era, "philanthropia was: first, a *philosophical and theological abstraction*; second, a *political attribute*; third, *charity directed to the individual in want*; and fourth, *philanthropy properly so called and expressed in organized institutions*" (Constantelos 1968, 18; emphasis mine). Essentially, Christian Greek philanthropy was "markedly similar to the ancient Greek understanding of philanthropia" though "in Byzantium philanthropia assumed new dimensions" entailing, as stated earlier, the religious concept, belief and value of *eleemosyne* ("mercy"), informed by *divine mimesis*, where one is "merciful, [just] as [the] Heavenly Father is merciful" (Constantelos 1968, 19ff; brackets mine). On a sidenote, the *idea of universal human rights* did exist in ancient Greece such as *Politics* 7.2 where Aristotle states that "it is not right to hunt human beings for food or sacrifice" (οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θοίνην ἢ θυσίαν ἀνθρώπους). Other scholars agree such as Richard Kraut who "find[s] in Aristotle the *idea that all human beings have, by virtue of their humanity, certain rights*" and "[s]o even a slave is to be given a degree of protection: slave though he is, his humanity entitles him to be treated in certain ways" (Kraut 1996, 759–760; brackets and emphasis mine). Kraut's correct assertion is complemented by Darren Nah's nuanced analysis of Aristotle's *political realism*

with respect to the subject of slavery/servitude:

Aristotle [...] begins by first offering up a conceptual definition of a slave as 'a possession of the animate sort' and 'a subordinate in matters concerning action'. [...] In offering this definition, Aristotle does not justify that slaves should exist. He remains totally uncommitted to the normative claims exerted either for or against slavery' continuation. He explicitly asks 'whether anyone is of this sort by nature or not, and whether it is better and just for anyone to be a slave or not', leaving their factual existence a matter of debate, and not of a conclusion. In fact these passages even seem to question the need for slaves. Aristotle did not think that the modern world of automated machines and robots was possible, but in an odd, nearly science fiction-like conjecture, Aristotle says that if humans had the self-moving statues of Daedalus or mythical living tripods of Hephaestus, or if 'shuttles would weave themselves and picks play the lyre, master craftsmen would no longer have a need for subordinates, or masters for slaves'. Aware of the technological and economic constraints of his time, Aristotle here seems to suggest that having slaves was an unavoidable evil in the pre-industrial Greek world. (Nah 2018, 415; brackets mine)

34. For a concrete example of Hellenistic *sotēria*, see the Greek inscription from Smyrna honoring Emperor Hadrian as "Σωτήρα καὶ Κτίστην" ("Savior and Constructor/Builder") (Béquignon 1933, 306–308; English translation mine).
35. According to Richard Krautheimer, "Anthemios of Tralles and Isidorus of Miletus [...] were what their contemporaries called *mechanopoioi*, scholars grounded in the theory of statics and kinetics and well versed in mathematics" (Krautheimer 1965, 153; Krautheimer's emphasis, brackets mine). Specifically, "Anthemios was the author of a work on conical sections, an expert in projective geometry, and an inventor who knew the principle of steam power and of the burning-mirror" (Krautheimer 1965, 153). As for Isidorus, he "taught stereometry and physics at the universities, first of Alexandria, then of Constantinople, and wrote a commentary on an older treatise on vaulting" (Krautheimer 1965, 153).
36. David Alan Parnell provides a useful and accurate breakdown of the historical origins of Byzantine imperial mercy in his examination of Justinian I's campaign to "deliberately cultivat[e] a reputation for mercy" (Parnell 2020, 11; brackets mine). Said origins are

summarized as followed: 1) "the ancient Roman tradition of clemency" with, for example, Julius Caesar "famously grant[ing] clemency to his elite Republican enemies during the [Roman] civil war", 2) "the tradition of Hellenistic philanthropy" where "Hellenistic monarchs appropriated *φιλανθρωπία* as a trait of their rule and connected it to the divine" with "Greek *φιλανθρωπία* [later] "subsum[ing] the Roman concept of *clementia* during the Roman imperial period", and finally 3) "[t]he Christian tradition" where "Christ placed an emphasis on love of fellow man at the center of his ministry" (Parnell 2020, 12–14; Parnell's emphasis, brackets mine).

37. Diane Apostolos-Cappadona offers the following useful synopsis of *Hermes Kriophoros* as the model for *Jesus Christ the Good Shepherd*:

Originally associated with cultic practice, the ancient Greek *Hermes Kriophoros* was the "ram bearer" whose action of carrying this animal across his shoulders resulted in a solemn sacrifice. As the world of Late Antiquity and Early Christianity was dependent upon agriculture and herding, so references to the figure of a shepherd were not only recognizable but popular. The assimilation then of the figural image of the *Hermes Kriophoros* into the Early Christian image of the Good Shepherd was a natural progression. (Apostolos-Cappadona 2020, 67; Apostolos-Cappadona's emphasis)

Complementing Apostolos-Cappadona is the following summary by Rebecca I. Denova:

A figure known as "the good shepherd" has traditionally been associated with Jesus and was taken from the metaphor in the gospel of John, "I am the good shepherd." The image depicts a young man with a lamb carried across his shoulders. However, the image is much older in Greek art, as *kriophoros*, or "the ram-bearer." This depiction was associated with Hermes, as *Hermes Kriophoros*, where the ram represented a proper sacrifice. With the gospel association, this image was borrowed by Christians in their interpretation of the true good shepherd [...] (Denova 2019, 297; Denova's emphasis, brackets mine)

With respect to concrete examples, Dmitry V. Ainalov provides the following assessment regarding the *Good Shepherd* statuette from the Greek city of Broussa in Asia Minor:

Another monument [...] is closely related to the art of Constantinople, although it was not found in that city. It is a statuette of the Good Shepherd, now in the

Archaeological Museum of Constantinople, but discovered at Broussa, as I have been informed by O. Wulff (Fig. 104). [...] The Broussa statuette stands in the same tradition as the Hellenistic statuettes and small groups representing in a realistic manner shepherds, fishermen, old men and women. The groups of Orpheus and Bellerophon, of the same size as the statuettes of the Good Shepherd, maintained in Byzantine art the tradition of this kind of decorative sculpture. (Ainalov 1961, 221–223; brackets mine)

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