UNSETTLING BRAZIL

URBAN INDIGENOUS AND BLACK PEOPLES' RESISTANCES TO DEPENDENT SETTLER CAPITALISM

DESIRÉE POETS
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Frontispiece. Map of Brazil with Southeast region.
(Map by Stewart Scales and Desirée Poets.)
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DESIRÉE POETS

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA PRESS

Tuscaloosa
FOR MY MOTHER, LÚCIA,
AND FOR ALL THE WOMEN WhOSE STORIES
HAVE GUIDED THIS JOURNEY
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This book is the materialization of more than a decade of encounters, collaborations, and dialogues with diverse knowledge communities.

First and foremost, I thank the people from the five communities and movements in this book for their companionship and trust. This project is the culmination of many years of learning and unlearning with them and only one step in a longer-term commitment to their movements and political projects.

In the Quilombo dos Luízes, I thank Luzia Sidônio for her time and for sharing a bit of her wealth of knowledge and wisdom. I also thank Miriam Aprigio for the confidence placed in my work and the frequent pushback against my academic tendencies. It was through Miriam’s research that I learned about many other quilombola thinkers, including Nego Bispo, and about a nonanthropological, more expansive, and radical understanding of quilombos. I also thank her for the careful review of the book’s introduction and of the chapter about the Luízes.

It would not be an overstatement to affirm that the Aldeia Maracanã Indigenous movement, and the many voices and people that have journeyed with it, have changed the landscape of Indigenous politics in Rio. I thank especially Marize Guarani, Carlos Tukano, Dauá Puri, Índia, Sandra Benites, and Niara do Sol for allowing this book to be a small part of this endeavor and for allowing it to tell a bit of their collective and individual stories.

I thank the members of Quilombo Sacopã for the warm welcome, even in a context of research saturation. I have continued to learn from José Cláudio Torres Freitas’s quilombola critique of ethnic rights. Cláudio, much like Miriam, has held on to what is most generative about quilombola land titles—the possibility to continuously revitalize ancestry, tradition, and relations to land, a political space from which to dream and enact another Brazil—while challenging the limitations they carry. As he
once said, “it is these little sips of hope that keep us going.” I also thank him for reviewing the chapter about Sacopã. From Luiz Sacopã, I have learned not just about the history of the quilombo and the neighborhood in which it is located but also about the landscape of quilombola land-titling processes in the entire state of Rio. I thank him for our many conversations, which really were a series of lessons. And Quilombo Sacopã truly makes the best feijoada in Rio. Like the Quilombo dos Luízes, it remains a place of festivity, kinship, reflection, and struggle against inequalities and injustices, all at once.

I learned much about Indigenous approaches to public policy and white-Indigenous allyship from the Pindorama Program. Warm thanks especially to Emerson Souza-Guarani, Alex Potiguara, Edcarlos Pankararu, Cicera Pankararu, Rejane Pankararu, Cida Pankararu, and Benedito Prezia. So much of this book has been shaped by their political and intellectual labor. It has been guided by their capacity to be self-critical, at individual and collective levels, while fighting for concrete policies that improve Indigenous peoples’ lives in the city and the countryside. I also thank Edcarlos, Cida, and Benedito for their careful reading of the chapter about the program and of the introduction.

Right at the start of a project, we sometimes receive the kind of support and advice that will guide us all the way until the end. The notion of authenticity that I develop in this work is to a great extent based on Marcos Alexandre dos Santos Albuquerque’s research. I thank him for this contribution and for the suggestion that I travel to São Paulo to see its Indigenous movement back in 2014.

It was at the suggestion of Eliane Cantarino O’Dwyer that I first visited Sacopã, for which I am sincerely grateful. And if Sacopã set the foundations for my initial critical stance on ethnic rights, Luz Stella complemented this critique by pointing me to a Latin American literature on this topic. Equally important were Bartolomeu Pankararu and Maria Gabriela Marques (Tupiniquim). I am grateful for their friendship and the time at the Federal University of Minas Gerais in Belo Horizonte.

I have learned to grapple with the contradictions of ethical and politically meaningful scholarship through North-South collaborations from the work of Richa Nagar. Richa has helped me develop a radical critique of academic knowledge production, especially through fieldwork, while not abandoning the field. I thank her sincerely for the opportunity to learn with her over the years.

Indeed, I count myself lucky to have encountered numerous collaborators whose brilliance has continued to inspire my work. Sharri Plonski’s
own research and our shared projects have sharpened my readings of settler colonial studies from a transnational perspective, as well as my approach to ethical, collaborative methodologies. Her always incisive and supportive feedback has been invaluable, as has her careful editing of drafts of this manuscript.

The *Maré from the Inside* collective is an equally cherished space of collective knowledge cultivation. It was Andreza Jorge who showed me the work of Beatriz Nascimento, for example, and lent me books that would come to be formative to this work. Henrique Gomes’s sharp critiques of academia and his contributions to producing more community-led and locally relevant knowledge in Maré have been an inspiration throughout. Regarding this book specifically, I thank him for the critical perspective on my early interpretations of “pacification” and for reading a draft of the chapter about Maré. Nicholas Barnes, too, has carefully reviewed this chapter and the introduction. He is also the one in our group who first noted the disparities and commonalities of police violence across the United States and Brazil. I thank the three of them for their trust and for the opportunity to develop a project across multiple disciplines as well as across our differences, with all that it unsettles and rebuilds. It has truly been an honor to travel with you.

Lucy Taylor has been a mentor and role model for many, many years. I thank her for believing in me way back when, for opening my eyes to discussions of settler colonialism in Latin America through her own work on Argentina, and for the thoughtful guidance she has offered throughout the years. Lucy, *muitíssimo obrigada*.

A special note of appreciation goes to Berit Bliesemann de Guevara. Her scholarship on collaborative and creative methods and her support kept me motivated and inspired, even in difficult times. Robbie Shilliam, who is a mentor to so many of us junior scholars, has always been incredibly generous with his time and attention. Our conversations over the years and the exchanges he has made possible by curating diverse spaces of knowledge cultivation have been essential in helping me develop my own reading of key texts as well as the arguments the reader will encounter in this work. I also want to express my sincere thanks to another mentor, Mustapha Pasha, who has read parts of this manuscript at different stages and whose feedback always “hits the nail on the head.”

Peter Wade’s *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* was the initial academic impetus for this project, as it laid out the differences and similarities between Indigenous and Black movements and peoples in Latin America. I thank him for his critical engagement with my discussion of
Brazil as a settler colony. While some may still resist the argument I bring forward in this work, his pushback gave me some indication as to how and why they may do so.

This book would be radically different were it not for André Kaysel. It was a question he asked me at a Latin American Studies Association conference—“How does your research speak to the work of Caio Prado Júnior, Florestan Fernandes, and José Carlos Mariátegui?”—that opened me up to dependency theories and forever changed this book’s direction. In many ways, the present text is an answer to his question. André also kindly shared his breadth and depth of knowledge about Brazilian dependency theorists and theories in subsequent conversations. *Muito obrigada*, André.

Paulo Chamon offered a truly incredible, informal review of a first draft of the manuscript. I have been honored to have been at the receiving end of his collegiality and his rich and generous engagement. I am thankful for his time and care with my work and thank him for helping me develop the debates in this work with other Brazilian colleagues.

Two friends and colleagues at Virginia Tech have been essential companions on this journey. Jessica Taylor and Karen Kovaka have given me the kind of moral support one can only dream of. Both Karen and Jessica are also beautiful writers, and I thank them for the careful editing of several chapters.

Still at Virginia Tech, my collaborative methodology and research on Brazil have found a home at the Community Change Collaborative of the Institute for Policy and Governance. My cothinkers and coauthors there—Catherine Grimes, Molly Todd, Neda Moyerian, Nada Berrada, Vanessa Guerra, Francine Rossone, and Max Stephenson Jr.—are proof that many of us dream of and labor toward a more democratic university. It was in this space that I “stayed with Maré” as the COVID-19 global public health crisis imposed a distance between all of us. It was also with them that the *Maré from the Inside* exhibit visited Virginia Tech and the University of Virginia.

My first academic engagement with matters of race in Brazil was due to Verena Alberti’s careful implementation of Law 10.639 of 2003 (later Law 11.645 [2008]), which mandated the inclusion of Afro-Brazilian History and Culture in school curricula, in my high school history class in Rio. With her, I had a first example of how our classrooms are political spaces in which allyship can be practiced. She planted the seed that has grown into this book.

This research would not have happened without the generous financial support of the Economic and Social Research Council in the UK and
the funding, mentoring, and administrative assistance of the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University in Wales, UK, and, at Virginia Tech, of the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences; the Department of Political Science; and the Alliance for Social, Political, Ethical and Cultural Thought (ASPECT) PhD program. In ASPECT, a special note of thanks goes to Mauro Caraccioli and François Debrix for their encouragement and mentorship and for making ASPECT the beloved intellectual community it has become. Thank you also to Bikrum Gill, whose own work has relentlessly insisted on the relevance of Third World Marxist perspectives and who has been a true supporter of my “return” to dependency theories. I am also grateful to Peter Potter for the invaluable advice and for spearheading the Toward an Open Monograph Ecosystem (TOME) initiative, which has supported the open access e-book version of this work. In addition, Stewart Scales from Virginia Tech's Geography Department created the maps for each chapter. Stewart has been wonderful to work with, and I thank him sincerely for his time, expertise, and collegiality.

I thank Elgan for his unconditional positive regard. The genuine friendship we have built after a decade of working together is a precious gift I will forever hold dear. This book is also a testament to this journey.

I thank Karl and Lúcia, my parents, for encouraging me to go on my path and always cheering me on to go farther. I thank them also for insisting on periodically bringing me back to Rio and other places in Brazil, from where I have learned to think about the world. Indeed, it was my mother’s trajectory that first instigated my curiosity for the entanglements of militarization, class, race, and gender in Brazil. Born and raised in São Paulo’s countryside, much of it during the military dictatorship, she was the second of seven children in a poor military family, three of whom—herself included—later migrated to Rio in search of a better life. A warm note of appreciation to my sister as well, who has the kindest of hearts and who gives what are truly the best cafunés there have ever been.

I could never thank Matthias and Monika Gattinger enough for reviewing early drafts of every chapter in this book and for being my most engaged and critical readers. They have also frequently come to my rescue in difficult times and have shared the joys of many small and big victories. For all of that and more, I thank you.

Finally, thank you to Boomer, for always making space for my writing and for loving and supporting me unconditionally. You are a source of good in my life.

Early versions of chapters 1 and 2 are derived in part from an article
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


This book has been written in loving memory of tia Neném, Márcio, Hugo, Carlinhos, tio Gerd, and Lio.
UNSETTLING BRAZIL
On June 12, 2014, millions of soccer fans around the world tuned in to watch the live broadcast of the 2014 FIFA World Cup opening ceremony in São Paulo’s freshly renovated Itaquerão Stadium. On the field, performers stood motionless around an enormous globe-shaped LED screen as it flashed “welcome” in different languages. Dressed as colorful flowers, trees, ferns, and other plants, the performers represented the rich tropical flora of the Amazon region.

A group of dancers in blue rushed into the scene, symbolizing the life-giving rain and Amazon River. They set the other performers in motion. Men on stilts dressed as araucaria trees walked across the stage, then stood still, swaying slightly. Gymnasts jumped on giant water lily–shaped trampolines. The dancers in blue swarmed around the LED globe from east to west, and north to south. But their moves were more stilted than synchronized.

After a few minutes, the dancers in blue carried two canoes onto the field, each with one Guarani child in full regalia. The children pretended to paddle across the field as they looked around the stadium. The audience, largely comprising white people, gazed back.

This entire performance unfolded atop a drab beige canvas, decorated with just a few stripes of color. Neither the dancers nor the props entirely filled the stage. Such sparse scenery did little to evoke the Amazon region’s dense and luxurious landscape. It was a disappointing start to the 2014 World Cup. Viewers and the media later described the opening ceremony as “weak, tasteless and bordering on the ridiculous.”

But these were only the opening scenes of Brazil’s debut on the world stage. Minutes before the opening game kicked off, three children—one Indigenous, one Black, and one white—wearing white jerseys walked onto
the field. Each held a white dove. In a single synchronized movement, they lifted their arms, opened their palms, and released the doves. The camera followed the birds for a few seconds as they flew above the crowd.

Those familiar with Brazil’s national narratives will have recognized this scene as a reenactment of the three founding races, the idea that Brazil’s distinctive feature is the coming together of African (Black), Indigenous, and European peoples. It was first coined in Phillip von Martius’s 1843 essay on “how to write the history of Brazil,” an early nation-making effort after independence in 1822. An often overlooked side to this story is that von Martius’s essay also defended the superiority of Europeans, prefiguring the pseudoscientific racist theories so influential in Brazil between 1870 and 1930. Contrary to their European counterparts, the Brazilian interpretation of these theories posited that miscegenation in Brazil would lead to whitening. In the twentieth century, this founding narrative evolved into the “myth of racial democracy.” According to this myth, Brazil’s history of miscegenation was evidence that it was not founded on exclusionary racism. And since it was no longer possible to identify who was Indigenous, Black, or white, there could be no racism in contemporary Brazil. This myth has by now been definitively debunked, but its appearance at the World Cup opening ceremony demonstrates its tenacity. It has stuck, in part, because Brazil has not yet come to terms with the gendered and racialized structural and visceral violence on which it has, in fact, been founded.

The reenactment of this myth did not, however, end as the organizers planned it. One final movement was omitted from the official broadcast: shortly after releasing the dove, the Indigenous participant, Wera Jeguaka Mirim, took a banner out of his shorts and held it over his head. It read, “DEMARCAÇÃO” (DEMARCATION).

The act of protest was organized by the Guarani Yvyrupa Commission of Brazil’s South and Southeast regions in opposition to the halting pace of Indigenous (and quilombola, or maroon) land recognition processes, or demarcation. They also protested the growing frequency and violence of land invasions, as well as bills such as PEC 215 that threatened Indigenous and quilombola peoples’ hard-won constitutional rights by transferring their demarcation processes from the executive branch (under the Indian National Foundation [FUNAI], and the Colonization and Agrarian Reform Institute [INCRA], respectively) to the mostly conservative legislative branch (Congress), where it would remain more vulnerable to settler political and economic interests. These bills also defended the so-called temporal landmark thesis, which posits that Indigenous and quilombola
peoples can only demand the demarcation of territories that they were already occupying by October 5, 1988, the day the constitution was passed.

There it was: the real backdrop to this celebration. Brazilians everywhere were watching the opening ceremony amid an intensifying economic, political, and social crisis. As we now know, this crisis culminated in the coup that impeached President Rousseff and in the 2018 election of right-wing candidate Jair Bolsonaro (2019–22). In Rio, where the 2016 Olympics were also going to take place, dozens of favela (peripheral, often informal) neighborhoods had been forcibly removed to make way for the sports megaevents that began with the 2014 World Cup. Almost 250 other favelas had been militarily occupied with the aim of “pacifying” local drug trafficking organizations. Instead of peace, these communities were met with renewed waves of violence. At the same time, urban redevelopment projects gentrified previously abandoned areas of the city, whose residents tended to be working class and Black. Numerous overpriced, corrupt, and often superfluous infrastructure projects were implemented for the sports megaevents without popular participation and ultimately served the already privileged parts of Rio. According to a 2014 survey, 75.8 percent of participants deemed the investments geared toward the World Cup “unnecessary.” These changes to the city took place in an overarching context of inadequate investments in public services and welfare and an alarming rise in living costs. Fresh in Brazilians’ memories, finally, was the violent repression of the June 2013 protesters, who had spontaneously taken to the streets when an increase in bus fares pushed everyone over the edge and triggered mass demonstrations across Brazil. And still, the “Não vai ter Copa” (there will be no World Cup) and “FIFA Go Home” protests that had subsequently erupted throughout the country had been unable to stop the competition from proceeding a year later.

It is no surprise that the opening ceremony became the site of a protest. And this protest amended the official narrative in important ways. The young protester, Wera Mirim, was from the Krukutu Guarani territory in São Paulo’s southern metropolitan region. He was also one of the children who had paddled across the field on the canoe. His participation communicated to Brazil and the world that, if Indigenous peoples choose to engage with nation-making efforts such as the opening ceremony, they will do so subversively. They will co-opt these acts and narratives to invert the romanticized and pejorative stereotypes about Indigenous peoples they frequently contain. They will show how the colonial encounter that founded and structures Brazil is anything but idyllic. And they will come not as the noble savage who harmoniously integrated into a colonial society, as the
opening ceremony suggested, but as political subjects who will continue to hold the nation-state accountable to its promises and duties. Put simply: if Brazil portrays itself as a racial democracy, then it must act like one.

This book tells the stories of five urban Indigenous and Black (favela and quilombola) communities and movements in the capital cities of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Belo Horizonte that insist on such political agency. In the city, they fight for land, rights, and their ways of life. The five communities and movements include the Indigenous movement Aldeia Maracanã in Rio and the Pankararu who have cofounded the Indigenous Pindorama Scholarship Program in São Paulo, the Quilombo Sacopã in Rio and Quilombo dos Luízes in Belo Horizonte, and Rio de Janeiro’s Complexo da Maré favela. Their struggles illustrate the diverse ways that Black and Indigenous people negotiate, disrupt, reshape, and resist symbolic and material projects that have continuously attempted to erase, dispossess, and exploit them in interrelated yet distinct ways. These projects are settler colonial, capitalist, and militarized. They are founded upon and upheld by racist and gendered logics. Moreover, they unfold in a context of dependent capitalist development.

Brazil has remained dependent, settler capitalist, and militarized across the ruptures of the last five hundred years. Waves and generations of settlers, originally arriving as part of the Portuguese mercantilist empire, have built a polity that has historically occupied a subordinate position in the colonial/capitalist world system. The decision to host the 2014 and 2016 sports megaevents, after all, was part of the Workers’ Party (unfulfilled) foreign policy ambition to reposition Brazil as a global player. This polity has repeatedly emulated Western political and economic models. Its economy has (not without internal contestation) remained significantly primary goods and export oriented, and reliant on foreign interests and capital. The result is a condition of unequal exchange in which surplus value is transferred from Brazil to other, wealthier—the so-called central—countries. Brazil’s domestic socioeconomic and political system have been premised on the ongoing and unfinished pacification, elimination, superdispossession, and superexploitation of Indigenous and Black peoples, often through militarized force. These conditions have furthered industrialization in the Global North and the “development of underdevelopment” in Brazil. As Frantz Fanon put it, “Europe is literally the creation of the Third World.”

Militarized settler capitalism and dependency are, respectively, the interdependent internal and external structures of what I call Brazil’s settler project. And they are the structures within, against, and beyond which
urban Black and Indigenous struggles in Brazil unfold. This is my overar-
ching thesis.

Much like Wera Mirim’s participation at the 2014 World Cup open-
ing, and like other social movements around the world, people from the
five communities and movements in this book have positioned themselves
at the interstices of Brazil’s settler project, refracting it through their own
lived experiences and dreams. In so doing, they have aimed not at in-
clusion into this project but at its transformation. They have acted with
the understanding that a real implementation of Indigenous and Black
constitutional rights will require nothing less than a break with Brazil’s
capitalist-colonial foundations. Some groups have taken a more straight-
forward stance of refusal by, for example, opposing agreements or part-
nerships with the state. Others have chosen to work with the state and
nongovernmental organizations. When oppression was particularly se-
vere, they developed covert (or fugitive) strategies of resistance. At other
times, they were able to organize publicly. In fact, sometimes organizing
publicly was the only way to win a fight. They have worked, sometimes
together, but always in their heterogeneity, to unsettle the related yet dis-
tinct places that settler society has reserved for them.

Their stories show the many intersections at which urban Indigenous
and Black politics converge and the points at which they diverge. What
all the communities and movements share is the imperative to “imagine
themselves outside of the interstices of Empire while operating within it,”
to borrow the words of Kanien’kehá:ka scholar Audra Simpson.15 And so,
we ask: What does it mean to talk about decolonization in Brazil? This
book contends that decolonization must unravel the imbricated threads of
militarized, dependent settler capitalism. With this task in mind, it builds
on the work of Indigenous, Black, dependency, and other thinkers in Bra-
zil and beyond whose intellectual and political labor pave the way toward
more just horizons.

The next section of this introduction introduces readers to quilombos,
favelas, and Indigenous peoples in Brazil with a focus on urban contexts.
I follow this order because quilombos and favelas are spaces of Black and
Indigenous encounters that challenge their categorical separation. The
second section outlines what I mean by militarized, dependent settler cap-
italism. This outline is neither a revision of the whole of the Brazilian stud-
ies field nor an exhaustive history of Brazil. Instead, it discusses a few key
historic moments through a select literature to illustrate my argument,
introduces the language of settler colonialism, and shows how contempo-
rary Brazil is a settler colony. It also expands the field of settler colonial
studies from a Third World perspective by combining it with Marxist works on dependency in the south of the Americas. In the third section, I discuss what this emerging perspective offers to our understanding of Brazil and to Indigenous and Black struggles there, considering that Brazil is not usually defined as a settler colony. After a brief methodological discussion in the subsequent section, I finish with an outline of the chapters to follow.

QUILOMBOS, FAVELAS, AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

Indigenous and Black peoples have challenged European colonialism and slavery from the outset. For example, enslaved and freed Black people throughout the American continent, sometimes alongside other subordinated persons, have historically formed diverse communities in resistance to this system. In Brazil, these communities are commonly called quilombos.\textsuperscript{16} The most emblematic territorialized quilombola community was probably the Quilombo dos Palmares (c. 1600–1710). But quilombos are not a thing of the past. In Brazilian Black radical thought and practice, quilombos are an ongoing project, a desire for utopia, and a dream.\textsuperscript{17} Writing mostly in the second half of the twentieth century, Beatriz Nascimento, Abdias Nascimento, and Clóvis Moura, for instance, understood quilombos as future-oriented, transatlantic geographies of liberation rooted in Black African ancestry and historical resistance.\textsuperscript{18}

Across quilombos’ diverse forms and origins, their essence is a collective, organized, and radical negation of the institution of slavery and a society structured by it.\textsuperscript{19} To become a quilombola is to become a new being that negates the “thingification” (or turning into an object) of Black people, affirming the humanity of a person who has been enslaved. Quilombos are thus “a breach in the slavocratic system.”\textsuperscript{20} This system persists after abolition through “racialized poverty, the disparagement of Black aesthetics, urban segregation, and the erasure of history,” as Christen Smith summarized it.\textsuperscript{21} The stories of Quilombo Sacopã, Quilombo dos Luízes, and the Complexo da Maré illustrate this continuity. In the city, all three have fought against the dehumanization that has undergirded their dispossession, exploitation, and segregation, often in their own territories, at different historical moments. By refusing the placelessness to which settler capitalist society has attempted to relegate them, these communities have expressed what Moura described as quilombagem, “a continuum of permanent erosion of the social, cultural, political, and economic forces of slavery and its [ideological and existential] values.”\textsuperscript{22}
Quilombos are dynamic sociopolitical models of self-defense and resistance, constantly renewed to meet changing historical and geopolitical contexts that remain colonial and racist. As the subsequent chapters show, Quilombo Sacopã and Quilombo dos Luízes have always adapted to changing historical moments. They have, for example, been forced to urbanize as the city has encroached upon their territories. But at every stage, they have ensured not just their physical but also their cultural survival. They have insisted on practicing their traditions, such as the Festa de Sant’Ana, in the case of the Luízes, and the samba and feijoada (black bean stew) events that once made Sacopã famous in Rio. These festivities and their quotidian communal practices resonate with Abdias Nascimento’s notion of quilombismo as a “scientific-historical-cultural concept” that understands quilombo not as “escaped slave” but as “fraternal and free reunion, or encounter; solidarity, living together, existential communion.” In the defense of their ways of life, the quilombolas in this book have drawn strength and inspiration from their inherited traditions and from their ancestors’ fight for their lands. Standing firmly on this ground that projects their past into the future, quilombolas such as Sacopã and Luízes, as Beatriz Nascimento put it, therefore embody “the hope for a more just Brazil, where there is liberty, union, and equality.”

In a similar vein, contemporary quilombola thinker Antônio Bispo (also known as Nego Bispo) from the Quilombo Saco-Curtume in the state of Piauí, refers to quilombolas as countercolonization peoples (povos contra colonizadores). As he writes, countercolonization consists of “all the processes of resistance and struggle in defense of [their] territories, and the symbols, significations, and ways of life practiced in these territories.” Bispo includes peoples indigenous to the Americas and those of African descent in this category. He does so because he understands that their cosmovisions are both grounded in place-based, circular, horizontal, and heterogeneous cultural matrices that manifest in nature. He describes them as pagan polytheist. Indigenous and Black cosmovisions, he continues, inevitably threaten colonizers’ linear, vertical, deterritorialized (for “God cannot be seen”), homogenizing, and patriarchal “Euro-Christian monotheist” framework. Bispo therefore speaks of Afro-Pindoramic peoples (povos afro-pindorâmicos), Pindorama being a Tupi term for Brazil (land of the palm trees).

His work develops an important convergence of Black and Indigenous struggles. It points our attention to how African and Indigenous traditions have often articulated elements of one another and how communities, such as quilombos and favelas, have frequently been built by both
Indigenous and Black people. These convergences, nonetheless, follow the principle that “not everything that comes together, mixes” or becomes the same, but coflows, as confluence.28 This insight grounds and guides this book. By placing Indigenous and Black movements and communities in conversation, it traces their confluences without collapsing them. For example, many of the Indigenous people in Brazil’s Southeast region, where this research took place, are migrants from the Northeast, where Indigenous peoples have historically mixed with Black and white groups. These encounters have marked their cultural traditions, such as the *toré* dance ritual, which incorporates African and Christian references.29 In this regard, Rejane Pankararu affirms that, “between Black and Indigenous, I have learned to be Indigenous. But my Blackness is here [pointing to her face and hair], it is all over me.”30 That is, Rejane can acknowledge the mixture that has characterized her community without ceasing to be Indigenous. This book also acknowledges the similar structural positions that Black and Indigenous peoples have occupied in the dependent settler capitalist society without arguing that they are therefore the same.

Since the 1988 constitution, which marked a turn to multiculturalism and an expansion of civil rights in Brazil in the aftermath of the 1964–85 military dictatorship, quilombo is also a legal category that confers collective land rights to those remaining from quilombola communities, guaranteed by Article 68 of the Temporary Constitutional Provisions (Ato das Disposições Constitucionais Transitórias [ADCT]).31 These rights imply quilombolas’ “permanent possession” of the lands they “occupy” and that are necessary for the “guarantee of their physical, social, economic, and cultural reproduction,” as prescribed by Decree 4887 of 2003.32

Decree 4887 regulated the process of quilombola recognition and land demarcation following the 1988 constitution, placing it under the INCRA’s remit. Its stages are analogous to Indigenous land demarcation.33 These include, broadly, the identification and delimitation of the community’s ethnic and geographical boundaries, the possibility for interested parties to contest this initial report, the removal and compensation of non-Indigenous or nonquilombola settlers, and, finally, the territory’s titling and registration. One major difference between the two kinds of titles is that Indigenous lands remain the property of the federal state and only in possession of Indigenous peoples. Quilombola lands, in contrast, are registered in the collective name of an association the quilombo must form to this end. Both processes are premised on the communities’ right to self-identification, as guaranteed by the International Labour Organization (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169. The first
stage of quilombola land demarcation is in fact the community’s registration for a certificate of self-identification at the Palmares Cultural Foundation (Fundação Cultural Palmares [FCP]).

Most quilombos only came to self-identify as quilombos after 1988, as part of their struggles for land. Contemporary quilombos are therefore created as such in the present through kinship, memory, and culture. As of 2020, around three to four thousand quilombola communities have been identified in Brazil. A 2012 estimate counted around 1.17 million quilombola persons, and their number keeps growing. At the time of writing, five quilombos have been identified in the city of Rio de Janeiro, three in Belo Horizonte (the capital city of the state of Minas Gerais), and none in São Paulo.

A separate academic literature on quilombola communities has been produced by Brazilian anthropologists who were hired after 1988 by the state to produce the anthropological and technical reports that support communities’ official recognition and demarcation processes. This literature did not substantively integrate the Black radical tradition discussed above. Policy oriented, these anthropologists institutionalized a more technical definition of quilombo that could guide titling processes. They pushed against a then-dominant and anachronistic typology based on a formulation by the 1740 Overseas Council, which associated quilombos with fugitivity, socioeconomic and geographical isolation, and, consequently, cultural homogeneity and alterity. This anachronistic typology has continued to shape how quilombola communities are popularly imagined, as I discuss throughout this book.

The post-1990s anthropological and legal definition of quilombo contains some elements of Black Brazilian thinkers’ understanding of quilombo, but it is also firmly placed within the framework of ethnic rights. In a 1994 working paper, the Brazilian Anthropology Association (Associação Brasileira de Antropologia [ABA]) determined that contemporaryquilombos, “above all, consist of groups that have developed every-day practices of resistance in the maintenance and reproduction of their characteristic ways of life and in the establishment of their particular territory.” Following this academic consensus, Decree 4887 of 2003 defines them as “ethno-racial groups, following criteria of self-identification, that have a unique historical trajectory and a particular relationship with their territory, and a Black ancestry linking their contemporary resistance to the historical oppression of such groups.” This was an important expansion, or resemanticization, of the term at the time.

For Beatriz Nascimento, favelas should also be understood as one
toponym of the quilombo continuum. Favelas, as racialized, working-class neighborhoods, share with quilombos a history of resistance to dispossession, racism, and elimination in the countryside and the city. Moreover, favelas too are geographies of Black and often also Indigenous cultural, political, intellectual, and spiritual power. In the words of Makota Kidoialem, from the quilombo Manzo Ngunzo Kaiango in Belo Horizonte: “Not that we want to be recognized as a favela, but . . . our characteristics are much like those of favelas. I even say that today the favelas . . . are quilombos, are urban quilombos. If you look there, in the garden, you will find rural medicines, there are healers in the favela, there are congadeiras [women who celebrate the congado, see chapter 3] in the favela, quilombo traditions are spread throughout the favela. . . . And it is in the favela that we find . . . this resistance, this African culture, this tradition, this African heritage, it is not just in the quilombos but also in the favelas.”

Historically, favela communities in Brazil’s Southeast are partially the result of uneven industrialization in the twentieth century, which concentrated in this region and propelled mass rural-urban migration, especially from the Northeast region. The Northeast was also the region with the second largest Indigenous population in Brazil in absolute numbers in 2010. In 2021, São Paulo, Rio, and Belo Horizonte were among the cities with the four highest GDP per capita in Brazil. As such, they have frequently been the destination of those who seek a better life, in search of employment, education, health care, or other services and opportunities. Out of an estimated 17.1 million favelados (favela residents) nationwide in 2021, 20 percent were in São Paulo and Rio, the two cities with the highest absolute number of households within favelas.

These rural-urban migration flows have included Indigenous peoples, who once in the city are often pushed into subemployment and to peripheries. This was the case of the Pankararu, for example (chapter 5). Facing violent land invasions and economic, as well as environmental, crises in their home state of Pernambuco, the Pankararu have seasonally or permanently migrated to São Paulo, working, at first, mostly in civil construction and domestic service. In São Paulo, many were employed in the construction of the Morumbi Stadium and built their homes in its vicinity, cofounding the Favela do Real Parque. Alongside the Pankararu, the Real Parque is home to many Black and brown (pardo) residents in an otherwise mostly white neighborhood. Following Nascimento and Bispo, I therefore understand urban peripheries and favelas like this one as spaces of Black and Indigenous encounters. More broadly, favelization
(favelização, the process of favela formation) is a phenomenon of dependent settler capitalist development that has impacted both Black and Indigenous peoples. Favelas, in turn, are the sociospatial and political expression of marginalized (Black, Indigenous, and working-class) people’s refusal to be overdetermined by these settler capitalist structures.

Legally and in the ABA’s terms, however, favelas are not ethnic communities and therefore do not officially count as quilombos, leaving a majority of poor (Black and Indigenous) Brazilians in urban contexts excluded from this kind of collective land title. In other words, the institutionalized definitions of quilombo have served to keep the number of quilombola communities to a minimum, empowering the state, its lawyers, and experts in the process. In this sense, they are a form of colonial science, producing knowledge about marginalized people at the service of Brazil’s post-1988 liberal democratic and settler capitalist state. In the following chapters, I explore how these institutionalized definitions have served efforts to domesticate and discipline quilombola political demands and visions. I understand these efforts as a settler strategy of pacification. Nevertheless, as Abdias Nascimento reminds us, “Black people utilize such unconfessed propositions of domestication like an offensive boomerang.” The quilombolas whose stories I tell here appropriate and unsettle the state-sanctioned model of quilombos, resuming previous quilombola dreams of freedom in their struggles.

Although around a third or 36.2 percent of Indigenous people in Brazil lived in urban areas in 2010, the landscapes and imageries most associated with Indigenous peoples in Brazil are not cities (especially in the industrialized Southeast) but rural, forested regions such as the Xingu Indigenous Park or the Amazon. Even a cursory glance at Brazil’s history of urbanization, however, disrupts this dichotomy. Indigenous peoples have historically been present in cities long before twentieth-century migration and urbanization trends. All Brazilian cities were, of course, built atop Indigenous territories, and many were founded in the surroundings of or even within Indigenous aldeias (villages) or the missionary settlements known as aldeamentos. São Paulo’s historic center, for example, grew around the Jesuit Colégio de São Paulo de Piratininga (current Pátio do Colégio), established in 1554 inside an aldeia led by Tupi chief Tibiriçá. Despite this history, essentializing notions of indigeneity still commonly perceive Indigenous peoples in urban contexts as out of place and less Indigenous.

In the Southeast, this perception is arguably aggravated by the fact that, in 2010, it was the region with the second smallest absolute number
of self-identified Indigenous persons, last nationally estimated at almost 897,000 people. That same year, nonetheless, São Paulo was also the fourth largest city in absolute numbers (12,977) of Indigenous persons. When only so-called urban Indigenous people were counted—that is, those living outside state-recognized territories—the city of São Paulo ranked first in absolute numbers (11,918) and Rio fourth, at 6,764, while 3,477 Indigenous persons lived in Belo Horizonte. Eighty-four percent of Indigenous peoples in the Southeast were urban. It is by far the region with the highest percentage of urban Indigenous people in Brazil.

The invisibility of Indigenous people in the region’s capitals is linked to the flawed dualisms of rural-urban divides, which associate the Southeast with modernization, European immigration, and whitening. It is also linked to a related anti-Indigenous racism that relegates Indigenous persons to a non- or premodern “wilderness”—not unlike popular notions of quilombos. This eliminationist logic informs the body of law surrounding Indigenous rights, for they have so far not been extended to Indigenous peoples in urban contexts (see chapter 1) and the National Indian Foundation has only rarely attended to urban Indigenous peoples’ demands. Many Indigenous people, such as Eliane Potiguara, have been writing and organizing against these eliminationist imageries and policy frameworks for a long time. For Gersem Baniwa, “to only acknowledge the differentiated rights of Indigenous people who reside in state-recognized Indigenous lands is a big mistake, because it is an attitude of profound discrimination and racism. Indigenous communities in urban centers are true aldeias, with their caciques and ways of life, who also fight for land demarcation. The Indigenous and indigenista movements need to consider and include these new rights-bearing, Indigenous collective subjects in their recognition processes and in their demands for public policies.”

This is the conjuncture against which Aldeia Maracanã in Rio and the Indigenous Pindorama students in São Paulo have organized, struggling not just for public policies in the city but also to assert their sovereign right to define their collective identities (on sovereignty, see chapter 4 and conclusion). In this process, they have had to negotiate hegemonic notions of indigeneity, unable to remain entirely outside of them. This experience resonates not just with quilombos in Brazil but also with Indigenous peoples around the world. In the words of Nunga scholar Irene Watson, “colonization brought its own way of looking at us, and in turn this construction affected how we also looked at ourselves. . . . The objective view is ‘known’ to be more reliable than our own oral stories about ourselves, which are too much ‘inside the story,’ and not sufficiently distant from the
subject. The state, engaging the ‘expert,’ imposes its way of knowing us, and deploys colonial institutions to name us, and we are left to work with this, sifting the sand to find the kernel of our lives.”61

MILITARIZED, DEPENDENT SETTLER CAPITALISM

A growing body of research, including my own, demonstrates that contemporary Latin American societies such as Brazil are settler colonies.62 In this section, I place this literature in dialogue with Marxist dependency theory and with the problem of militarization in Brazil.63 This is an important exercise because, despite the burgeoning scholarship on settler colonialism in Latin America, Brazil remains most commonly defined as an extraction colony rather than a settler colony.64 But settler colonies are extractive through dispossession, and extraction often requires settlement.65 Indeed, primitive accumulation more broadly has also entailed dispossession.66 Brazilian sociologist Florestan Fernandes, for instance, characterizes Brazil as “an extraction colony with some elements of povoamento [population] and the constant demographic increase of colonos [colonizers or settlers].”67 Moreover, the 1548 regiment given to Brazil’s first governor-general, Tomé de Souza, already prescribed a colonization plan that combined military conquest and defense, peopling (povoação), settlement (assento), and agricultural production (in the sugar engenhos or mills). Deployed through the sesmaria land grant system, this plan also aimed to spread the Christian faith and establish Portuguese sovereignty over the land and the people indigenous to it.68 That said, it is true that Portuguese colonialism in Brazil did not include as large a movement of European settlers as Anglophone settler colonies. In this context, the Portuguese attempted to engage Indigenous peoples as settlers in their own lands.69 I return to this below.

In Patrick Wolfe’s much-cited formulation, settler colonialism is not an event but a structure, for “settlers come to stay.”70 In Brazil, this is evidenced by how independence in 1822 was declared by Portuguese and Portuguese-descended elites, who understood themselves as continuing a European “civilizing mission in the tropics.”71 Since then, Brazil’s bourgeoisies and its political elites have continued, structurally, to be descendants of Europeans.72 In a country whose population was 46.5 percent pardo,73 9.3 percent preto (Black), 0.38 percent Indigenous, and 43.1 percent white in 2019, federal representatives in Congress were 75.6 percent white and 24.4 percent pretos or pardos.74 Meanwhile, until the 2022 elections, only two Indigenous persons had ever been elected to
Congress in the history of Brazil.\textsuperscript{75} And while white Brazilians’ salaries were 73.9 percent higher than those of Black Brazilians in 2018,\textsuperscript{76} 75.5 percent of the tenth percentile of the population with the lowest income per capita in 2015 were pretos and pardos,\textsuperscript{77} and 49 percent of Indigenous people were among the fifth poorest segment of Brazil’s population.\textsuperscript{78} Even after the 1988 constitution, plurality and democratic rights have remained mostly formalities.

\textbf{(Super)Dispossession, Elimination, and (Super)Exploitation}

As settlers have stayed, they have also strived to make colonized lands productive to the European mercantilist and, later, Euro-American capitalist system. The entire enterprise is thus founded upon the dispossession of Indigenous people. It has also relied on the extraction (or appropriation) of land, labor, and knowledge not only from Native people but also from other peoples to be colonized.\textsuperscript{79} In the interests of the Portuguese Crown, Brazil became a primary goods-exporting economy in the emerging international division of labor, and its industrialization was directly and indirectly hampered.\textsuperscript{80} The aforementioned sesmarias model served this end. It divided the colony into large estates (\emph{latifúndios}) under the ownership and management of Portuguese noblemen and settlers.\textsuperscript{81} In these estates, production was monocultural, export oriented, and based on the forced labor of Indigenous and, since the mid-sixteenth century, of African people.\textsuperscript{82} Trafficking itself was a profitable industry. For over three centuries, production followed the boom-and-bust cycles of raw materials such as sugar, tobacco, cotton, rubber, and coffee in the world market. We can summarize this extractive, primary good-exporting system, premised on Indigenous and Black dispossession and exploitation, as a first iteration of Brazil’s dependent settler capitalism.\textsuperscript{83}

The historical and ongoing dispossession and exploitation of Black and Indigenous peoples have been underpinned by their interrelated but distinct dehumanization, which Sylvia Wynter conceptualizes as the coloniality of being.\textsuperscript{84} In Maldonado-Torres’ words, anti-Indigenous and anti-Black racisms comprise “a certain skepticism regarding the humanity of the enslaved and colonized sub-others.”\textsuperscript{85} Dehumanization has implied both “thingification” and infantilization. And it lies at the core of what Wolfe labeled the settler colonial “logic of elimination.”\textsuperscript{86} While from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries Portuguese and later Brazilian colonizers enslaved Black people (as “nonhuman”) without significant legal debate, they deemed Indigenous peoples “to have souls” and be “perfectible” through “civilization,” as “sub-humans.”\textsuperscript{87} Throughout the centuries,
Portuguese colonial law maintained that Indigenous people could only be enslaved if they were of “enemy” Indigenous nations and in cases of just war or “rescue” from other nations. Allied Indigenous people had the right to remunerated labor and “good treatment.” In practice, all sorts of tricks were devised to evade these laws, and records indicate that Indigenous people were enslaved into the nineteenth century. In seventeenth-century São Paulo, the practice was so widespread that Indigenous people who were not residents of missionary aldeamentos came to be called ne-gros da terra, Black people of the land.

For Native peoples, the project of civilization implied just wars, on the one hand, and catechization in aldeamentos, on the other. In the aldeamentos, Indigenous people were (often forcefully) placed under missionary guardianship (tutela) to be catechized, disciplined into European labor practices and relations to land, and made available for labor and military deployment. Aldeamentos thereby also freed up larger areas for colonization. They were spaces in which confinement, dispossession, exploitation, and elimination worked in tandem to turn Indigenous peoples into productive subjects of the Portuguese Crown in the absence of mass Portuguese migration to the New World. The model was adapted throughout the centuries in Brazil, by the 1759 Pombaline Reforms in the aftermath of the 1750 Treaty of Madrid, the 1845 Regulamento das Missões (Regulation of the Missions), and the Indian Protection Service (1910–1967, later National Indian Foundation, FUNAI, 1967 to the present) in republican Brazil.

For enslaved African people, the forced diaspora itself was a process of deterritorialization that attempted to disrupt their linguistic, religious, kinship, and political practices. Cedric Robinson dubbed this process “the creation of the Negro,” a wider logic of Black elimination through which the West’s historical reliance on Africa and Black knowledge systems has been made invisible. Once in the New World, enslaved peoples’ high mortality rates, the imposition of Christianity, and the violent suppression of African knowledges continued the work of Black elimination. In parallel, legal and socioeconomic conditions including the institution of slavery itself, imagined as a kind of tutelage, kept Black people from formal access to land.

The logic of elimination is central to settler colonialism, not only because it ideologically justifies the exploitation and dispossession of Indigenous and Black peoples but because it also helps to legitimize and naturalize the settler polity by attempting to erase Black and Indigenous sociopolitical systems that challenge it. And while this logic takes the
form of genocide and biocultural assimilation, it should not be reduced to the definitive disappearance of peoples to be colonized. As Wolfe argues, “the process of settler colonialism does not simply replace native society tout court. Rather, the process of replacement maintains the refractory imprint of the native counterclaim” so that the logic of elimination “marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler-colonial society.” To borrow the words of Kanaka Maoli scholar J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, “settler colonialism is a structure that endures indigeneity, as it holds out against it.”

Nationalist celebrations of Indigenous and Black peoples as two of Brazil’s three founding races, for example, are not in contradiction with the logic of elimination. Symbolic narratives and gestures of this kind still relegate them to the past and to cultural difference, eliminating their political systems as definitively subjugated to national (settler) sovereignty. They also legitimize the settler society as a distinct national formation in the present and future. Elimination, as a logic, is not an event—it persists as an organizing principle of power relations in the settler colony, even as it continuously fails to fully destroy Black and Indigenous worlds, as the stories of the five communities in this work illustrate. Indigenous and Black people have resisted on all fronts through outright war, flight, and other more ambiguous practices such as religious and cultural syncretism.

The formation of a Brazilian national society per se became a firm goal since at least the mid-eighteenth century, in ways that reveal the distinct place imagined for Black and Indigenous peoples in it. The 1759 reforms implemented by the marquis of Pombal envisaged that catechized (“civilized”) Indigenous peoples and Portuguese settlers would form a Portuguese civilization in the tropics, a “free Brazilian people,” while excluding enslaved Black people. To this end, Indigenous elimination was accelerated: marriages between Portuguese and Indigenous persons were encouraged, Portuguese was instituted as the official language, the aldeamentos were placed under lay governance and therefore stricter sovereign control, and the Jesuits were expelled. The Pombaline Reforms left long-term ripple effects in Brazil, inspiring postindependence indigenista projects.

As the abolition of slavery gradually approached after independence, the Lei de Terras of 1850 would come to serve as a key instrument of Black and Indigenous dispossession and exploitation. Inspired by Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s “systematic theory of settler colonization” in Australia and New Zealand, the law instituted the system of private property in Brazil by determining purchase as the only valid way to acquire land. In so doing, it hindered Indigenous and Black peoples’ legal access to land and
protected the interests of big landowners. The law for example merged and declared numerous aldeamentos as extinct, with the official justification that their residents were too mixed to count as Indigenous.¹⁰¹ For anthropologist Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, this comprised “a first version of twentieth-century criteria for ethnic identity.”¹⁰² Returning to the opening anecdote, at the level of the state and dominant interests, miscegenation was first employed to eliminate and dispossess Indigenous peoples rather than as the foundation for an egalitarian society.¹⁰³ In the northeastern state of Pernambuco, home of the Pankararu, all Indigenous territories were thus declared extinct by the end of the nineteenth century.

Brazil has since remained one of the countries with the highest levels of concentration of land ownership in the world, with 45 percent of rural lands in the hands of less than 1 percent of landowners.¹⁰⁴ This land concentration has remained racialized: in 2017, 72.2 percent of landowners/producers of farms larger than 500 hectares (around 1,235 acres) were white.¹⁰⁵ I understand superdispossession as the racialized process behind such high levels of land concentration.¹⁰⁶ And the agribusiness lobby holds significant power in Congress, such as via the Frente Parlamentar da Agropecuária that presents an institutionalized opposition to quilombola, Indigenous, and environmental rights.¹⁰⁷

The logic of elimination played another pivotal, historical role in the transition from enslaved to waged labor in Brazil. Haunted by the specter of the Haitian revolution and facing the need to affirm Brazil’s place in the modern nation-state system, Brazil’s intelligentsia was concerned with the country’s racial makeup: the 1872 census had revealed a population that was 61.9 percent Black (preto and pardo) and Indigenous.¹⁰⁸ Fearing challenges to their white supremacy, Brazilian men of science reinterpreted pseudoscientific racist theories between 1870 and 1930 to conclude that miscegenation would lead to the elimination of nonwhite populations, or to Brazil’s gradual whitening (branqueamento).¹⁰⁹ Arguably, the settler colonial logic of elimination, now pseudoscientific, intensified after independence.

To accelerate whitening, Black people were to be replaced with white, European workers. To this end, Brazilian states implemented restrictive immigration policies and subsidized European settlement. Pushed at least in part by these incentives, around 4.3 million settlers arrived in Brazil between 1821 and 1932, mostly in the South and Southeast regions.¹¹⁰ And, between 1872 and 1950, Brazil’s population shifted from 38.1 to 62.5 percent white.¹¹¹ The 1845 Regulation of the Missions in turn continued the project of Indigenous assimilation as Indigenous peoples were relegated
to a “supplementary” agricultural labor force and eliminated “as natives” in this process. Their integration as workers was perceived as socializing, as a process of elimination through assimilation. At the same time, racist attitudes such as the notion that Indigenous people were “lazy” served to “justify” their low remuneration. The elimination of Black and Indigenous people was structurally similar but differed in content: settlers understood Black peoples as transitioning to mulatto then white, and Indigenous peoples to caboclo (mixed white and Indigenous people) and then civilized.

The racist marginalization of Black and Indigenous people in the formal labor market in the aftermath of the Lei de Terras also helped keep this large population de facto excluded from access to land. These excluded people formed a racialized permanent surplus population that Moura dubbed the franja marginal (marginal fringes). To adapt the words of Darcy Ribeiro, when Indigenous and Black peoples are pushed out of their territories that guarantee their political and social reproduction, they are forced into “the mass of landless workers, and comprise its most vulnerable and wretched segment.” Put succinctly, the logic of elimination (re) materialized in Brazil’s process of class formation. Both property and salary have since remained the “privilege of Whiteness.”

At the same time, the economic surpluses of the nineteenth-century coffee boom in the Southeast region and protectionist measures such as the 1844 Alves Branco tariff stimulated the incipient industrialization of urban centers linked to the coffee economy, especially Rio and São Paulo. As industrialization picked up pace in the twentieth century, it attracted growing numbers of migrants to the region’s capital cities. Many migrants were landless rural (Indigenous, enslaved, and freed) people, who came increasingly from poorer regions such as the Northeast pushed by decades of often violent dispossession and, after 1960, the Green Revolution that reduced the demand for unskilled agricultural labor and aggravated local environmental crises.

Industrialization, nonetheless, was constricted by Brazil’s dependent position in the world economy, with all the unequal commercial, productive, and financial relations between center and periphery it implies—a condition that Kwame Nkrumah describes as neocolonialism. Let us take import substitution industrialization (ISI) in the mid-twentieth century as a brief illustrative example. ISI began during the period of crisis triggered by the two World Wars and the 1929 financial crash, when it became imperative to supplant Brazil’s reliance on imports by diversifying and expanding national production. Although ISI fostered growth,
especially of Brazil’s durable consumer goods (such as the automotive) industry, it ultimately repositioned Brazil as an importer of obsolete technology from central economies. Thus the superiority of foreign companies was reestablished. National companies then sought to maintain their levels of profit by intensifying the exploitation of the occupied workforce, such as by extending the workday. At the same time, the adoption of these technologies served to increase the number of obsolete workers, the franja marginal, which has continued to help depress wages across the board. And lower wages mean lower consumption levels, which hinders the formation of a domestic market so central to sustained industrialization. In other words, dependent industrialization not only pushed even more Brazilians (often Black and Indigenous) into sub- or unemployment, and into the tertiary sector, it also played the role of worsening the work conditions and remuneration of those formally employed. The persistence of the minimum wage below subsistence levels and of comparatively high rates of hunger, income inequality, and poverty in Brazil all stand as evidence for this reality of superexploitation.

Building on the work of Ruy Mauro Marini, Marxist dependency theorists contend that superexploitation is the essence of underdeveloped economies. This is the case because superexploitation partially or totally compensates capitalists in the dependent economy for the surplus value lost to central economies, thus helping the former maintain their rates of profit in the face of capitalist competition. And, if the (re)production of a franja marginal is functional to superexploitation, then we can affirm that the settler colonial logics and processes that support it have equally become functional to dependent capitalist development. Postindependence dependent capitalist development rearticulated and grafted onto rather than overcame settler colonial relations. Dependency in Brazil comprises direct and indirect foreign infiltration and extraction in alliance with local capitalist classes through intensified settler capitalist logics and processes. That said, Brazil’s dominant classes are also subordinated to and in competition with Global North capitalist and state interests in ways that limit their national (dependent settler) sovereignty. In the words of Nkrumah, “A state in the grip of neo-colonialism is not master of its own destiny.” This is how I understand the problem of dependent settler capitalism in Brazil, and it has implications for the task of decolonization in the Third World.

Staying with superexploitation for now, one concrete expression of it has been the formation of favelas. In this context of underdevelopment, the mass of rural migrants who arrived in the southeastern capitals
were met with insufficient formal employment as well as inadequate public housing and transport, despite the social reforms of the Vargas Era (1930–45).\textsuperscript{133} Pushed into homelessness, poverty, and informality, this urban surplus population, including Indigenous people as records indicate, first lived in tenement houses known as cortiços.\textsuperscript{134} But as cortiços were eradicated by turn-of-the-century modernist urban reforms, this diverse mass of marginalized citizens resisted by forming new communities—the favelas. That is to say, Indigenous and Black peoples negotiated and challenged the structural conditions thrust upon them by creating new geographies of homemaking in the city.

Decades of ensuing favela removal programs have been unable to halt the growth of favelas in number and in size.\textsuperscript{135} Frequently, when a favela was removed, usually from areas of speculative interest—itself a process of dispossession and elimination—residents merely relocated to other favelas or formed new ones. This was the story of Quilombo Sacopã and of parts of Maré (chapters 2 and 5). More recently, the IBGE estimated that the number of favelas had doubled between 2010 and 2021.\textsuperscript{136} It is thus fair to affirm that industrialization, class formation, and urbanization (including favelization) in Brazil have been related phenomena of dependent settler capitalist development in the countryside and the city.

\textit{Militarization and Pacification}

Despite favelas’ creative, political, and intellectual vibrancy, they have also become the sites of further iterations of the logic of elimination for the sake of dispossession and exploitation. One current manifestation of this logic is the militarization of life in favelas. At the same time that Brazil’s 1988 constitution entailed an unprecedented expansion of civil rights, an emerging penal and carceral state renewed the “military model of criminal policy” of the preceding dictatorship.\textsuperscript{137} In this post–Cold War context, the state’s internal enemies shifted from leftist revolutionaries and movements to the criminal organizations popularly called drug factions, which had begun to form during the dictatorship years (see chapter 5). The consequences of the ensuing so-called war on drugs are well-known. They have included structured state neglect alongside the exponential growth of prisons, going from 88,041 inmates in 1988 to 773,151 in 2019; investments in increasingly lethal weapons and vehicles that have militarized policing; and the ever more frequent domestic deployment of the military as a police force during public security crises.\textsuperscript{138}

Favelas have borne the brunt of Brazil’s post-1990s punitive and neoliberal governance model. Stigmatized as the territories and population
of the latest internal enemy, favelas and their residents frequently face violent and lethal police incursions and are disproportionately represented in Brazil’s prison system. Despite a Supreme Court ruling that prohibited police operations in favelas during the COVID-19 public health crisis, for instance, the police murdered 6,416 people throughout Brazil in 2020, mostly in the cities of Rio (415) and São Paulo (390). Of these, 76 percent were twenty-nine years old or younger, 98.4 percent were male, and 78.9 percent were pretos and pardos. In the midst of the pandemic, as favelas faced insufficient public service provision and the misinformation campaigns of a denialist federal government, in May 2021 the police also killed twenty-eight residents of the Jacarézinho favela in what became Rio’s deadliest police raid.

This genocide of Brazil’s Black population is a manifestation of the logic of elimination, as is the marginalization that serves to normalize it. Marginalization comprises a sociopolitical, economic, and spatial exclusion steeped in the dehumanization of subordinated people. Marginalized peoples are erased from memory and history, in policy making, as rights bearing subjects and from spaces of power and political participation. As to favela residents, this erasure not only attempts to naturalize the violence committed against them but also their exploitation and dispossession.

Alongside superexploitation and superdispossession, anti-Black and anti-favela violence is another settler capitalist imperative that is intensified in the semiperiphery. A brief comparison of police murders in Brazil and the United States illustrates this point. While the United States is an exception in global rankings of police violence comprised mostly of developing countries, police murders in Brazil in 2020 were nearly six times higher than in the United States (1,126). While there are important continuities in anti-Black violence across the North and South, we also need a language and analytical framework that can explain their idiosyncrasies. Together, the perspectives of settler colonialism and dependency help us in this task.

From this perspective, militarization in contemporary Brazil is not limited to the present context; it is a fundamental and structural characteristic of a settler society. For Cynthia Enloe, militarization is the normalization of war in the everyday. The structure of settler colonialism in turn normalizes an unfinished war of conquest in the everyday, with which violent assertions of economic, spiritual, cultural, and political domination have gone hand in hand. Settler societies are always militarized societies. By portraying the conquest of peoples to be colonized as “finished” (in the
past), settlers continuously attempt their pacification (subjugation and assimilation) in the present. Returning to Wolfe, pacification is a militarized process through which settlers attempt to “destroy to replace” and it, too, is a (still-settling) structure not an event.\textsuperscript{149} To apply Maldonado-Torres’s terms, colonialism is a racialized, gendered, and sexualized program of domination that naturalizes and radicalizes practices otherwise reserved for wartime, such as enslavement, elimination, and rape, through pacification.\textsuperscript{150} In the words of Ailton Krenak, “we are at war. I don’t why you are looking at me with this friendly face. Your world and my world are at war. The ideological fabrication that we are at peace serves to keep the thing going. There is no peace, not anywhere. There is war everywhere, all the time.”\textsuperscript{151}

The policy of pacification has appeared across disparate colonial and imperial military engagements from the sixteenth to the twenty-first century. These have included the Iberian conquest of the Americas, nineteenth-century French colonialism in Algeria, twentieth-century US imperialism in Vietnam, ongoing Israeli settler colonialism in Palestine, and the so-called wars on terror, drugs, crime, and poverty.\textsuperscript{152} In a review of these interrelated contexts of pacification, Mark Neocleous describes it as a hearts and minds approach that “aims not only at destroying ‘the present, gloomy old life,’ but also ‘replacing it with a brighter and nicer new life.’”\textsuperscript{153} In this task, it has combined security (military and police force) with human development (health, infrastructure, education, and economic growth) to produce “the ideal citizen-subjects of capitalism” in target communities.\textsuperscript{154} Pacification is thus a productive and recurring counterinsurgency or counterrevolutionary strategy, a military and ideological (cohesion-based and consent-forming) program of capitalist accumulation.\textsuperscript{155} In this sense, pacification is one element of what Lorenzo Veracini calls the “global settler-colonial present.”\textsuperscript{156}

In postindependence Brazil, the aim to pacify Indigenous peoples was first federally institutionalized under the \textit{política indigenista} (indigenista policies) of the Indian Protection Service (SPI), founded in 1910 with the paternalistic mission to “gently” attract, settle, govern, and integrate Indigenous peoples into the national workforce.\textsuperscript{157} To this end, it placed Indigenous nations under its secular tutelage and in state-controlled territories. In official discourse, the pacification of Indigenous peoples was portrayed as their humanitarian and nonviolent protection as they inevitably assimilated into modern civilization by the sheer force of its persuasive power.\textsuperscript{158} As Antonio Carlos de Souza Lima shows, however, the language of protection and pacification in fact obscured the violent “historical processes
of destruction, submission, alliance and reorganization” of peoples to be colonized. Pacification, steeped in the logic of elimination, continued a colonial war of conquest through everyday state administration. In Lima’s apt wording, it thus comprised um grande cerco de paz (a massive siege of peace).

The SPI’s eliminationist policy reached its zenith during Brazil’s 1964–85 military dictatorship. Even after the FUNAI replaced the service in 1967, the (still legally valid) 1973 Indian Statute extended the state’s tutelary powers over Indigenous peoples and categorized them into stages of integration or emancipation. The more civilized Indigenous peoples became, the statute posited, the more emancipated and therefore the less eligible for protection, including land rights, they would be—a logic we already observed from the nineteenth century. The proposed 1978 Indigenous Emancipation bill took the statute to its logical conclusion: it proposed to legally emancipate all Indigenous peoples and open their lands to economic interests. Its effect, nonetheless, was quite the opposite. Brazil’s contemporary Indigenous movement emerged in many ways as a collective resistance to this bill, specifically, and the dictatorship, more generally, culminating in a historical political mobilization at the 1987 Constituent Assembly. Only the 1988 constitution formally broke with the assimilationist, tutela-based paradigm of indigenista policy.

Nonetheless, the tenets of tutela have de facto endured after 1988. The notions of Indigenous authenticity imbued in popular representations and public policy discussed above are one example of this continuity (see chapters 1 and 2). Patrick Wolfe helpfully describes such notions as a kind of “repressive authenticity” saturated with a culture logic that is “both more diffuse and more resilient than the formal provisions of juridical or legislative determinations.” Institutionalized notions of ethnicity also function—even if inadvertently—as the semiotic pivot of the asymmetrical relationship between a settler state that retains the authority to officially determine who counts as ethnic and the populations it thereby attempts to manage. Indeed, the question of authenticity, on which the ethnic rights of both Indigenous and quilombola peoples rest, illustrates the connections between the imperatives to know in order to conquer and govern. A key element of pacification is precisely such a “semiotic labor,” through which conquerors seek to understand and, in the process, create a radical alterity (the Other) who is to be dehumanized, militarily subjugated, and then productively integrated into the colonizers’ society. That is, pacification is continued via the state’s conciliatory policies, including ethnic rights.
One way that the state attempts to integrate Black and Indigenous peoples is through the creation of numerous authorized political subjects and movements. In this regard, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui describes the “indio permitido” as a kind of Indigenous politics that stays within the cultural model of indigeneity and does not fundamentally challenge the authority of the state and neoliberal accumulation. Charles Hale adds that “the concessions and prohibitions of neoliberal multiculturality structure the spaces that cultural rights activists occupy; defining the language of contentions; stating which rights are legitimate, and what forms of political action are appropriate for achieving them; and even, weighing in on basic questions of what it means to be Indigenous.” As many scholars have argued, recognition and rights are granted only to those who do not fundamentally challenge the status quo. In the chapters that follow, I identify the creation of numerous “permitted” Black and Indigenous subjects that serve to co-opt and fragment (or pacify) their more radical resistances to settler capitalist and state interests.

We find indications of the close ties between pacification and ethnic rights in the 1988 constitution itself. Even though Indigenous peoples understand themselves as peoples or povos, the constitutional text adopts the less political term communities. It hereby maintains the primacy of settler sovereignty over Indigenous and Black political systems. Furthermore, as Bispo points out, while codified Indigenous and quilombola rights (Articles 231 and 232 and Article 68 of the ADTC) defend the inalienability and indivisibility of Black and Indigenous lands, they maintain the possibility of economically exploiting their resources. Legal frameworks also articulate these rights through notions of possession and ownership that conflict with Indigenous and Black relations to land. The question that then emerges is why urban Black and Indigenous movements still insist on defending their constitutional rights, given their structural limitations. I return to this question throughout this work.

The wars waged against quilombos of the past were certainly also attempts to pacify the threat they posed to settlers and their socioeconomic system. In the twenty-first century, pacification has resurfaced in the form of the Pacification Police Units (UPPs), a public security policy targeted at Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. As part of the preparations for the 2014 and 2016 sports megaevents, Rio’s government declared a humanitarian crisis in favelas and launched a Pacification Program that officially aimed to retake (or reconquer, as Rio’s 2007–14 Gov. Sérgio Cabral put it) the favela territories that armed drug organizations controlled, bring them under the democratic rule of law, and promote their socioeconomic
development.\textsuperscript{177} The program took inspiration from previous community and proximity policing experiments in Rio and in Medellín and built on lessons Brazil had supposedly learned from its involvement in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) regarding personnel training and tactics.\textsuperscript{178} In theory, Pacification was to follow the phases of the clear-hold-build (CHB)—in Wolfe’s terms, “destroy to replace”—approach adopted in Haiti, beginning with intelligence gathering, followed by the military invasion and occupation of favelas, and finally installing proximity policing stations, the UPPs.\textsuperscript{179} Through public-private partnerships, pacified communities would subsequently benefit from new and expanded services and infrastructure, besides numerous activities run by the occupying police and/or military forces, including professional training courses, educational initiatives, and social programs.

The UPPs were implemented as part of an emerging neoliberal urban entrepreneurial governance model in Rio and within a federal growth-oriented economic policy framework. Scholars have described Pacification as a wider social intervention program, a civilizing mission that helped secure the capital accumulation boosted by the sports megaevents.\textsuperscript{180} The public-private partnerships it comprised also aimed to reeducate and discipline favela residents into “new favelados.”\textsuperscript{181} As Márcia Pereira Leite argues, this new favelado is “firstly pacified (as in, disconnected from the drug trafficking network and the violence it implies) and then captured by the market (through the ideology of entrepreneurship that animates state and nonstate action in favela territories).”\textsuperscript{182} Market capture was also furthered by the formalization of previously informal businesses and markets in favelas as well as rising real estate speculation in pacified favelas and their surrounding areas, especially in already privileged parts of the city. In other words, Pacification aimed to reshape a population commonly targeted by Rio’s police as “the [unruly] civil population of the enemy forces” into a politically assimilated (permitted) subject made productive for neoliberal appropriation.\textsuperscript{183} This is precisely how Neocleous defined pacification, as the promise and imposition of “a brighter and nicer new life.”\textsuperscript{184}

Promising democracy, development, and security, the UPPs were in fact marked by numerous and frequently fatal human rights abuses in target favelas (see chapter 5). In some communities, including in Maré, Pacification amounted to military occupations that transformed them into war zones. Settler colonialism’s civilizing mission thus reveals itself as a necrohumanitarianism: a promise of civilization premised on recurring genocidal wars of conquest. In this context, the 2013 disappearance of Rocinha resident and bricklayer Amarildo Dias de Souza, last seen as
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military police officers took him to the local UPP station, sparked mass protests throughout the city that repeatedly asked, “Where is Amarildo?” (fig. 1.1).185 Thereafter, the UPPs faced a crisis of legitimacy later aggravated by the declared bankruptcy of Rio’s government in 2016. Overall, after reaching thirty-eight installed units, the UPPs did not eradicate Rio’s drug organizations and neither were favela residents’ lives radically transformed for the better.186 In 2022, the UPPs were relaunched as the Cidade Integrada (Integrated City) program, which prioritizes the expansion of credit lines and the construction of formal housing units in target favelas under the (growth-oriented) Casa da Gente Program.187 From the perspective of dependent settler capitalism, the failure of Rio’s Pacification Program forms part of the unfinished task of conquest, as settler capitalism resettles in each new wave of capitalist accumulation.188

A final note on these settler colonial continuities: like dependency, the resilience of settler colonialism is not a historical necessity but rather the result of dynamic historical movements and processes that become evident when studied through a diachronic approach.189 Settler colonialism only appears to be totalizing, an inescapable yet invisible structure, a fait

Figure I.1. Girl at a 2014 protest paints the Brazilian flag with the name of Amarildo Dias de Souza, who was tortured and executed by police. (Photo courtesy of Antonello Veneri and Henrique Gomes.)
accompli. In reality, Indigenous and Black peoples have always challenged it. This is why Audra Simpson speaks of a still settling colonialism that is concomitantly always failing.\textsuperscript{190}

For instance, I do not dismiss that the 1987 Constituent Assembly was a time when political horizons were at least partially open and do not diminish the democratic process that culminated in the 1988 constitution. Its victories were the result of sustained Black and Indigenous mobilization, for instance, and they were real—in the sense that they have structured real, lived possibilities for many quilombolas, Indigenous people, and favelados. One such possibility has been the increase in the number of self-identified Indigenous persons from 294,131 in 1991 to 734,127 in 2000. Although this growth is not fully understood, it is usually associated with the post-1988 shifts in Indigenous rights, when indigeneity was resignified more positively and some of the stigmas that would have previously discouraged Indigenous self-identification were challenged. This matters.

The constitution also remained within the limits of a liberal democracy and did not fundamentally disrupt the colonial and capitalist foundations of Brazilian society. But its democratic opening did set the foundations for another moment of potential rupture: the election of Workers’ Party (PT) President Lula in 2002 as part of Latin America’s Pink Tide. But we know how this story ended—with the persistence of dependency and settler colonial structures and even a deepening of militarization. This result was contingent on the PT’s class conciliatory approach that broke neither with neoliberalism nor with neoextractivism and indeed ostracized and fragmented the social movements that once formed its support base.\textsuperscript{191} The subsequent Bolsonaro administration worked hard to reverse the gains of the PT years, and the attacks on Indigenous and quilombola peoples only intensified. Under Bolsonaro, settler colonialism perhaps more explicitly revealed its genocidal drive. But at every stage, the renewal of settler capitalism and dependency have not been a given. Dominant groups such as the agribusiness lobby have only so far succeeded in maintaining this structure. The possibility for ruptures, too, have persisted, even “in the days of destruction.”\textsuperscript{192} In many ways, this book is about just these glimmers of hope.

**WHY SETTLER COLONIALISM? WHY DEPENDENCY?**

But what does the notion of dependent settler capitalism contribute to existing frameworks, in other words, why this book? Affirming that contemporary Brazil is structured by colonial continuities is nothing new per se.
Scholars of Latin America will probably be more familiar with the notion of “internal colonialism,” for example, developed by dependency theorists Pablo Gonzalez Casanova and Rodolfo Stavenhagen in the Spanish Americas. These authors describe the continuation of Indigenous exploitation after independence with “the same characteristics it had before” and in fact intensifying “as a stage of industrial process.” They also acknowledge the role of anti-Indigenous racism in this exploitation and describe related processes of dispossession, stressing the political domination and forceful assimilation Indigenous people face as exploited workers. Both internal and settler colonialism highlight that colonialism “is above all structural” and that it has always been international and internal, as the process through which external domination has taken root.

Nonetheless, settler and internal colonialism differ on two key interrelated issues. First, Casanova defines internal colonialism as “the domination and exploitation of natives by natives.” Conversely, settler colonialism avoids this categorical confusion by bringing to the fore the fact that settlers, who continue to occupy Indigenous lands, structurally enact exploitation and domination. Second, some interpretations of internal colonialism suggest that capitalist (class) relations will eventually replace colonial (ethnic-racial) relations. This flawed assumption can be linked to the dismissal of the material weight of race, as coconstituting class relations, and to an attachment to the idea that modernization (at least potentially) implies acculturation. Rather, as I argue throughout this book, capitalist development reproduces colonial structures in the present, and indigeneity endures.

Finally, in the south of the Americas, internal colonialism has been mostly understood as pertaining to Indigenous peoples, while in the North it has primarily been developed through Black radical thought and practice. The perspective brought forward in this book acknowledges how Black and Indigenous peoples have been introduced into Brazil’s settler project in different but related ways. Settler colonialism has fundamentally required the dispossession of Indigenous lands, on which a new polity has been built. But, unlike some strands of settler colonial studies, this book understands settler capitalism as eliminationist and extractivist of both Indigenous and Black lands, labor, knowledges, and cosmologies. In this regard, the quilombos in this book have understood their struggles in relation to, but not identical to, those of Indigenous people (see chapter 2). And Brazil’s Indigenous movement has generally accepted quilombos as having much in common with Indigenous peoples. But solidarities have not always been sustained. In this regard, what is at stake is a plural world
in which Black and Indigenous futures have both found a place, without obscuring one another. Nonetheless, to borrow the words of Tuck, Guess, and Sultan, “there isn’t something easy to say about this,” especially by a white scholar. My hope, more modestly, is that the present work contributes to tracing the entanglements between Black and Indigenous experiences in Brazil.

Building on and expanding dependency theories, the post-1990s coloniality/modernity/decoloniality research collective has developed another and increasingly salient framework through which the Anglophone and Brazilian academy have approached Latin America. Coloniality/modernity locate the onset of modernity, an epistemological and material civilizational project, in the so-called long sixteenth century and the colonization of the Americas. The scholars argue that colonial logics and power structures fundamentally shaped modernity. And coloniality, also called the “colonial matrix of power,” articulates the structural continuities of colonialism in the domains of the economy, authority, gender and sexuality, and subjectivity and knowledge under the aegis of modernity. These are all valid points on which the present work builds. Particularly insightful is the differential notion of humanity conveyed in the ideas of the coloniality of being and of knowledge, which also undergirds the logic of elimination.

The trouble with the modernity/decoloniality framework is that it circumscribes settler colonialism within the North of the Americas and asserts that formal or explicit colonization in Latin America has ended. The language of settler colonialism, however, highlights that independence only implied an end to formal colonization for settlers. Returning to Bispo, “today, the colonizers, instead of calling themselves an Overseas Empire, call their organization a Democratic State, and not just burn but also flood, implode, crush, bury, and turn with their earth-moving machines all that is fundamental to our existence and our communities, that is, our territories and all the symbols and significations of our ways of life.” In other words, the perspective of settler colonialism demands a specification of how coloniality frames colonialism’s continuities.

Moreover, the collective proposes decoloniality as an option to delink from the persisting colonial matrix of power in what has become an increasingly epistemological project. In the words of Catherine Walsh and Walter Mignolo, the horizon of decoloniality is not primarily “the confrontation with capitalism and the West” but “the habits that modernity/coloniality implanted in all of us; with how modernity/coloniality has worked and continues to work to negate, disavow, distort and deny knowledges, subjectivities, world senses, and life visions.” In this regard,
the perspective of settler colonialism helps us not lose sight of whiteness as property/salary/capital. Indeed, Walsh and Mignolo would agree that symbolic and material forms of domination are deeply entwined and that capitalism remains the material basis with which epistemic appropriation and erasure are entangled.208 Relatedly, as Unangax̂ scholar Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang affirm, decolonization cannot be reduced to a metaphor, for it “must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted.”209 We can add that it must equally break with racialized labor exploitation. In other words, decolonization must be anticapitalist and anti-imperialist, as it unsettles coloniality/modernity’s ontological and epistemological axes.210 And favelas, quilombos, and Indigenous territories, challenging the foundations of this socioeconomic system such as its private property regime, are the geographies in which this horizon is prefigured.

A key reason why I turn to the perspective of settler colonialism is because the logic of elimination was central to the struggles of the urban Black and Indigenous movements and communities in this book. It was precisely against this logic and the dispossession as well as exploitation it upholds that many of them were organizing in the city. Their stories leave no doubt, as Speed affirms about the whole of Latin America, that Brazil is a settler colony “for reasons that are not debatable.”211 Nonetheless, settler colonialism does not on its own explain the struggles of urban Indigenous and Black peoples in Brazil’s Southeast region. It cannot explain why so many of them have moved to its capital cities or why they were met with under- or unemployment there, often ending up in the service sector as self-employed workers and in the city’s peripheries. This is the reality faced by a diversity of Indigenous peoples in the city, many of whom make a living by selling handicrafts for example.212 It is also the experience of Indigenous women who become domestic servants, sometimes in situations of forced labor and other kinds of violence.213 Marxist dependency theory contextualizes these experiences as part of dependent urbanization, in the face of which Black and Indigenous peoples have organized into the kinds of movements and communities I encountered during my fieldwork.

In this regard, this book also expands Marxist dependency theory by centering race and indigeneity as well as Black and Indigenous thought and practice in Brazil. In so doing, it specifies that postindependence settler colonial logics and structures were renewed and indeed intensified as part of processes of class formation, a perspective that is often still
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dismissed in studies of settler colonialism. The notion of dependent settler capitalism that this book develops is also attentive to the complex patterns of inequality and violence that cut across the northern and southern hemispheres, helps us retain the specificities of Indigenous and Black politics in the Global North and South, and brings to the fore the problem of Third World sovereignty (see conclusion). Finally, the multifaceted dialogue that comprises this book helps avoid an uncritical transference of settler colonial studies from Global North contexts to the Global South.

On a related note, some may argue against understanding Latin American states as settler colonial on the basis that settler colonialism is a foreign concept or thesis to the region, imposed by First World scholars. The similarities between internal and settler colonialism certainly suggest that the notion is in fact quite familiar to Latin America. And both internal colonialism and coloniality have been developed through a transatlantic and hemispheric conversation, especially with Black Marxist thinkers, including from the United States. Antiracist and anticolonial thought and practice in Brazil—such as in the Pan-Africanist tradition—have equally been grounded in such transnational dialogues because they are positioned against global imperial designs with local histories. Forms of resistance have thus never been confined to methodological nationalism. Nevertheless, in the twenty-first century, there is still work to be done in developing sustained hemispheric exchanges in the Americas from a non-Eurocentric perspective that also accounts for the distinct positions of the North and South in the world system. And the perspective of settler colonialism has been primarily developed by Indigenous thinkers and activists around the world to better describe and then challenge the oppressions they face.

Therefore, I suggest that the study of settler colonialism in Latin America serves, at the very least, as an opportunity for a critical exchange with Indigenous political thought and practice in other parts of the world.

Rather than refuting existing interpretive traditions such as dependency and coloniality, settler colonialism complements and expands them. For my thinking on Brazil, settler colonialism offers a more precise language than internal colonialism and coloniality to foreground the continuities across the ruptures of pre- and postindependence Brazilian society. But it does not foreclose a generative engagement with these literatures. Furthermore, while settler colonialism is not the only reference point from which we can view Black and Indigenous encounters, it does highlight their entanglements and differences. That is to say, the study of settler colonialism helps us unsettle the settler imperative to “divide and conquer.” Finally, speaking to fellow Brazilians, I contend that it also
helps us arrive, to return to Moura, “at a better explanation of ourselves—members of the national society—as we are revealed through the other.” And this better explanation can also help us forge better signposts for the journey toward decolonization.

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

Methodologically, this book builds on ethnographically informed fieldwork, including participant observation and interviews conducted between 2014 and 2019 and following a snowball technique. It was Quilombo Sacopã’s leader, Luiz, who told me that I should visit the Quilombo dos Luízes in Belo Horizonte because they both had much in common. And I was encouraged to extend my research to São Paulo by the anthropologist Marcos Santos Albuquerque, whose work had found that São Paulo’s urban Indigenous movement was exceptionally well established in Brazil’s Southeast region. I came to Maré while reporting for the community news site RioOnWatch and have since been building long-term collaborative relations with local organizers and researchers, especially through the Maré from the Inside visual art exhibit and collective. Moreover, my research with each group was based on an explicit agreement on how I would concretely support their work in still evolving collaborations. So far, this has involved, for example, helping digitize their archives (in Quilombo Sacopã), authoring or coauthoring public-facing pieces in their support (with Aldeia Maracanã and members of the Pindorama collective), serving as an external examiner for postgraduate dissertations (also in the case of Pindorama), or reframing my research as an assessment of the strategies and tactics developed by each of them for my final presentation to the community (in Quilombo dos Luízes).

The methodological variations the reader will find in the following chapters reflect the research relationship I built with each community as well as the circumstances they were facing when I arrived. Some chapters build closely on participant observation and semistructured interviews, while others are based on preexisting recordings of meetings, interviews, documentaries, other secondary and online sources, and the knowledge produced by community members themselves, including master’s theses, PhD dissertations, artistic works, books, reports, community-produced censuses, and newspaper articles. I also presented my research to all groups and shared full chapter drafts, translated to Portuguese, with members whose stories these chapters tell. All chapters have been edited and reviewed by members of the referenced communities and movements,
who have also had a say in the book’s overall argument and structure. The present work is the final product of this dialogical process.

Throughout these efforts, the research has inevitably remained steeped in the structural inequalities I embody as a white, settler Brazilian institutionally located in the UK and, more recently, the United States. From this positionality, I carry the responsibility of telling their stories ethically and meaningfully and approach it as a form of active witnessing in which the reader, too, is implicated. To be more precise, the horizon of this witnessing is the destruction of the structural conditions of possibility for my solidarity. In this stance, I agree with Black, nonbinary artist and writer Jota Mombaça that such a solidarity must include a “negative program” in which those in structurally privileged positions also “lose space,’ ‘lose visibility,’ ‘lose voice.’”

In addition, I stress that I do not derive a structural analysis from my qualitative research with the five communities and movements. Rather, I demonstrate how their stories articulate existing arguments in the literature, confirming some of them while throwing their limits into sharp relief. I also do not offer an exhaustive reinterpretation of Brazilian history or theorization of settler colonialism, let alone a reframing of dependency. I turn selectively to these literatures to the extent that they help us better contextualize and understand the five stories. This conversation between the macro and micro is necessary because dependent settler capitalism is the structure or wider context within which urban Black and Indigenous struggles in Brazil’s Southeast region take place. It shapes the push and pull factors of their rural-urban migration and the forces (removal, elimination, superexploitation) against which they organize in the city. Without this backdrop, and without placing them in dialogue with one another, we would gain only a partial view of each of their trajectories. To adapt the words of Clifford Geertz, anthropological understanding, after all, requires “a continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of global structure in such a way as to bring both into view simultaneously.” This has been my horizon in this research.

**BOOK OUTLINE**

In chapter 1, I linger on the question of who counts as Indigenous in the Rio-based urban Indigenous movement Aldeia Maracanã. Aldeia Maracanã reclaimed the area of the former Museum of the Índian by the Maracanã Stadium between 2006 and 2013 as an Indigenous *retomada*, or return. When the community was to be evicted as part of the preparations
for the 2014 and 2016 sports megaevents, movement participants were forced to prove that they were Indigenous. In this task, they had to refract externally defined notions of Indigenous authenticity that renewed the settler colonial logic of elimination to justify their dispossession. Faced with their stubborn resistance, Rio’s state government offered an agreement to the collective that compromised their political project and aligned it with its own interests. This, I argue, was a kind of differentiated political assimilation/elimination, which reproduced Indigenous dispossession in the city for the sake of settler capitalist appropriation. Yet, it is also an elimination and dispossession that has remained unfinished and contested.

In chapter 2, I expand this argument through the story of Quilombo Sacopã, in Rio’s Lagoa neighborhood. I show how the settler capitalist state has attempted to relegate quilombos to a kind of permitted Black subject that dichotomizes between quilombola and favela communities. To access their land rights, Sacopã felt forced to agree to a reduction of their official territory to exclude properties invaded by the luxury residential buildings surrounding them because the federal budget allocated to quilombola demarcation, so the state argued, would not be able to cover their expropriation as prescribed by law. In other words, the quilombo titling process itself had reproduced their dispossession in Lagoa. Within this focus, chapter 2 also departs from the history of Lagoa to trace how urbanization is a dependent settler capitalist phenomenon in Brazil and how the quilombolas of Sacopã have resisted this process by accessing collective land rights while challenging these rights’ structural limitations.

I pick this same thread up in chapter 3 through the story of the Quilombo dos Luízes, in Belo Horizonte’s middle-class neighborhood of Grajaú. In the case of the Luízes, the most recent invasion into their territory (by the construction company Patrimar) had taken place after the publication of their official anthropological report in 2008. The INCRA then single-handedly excluded this and other invaded lands from the community’s official territory, in direct violation of their right to free and informed consent. The Luízes vehemently rejected and have continued to fight this decision. Patrimar was one of the companies that had formed public-private partnerships with the federal government to build the Minha Casa Minha Vida (MCMV) social housing units, a federal, growth-oriented program that served to propel Brazil’s post-2007 real estate market boom. As a direct beneficiary of this boom, Patrimar was not just driving the dispossession of the Luízes family, it was also one of the companies that had bid to build the MCMV condominium to which Aldeia Maracanã
members were relocated after their forced displacement. In other words, even the progressive social policies of the settler state have served the anti-Indigenous and anti-Black interests of capital.

Chapter 4, in turn, is about the Pindorama scholarship program for Indigenous students at a private university in São Paulo, the Pontifícia Universidade Católica (PUC-SP). As one concrete victory of São Paulo's Indigenous movement, the program also comprises a space of political formation for young Indigenous people in the city. Pindorama students have continuously had to engage with the kinds of urban Indigenous politics that others—the general population, the state, NGOs, the Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI), and non-Indigenous researchers such as myself—imagine as authentic. This chapter brings to the fore how the logic of elimination not only attempts to determine the contours and content of Indigenous identity but also that of urban Indigenous movements. It imposes the expectation, for example, that urban Indigenous movements should not aim for social mobility, in Brazil still very much made possible through access to higher education. I reflect on how Pindorama students, refusing such impositions, occupy hegemonic spaces like universities, specifically, and public policies, more generally, as sites of Indigenous autonomy and with the aim to contribute to the transformation of the settler capitalist state and society.

The final substantive chapter is about the Complexo da Maré favela, in Rio’s North Zone. It shows how a settler colonial perspective places Brazil’s carceral and penal state and, more specifically, the militarization and pacification of Maré in a longer historical context. This perspective connects favelas to Indigenous as well as quilombola peoples, albeit with important specificities. Favelas, perceived by settler society as the geographies of the unruly and unpermitted Black subject, are presented not with the soft conquest of political assimilation but with the visceral violence of militarization. Nevertheless, this focus on violence does nothing to break with a global representational practice that has often reduced favelas to this problem and that ultimately reproduces the logics of militarization. At the same time, favela organizers and thinkers have claimed the space to speak about public security in their own terms, arguing for the need for a community-led response and approach to it. In this chapter, I take my cue from them and build closely on their research.

By way of conclusion, I turn to the meaning of decolonization in such a dependent settler capitalist context. In this task, I reflect on the contradictory roles of rights, citizenship, and the state, the so-called master's tools, in Indigenous and Black resistance strategies in Brazil. Refusing to
be prescriptive, I stay with the work of Black and Indigenous organizers and thinkers from Brazil and beyond to make the case for an intersectional and transnational lens that takes settler colonialism into account and centers Black and Indigenous peoples and their intellectual, political, and creative labor. At the same time, to repeat a previous point, the stories I tell in this book and the questions it raises are invariably partial and marked by my positionality. This book, including its concluding section, thus unfolds in the tense gap between the limits and possibilities of politically meaningful scholarship on such uneven ground. On this imperfect terrain, it chooses, not without contradictions, to “speak nearby,” to be in relation, to walk with, and to stand behind Indigenous and Black peoples on the journey to more just horizons.
Who Counts as Indigenous?

The Authenticity Prejudice in Aldeia Maracanã’s Retomada

One morning in June 2014, the members of the Indigenous Association Aldeia Maracanã (AIAM) gathered at the inauguration of Rio’s most recent Minha Casa Minha Vida (MCMV) social housing condominium with president-elect Dilma Rousseff (2011–16). They were there to receive the keys to their new homes. They had been granted MCMV flats as part of a deal they had struck with Rio’s state government at the eleventh hour of their forceful eviction from Aldeia Maracanã (AM). AM was an Indigenous retomada (return or retaking) of the abandoned palace of the former Museu do Índio (Museum of the Indian) that lasted from 2006 to 2013 (fig. 1.1). In the buildup to the June 2013 protests, their violent eviction had become a media event, drawing national and international attention and heavy criticisms of Rio governor Sérgio Cabral (2007–14). On that morning in June 2014, the government’s media and press team paid the Indigenous group a lot of attention. They called them on to the stage with Rousseff, took countless pictures, and recorded collective and individual interviews. This sparked their future neighbors’ curiosity, several of whom approached the group. One such resident and her family turned to Arassari, an AIAM member from the Pataxó Indigenous nation, and asked whether he, too, was Indigenous. He replied, “Yes.” “But you wear braces!” she quickly rebutted. “And I saw that you have a car!” her sister added. I watched as the other Indigenous organizers discreetly stepped away to avoid being drawn into the conversation.

Arassari, with much patience, took on the task of challenging the family’s expectations of what makes a person Indigenous. These expectations usually relegate indigeneity to absolute alterity: to distant, wild territories, past times, and premodern cultures. Braces and cars upset this
image. And so do northeastern Indigenous peoples such as the Pataxó, who have historically mixed with Black and white people and therefore tend to be perceived as pardos. As their conversation with Arassari progressed, one of the non-Indigenous neighbors turned to me and asked,
“You’re not Indigenous as well, are you?” I replied in the negative. “Ah, good, ok. At least that.” I looked at Arassari. His discussion with them, we both recognized, was not enough to break with the prejudices completely. The family still expected indigeneity to have some level of tangible visibility. If I had responded that I, too, was Indigenous, would I have upset their expectations of indigeneity just a little bit too much? They could believe that he, Arassari, was Indigenous, but I was the limit. Otherwise, where will we end up?

This was not an exceptional encounter. Even in their negotiations with the state, AM’s work revolved around challenging the idea that they were not “real Indians.” In this effort, they articulated their own answers to questions with which urban Indigenous movements around the world have been forced to engage: Who counts as Indigenous? Who gets access to Indigenous rights? What do these rights look like in the city? This chapter tackles these questions not with the aim to establish a list of criteria that determine who is and who is not Indigenous but as an essentially political question. Because settler colonial power structures also shape the self-identification and official recognition of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous peoples do not have full control over how and which definitions of indigeneity become institutionalized, let alone over the imageries that have entered the so-called common sense. As such, notions of indigeneity are one space in which power is negotiated, and this becomes particularly tangible in the city.

In 2006, the Instituto Tamoio dos Povos Originários, later AM, had led an Indigenous return to the abandoned building of the Museu do Índio, originally founded by the Indian Protection Services’ (SPI) Studies Section in the 1940s. The Museu do Índio was transferred to the Botafogo neighborhood in the 1970s, where it remains. Calling their community Aldeia Maracanã, the collective turned this site of Brazilian republican assimilationist history into a living space of future-oriented indigeneity and resurgence.3 In March 2013, as part of the preparations for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games, Rio’s government violently removed the collective and, in its efforts to resist removal, AM’s struggle quickly became a matter of recognition. They had to prove that they were not mere squatters but an Indigenous collective that lived on the site as an Indigenous community. For them, AM was an Indigenous territory.

The chapter begins with a brief account of AM as entangled with the history of the Museu do Índio. I elucidate this institution’s role in the historical construction of the “prejudice of authenticity,” a notion developed by Marcos Santos Albuquerque that has partially shaped AM.4 In 2013,
this prejudice ideologically supported the militarized appropriation of AM, whose land, by the Maracanã Stadium, had become valuable in the context of the sports megaevents. The second section discusses how AM has collectively determined who counts as Indigenous through the stories of two AM members, Dauá and Índia. Their stories problematize prevailing debates regarding Indigenous identity, membership, and descent, as well as the so-called impostor discourse. They also point to the intersecting systems of oppression (including class, race, and gender) that shape Indigenous lives in Brazil. In the third and final section, I discuss AM’s forced displacement and negotiations with the state as the collective endured to protect their community until the very last minute. Aiming to pacify this resistance, Rio’s state government offered a partnership that attempted to assimilate the most disruptive of AM’s many political projects into its neoliberal multicultural framework. But at each stage, AM has located itself at the interstices of such hegemonic projects to challenge Indigenous elimination, exploitation, and dispossession in the city.

ALDEIA MARACANÃ’S “RE TOMADA INDÍGENA”

On the night of September 16, 2006, Marize, a Guarani descendant and organizer of the Movimento Tamoio dos Povos Originários, had a dream. In her dream, an enormous pajé, a shaman, held her hand and said to her: “Marize, if you do not occupy the building by October, you will never occupy it.” There had previously been talk about retaking the building of the former Museu do Índio, mainly by Zé Guajajara, one of the movement’s leaders. Marize had immediately embraced the idea, but the plan had yet to become concrete. The day following Marize’s dream was her birthday, and as people called to congratulate her, she began mobilizing the group. They decided to organize an Indigenous retomada of the building on October 12, 2006. “The twelfth of October, don’t you forget,” she said to me, “is the period of the arrival of the Europeans on the American continent. The twelfth of October marks the beginning of the genocide of our people. It had to be October.”

October 12, however, came too soon to finalize the necessary preparations. On October 20, 2006, instead, the group held the First Seminar of the Original Peoples at a nearby auditorium at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ, Rio’s state university) and then made their way to the abandoned palace (fig. 1.2). As Marize recounted: “I went ahead of everyone else. . . . The guy [a guard] put a gun to my head. I was painted all over with urucum. I had a macaw feather on my head. And I said, ‘Calm down,
1º ENCONTRO
MOVIMENTO TAMOIO
PELO RESGATE DOS DIREITOS DOS
POVOS ORIGINÁRIOS DO BRASIL

DIA: 20 DE OUTUBRO 2006
LOCAL: AUDITÓRIO 53 - 5O ANDAR
PAVILHÃO REITOR JOÃO LIRA FILHO

Credenciamento: 9 às 11h.

Abertura: projeção de vídeo.

Palestra/debate: 10 às 12:30- Organização e Resistência dos Povos Originários do Brasil-
12:30 às 13:30- intervalo almoço
13:30 às 15:30- relato de experiência das etnias presentes.
15:30 às 16:30- Toré

Apoio: SEPE/ UERJ/CSAC/ASIB/CNTE

Figure 1.2. Flyer for the first meeting of the Movimento Tamoio, October 2006. (Photo by Desirée Poets.)
we are Indigenous people, we are only coming home. ‘The guy was shaking like this with his gun [she imitated his shaking]. We got all the indígenas inside, . . . and then I said: ‘You can come out!’ Then all the maracás [maracas] started playing—I get goose bumps—the maracás started playing, and Garapirá puxou [started] the toré dance, and sang that song “hai-o . . .” and the people who were with us started coming out: the Guarani, the Patxó . . . everyone with their maracá, and we made a huge circle, all the nations dancing, singing. Soon they went over to the guards and started putting necklaces around their necks.77

This was a coming home (retomada) in the sense that all Brazilian cities, including Rio, are built atop Indigenous lands and in the sense that Indigenous peoples have always been present in the city. In the 1500s, what we currently call Rio was the home of Tupi nations such as the Tamoio or Tupinambá and the Temiminó or Maracajá and later the location of numerous missionary aldeamentos. As an urban center and the capital of the Portuguese Empire from 1808 to 1821 and of Brazil from 1763 to 1960, Rio has historically also attracted Indigenous migrants. In the eighteenth century, for instance, the Portuguese and later Imperial Court relied on the forced labor of Indigenous peoples, who worked in public construction projects and in the navy among other jobs.8 That is, Rio has been built through both Indigenous dispossession and labor exploitation.

Within this wider context, the retomada of the abandoned building had three major interrelated goals. Most immediately, it aimed to increase the visibility of Indigenous peoples in Rio, offering a space where they could come together and organize.9 The latest estimate, from 2010, identified 6,764 Indigenous persons in the city and 15,894 in the state of Rio, of which 15,444 lived outside state-recognized Indigenous territories.10 It is fair to say that, before AM, Rio’s government ignored their presence in the city. In addition, the retomada was a protest against the wider neglect of Indigenous peoples’ material and immaterial heritage, a theme around which the group was already developing initiatives. They organized school visits, sold handicrafts in fairs, and gave talks on Indigenous peoples and struggles.11 The retaking of the abandoned building would help cement and expand these efforts. Finally, the palace and its grounds would also serve as a housing option for Indigenous people who temporarily or permanently migrated to the city. Facing subemployment and joining the urban franja marginal, they often ended up living in Rio’s peripheries and in situations of precarity. This had been the experience of several AM members themselves, many of whom were self-employed workers in the city’s cultural market.12 They worked as artisans, street vendors, writers,
filmmakers, actors, and in other related fields. The retomada was therefore a multifaceted resistance to the socioeconomic, political, and cultural marginalization with which many Indigenous peoples are met in the city.

The original Aldeia collective consisted of thirty-five individuals who self-identified as belonging to seventeen Indigenous peoples, including the Guarani, Pataxó, Guajajara, Ticuna, Xavante, Tabajara, and Krikrati. Some had recently arrived in Rio from their traditional territories, often in the Northeast region, while others had been born and raised in the city. Others still were in constant movement between several Brazilian cities and their communities of origin. Over the years, participants frequently came and went from AM in search of health services, education, work opportunities, and more.

From the Museu do Índio to an Indigenous Territory: Elimination and Resurgence

But why retake this particular building? The building, where the SPI’s Museu do Índio was once based, played an important albeit relatively short-lived role in Brazil’s republican política indigenista. As discussed in the introduction, the SPI had been founded in 1910 with the task of pacifying and integrating Indigenous peoples into the national labor force and community. To this end, the state instituted its legal guardianship (tutela) over Indigenous peoples and retained the right to define who counts as Indigenous—a right that Lima describes as conquest’s “semiotic labor.”

The service’s Studies Section (SE) and its Museu do Índio helped in this task. Decree No. 10.652 of 1942 listed the SE’s responsibilities as, among other things, to study Indigenous populations and their regions, run a museum, and promote the dissemination “of several aspects of Indigenous life, through conferences and expositions, awakening public interest for the índio.” In so doing, the SE’s task was to produce modern and scientific knowledge that would pedagogically accelerate the SPI’s work toward its integrationist/assimilationist aims. To this end, the SE hired and trained two ethnographers in 1947, Max Boudin and Darcy Ribeiro. Ribeiro served as president of the SE during its most prestigious years, from 1952 to 1956. He opened the Museu do Índio on April 19, 1953, the American Indigenous Peoples’ Day (Dia do Índio).

In a 1956 article about the museum, Ribeiro described its “humanitarian and political goal” to break with the idea that Indigenous populations are “fossils of the human race.” The museum, he affirmed, aimed to dispel “the most common prejudices about Indians,” such as the assumption that they are a “lower form of life . . . unsuited to civilization, or hopelessly
lazy.” The museum had been set up “to inspire sympathy for the Indian.” Nonetheless, if the Museu do Índio aimed to awaken interest and sympathy in its visitors, the SPI was also tasked with assimilating and governing Indigenous peoples, albeit in a “gentle,” “humanitarian” way. An underlying goal of the museum was indeed to legitimize the SPI and its tutelage over Indigenous peoples in the eyes of the wider public, including by portraying it as a progressive project. In parallel, the museum also affirmed the SPI’s role as translator between the wider nation and Indigenous peoples. The SPI hereby attempted to hold the monopoly not only of actions over this population but also of the creation and dissemination of knowledge about them.

Despite the museum’s aim to draw visitors closer to Indigenous peoples, such a “museum model” of indigeneity carries an implicit temporal, geographical, and social distance between subject and object. In this model, Indigenous people remain elsewhere, in the past, and different. In the present context, this model persists by informing what Santos Albuquerque calls the “prejudice of authenticity,” which operates through three related evolutionist categories. The first category is the idea that Indigenous people in the city become assimilated, a phenotypic prejudice that regards them as “no longer looking Indigenous.” The second category is the claim that they are acculturated, a linguistic or cultural prejudice that perceives Indigenous peoples in urban contexts as having “no distinct Indigenous culture.” Finally, urban Indigenous peoples are also deemed desaldeados, a political-administrative prejudice that denies them access to Indigenous rights outside of their territories, to which the right to so-called protection is seen as limited. Put succinctly, the authenticity prejudice renews tutela’s logic of elimination in the aftermath of the 1988 constitution. It implies the power to make Indigenous peoples who do not satisfy settlers’ criteria of authenticity invisible and to marginalize or to eliminate them from the political landscape.

In many ways, AM’s political movement would later emerge in resistance to this “semiotic labor” of “soft conquest” advanced by the Museu do Índio. In this chapter’s opening story, this was the dynamic that Arassari was trying to challenge. AM’s retomada of the abandoned palace was a literal and symbolic retaking of not just the Museu do Índio but also the persisting eliminationist model it embodied.

After 2006, the palace quickly became the heart of AM, a space of celebration, culture, daily coexistence, political debate, and communal living (fig. 1.3 and fig. 1.4). The palace was located on a large plot of land, surrounded by a garden abounded with trees and protected by a wall. At
Figure 1.3. Facade of the Museu do Índio’s abandoned palace. (Photo courtesy of © CordeliaFourneau.)
Figure 1.4. Stairs of the abandoned palace, Museu do Índio. (Photo courtesy of © CordeliaFourneau.)
first, one of its rooms housed a communal kitchen and tents lay scattered in the other rooms. The National Supply Company (Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento, CONAB), who had legal possession over the building at the time, conceded the collective free use of water and electricity. In 2009, due to an influx of new residents and due to the building’s decay, the group decided against sleeping inside the palace and built eight mud houses in the garden. The group also built a large oca, an Indigenous-style thatch-roof hut made of wood, in which to hold celebrations and rituals. One of the houses became the casa de reza (prayer house), where they built a new community kitchen. The casa de reza was a gathering point and a key part of AM. It was the home of the group’s pajé, Niara do Sol, whose parents were from the Kariri-Xocó and Fulni-ô Indigenous groups.

The mud houses and the oca spatially organized AM as an Indigenous aldeia. Niara’s prayer house was an important part of this, for it additionally revealed the group’s distinct spirituality. A prayer or ritual house is a central element of the architecture and layout of Guarani communities, who are probably the most widely known Indigenous nation in Brazil. As of 2019, the Guarani are the majority of Indigenous persons living within officially identified Indigenous territories in the state of Rio. A casa de reza is therefore commonly associated with Indigenous peoples in Rio. So, on one hand, the presence of a prayer house in AM strengthened its Indigenous identification to the outside. But on the other hand, it was also a space of knowledge production and transmission, education, and spirituality to the inside. The casa de reza strengthened the bonds between AM members as well as their Indigenous practices in the city. Niara also organized healing courses, rituals, and dances that attracted visitors and supporters from all over Rio. In addition to Niara’s courses, the group began to hold monthly storytelling events in 2009. These were another opportunity to develop collective Indigenous practices that simultaneously raised awareness about Indigenous rights and issues in Rio. We can understand these acts as responding to Cherokee scholar Jeff Corntassel’s question, “How will your ancestors and future generations recognize you as Indigenous?”

Staying with this question, AM instituted a traditional Indigenous leadership structure, in Brazil often composed of a cacique, a conselheiro (counselor), and a pajé. AM’s leadership comprised a cacique, a vice cacique, and a pajé. Finally, the name Aldeia Maracanã resemanticized the term aldeia, meaning community or village, often used to refer to Indigenous territories in Brazil. Through this name, the occupation immediately evoked the imagery of an Indigenous aldeia. Creating a space that was
culturally, spatially, politically, and semantically organized as an Indigenous aldeia, they challenged the idea that they were assimilated, acculturated, or desaldeados (deteritorialized). These practices (re-)created and affirmed the Indigenous belonging of AM members as they created an Indigenous territory in the city. Indeed, for many of its members, AM was a space of learning how to be Indigenous and of Indigenous resurgence.

AM’s place-based resurgence illustrated what Bispo describes as the circularity of Afro-Pindoramic thought (see introduction). By circularity Bispo means, for example, the processes through which Black and Indigenous peoples have resignified categories originally imposed to dehumanize and conquer them, such as “índio” or “quilombo,” “from crime to right, from the pejorative to the affirmative . . . in a philosophical reflux that results directly from our capacity to think and elaborate circularly.”

In AM, in turn, Indigenous organizers positioned themselves at the interstices of Brazil’s republican history and its colonial understandings of who counts as Indigenous to refract them through their own ways of knowing and living as Indigenous peoples in Rio. In so doing, they usurped the authenticity prejudice to turn it on its head, generating Indigenous resurgences and returns in its stead. This was AM’s collective countercolonizing retomada.

That said, the group has always been aware that AM could not be an aldeia in the traditional sense. They made efforts to create something that was always striving to be like an Indigenous aldeia. And this goal was not only aimed at outsiders as part of their political struggle. The retomada in fact held deep personal affective and political meaning for the collective, as I discuss in the next section.

WHO COUNTS AS INDIGENOUS?

AM has also defied the authenticity prejudice by developing its own ways of recognizing individual persons as parentes (relatives), as Indigenous peoples in Brazil often refer to one another. As mentioned, not all members of AM had been born and raised in state-recognized Indigenous territories. And some joined AM because they were on a journey to reconnect with an origin and identity they felt had been lost. The collective embraced some of these journeys as part of its resurgence work.

This was the case of Índia, whose given name is Iracema. Iracema, an anagram for America, is curiously also the main character in José de Alencar’s 1865 indianista novel of the same title. In the book, Iracema has a son (Moacir) with a Portuguese settler (Martim). In Alencar’s story, Moacir represents the first true (miscegenated) Brazilian, a mix of Iracema’s
Indigenous “natural innocence” and Martim’s European “culture and knowledge.” In our story, Índia was the nickname given to Iracema for having *cara de índia*, for looking Indigenous. Índia does not know in which Indigenous territory she was born, but she knows that she was born in the northeastern state of Pernambuco. At the age of five, she was abandoned in the square of a small town. She recalls that for several years of her life, she lived in this square among a group of children. Later, Índia lived and worked on a farm for room and board, a situation marked by exploitation and violence. On one of my visits to Índia’s MCMV flat, Patxiá, a Pataxó woman, discussed how the group believes Índia is Pankararu because of the Pankararu community’s proximity to the town where she grew up and because she “looks most like the Pankararu Indians.”

Índia decided to move to Rio from Pernambuco after seeing the city on television because she “knew that her place was here.” In Pernambuco, she had been an activist of the Landless Movement (Movimento Sem Terra, MST). In Rio, she switched to the homeless movement, a transition that illustrates the continuity between landlessness in the countryside and homelessness in the city, as related processes of dependent urbanization (see introduction). Through this political engagement, Índia heard about AM. In her own words: “When they occupied the museum, I thought that I was the only lost Indian around here. You know, as Índia everyone knew *me*, but I thought it was *just me*! So, when I heard that the museum was occupied by Indigenous people . . . I said, ‘I am going to live in that museum!’ I got that into my head: ‘Now I am going to live in that museum!’”

What did it mean for Índia to join AM? On the same visit to her flat, as Índia manufactured dream catchers for a client, she told me about how she came to live in AM. On her first visit, Niara had questioned her directly about her Indigenous identity and turned her away. Shortly after, nonetheless, Índia became engaged to a Pataxó AM resident and returned as his fiancée. When asked why she joined AM, she explained:

ÍNDIA: Ah, because I had been expelled from my own community, because I didn’t know what an Indigenous community was like. . . . I had always wanted to see the culture, you know, I wanted to learn. I already dressed and wore everything Indigenous that I could find, but I used to make my own handicrafts, and I had no clue how to and they were all out of touch with reality [she laughs], but then I met them [the Pataxó of AM], and then I went to the community [Aldeia Velha], and . . . it was my dream to go to an aldeia.
Desirée: Did you learn how to make Indigenous handicrafts in Aldeia Maracanã?

Índia: Ah, yes. It was there that I started living from culture, and it was from there that I went to an aldeia for the first time. I was adamant that I wanted to live there [in AM] because I was curious to know what the *indio* was like, because I had had no contact with *indios*. I thought I was more white than Indian, you know, because in truth I knew nothing! So, I was curious to see how an aldeia was, any aldeia, it didn’t matter which one. But when the Pataxós made their handicrafts, I thought they were beautiful... I wanted to marry a man who lived from his culture in his aldeia.34

For Índia, AM was a journey of simultaneously reconnecting with and (re)inventing her origins. This was both personal and political. Not only does her life story articulate structural questions of socioeconomic and political marginalization in a settler capitalist society, her “return” also made Índia vulnerable to the intersectional violence that Indigenous women face in such contexts.35 During her engagement, Índia was sexually assaulted by a security guard who had identified her as an Indigenous woman and who had asked questions about “what it was like in the community,” as Índia recounted: “Do you walk around naked? Do men have two wives? Etc.”36 These questions revealed the anti-Indigenous, sexualized racism prevalent in Brazil as a Christian-centric society, in which settlers have interpreted “diverse practices of gender and sexuality as signs of a general primitivity among Native peoples.”37 These racist tropes have fed sexualized violence against Indigenous women. As many Black and Indigenous thinkers in Brazil have argued, Brazil’s celebrated national feature itself, the *mestiçagem* of the three founding races, was historically a product of this violence.38 The logic of elimination is thus also gendered, as settler colonialism transits not only through land but also through Indigenous (as well as Black) women’s bodies to produce the whitened, *mestiça* nation.39

In this regard, Kanien’kehá:ka scholar Audra Simpson has demonstrated how settler colonialism is a process through which settlers have attempted to impose their white, heteropatriarchal sovereignty on Indigenous nations.40 For María Lugones, the colonial gender system undergirding this sovereignty was not transferred from a precolonial Europe but was in fact invented in the process of colonization itself.41 This colonial gender system and sovereignty were threatened by Indigenous peoples’ alternative forms of governance and living, such as that of the Iroquois
or Haudenosaunee peoples in the North of the Americas or the Guarani in the South, in which women have held a relatively high degree of power and authority. Indigenous women, who embody Indigenous political life, thus also became the targets of settler colonial dispossession and elimination. In Simpson’s words, “in the settler mind, the Native woman is rendered ‘unrapeable’ (or, ‘highly rapeable’) because she was like land, matter to be extracted from, used, sullied, taken from, over and over again, something that is already violated and violatable in a great march to accumulate surplus.”

This violent foundation was whitewashed in José de Alencar’s Pocahontas-style Iracema. But this other Iracema, Índia, who can speak for herself, reminds us that this racialized and gendered violence has not only been foundational in the past. It continues to shape the lives of Indigenous and Black women in Brazil’s settler colonial present. In Eliane Potiguara’s words, for Indigenous women this present is marked by a “loneliness . . . caused by violence, racism, and all sorts of intolerance, including regarding Indigenous spiritualities and cultures.”

Índia and I have recurringly reflected on how her story should appear in this book. Throughout the years that we have been in conversation, she has maintained that I should “tell it how it was, tell everything.” On one hand, her request is a refusal to allow her story to be silenced and rendered invisible, as someone at the margins of many segments of Brazilian society. On the other hand, this story, the violence Índia experienced, is individual, sociological, and transnational, as a product of settler capitalist structures of power. In this sense, Índia’s story relates to that of the Indigenous writer and organizer Eliane Potiguara, who has also been active in AM. As she recounts in her book Metade Cara, Metade Máscara, her grandmother was one of many Potiguara people who migrated from the northeastern aldeia in Paraíba to Rio, fleeing land conflicts that had directly affected her family. Much later in life, Eliane was able to make her way back to her community. She became politically active in Potiguara land and feminist struggles. As part of this, she denounced several irregularities that involved local authorities as well as some Potiguara members. Her work was so effective in upsetting the status quo that her rivals tried to halt and delegitimize it, and she suffered political prosecution, defamation, death threats, and sexual violence. Her opponents also publicly challenged her Potiguara belonging. Reflecting on her story, she writes, “I register here colonization’s recurring vices. Wherever I may pass, I insist on telling my story so that other Indigenous women whose families have migrated outside of their original territories may be truly heard and
respected in the future, and so that xenophobia may be challenged.” 48 This is what is at stake in witnessing Índia’s story.

Dauá, in turn, self-identifies as Puri, an Indigenous nation officially considered extinct in Brazil. The Puri were one of many peoples that lived in the forested mountains between Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and Espírito Santo (see frontispiece). 49 The Puri’s taken-for-granted extinction can be partially attributed to the myth that the flag-bearing troops known as bandeirantes had successfully brought this sertão (hinterlands) region under absolute Portuguese control.50 The bandeirantes drove the colonization of Brazil’s interior, fighting bloody frontier wars to destroy quilombos and force autonomous Indigenous peoples into enslaved or otherwise coerced labor regimes, and in search of mineral riches. In the Southeast, their expeditions date back to the late seventeenth century. The Puri are known to have resisted these paramilitary expeditions and the encroachment of settlers, such as by militarily attacking recent or more established settlements. Records find evidence for Indigenous people’s presence in the region’s towns, villages, and countryside into at least the nineteenth century, where they refused captivity and assimilation.51 Aware of settler colonialism’s failure to deracinate Puri peoples, Dauá is one of many descendants leading a contemporary Puri resurgence movement, headquartered at the University of Viçosa in the state of Minas Gerais.

With the hope to learn more about his Puri ancestry, Dauá turned to and found a home in AM. There, he was motivated and supported in his search for others who self-identify as Puri. As he explained:

My people have suffered a lot. Many have died. Almost all of us are gone, but a few of us are left… And, today, we face the task of “making our way back,” of finding our people again. When I was little, I would go to school and when the teacher would say my name, everyone would look at me and say, “Dauá, what kind of name is that?” and I would answer, “It is an Indigenous name.” And, for a long time, I yearned to find my parentes. . . . Within me, inside of me, something would tell me that I would one day find my parentes. And so, I continued on my path, on my walk, looking for my parentes for over forty years. . . . Then, an índia [Niara] arrived at the Rádio Viva Rio, where I worked . . . and told me that they already had an Indigenous movement in Rio, . . . and I met [everyone else]. . . . For me, I was realizing a dream. . . . Then, they came here [to AM], . . . and four years ago I moved here. . . . I came to live here due to this necessity that I felt to be present, due to this force from here that would call me.52
In another interview, he stated:

To me, I think Aldeia Maracanã represented meeting my parentes. There, we had the strength to “jump over the wall” and go inside to defend Indigenous peoples’ heritage. An Indigenous heritage in the following sense: a territory that was for a long time inhabited by Indigenous peoples and culture. . . . And even with the difficulties, with many parentes not understanding us, we created a project of storytelling, of awareness in the media, of contact with the state bodies and with the institutions surrounding us. So, we tried to develop a work of engagement with the whole community, aiming to change the image that carioca [Rio’s] society has always had of the indígena—as an “invisible being.” We want carioca society to understand that we are equal human beings, and that we have our rights, and fighting for our culture was fundamental at that stage.53

Holding the local and the systemic/global simultaneously in view, we can see the wider settler colonial processes that were forced upon Dauá and Índia. Combined with personal circumstances, these processes ruptured their connections with their Indigenous origins. For them, AM represented a space in which to mend these ruptures and re-create their stories as stories of Indigenous return or recovery instead.

In so doing, Índia’s and Dauá’s stories also articulate difficult but recurring discussions in spaces of Indigenous organizing. In the Anglophone academy, for example, cases of well-established scholars who have claimed Indigenous identity but were not claimed by their purported Indigenous nations are well-known.54 As they access Indigenous spaces and rights otherwise foreclosed to them, they do harm to Indigenous peoples by breaking trust and appropriating painful histories of intergenerational and personal trauma, to name only two issues. At the same time, my conversations with Índia and Dauá showed how their involvement had not been about usurping rights or pretending to be something they were not. Both Dauá and Índia were transparent about their trajectories and the meaning that joining AM held for them. Moreover, when they joined the movement, they shared the costs of its struggle. AM demanded their full commitment to researching and learning about their origins, for example. For Índia, it also made her vulnerable to a violence that is both interpersonal and structural.

Índia’s and Dauá’s stories invited me to question the so-called imposter discourse and a related debate regarding Indigenous descendants in
Brazil. In São Paulo, I frequently encountered the opinion that, because most if not all Brazilians have some level of Indigenous descent due to Brazil’s history of miscegenation, individual self-identification is only legitimate if supported by full membership in an Indigenous nation. As Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro phrased it, “in Brazil, everyone is Indigenous, except those who are not.” This stance rightfully recognizes Indigenous peoples’ authority to collectively determine membership, as a process of “claiming and being claimed by.” At the same time, I came to understand that in the spaces of urban Indigenous politics marked by a significant presence of non-Indigenous actors such as NGOs, the impostor discourse tended to reify state-sanctioned notions of indigeneity. It also articulated a market logic of rights, as if Indigenous rights are finite resources that must somehow be protected. If too many groups enjoyed access to those resources, the argument runs, the real Indians would lose their privilege to them and the definition of indigeneity would be “too loose.” Staying with Viveiros de Castro: “If everyone is Indigenous, then no one is.” Implied in this logic was an assumption that Indigenous peoples are and must remain a minority, as the exception that serves to normalize and legitimize the majority *mestiça* settler nation-state, premised as it is on the logic of elimination and the semiotic labor of conquest. Returning to this chapter’s opening anecdote: otherwise, where will we end up?

In this context, AM has also struggled with defining who counts as Indigenous in their own terms. The negotiations of inclusion and exclusion revealed in Dauá’s and Índia’s stories articulate political decisions and relationships within the movement itself. Other members, who migrated from Indigenous territories relatively recently, such as Zahy Guajajara and Vângri Kaingang, elucidated this point to me. They saw it as part of their duty to help their parentes revitalize (or *retomar*) their Indigenous practices and identities. In the words of Vângri: “Indians have suffered enough discrimination. We want them to try and go back to their origins so that their cultures and customs do not die, but . . . an índio does not become an índio, they are born índio. You must honor that, and find your origins, your customs. . . . They must find themselves, their traditional dress, their body painting, and their culture.” Yet, for them, there was also a “real difference” between those who come from aldeias and those who do not. AM’s recognition of Dauá and Índia should therefore not be read as a sign that the group let just anyone in. As we saw, Índia was in fact first questioned about her Indigenous self-identification. In this regard, Sandra Guarani explained that AM recognizes members such as Dauá and Índia because of their transparent and consistent commitment to AM’s urban Indigenous struggle.
In so doing, AM illustrates how Indigenous peoples in Brazil also invoke a living archive of the Indigenous movement when defining who is a parente. Parente not only refers to direct kinship or to a genealogical archive, although this remains an important Indigenous way of “knowing one another.” Parente also articulates a shared experience of settler colonialism and a common political struggle for survival within and beyond its structure. In this context, Indigenous practices of recognition take the historical processes of forced elimination and dispossession seriously and sometimes acknowledge those without official membership as parentes. These are moments of recognition that exceed colonial ways of defining indigeneity and that mobilize an archive of knowledge based on solidarity, genealogy, sociality, memory, and narration. As such, parente is a cultural, kinship-based, and political relationship through which networks of belonging and solidarity form across time and space.

Facing this problem of recognition, the ILO Convention No. 169 and its protection of the right to self-identification have been important resources for AM. To register at the University of Viçosa, for example, Dauá was asked to provide documentation that attested to his Indigenous identity. Usually, leaders of an Indigenous nation and/or a federal FUNAI agent sign this document, but Dauá had no community of origin to which he could turn. He then headed to Rio’s FUNAI office at the Botafogo-based Museu do Índio and asked its director to sign a certificate of self-declaration. At first, the director denied Dauá’s request. Evoking the ILO Convention No. 169, nonetheless, he convinced the director of his right to a certificate.

This certificate, however, the director warned, was not fully valid without the signatures of Indigenous leaders. Dauá returned, accompanied by Carlos Tukano, then the president of AIAM. Tukano cosigned the certificate as the group’s leader. Other AM members followed suit, and the director was left without a choice but to remit the certificates to all of those who asked for it. On one such occasion, he reportedly turned to Tukano and told him he was “fabricating more Indians than the SPI and the FUNAI.” He was referring to the SPI’s and FUNAI’s role in officially recognizing new or emerging Indigenous nations in Brazil’s Northeast region since the 1920s. Tukano told me of this incident as he laughed and shrugged his shoulders. “It’s a thing of the state to want these documents, you know?” he stated. In so doing, once again, AM emulated a traditional Indigenous community. As is common in other urban contexts in Brazil, AIAM, as a legally registered association, enacted the administrative and political capacity of traditional Indigenous leaders. AM had thus devised
their own process of recognition, co-opting the procedures of the settler state to displace this state’s authority to verify indigeneity. Returning to a previous point, this was one aspect of their countercolonizing retomada.

The impostor discourse and the question of membership reveal the political nature of recognition and self-identification. It is a product and negotiation of settler colonial structures that attempt to determine who can act and speak with legitimacy, beyond a state versus social movement dichotomy. When Indigenous peoples become threatening, denying their authenticity as Indigenous (eliminating them “as native”) can serve as a strategy to delegitimize their political struggles. This had been the case in Eliane Potiguara’s story, which also shows how Indigenous women leaders are targeted in particularly violent ways for doing the work of unsettling colonialism. Beyond such individual incidents, Brazil’s agribusiness lobby has reverted to the trope of the fake índio in recent years to challenge Indigenous land claims.

Overall, AM illustrates that urban Indigenous movements face the challenge of finding Indigenous ways of engaging with stories such as Dauá’s and Índia’s. Discussing this imperative with São Paulo–based Guarani organizer and researcher Emerson Souza, he pointed out the dangers of reproducing “what the FUNAI does to us [Indigenous peoples].” To borrow the words of Yellowknives Dene scholar Glen Coulthard, “urban Native people and First Nations need ways of forging national alliances strategically in a manner that does not demand that First Nation governments endlessly open their membership to those who grew up disconnected from the life and culture of their original communities, or urban Indigenous people having to engage in the arduous struggle of maintaining an Indigenous identity cut off from the communities and homelands that ground such identities. In other words, we need to find ways of bringing together through relations of solidarity and mutual aid ‘the strengths that urban and reserve-based Native people have developed in their different circumstances, in the interests of our mutual empowerment.’”

**Resisting Settler Capitalist Appropriation in Aldeia Maracanã: “A Step Back to Take a Step Forward”**

The 2014 and 2016 sports megaevents would forever change AM’s fate. As the games approached, communities near the Maracanã Stadium such as the Favela do Metrô started facing eviction threats. The government also announced the demolition of numerous local public facilities. In 2012,
Governor Cabral publicly stated that he planned to turn the grounds of the former Museu do Índio into a parking lot, a statement he revised in 2013 to announce that the site would become an Olympic museum instead. To this end, one of its tactics was to affirm that the site “had never been Indigenous land” and that the collective consisted of “fake índios” who had recently “invaded” the abandoned building. In the words of Cabral, “to call that an aldeia is a mockery.”

Faced with such threats, AM organized protests and teach ins, mobilized the press and social media, and reached out to numerous state-level and federal public authorities, including the FUNAI, whose first response, however, was to refuse support to the collective because “the organ’s priorities are actions in Indigenous lands” and there was no federal policy framework for Indigenous peoples in urban contexts that could guide actions on its part. In other words, the FUNAI reinforced the authenticity prejudice’s category of desaldeado to argue that AM did not fall under its remit and could not access Indigenous rights. AM, in turn, refused to succumb to this logic of elimination or to accept their dispossession. And by the end of January 2013, its efforts had produced considerable impact: the collective had managed to mobilize the support of state institutions, including Rio’s Public Defender’s Office; of the academic community, such as the Brazilian Anthropology Association (ABA); of several public individuals such as celebrities and politicians; and of leftist social movements. It also garnered the support of the quilombolas of Sacopã, who invited the collective to visit the quilombo and attended protests in defense of AM (see chapter 2).

In the months that followed Cabral’s announcement of AM’s removal, AM featured so prominently in the national and international media that it became a symbol of the growing public outrage that fueled the waves of protests of June 2013. In so doing, AM successfully organized the kind of direct action Coulthard has described as prompting “the state to respond with pacifying gestures of recognition and reconciliation.” On January 28, 2013, the government issued a press statement rescinding its decision to demolish the building. It would preserve and protect the building as a heritage site, but the “invaders” would still be evicted. AM did not concede to this condition and contradictory official statements followed. In this context of uncertainty, Rio’s Secretary of Culture Adriana Rattes approached the group. She maintained the position that the collective would need to vacate the building and its grounds but was open to a partnership that could meet the state’s and AM’s demands.

The Culture secretary’s offer to AM divided the group. In response, part of the collective devised a proposal to turn the site into the Reference
Center for Living Indigenous Culture to be managed in a partnership between Rio’s government and the collective. AM’s members would develop different kinds of educational and cultural activities at the center, such as classes, talks, and rituals. And those who normally lived in AM would receive alternative housing, ideally in the form of a collective territory on which they could rebuild their aldeia. This part of the group believed that entering an agreement with the secretary would at least save part of their project by protecting the building. They feared that if they did not accept the deal, they would be evicted without prospects for future negotiations. Another faction argued that the Reference Center deradicalized and co-opted their movement. Mistrusting any promises made by the state, this side defended that the site should remain under exclusive Indigenous management and spoke of founding an Indigenous university. They also defended their legal right to the building and the land according to the principles of adverse possession (usucapião).

Both sides of the collective were aware of the compromise that turning AM into the Reference Center for Living Indigenous Culture entailed. For example, the conditions set by the secretary indicated that Rio’s state government continued to refuse to recognize AM as an Indigenous territory. It would only recognize that its members were Indigenous persons. Arguably, such a partnership with the Department of Culture also both expressed and reinforced the common and flawed idea that legitimate Indigenous issues are those that pertain to matters of culture. And this gesture of recognition and reconciliation of course served to contain dissent during a turbulent period that witnessed falling popularity rates of both the state and federal governments. It would also allow for the reappropriation of this now valuable land and turn the site into a profitable endeavor to Rio’s tourism industry. Circumventing the movement’s more disruptive claims such as their assertion of Indigenous autonomy over the territory, the state recognized their Indigenous cultural distinctiveness insofar as it benefited its own ends. It could now even look accommodating and progressive.

Once the outright removal and elimination of AM had been unsuccessful—or at least, unproductive—Rio’s government engaged a new strategy: neoliberal multiculturalism. It attempted to turn AM into what Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui calls the “permitted Indian,” with whom dominant groups and the state negotiate as long as certain restrictions are respected. The Department of Culture’s conditional offer reinforced the authority of the settler colonial state and capital for example. It thus comprised a form of political, differentiated assimilation through which AM
was allowed to retain a certain (cultural) version of its difference with the effect of both constraining and dividing its movement. In this way, neoliberal multiculturalism continued the unfinished task of Indigenous pacification.86

But conquest is always undergirded by militarized violence. When Rio’s military police arrived in March 2013 to evict AM with disproportionate force, only part of the collective accepted the offer. Tukano reported the asymmetric position in which AM found itself: “The first attempt was on March 12, 2013, the official attempt on March 22. The first time, forty [police]men came, the second time, two hundred men came. Two hundred men, forty police cars, two caveirões [literally, big skulls, Rio’s military police’s Special Operations Battalion’s armored cars] and three helicopters.” I asked, “And how many were you?” He answered: “We were thirty! A few supporters and us. . . . So, the group accepted the offer at 9 a.m.”87

Another group of AM members refused the secretary’s deal and remained in the building. Outside, protesters clashed with police officers, who fought the crowd with pepper spray and tear gas. Claiming that a fire had broken out in the building grounds, the police entered the abandoned building, violently removed the resistant arm of the group, and arrested some of its members. That is, when the disciplining power of soft conquest failed, state violence ensured its interests. The multicultural turn of the 1988 constitution and its human rights demands may conceal the unfinished settler colonial conquest on which it rests, but the violence inherent in it is always operational and ready to erupt into view when Indigenous movements dare to step outside the permitted boundaries.88

The Indigenous identities of those who refused the secretary’s deal were subsequently denied and ridiculed by state officials. In the words of city councilor Carlos Bolsonaro, the son of president-elect Jair Bolsonaro and then vice president of Rio’s Human Rights Commission: “I would like to . . . praise the attitude of the Military Police regarding the eviction of the Museu do Índio—because it really was nothing like a museum anyway. . . . What are they doing there in Maracanã? Their eviction was negotiated; we all know that the índios left peacefully. But those who stayed there were those índios with blue eyes—these people who do not even like to hunt turtles because chasing them is too much work. . . . And those Indians are so modern, so modern that they can mobilize over the Internet!”89 The racist tropes of authenticity once again served to justify Indigenous dispossession through militarized police violence.

In the months after their forced removal, this group reorganized into the Aldeia Rexiste movement and has continued to claim the building.
The other part of AM formed the AIAM, and it was with them that I visited the MCMV condominium in June 2014, where this chapter’s opening anecdote took place. The MCMV flats had been offered to the group after their eviction, when the state government found that the process of establishing a collective Indigenous territory would be challenging and bureaucratic. The MCMV flats were the most readily available alternative. This was a major disappointment for the group. For them, their communal living had been a fundamental element of their movement. The former Museu do Índio, after all, was imagined to be a kind of embassy for Indigenous peoples in Rio. It offered them a retreat and cost-free housing and helped ameliorate their superexploitation and sociospatial marginalization in the city. According to Sandra Guarani, “that space, it was occupied so that . . . Indigenous people could have the autonomy to do as they wanted. But that is over, now the objective has changed. Now, it will be a cultural center, no one will stay there overnight anymore, people will give talks and lectures, these kinds of things, and promote [the culture], really, but the space was supposed to be for people to sleep in and perform their rituals, as well as promote the culture, because this is how it works for us, Indigenous people. We don’t separate things. . . . When we do our rituals, we have to sleep in the same location, so that you can rest, because it is all part of a process.”

Their relocation to individual flats, which the group has dubbed the Aldeia Vertical, radically changed their communal living practices and imposed the neoliberal logics of property ownership. While the MCMV apartments are subsidized, residents still need to pay monthly mortgage installments and cover the costs of formal services such as electricity, water, and homeowners’ association fees. As part of Brazil’s franja marginal, these fixed and higher living costs forced some Indigenous residents to seek additional work opportunities or increase the production of their artifacts for instance. Their eviction from AM and relocation to MCMV thus also implied their disciplining into neoliberal consumer-citizens as their superexploitation remained unchanged. And AM members were not alone in this experience. Evidence shows that most of the MCMV units in the city of Rio were allocated to favela residents displaced for the sports megaevents. Located within the Workers’ Party growth acceleration program and based on public-private partnerships, the true beneficiaries of MCMV, as I further detail in chapter 3, have been the companies that built its units. The social program, therefore, has served to enable settler capitalist accumulation through Indigenous and Black dispossession in the city. In this task, it has served to pacify Black and
authenticity prejudice in aldeia maracanã’s retomada

Indigenous opposition to appropriation and to eliminate their specific relations to land and community.

AM once again invented ways to resist this latest rupture creatively. Niara, Dauá, and Índia for example have organized a community garden behind their apartment unit since at least 2016. By working in the garden, they have retained and developed embodied Indigenous knowledges of the land. Mississauga Nishnaabeg scholar Leanne Simpson may describe this initiative as an example of “embodied resurgent practices,” the everyday place-based practices through which Indigenous people renew relations to self, land, culture, and community. As Simpson and other theorists of resurgence argue, these community-centered practices may seem small but they indeed prefigure the goals of decolonization by revitalizing Indigenous knowledge systems, networks, and territories. The Aldeia Vertical’s garden, open to non-Indigenous people, has also helped the collective establish relations with its neighbors and with outsiders. The communal garden was one way that AM members have persisted in their retomada and have continued to challenge the invisibility that marks their lives in the city.

In the aftermath of their violent eviction, AM was also left with the task of rebuilding its community and political project. Responding to this crisis, part of the collective organized a conference in December 2013 with traditional leaders from almost ninety Indigenous nations, among them cacique Marcos Terena and cacique Ancieto Xavante. The conference had the strategic purpose of gathering wider support for the Reference Center and turning it into a national Indigenous cause rather than a local demand. It also aimed to once and for all put to rest the accusations that it was a demand by fake índios and to help pressure the state to fulfil its promises. As Marize Guarani explained, “Aldeia Maracanã is . . . a national institution that should serve as a meeting point and a point of discussion for all Indigenous peoples around the world.” And the conference highlighted the agency and strategic thinking of those who did agree to the forced partnership. In the words of Tukano, “we had to take a step back to take a step forward.”

CONCLUSION

As of 2022, the state’s promise to reform the abandoned building and open the Reference Center for Living Indigenous Culture have not yet been fulfilled. AIAM has continued to exert pressure on the state to keep up its part of the deal. The collective has also consolidated and expanded their
organizing in Rio. For example, alongside leaders of Guarani territories in the state of Rio, they have cofounded and co-led Rio’s Indigenous State Council, which works to develop public policies in the areas of Indigenous environmental protection, education, health, housing, and land rights. AIAM has also continued to organize public-facing and autonomous spaces in which Indigenous identities are affirmed and made visible in the city. One example of the former is the yearly and popular Indigenous Peoples’ Day Event at Rio’s Parque Lage. In the aftermath of June 2013, it is fair to say that most cariocas are aware that Indigenous people live, work, and politically organize in the city. This represents a small but important interruption of the logic of elimination. AM’s path to institutionalization was therefore not a capitulation to the settler state but a strategic, albeit contradictory, choice.

AM’s contradictions are structural rather than endogenous to the movement. To disrupt Indigenous elimination, dispossession, and exploitation in the city, AM has always had to inhabit and usurp hegemonic spaces, including the prejudice of authenticity and Brazil’s indigenista history. In other words, the collective is practiced in prodding open and multiplying the interstitial spaces of settler colonialism. Its members have always expanded settler colonialism’s inconsistencies to affirm Indigenous self-determination as well as relations to land and community in the city, the space of modernity where colonialism often appears to be so definitively settled. But, in so doing, AM also leads us to ask: In a militarized settler capitalist context such as Brazil, what role can the federal and local state play in the task of decolonization, if any? I return to this question in the following chapter.
Sacopã is a quilombo community in Rio’s upper-class neighborhood of Lagoa in the city’s touristic South Zone (Zona Sul) (fig. 2.1). Lagoa is known for its luxurious residential buildings and the picturesque Rodrigo de Freitas lagoon. Nestled in the neighborhood’s heart, the lagoon offers a privileged view of the Corcovado Christ Statue on one side and quick access to the popular Copacabana, Ipanema, and Leblon beaches on the other. The quilombo derives its name from the street on which it is located, Rua Sacopã. It was only after I left Rio that I learned of Quilombo Sacopã, located not too far from the school I attended for most of my childhood and teenage years. Rio-based friends and acquaintances continue to be shocked when they learn of a quilombo there—in one of Rio’s most expensive zip codes. In this way, Sacopã illustrates the invisibility inflicted upon so many urban quilombola communities, who are popularly still imagined as remnants (remanescentes) of communities of runaway enslaved people and who remain unseen even by those whose daily lives unfold in their immediate vicinity.

In this chapter, I offer a brief account of Sacopã’s story to unpack how Santos Albuquerque’s notion of the “authenticity prejudice” and its three categories of “deterritorialized,” “acculturated,” and “assimilated” also shape quilombola politics of recognition in Brazil. This prejudice links urban quilombola and Indigenous peoples while categorically separating them from favelas, allowing us to trace how settler colonialism, as a structure, applies its logic of elimination and practices of dispossession, exploitation, and sociospatial exclusion to both Black and Indigenous peoples. In this context, the quilombolas of Sacopã have challenged these very logics and practices to protect their place-based and communal traditions in a city that remains sociospatially structured by white supremacy.
I begin with a brief account of Sacopá’s history, which consists of around thirty members of the Pinto family who have self-identified as quilombolas since 2004. This account, though unable to do Sacopá’s story justice, will be the foundation for the following discussion of settler colonialism in Brazil.
The community has been fighting for their land since 1975, when Rio’s southern side, especially its beachfront and nearby areas, became sites of real estate speculation that targeted local favela communities for removal. Identified as part of the favela do Sacopã, the family had to creatively resist the threat of displacement to Rio’s peripheries. At first, the Pinto family attempted to remain in Rua Sacopã through an adverse possession process. The family won their case in the first instance but then lost in the appeal process in 2005. In this context, they self-identified as a quilombo and initiated their official recognition and titling process. At the time of writing, Sacopã was in the final stages of titling as a quilombola community.

As a favela community, Sacopã was not granted land rights, but as a quilombo they have been able to access land rights. This raises questions about the possibilities and limits of multiculturalism and Brazil’s 1988 constitution. How did the Pintos manage to remain in Lagoa? Why is a quilombo entitled to land, but a favela is not? Why and under what conditions do ethnic rights work, but the family’s rights as citizens do not? Are ethnic rights such as quilombola land rights distracting us from broader patterns of inequality and deeper change? And ultimately, to what extent do quilombo titles challenge Brazil’s settler capitalist structures?

“This Is Not a Favela”: The Quilombo on Sacopã Street

Eva Manoel Cruz and Manoel Pinto Junior arrived at Sacopã Street in the beginning of the twentieth century. They migrated from a coffee farm in Nova Friburgo, in the state of Rio, where their parents had been enslaved. At that time, Lagoa still belonged to Rio’s rural periphery, but much like the rest of the capital city, it had been historically marked by intense colonization. When the Portuguese arrived in the sixteenth century, it is likely that Tupi peoples, commonly called Tupinambás, lived in the area surrounding the Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas. Records indicate the presence of an Indigenous village called Kariané close to the lagoon, which was reportedly also known under the name of Sacopã. Soon, this area became of interest to the sugar plantation industry and the location of the sugar mill Engenho Del’ Rei, founded in 1575. It then went through a series of settlement stages that gradually eliminated and dispossessed the peoples indigenous to the region. Over the centuries, the forested hills surrounding Lagoa also served as refuge for enslaved people who escaped captivity. At least one quilombo was recorded in the nineteenth century, and numerous fugitive enslaved people were apprehended in the area.
When the Pintos arrived in the area and until 1912, the Darke de Mattos family owned a significant portion of Lagoa's lands. Most of the area was a coffee plantation that encompassed the current quilombo's territory. Shortly after their arrival, Manoel was employed at the Darke de Mattos family estate as a cleaner and gardener and gained the trust of its matriarch, Astréia Bhering de Oliveira Mattos. Mattos verbally conceded to him and his family the plot of land on Rua Sacopã where Eva and Manoel raised their seven children. Of those seven, three were born in Rua Sacopã, including Luiz, the most recent quilombo leader and former president of Rio’s State Quilombo Communities Association (Associação das Comunidades Remanescentes de Quilombo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, ACQUILERJ).

The Pintos thereby came to settle in Lagoa with the permission of a white settler family, the official landowners. The structural positions of these two families, the Pintos and the Darke de Mattos, were on opposite ends of the spectrum. The Darke de Mattos benefited from intersecting privileges of class and race that secured their legal land ownership, premised on the dispossession and elimination of Lagoa’s Indigenous peoples. The Pintos, however, as part of Brazil’s franja marginal, were on the flipside of these systems of oppression, which served to legitimize their landlessness. While their homemaking in Lagoa was also on dispossessed Indigenous lands, it was contingent on the “proper” owner’s permission and marked by informality and vulnerability. This vulnerability became evident when, under the government of Mayor Carlos Sampaio (1920–22), the city gradually expanded toward its nowadays coveted waterfront in the South Zone and Lagoa began to gentrify. Sampaio’s urbanization plans included reclaiming lands from the lagoon to create space for more streets and avenues and for the construction of apartment buildings.

The Pinto family witnessed and took part in these processes. Their story is in many ways the story of Lagoa. Aiming to benefit from Lagoa’s urbanization, the Darke de Mattos family cofounded a property development company that employed Manoel in the opening of the neighborhood’s streets. These large construction works caused an influx of workers to Lagoa, especially from Brazil’s impoverished Northeast region, as part of wider, national migration trends (see introduction). Spotting an opportunity, Eva started a pensão (boardinghouse) that served boarders meals and refreshments, a tradition the family maintains to this day. Eva’s grandchildren, including Cláudio and the late Carlinhos and Márcio—the former two sons of Eva’s daughter, the late tia (aunt) Neném—all worked in the pensão. Until the 1990s, the family was able to live on Manoel’s
income, the money generated by the pensão, and other subsistence activities derived from their land. Eva, who was also a healer, grew a vegetable garden and some of her sons and sons-in-law kept farm animals such as pigs and chickens. For some time, the family additionally operated a car repair shop in their territory. In this way, their territory was essential to the family’s survival and to their identity, as Cláudio often recounted as he told me about the trees, the birds, and the many animals he grew up with. In the words of Carlinhos, “I learned to like nature in my childhood, my grandfather passed it on, my father too. . . . They passed on to us this contact with the land. And I really miss it if I go somewhere where I don’t have this contact. This need I have is all inherited from them.”

In the 1970s, the family also started hosting the pagode (a subgenre of samba) and samba events Só na Lenha (Just on Firewood). By the end of the 1980s, Só na Lenha had transformed the community into a cultural hub for Rio’s elites and led to the creation of their carnival bloco (street parade) Rola Preguiçosa, which still opens Rio’s carnival season. Intellectuals, artists, politicians, and socialites were frequent attendees, and this movement of people brought friends and material prosperity to the family. Só na Lenha was a reference to their popular traditionally cooked feijoada, a black bean and meat stew. Só na Lenha was organized both to generate income and because Luiz and his sister tia Neném were singers, musicians, and composers. During the events, Neném and Luiz sang, Eva and the women worked in the kitchen, and the other family members helped as bartenders or waiters (fig. 2.2). These survival strategies through the Black cultural practices of the samba and the pagode are one element that later granted them status as an ethnic community with a distinct cultural identity in the eyes of the state. As Cláudio affirmed, “the most important means in the fight for this space has and always will be how we communicate through our cultural ancestry, which we developed on this territory through food, music, beliefs, spirituality, and our welcoming of people, opinions, and support. Just like the Quilombo dos Palmares, where not just Black people but ‘diverse lives’ came together from all excluded segments of society, so too have ‘diverse lives’ passed through this quilombo.”

One by one, however, the Pintos’ undertakings were prohibited because of noise and disorder complaints by neighbors, who claimed that Rua Sacopã is a residential street and cannot accommodate commercial activities despite the presence of other business establishments in the quilombo’s vicinity. During this period, the Pintos began to face escalating police repression. The police once went so far as to lock the communal kitchen and the front gate, confining the family to their residence in
Sacopã. Carlinhos recounted the fugitive resistance practices they developed in response to this policing: “The judge would order us to interrupt the work, so we would stop for one, two months, and we wouldn’t earn a living. Then [we’d say], ‘Let’s get back to work anyway!’ So we would go back to work. And so, we would go from closed to open, to closed, to open for quite a while. . . . Yeah, they would come, lock things up, put a padlock around things, we would unlock them, and we would work. There was a period when we would even do it in the forest—the food delivery—so that we wouldn’t get into trouble for using the communal space here. We would work in the forest, hidden. It even looked like we were traffickers of some kind—just to sell food.”

The criminalization of their subsistence and cultural activities forced the Pinto family to seek new sources of income outside their territory. As part of Brazil’s superexploited class, many of the family members began to work in the service industry, as domestic workers, taxi drivers, maids, security guards, school bus drivers, and receptionists for example. Even so, however, they have retained and defended their cultural practices. They have continued to organize the carnival block Rola Preguiçosa (fig. 2.3) and to sporadically host political and cultural events in their territory,
sometimes facing police intervention. They also persisted in their legal fight for their right to cultural expression. As a result, the family secured the authorization to resume their samba and feijoada events in 2020. Finally, Luiz’s wife, Tina, still opens the pensão on weekdays.
Lagoa’s urbanization marked the beginning of the real estate speculation and land conflict that would eventually threaten the Pintos’ presence in Lagoa and that continues to exert pressure on the family to sell their land. A process of favelização, or favelization, accompanied the neighborhood’s urbanization as workers settled in the surroundings of the construction sites that employed them, giving rise to communities such as the Favela da Catacumba and the Favela da Praia do Pinto. Some migrants also decided to settle nearby the Pinto family, forming what would be briefly identified as the favela do Sacopã, documented in a newspaper article from *O Globo* published on February 27, 1975, titled “A favela is born in Sacopã, the residents complain.”

In my conversations with the family members, none of them recognized this supposed favela. Márcio, for example, compared their street with those of the Favela da Catacumba and argued that “there wasn’t a sense of community, it was one house here, one house there. And that was along the whole street, and the houses were separate. . . . It was not a favela. There were plots of lands, separate houses, far away from one another, different from Catacumba, where the houses were one on top of the other, where no one had a plot. . . . They were proper shanties made of wood, proper shanties, extremely poor.” Identifying them as part of a favela, a pejorative yet fluid category, can be interpreted as a strategy to justify the removal of the families living in Rua Sacopã. We find evidence for this in how quickly the “favela do Sacopã” was “dealt with”: the newspaper article “Favela residents move,” published in *Jornal do Brasil* on March 14, 1975, already documented its removal.

The Pinto family witnessed the relocation not only of its more immediate neighbors but of all the favelas of Lagoa and of the adjacent neighborhoods of Flamengo and Botafogo. This was a traumatic process for the family. For Luizinho, “it was scary. I was six years old at the time. Ours was a humble home, but to lose that . . . to go where? It was shocking, because I remember not only that they [their neighbors] left, but the way they left, because the houses were very simple, so the people from COMLURB [sic], I remember it until today, they would toss a rope and pull the house down. The houses were fragile, so they just pulled the rope, and the house would come down in one piece.”

The family continues to hear accusations that it is a favela, as the neighbors’ official contestations to the group’s Technical Report of Identification and Delimitation (RTID) illustrate. In this document, which I further discuss below, the neighbors argued that Sacopã’s titling as a quilombo would further the area’s environmental degradation and favelization. In
reaction to the neighbors’ repeated identification of Sacopã as a favela, Luiz emphasized to me on my first day at Sacopã that “this is not a favela,” himself dichotomizing between favelas and quilombos. I understand this dichotomization as having been imposed on the family through the distinct treatment and rights, or lack thereof, afforded to these two kinds of permitted and unpermitted communities. As a legal category since 1988, quilombos have also become Black spaces that come under the direct management of the state, fully demarcated (geographically limited) and accounted for. Despite their historical and ongoing resistance, quilombos have become positively resignified Black territories that can be celebrated for their contribution to Brazilianness. Favelas, in contrast, remain associated with informality, crime, marginality, disorder, and immorality. They are often represented in public policy, in the media, and in popular culture as ungoverned and ungovernable dangerous spaces. As a favela, Sacopã was not allowed to remain in Lagoa, but as a quilombo, they have been—as long as the Pintos were willing to agree to a set of conditions, as I discuss.

In this sense, we can interpret quilombos as a kind of permitted Black group, or negro permitido, a term previously coined by Jean Rahier and Christen Smith. Analogous to the indio permitido, this category differentiates between reasonable/manageable and unruly subjects, inviting Black people to the negotiating table within certain constraints. As I argue elsewhere, the negro and indio permitidos are sociopolitical categories as well as spatial formations. To be more precise, the state grants recognition only to the place-based practices and the territories of Indigenous and Black peoples that do not threaten its interests as well as those of dominant groups. Abdias Nascimento labels these the “quilombos legalized by ruling society,” on one hand, and the “underground, secretive quilombos,” on the other. Yet, as he states, “the ‘legalized’ and the ‘illegal’ form a unity, a unique human, ethnic and cultural affirmation, at once integrating a practice of liberation and assuming command of their own history.” This web or complex of Afro-Brazilian praxis, for Nascimento, is Quilombismo. That is, Sacopã’s struggle as a quilombo is in continuity with favelas.

In the same vein, Beatriz Nascimento argues that favelas are a current phase of previous quilombola movements, for they, too, comprise an “alternative social system” organized by Black and other marginalized people. For her, forced displacement is precisely one way that different kinds of quilombos have continued to be oppressed since the abolition of slavery. And indeed, the attempt to dispossess Sacopã was part of Rio's
mass favela removal policy under the military dictatorship. In 1968, Rio’s Metropolitan Social Housing Coordination (Coordenação de Habitação de Interesse Social da Área Metropolitana, CHISAM) was created with the aim to eradicate all favelas by 1976. The CHISAM, dismantled in 1973, removed around 175,000 people and sixty-two favelas, all mostly in Rio’s Zona Sul.23 In other words, as this area of the city gentrified, it was also to be whitened. Most favela residents were relocated to the industrialized suburbs of the city’s western and northern zones, including the Complexo da Maré (see chapter 5). This was also the case with Sacopá’s neighbors.

Since the end of the military dictatorship, public policy regarding favelas has officially shifted to upgrading and urbanization. But even in this context, favelas have continued to face displacement for the sake of urban renewal projects.24 The most recent of these waves also swept over Aldeia Maracanã, as discussed in the previous chapter. Across time and space, settler capitalist accumulation in Rio has required both the ongoing dispossession of Indigenous peoples and the continuous sociospatial segregation of Black residents, enforced by police violence. Their interrelated elimination from the city’s more privileged landscapes is underpinned by their structural elimination as political subjects and citizens. Returning to a previous point, the anti-Indigenous and anti-Black racisms that undergird the logic of elimination are also spatial formations and so are Indigenous and Black resistances to them.25 For Wolfe, after all, the logic of elimination has always been closely linked with settlers’ need for land.26

The aforementioned March 1975 Jornal do Brasil article continues: “Around 120 people, residents of the favela of Sacopá, were transferred yesterday to . . . Santa Cruz [a suburb on the western side of Rio]. . . . There was only one exception: the residents of number 76 who did not want to leave their house, claiming that there they could remain with the permission of Darke Real Estate, old owner of the area. And there they remained.”27 House 76, the Pinto family, resisted.

In this decisive moment, Luiz and his sister Neném came into their roles as the family and later quilombo leaders. They were unconvinced that they had no right to remain where they had been born. They knew of their parents’ verbal agreement with Astréia. Despite this agreement, Luiz’s parents were not of the same opinion regarding their right to the land. As Márcia and Luiz told me:

Luiz: During this time there was talk from my part with them [the neighbors] regarding everyone chipping in and us hiring a lawyer to defend ourselves. . . .
MÁRCIA: I had even forgotten this detail. They declined.
LUÍZ: Yeah, yeah, they did not accept it! Because in their holy ignorance, as soon as they saw the money in front of them. . . . It’s what I told you, my mother, poor thing, was the same, but it so happens that I was around. But when they saw the money in front of them, a place to live, they did not gauge the loss that they would have from a social as well as economic point of view.
DESIRÉE: But, Luiz, what came into you for you to say “no, we are not going”?
LUÍZ: Ah, I was born here, raised here. . . . At that moment, I did not think twice, “we are not going, we are not going.” Deep down, you know, I did not know if I was harming my family, but if we had to leave, wouldn’t we have to leave anyway? Then let’s fight not to! Are there means for this? There are. Was I the one who created these means? No, I wasn’t. It was the judiciary that created them [referring here to the adverse possession process]. We can fight for this; let’s fight.28

Luiz attributed his and tia Neném’s refusal to leave to the fact that, as the two youngest family members, they were furthest away from the time of slavery and thus saw the world differently. They decided to confront Brazil’s race and class privilege and initiated the adverse possession process without their parents’ consent. By law, they had a right to their land because they had been occupying it for more than five years and no one else had claimed it until then. Nonetheless, this was the period of the military dictatorship. When the police came to finally remove them, it was not the rule of law that protected their rights but a fortunate coincidence. Their lawyer was married to a military official, who was quickly called to Rua Sacopã and gave orders to “leave the family alone.”29

They won the case in the first instance but lost it in 2004 in the second instance under suspicious circumstances. By this time, their neighbors, some of whom were state judges and some of whose properties were within the quilombo’s territory, had begun to mobilize in opposition to the family’s land rights through their neighborhood’s housing association (Associação de Moradores da Fonte da Saudade [AMOFONTE]). The Pintos have reason to believe that their neighbors influenced the appeal process.30

As Sacopã’s conflict with the neighbors worsened and the adverse possession process stagnated, a friend who frequented their samba events and who worked for the local government informed Luiz about the 1988
constitution’s Article 68. And so, in 2004, after Eva’s and Manoel’s deaths, Luiz, without telling anyone but tia Neném, registered his family and their address for a certificate of self-identification as a remanescente de quilombo (remaining quilombo), as Article 68 prescribes. They did not know much about what the titling entailed, but it represented a possible way to secure not only the family’s land but also their communal way of life. They wanted to be allowed to return with their samba, pagode, and feijoada events, for instance, both as a source of income and a way of expressing their cultural identity.

Their neighbors in Rua Sacopã have constituted the main opposition to the family’s quilombo title. They brought forward the only official contestation to their land demarcation, as mentioned. This contestation rested primarily on the flawed claim that the Pintos were not an “authentic” quilombola community. In a 2010 letter, AMOFONTE members affirmed that “we cannot recognize the existence of a quilombo in the territory claimed by the Pinto family, because the patriarch, Manoel Pinto, came here when there was no more slavery [after abolition in 1888], being well received by the landowners, for whom he worked as a janitor, gardener, etc. There are, in this case, no remnants of quilombo communities, there are no quilombos, and the Pinto family occupies land that has never, at any time, been a refuge of runaway slaves. The AMOFONTE understands that this unfounded maneuver morally and materially damages the residents of Fonte da Saudade and adjacencies, putting at risk and harming the principle of JUSTICE.”

This was only one instance of a longer-term conflict with their neighbors that has severely affected the family’s well-being. Their seemingly never-ending land struggle has had health implications for many of the family members, who have suffered from hypertension, diabetes, arthritis, anxiety, and depression, among other things. In the United States, these physiological costs of racism and discrimination have come to be called John Henryism. And the uneven, racialized, and class-based impacts of the COVID-19 public health crisis have intensified this situation of precarity. Tia Neném, in fact, passed away from a heart attack after a serious confrontation with a neighbor, during which he threatened the Pintos to leave “with the sum of money they were being offered or with nothing at all.” And Sacopã lost a young member, Hugo, as well as his father, Márcio, to COVID-19. The pain and grief of these losses have stayed with the family. They are a visceral reminder that the logic of elimination also makes itself felt through premature death and a quality of life lowered by the traumas and stresses caused by racism.
Returning to AMOFONTE’s letter, it expresses a colonial understanding of quilombo that still informs how they are popularly imagined. It refers, for example, to the absence of any evidence of escaped enslaved people in the claimed territory as proof that Sacopã is not a quilombola community, an assumption supposedly sustained by Manoel’s arrival after 1888. However, it was not unusual for formerly enslaved persons and their descendants to migrate after abolition, not wishing to stay where they or their ancestors had been enslaved. This had been the story of Luiz’s parents. Moreover, the academic and policy consensus on quilombos does not require any archaeological evidence that such communities have been at the same location since before 1888. The relative openness of the wording of Article 68 allows for this expansion or resemanticization of the category. Even though the article refers to those remaining, the family’s ancestry already directly links them to histories of enslavement.

The letter also refers to Manoel’s employment in the Darke de Matos estate as proof that the family members were not enslaved people. However, the racialized and class-based power differentials between the Darke de Mattos family and the Pintos that set the conditions for Manoel’s employment at the estate cannot be separated from the Pintos’ position as descendants of enslaved people. As discussed in the introduction to this volume, the abolition of slavery in Brazil did not lead to a complete break from previous social and material hierarchies, including labor relations. The racialized transition from enslaved to waged labor in Brazil drove freed Black people into a segment of excluded workers, the franja marginal, whose working conditions are particularly exploitative and often informal. This segment of society has also tended to rely on informal housing provisions. This was precisely the experience of the Pinto family in Lagoa, as Luiz often acknowledged when he discussed his parents’ and his own experiences working and living in the neighborhood. The AMOFONTE letter, in its colonial and archaeological understanding of quilombo, dismissed how slavery is a foundational institution of Brazilian society that continues to materially structure it and that has marked the lives of the Pinto family in Lagoa.

The prevailing colonial imagery of quilombos has adversely affected quilombolas’ struggles for land since 1988. On this note, I contend that although the current policy and academic consensus on the definition of quilombo is more open than this stereotypical imagery, it reproduces its own assumptions of authenticity. Indeed, this consensus is structured through the categories of the “authenticity prejudice.” Returning to Decree 4887 of 2003, Sacopã’s anthropological report had to demonstrate
that it was grounded in “a Black ancestry” (that its members were not assimilated) and that the community had “a particular relationship with their territory” (that they were not deterritorialized [desaldeados]). In this territory, they also had to show that they reproduce their “characteristic ways of life” (that they are not acculturated), as the Brazilian Anthropology Association (ABA) phrased it in a crucial 1994 paper.36

Sacopã fulfills these criteria for authenticity. They are not deterritorialized because the community’s identity and resistance practices have been inseparable from their territory, on which they have struggled to remain. And they are not assimilated because they are a majority Black family that descended from enslaved persons. Finally, their cultural practices of the samba, the pagode, and the feijoada make Sacopã a culturally distinct community, proving that they are not acculturated. On this note, the neighbors’ official contestations to the community’s anthropological report also questioned that the practices of the samba and the pagode are symbols of cultural distinctiveness. They argued that these cultural practices belong to Brazil’s national culture and, therefore, are not exclusively Black traditions. This argument renews the discourse of racial democracy, which resigned some Black cultural practices as Afro-Brazilian during the Vargas era.37 In this context, the neighbors expressed the expectation that quilombola communities must be culturally “exotic” or “absolute alterities,” in another parallel with Indigenous peoples. As the Colonization and Agrarian Reform Institute (INCRA) replied to the neighbors, nonetheless, quilombos do not have to evince “exotic” cultural practices but traditions that provide the community with its own sense of belonging.38

The structures of authenticity therefore shape the struggles for rights of both Black and Indigenous peoples, which demand that they first be recognized as ethnic communities by the state’s experts. This illustrates how the Latin American multicultural turn inherited a conceptual division between race and ethnicity. Culture and the groups associated with cultural Otherness received increasing attention to the detriment of communities categorized as racial subjects, especially in areas traditionally associated with Indigenous peoples.39 Furthermore, while indigeneity has been historically constructed as inherently tied to ancestral land, Blackness has (erroneously) been associated with deterritorialization and cultural loss through the African diaspora—in other words, as a kind of elimination.40 Consequently, Black communities in Brazil as well as Ecuador, Colombia, and Nicaragua have been compelled to mobilize “like Indigenous groups” in the eyes of the state.41 Quilombos, after all, are often imagined as closer to Indigenous communities than as favelas. And in
fact, many of the anthropologists who began to work with quilombola communities in their demarcation processes after 1988 had previously worked with Indigenous peoples. In this regard, quilombos foreground how cultures, knowledges, and religions traveled with enslaved peoples, reterritorializing in the Americas. It is not the case that Black communities have emulated Indigenous communities per se in their post-1988 political organizing but that their respective cultural matrices have genuine resonance. As discussed earlier, for Bispo, for example, they are both place based (for they manifest in nature), circular, horizontal, and heterogeneous or “pagan polytheist.” This confluence makes of them counter-colonizing, Afro-Pindoramic peoples (*povos afro-pindorâmicos*). As such, they both also share the struggle of pushing against the structural limits of neoliberal multiculturalism and the structures of authenticity on which it rests. I turn to these limits in the following section.

**Quilombola Rights and Settler Colonialism**

During my time with Sacopã, we discussed the pros and cons of adverse possession and quilombo land titles. For the family, the quilombo title represented greater tranquility and security. As a collective title that does not allow the land to be sold, it would take their territory out of the real estate speculation that has threatened their presence and well-being in Lagoa for so long. In addition, as the family became involved in the production of their own official anthropological report and informed about what the quilombo titling process entailed, it gained growing significance for them. The community was certified as an Area of Special Cultural Interest, for example, which allowed them to restart the feijoada and samba events in 2020. Also, their recognition as a quilombo community helped them positively affirm their history, identity, and struggle as descendants of enslaved people. As Carlinhos stated, “before you felt excluded, now you don’t feel excluded anymore. So that really changes a lot, for here we would hear, ‘ah you guys are invaders,’ but after you are the result of a study, that you really have a right to that [the land] . . . really, that changed a lot.”

Márcio answered similarly, contextualizing their land rights in relation to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples in Lagoa:

We were raised as somehow inferior, in the sense that society would put us as inferior people, you know. This is why I said to you that, in the beginning, the fight was very difficult, with adverse possession, even though my father [Luiz] always raised us to have high
self-esteem. . . And this struggle . . . understanding your rights historically, you know. In this case: Who is the owner of the land, if the land was already here in the time of the Indigenous peoples? Who came here and thought they owned it? In the beginning, many in the family said, “Ah, we do not have the right to this here, we never paid for anything.” They talked like this, many talked like this, my grandmother even more so, “Ah, we did not pay anything, we did not buy anything, we do not have documents for anything” and the fight as a quilombo was good to show this part.45

Their titling as a quilombo has enabled them to challenge the naturalization of their dehumanization and sociospatial segregation in Lagoa. And this positive reaffirmation also rests on the recognition that they, too, are on Indigenous lands. Nevertheless, as they are well aware, settler property law and structural racism were not legitimate claims to land ownership either. Like the Pintos, the settlers had also not paid for anything. This conversation with Márcio resonates with a piece by Nungá scholar Irene Watson in which she reflects on “Settled and Unsettled Spaces” of empire. In this piece, Watson asks, “Are we [Indigenous peoples] free to roam?” She also questions whether she, when she stands outside of native land title recognition, “remain[s] the unsettled native, left to unsettle the settled spaces of empire?”46 What was so unsettling to the neighbors about a quilombo title in their neighborhood? Did it raise unsettling questions about their own place in the world, about their land and property rights?

Keeping within this theme, settler colonialism is an ongoing process that needs to be continuously naturalized. Márcio explained this in his own words, stating, “It’s the law of the force. Force is like a word, if everyone starts to repeat a word, even if it is wrong, the formal norm will be forced to accept this word. Eventually it will have to accept it. Because everyone says it, everyone says it, the continuous use of language makes the word be accepted.”47 The “word” here is an analogy of the racialized, settler capitalist structures that try to reify the family’s subordinate place and placelessness in Brazilian society and, especially, in a neighborhood as privileged as Lagoa, usually “reserved for white people,” as Luiz would say. Sacopá unsettled the unequal foundations of Brazilian society, reiterated daily in the “normal order of politics and law,” namely private property.48 Márcio raised an essential question: Who really, legitimately owns the land in Brazil? Quilombos show that the answer to this question is not settled. In this sense, Quilombo Sacopã is part of a historical struggle by both Black and Indigenous peoples against this naturalized order of things. It is
a sociospatial expression of enduring quilombola dreams for a more just world; a future-oriented geography in which a system founded on the dehumanization and dispossession of Black peoples is negated, where the utopia of a Brazil grounded in liberty, union, and equality can begin to find a place.49 This was the political movement that tia Neném and Luiz (re)ignited when they decided “let’s fight.”

That being said, family members and I sometimes also discussed the limitations of quilombo land titles. Cláudio, for example, while acknowledging its importance, would raise the following question every now and then: “Why this quilombo thing? To give us something that is already rightfully ours?”50 And this is how we came to the questions that open this chapter: Why can the Pintos remain in Lagoa as a quilombo, but they would not have been able to remain as a favela? Why did accessing ethnic rights work, but the family’s rights as citizens did not?51

When he posed his question, Cláudio was specifically critiquing the quilombo titling as a long, arduous, and slow process that required the family to agree to the state’s terms: once their RTID was finalized, the INCRA suggested a reduction of the territory to be officially demarcated from twenty-three thousand to around six thousand four hundred square meters. This had the purpose of excluding the plots that neighboring residential blocks had invaded. According to Decree 4887, property owners who are within quilombola territories must be removed in the titling process and are due compensation for their loss. The INCRA claimed that, considering Lagoa’s steep real estate prices, the state’s budget would be insufficient to cover the costs of compensating Sacopã’s invaders. This could potentially delay their titling process indefinitely. The family felt forced to agree to this reduction, with the promise that it would speed up the demarcation process. That is, in order to give them something that was already theirs, their official recognition contradictorily reinforced the inequalities between the quilombo and its neighbors by protecting the latter’s property rights over Sacopã’s collective land rights, something I return to in the Luízes’ story (chapter 3). In so doing, the state failed to challenge and reverse the dispossession of the quilombo’s lands, reframing it as a desirable and benign demarcation policy rather than a process of (still settling) colonialism.

Quilombo as a legal category can thus grant lands to some Black communities while avoiding a deeper challenge of Brazil’s settler capitalist structures. Many Indigenous/Native American scholars as well as Latin Americanists have shown how such land titles and multicultural rights, more broadly, fail to structurally question real property law or normal mestiço citizenship, of which Indigenous and quilombola peoples are the exception.
that proves the norm, as I discuss in the previous chapter. In Brazil, only a minority of groups can fulfil the state’s “authenticating desires” and access collective land rights. Out of 97 million Black Brazilians (pretos and pardos) counted in Brazil’s 2010 census, in 2012, only around 1.17 million were identified as quilombolas—although many pretos and pardos may also be unidentified Indigenous persons—while around 22 percent of Rio’s population lives in favelas. Although quilombola land titles are important in providing security to communities such as Sacopã, much like Indigenous land titles, they also allow the settler colonial state to be relegitimized, appearing progressive and inclusive while silencing challenges to its sovereignty and the interests of dominant classes, including those in Lagoa.

Analogous to what I argue in relation to Aldeia Maracanã, this is a form of political assimilation, in which a certain type of difference is tolerated and even made useful to the settler state. In this political assimilation, quilombos’ struggles for land run the risk of becoming emptied of their more radical challenge to settler capitalism. Indeed, because multiculturalism and ethnic rights are structured by the authenticity prejudice, they have implicitly renewed its logic of elimination as an a priori elimination of a Black majority from the political landscape of multicultural rights.

But even this differentiated political elimination remains always unfinished. Quilombo land rights have also supported the affirmation of the quilombolas of Sacopã as political subjects, as Carlinhos’s and Márcio’s statements show. They create the opportunity to reassert, value, and revive Black cultures, stories, histories, and practices until then silenced and to strengthen their relations with their territory. The Pintos, for example, only started to openly talk about and resignify their family’s history of enslavement when the titling process began. And this resignification has in turn also shaped the community’s space (fig. 2.4). A statue of Saint Anastacia, who was an enslaved woman and to whom tia Neném would pray asking her to protect the quilombo, can always be found in the quilombo’s communal area for example. Quilombo land titles have a real effect when they foster such movements. And so, while we can understand multiculturalism as a settler technique of managing difference at the level of the state, Black and Indigenous peoples have also occupied the spaces opened by its rights discourse to create cultural, political, and territorialized reemergences that contrive alternative, more just futures. And they do so without failing to challenge the structural limits and contradictions of ethnic rights. As Luiz explained, “some moments outrage me. When the [titling] process makes a small progress, people ask ‘are you happy, are you glad?’ Listen, our victory should be a matter of fact, of the law, it is a
right that we should sort out in a week’s time, and it takes us ten years and I am supposed to be happy about this . . . ? What, I’m supposed to be glad for something that is already mine? So, I start realizing that we are weak, you know. . . . The majority here voted to agree to reduce the territory, with the promise that we would sort it out in another year. That was two years ago. And then they come asking me if I’m glad.”
CHAPTER 2

CONCLUSION

The story of Sacopã, the quilombo built by the Pinto family in resistance to mass favela removals in Rio’s upper-class Lagoa neighborhood, lays bare how urbanization in Rio has also entailed recurring waves of Black and Indigenous dispossession and exploitation for the benefit of settler capitalists such as the Darke de Mattos family who profited, first, from a large coffee farm and later from real estate speculation in the neighborhood. As Lagoa gentrified and whitened, Sacopã refused to accept and succumb to the ensuing settler capitalist imperative to displace them. In their struggle to protect their territory, to which their collective living and identity have always been tied, the Pintos eventually accessed quilombola land rights, a process that has also imposed certain compromises on the community. They have, for example, felt forced to agree to a reduction of the area to be officially demarcated as quilombola land to exclude territories invaded by the luxury residential blocks that surround them. At the same time, their official recognition process has also created an opportunity for them to reconnect with and resignify their ancestry, as descendants of enslaved people who continue quilombolas’ historical struggle for a city and a society not structured by anti-Blackness.

Why has Sacopã been able to remain in Lagoa as a quilombo but not as a favela? We find the answer to this question in the institutionalized definitions of quilombos as ethnic groups, which work to separate them from other (racialized and class-based) Black communities, such as favelas. Quilombos can thus remain exceptions to the rule, a kind of permitted Black subject and territory that is granted limited land rights in a society still shaped by militarized dependent settler capitalism. But this is not the entire story. Much like Sacopã refused to give up their cultural practices and land in the past, as they access ethnic rights in the present, they have not passively accepted it as a generous gift of multicultural citizenship either. They have, instead, cultivated an awareness and critique of the structural contradictions that their recognition and titling as a quilombo have reproduced. And still, Sacopã is also a glimpse of a different Brazil. As Luiz summarized it, “maybe we are one of the main resistance movements in the country due to our location, due to the economic value of this location. Therefore, racism is not that strong because we fought against economic power and the ability of the powerful to influence all matters of politics—and managed to win. . . . We must have been helped by the Orixás. After everything we have been through, people wonder: ‘How are they still there?’” This, said Luiz, was Sacopã’s “miracle of resistance.”55
When Things Are Black and White

Resisting Compromise in Quilombo dos Luízes

In the Brazilian imaginary, the state of Minas Gerais evokes two interrelated references: the eighteenth-century gold and diamond rush, which drove the colonization of Brazil’s interior in the Southeast region, and the related trafficking to the region of enslaved African and African-descendent people, who labored in the mines that gave the state its name. At one point in the eighteenth century, over 50 percent of enslaved people in Brazil lived in Minas, mostly in the urban centers that formed around the mining industry, as did many Indigenous people, such as the Puri, although this history is often obscured (see chapter 1).¹ One corollary of this urbanization was the burgeoning of a thriving artistic and religious life. Today, Minas’s historical Portuguese colonial towns, such as Ouro Preto, Nova Lima, Mariana, and Tiradentes, are popular tourist destinations, where visitors can witness Brazil’s colonial past.

Unsurprisingly, in 2007, the NGO Eloy Ferreira da Silva Documentation Center (Centro de Documentação Eloy Ferreira da Silva [CEDEFES]) identified 435 quilombo communities in Minas Gerais, making it one of the top three Brazilian states in the number of quilombos.² Out of these 435 communities, three were in the city of Belo Horizonte: the Quilombo dos Luízes, the Quilombo Manzo Nguzzo Kaiango, and the Quilombo de Mangueiras. Nonetheless, Belo Horizonte stands apart from the imagery usually associated with Minas Gerais. Founded as the state’s capital only in 1897, after the abolition of slavery and the proclamation of the republic, it was designed to be a modern city (fig. 3.1). Its symmetrical blocks crossed by large, linear streets and avenues inscribed the republican ideals of order and progress onto its urban space. In fact, many of the engineers who planned Belo Horizonte were trained alongside the leaders of the Indian Protection Service (SPI) in the positivist Rio de Janeiro Polytechnic
The city’s very urban design was thus embedded in republican aesthetic, material, and ideological nation-building efforts, founded on Indigenous and Black erasure, as previously argued.

But Belo Horizonte’s urban development could not be contained by
these desires for order. Unregulated demographic growth and real estate speculation extended the city beyond the designated limits, eventually encompassing the three quilombos and threatening their physical and cultural survival. This threat is aggravated by the imagery of Belo Horizonte as modern, which, juxtaposed to essentializing and colonial representations of quilombos as isolated, rural communities, marks Belo Horizonte’s quilombos as temporally, culturally, and geographically out of place. In defense of their identities and territories, they therefore fight against their erasure from the city’s memory and future. They fight, in other words, against dispossession and elimination.

Moving on from the question of who counts as ethnic, this chapter turns to Quilombo dos Luízes in Belo Horizonte’s upper-class neighborhood of Grajaú. In a context of intense gentrification, the Luízes have lost more than 80 percent of their territory to land invasions, leading the family to initiate official recognition and titling as a quilombo community in 2004. Exceptionally, historical documentation confirms the Luízes’ original territory so that their right to their land is supported both legally and anthropologically. But this fact has been of little help to the family’s land struggle. The prospect of removing the invaders and restituting their territory has, so far, remained unlikely, despite the legal support they have received from the Public Defender’s Office (Defensoria Pública da União, DPU) and the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministério Público Federal, MPF).

After the completion of the Luízes’ Technical Identification and Delimitation Report (RTID) in 2008, while the INCRA dragged its feet to complete the subsequent steps in the titling process, the family suffered its perhaps most aggressive land invasion. In 2009, despite public knowledge that this was quilombola land, the construction company Patrimar built a luxury residential block and mall inside the community’s territory, and these units have now been sold and occupied. Patrimar, forming private-public partnerships to build many of the Minha Casa Minha Vida social housing units as part of the Workers’ Party growth acceleration program, was one of the construction companies that had benefited from the post-2007 real estate market boom it furthered (see chapter 1). As of 2022, its sales have continued to break records. Their invasion of the Luízes’ territory was thus just one moment in Patrimar’s wider settler capitalist accumulation, supported by federal policy.

Around this time, the INCRA-MG single-handedly decided to exclude this and another nine properties from the Luízes’ official territory, arguing that the federal budget allocated to quilombola titling processes
was insufficient to expropriate the invaders, as prescribed by Decree 4887/2003. The community vehemently opposed this decision and the technocratic logic supporting it. In every conciliatory meeting that followed, Luízes’ members explicitly named the two interrelated forces that were subordinating their quilombola rights: settler capitalist appropriation through Black dispossession and the interests and political will of the settler state. The very mechanism designed to bring about historical reparations for Black communities in Brazil, they repeatedly pointed out, ultimately legitimized and reproduced their dispossession and elimination in Grajaú, as well as the racist logics underlying it. Put differently, the Luízes were repoliticizing all attempts at compromise and reconciliation by bringing to the fore the colonial foundations on which the INCRA’s decision to reduce their official territory rests.

The Luízes’ story is unexceptional. As of 2022, in Minas Gerais, only the Quilombo of Porto Coris has received its land title. But the subsequent flooding of its territory by the Irapé Dam in 2003 displaced the quilombolas.7 As DPU federal prosecutor Estevão Ferreira Couto stated, this conjuncture “is a snapshot of the failure of the Brazilian state and its land titling model.”8 Nationally, only 162 or about 5 percent of the 3,477 officially recognized quilombola communities have obtained their land titles.9 Quilombos’ land titling remains a long, slow, underfunded, and bureaucratic process, harming not just quilombolas’ land security but also their personal safety. In recent years, over 30 percent of murders of quilombola leaders took place during their communities’ demarcation process.10 To borrow the words of Paulo Soares, from the Attorney General’s Office (Advocacia-Geral da União), “a good measure of our institutional racism is in the budget, which murders Brazil’s quilombola population by not providing it with resources.”11

These failures, rather than accidental, are structural to settler capitalism; alongside land invasions, forced removals, and visceral violence, the inefficient titling model continues the dispossession and elimination of Black peoples in Brazil, now under the framework of a seemingly more progressive and consent-based land policy.12 And still, for many communities, quilombola land rights remain the only viable option in the protection of their territories and ways of life. In this context, quilombolas such as the Luízes have insisted on holding the state accountable to the promises of the 1988 constitution. Seeking justice and equality, they act as political subjects, embodying previous quilombola struggles in the present, and refuse the state’s attempts to pacify their demands for what is rightfully theirs.
Underneath what is today the Silva Lobo Avenue flows a stream known as Piteiras. It was by this stream that, in the 1890s, the decade of Belo Horizonte’s founding, the ancestors of the Luízes family settled on plots of land they had acquired from the expropriated Calafate Farm (Fazenda Calafate), where one of their ancestors, Nicolau Nunes Moreira, had been enslaved. Historical documentation attests that Nicolau received around six thousand square meters (1.5 acres) of Calafate farmlands. Other documents suggest that the family’s property in the name of Nicolau totaled around eighteen thousand square meters (about 4.5 acres). The other side of the family was originally from Nova Lima, once an important urban center and mining region in the state of Minas. There, Anna Apolinária married Manoel Luiz Maria, and the couple lived in the Fazenda Bom Sucesso, on lands that their ancestors and others who had been enslaved on that farm had been granted through a collective “compensation” or “acquired right” process. It is unclear exactly how, but Luiz eventually became the last name of this branch of the family.

Probably in the early twentieth century, Anna and Manoel Luiz’s three daughters married three sons of Nicolau Nunes Moreira and Felícissima Angêlica de Jesus. The sisters Maria Luiz, Aurora Luiz, and Eulália Marcellina Luiz married the brothers Vitalino Nunes Moreira, Francisco Candido de Jesus, and Quirino Candido de Jesus, respectively. They all decided to live in Belo Horizonte, where Maria Luiz (later, Maria Luiza) became the family matriarch. Since then, the name Luiz(a) has been maintained in many of the family’s first names, such as Maria Luzia Sidônio’s own name as well as her sister’s, Luísa. As Luízes leader Miriam Aprigio Pereira affirmed, “in every family that you meet here, you will find that there is someone named in some variation of Luiz,” therefore, the Luízes.

In Belo Horizonte, the family built their homes in a relatively small section of their much bigger territory. For Miriam, this was due to the strong kinship and affective ties among the family members, and especially the leadership of Maria Luiza, the first in a long line of women leaders in Luízes, as Miriam discusses in her master’s thesis. As she stated during our interview, “everyone concentrated here [her house is located where Maria Luiza’s house once stood] due to this affectionate relationship with my great-grandmother. So much so that all the houses were built around her house, which was here in this garden, like this [making a circle with her two hands]. The houses were connected, they circled [this
plot] here and were connected to her house. There were little pathways, little tracks, through the bushes, that led to her house here. They had this peaceful relationship [with each other and with outsiders] and people did not worry about this occupation here, they did not worry about what was around them.”

The family lived off their farm, the Fazenda Piteiras, producing much of what they consumed from the fertile land around the stream and by selling some of their produce locally from door to door. At Fazenda Piteiras, they produced rice, coffee, fruits, and artifacts such as brooms and hats made from the piteira plant common to the area, which gave the region and the stream their name. From the stream’s slope, they also extracted the clay with which the family would make adobe and build their homes. Finally, several springs provided them with fresh water. The Luízes’ way of life was, from the outset, linked to their territory and ecosystem, about which they accumulated knowledge over time and that formed an important part of their traditions. Luzia, for example, liked telling me of the healing herbs about which she had learned from her mother, who used to collect them from the communal herb garden or from the surrounding area. Luzia was also very fond of the chickens she insisted on keeping, despite her neighbors’ persistent complaints.

Another tradition that originated during the time of Maria Luiza was the Festa de Sant’Ana (Saint Anne Festivities). The Festa de Sant’Ana contains many traditionally rural (roça) elements and is therefore a collective memory that traces the family’s presence in the region back to before its urbanization. The festivities center around an old, wood-carved statue of Saint Anne, which, as Luzia explained to me on my second visit to her, had been carved by the family’s enslaved ancestors themselves and passed down to Maria Luiza by Anna Apolinária. Maria Luiza was reportedly very devoted to Saint Anne, so the statue establishes, today, a material and affective connection with the family’s enslaved ancestors and their matriarchal lineage. The Festa de Sant’Ana still attracts family members from all over Belo Horizonte, renewing their relations every year. It also renews the now mythical status of Anna Apolinária in the family’s collective memory, tracing continuities in traditions, history, relations, and place-based practices that transcend the ruptures imposed by enslavement in the past and by the more recent land invasions. Finally, the Festa de Sant’Ana is also open to their neighbors, an expression of the quilombolas’ inclusive and fraternal practices.

In this regard, building on Bispo’s notion of “confluence,” Miriam theorized such practices as a _travessia_, or a traversing, across ruptures and
across differences to continuously remake the community in the present “without giving up our traditions but understanding, above all, the need to adapt to the new.”21 Quilombo, as she writes, is thus always a plural becoming.22 In this travessia, what is at stake is “how to carry, in each coming transition, the ancestry of peoples whose land was stolen as a pollen and kernel of the peoples whose land is still to be made.”23

The Festa de Sant’Ana always takes place in the last weekend of July, because the Feast Day of Saint Anne is celebrated on July 26 and begins with the many preparations it requires. A week in advance, the family members visit each other’s houses to pray the rosary. On the weekend of or leading up to the twenty-sixth, a Catholic priest from their local parish joins the festivities to celebrate mass. In recent years, mass has been accompanied by a missa conga (conga mass), enacting the crowning of a king of the Congo through dance and song. After the celebrations, the Luízes serve homemade, traditionally rural meals to all attendees. Between 2014 and 2016, nevertheless, they did not celebrate the Festa de Sant'Ana.24 Since 2010, as detailed later in this chapter, the family had been fighting the most recent invasion to their territory, and this fight consumed much of their energy. The interruption of their festivities in this context illustrates how dispossession also furthers erasure, disrupting the social organization and traditions of quilombola peoples by redirecting their energy to a struggle imposed from the outside.

This interruption of the Festa de Sant’Ana was only the more recent illustration of how cycles of dispossession have affected the Luízes’ ways of life. The urbanization of the Piteiras region, beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, destroyed the farmland and green area that surrounded and sustained the family, radically changing the Luízes’ rural lifestyle.25 As the city expanded beyond Belo Horizonte’s rigidly planned central area, circumscribed by the Contorno Avenue (Avenida do Contorno) (see fig. 3.1), and toward what is today the Grajaú neighborhood, the Piteiras stream was canalized and became the Silva Lobo Avenue. Thereafter, as more streets were opened and residential homes, buildings, and walls erected, the family’s vegetable and fruit plantations were invaded or isolated and became unviable. The owner of the Maria de Lourdes Drumond Hospital, for example, which is located opposite Miriam’s house, built a wall that separated the community from its main spring and from a small eucalyptus forest, a particularly painful loss for the Luízes.26 As real estate speculation and unregulated urbanization transformed the local geographic and demographic landscape, it also interrupted the family’s way of life. As Dona Alda recounted:
Everything here was jungle. . . . It was all jungle, and, over there, there was a cane field. The Xapuri [street] did not exist, the Arthur Ferrari [street] did not exist, and this street that exists now is very recent. There were no streets, there was nothing, it was jungle, not even a path or anything. The Silva Lobo Avenue also did not exist, it really was only the little river and the jungle. We were the only ones who lived on this side. On the other side, only Vicente lived. . . . The first ones that came don’t even live here anymore, they were Senhor João, and another young man who opened a little store, then passed away, and his family lives here in Barroca [a neighborhood that borders Grajaú]. People started arriving. Back then we even coexisted well with everyone, everyone knew us, because we were the first residents, right? Then it started growing, houses started appearing, buildings started appearing. People started here in this area of the Silva Lobo [Avenue]. It was empty, they came and built their houses, and then the avenue was opened, each person building their house, their building, and feeling like they owned this, like we couldn’t stay. . . . Because we lived only in this little bit, we knew that everything all the way up to the viaduct belonged to us, all the way to the Oscar Trompowski [street], but because we were poor, we didn't have the means to fight for anyone’s removal. . . . The family was always like that. . . . Nowadays this is no longer the case, we, the grandchildren, we fight. But the aunts, my father, they stayed calm, “Ah, they’ve come, they’ll stay.” Then the “big guys” came and started taking over, right, the Silva Lobo Avenue, the Arthur Ferrari [street], the Xapuri [street].27

As their agricultural activities were impaired, the Luízes began to set up commercial endeavors in their territory, such as stationery and tire shops, beauty salons, and carwashes. Today, as part of the franja marginal, family members work mostly in the service or construction industries, as domestic workers, cleaners, cooks, builders, and waiters for example, often in the quilombo’s vicinities.28 To cite their official anthropological report, “their insertion into the labor market is at the margins of properly industrial occupations, and are based on a personal dependency with their employer” with whom clientelist relations are often established.29 These labor relations are also structured by gender. Although both the men and women of the Quilombo dos Luízes frequently work in the informal tertiary sector, the men have still had more employment opportunities than the women, most of whom were
domestic servants at the time of the production of their anthropological report.30 As Felipe Antunes de Oliveira argues, the franja marginal is a racialized and a gendered class.31 Women are not only particularly discriminated against in the labor market, they also tend to be responsible for the (unpaid) housework in their own homes. For some of the Luízes women, this reality has hampered their ability to secure permanent jobs, leading many to work as so-called **diaristas** (cleaners hired day by day).

Returning to Dona Alda’s account, it reveals that the Luízes only became seriously concerned about the irregular occupations in their territory as “the first ones that came,” who knew that the family were “the first residents,” were replaced by waves of new arrivals that did not acknowledge the community’s existence. This was a process of simultaneous sociospatial segregation and dispossession.32 By 2021, less than 25 percent of Grajaú’s population self-identified as Black (preta or parda), making it one of the whitest neighborhoods in Belo Horizonte.33 By erasing the family’s historical presence and land ownership in the region, the invaders encroached upon the Luízes’ farm as if it were empty and free land in a logic that resonates with the idea of **terra nullius**.34 The new settlers deemed this land as terra nullius also because they did not perceive the Luízes—as a poor, Black family—as a community of political subjects with land rights. Luzia recounted several instances of interpersonal racism by their neighbors, who accused the Luízes of being “out of place” in “a sophisticated [chique] neighborhood”35 and told them to “go to the favelas, because they are in no position to have property in Grajaú.”36 Similar to Quilombo Sacopã, neighbors have accused the quilombo of devaluing real estate prices in Grajaú, claiming that it is a favela.37 Relatively, they have also reproduced a narrative that often positions the Luízes as the invaders, relegating them to illegitimate outsiders because of their class and race.38

That said, the research conducted as part of the community’s RTID revealed that most of the properties that invaded the Luízes’ territory are irregular, without approved plans or entries in the land registry. Their legitimacy to remain is thus not even premised on settler property law. It is based, instead, on the racist and violent foundations of Brazilian society, which naturalize white, settler land ownership—even in the absence of formal land titles—and continuously dispossess Black and Indigenous peoples, even when legal documentation verifies their land ownership. It is within this structure that the so-called failure of Brazil’s quilombo land titling model unfolds.
“YOUR RIGHTS ARE NOT WORTH THIS MUCH”: RESISTING DISPOSSESSION THROUGH QUILOMBO LAND TITLING

The first person in the family to take a stance against these invasions was tia Cordelina, also known as tia Nina. Tia Nina passed away in 1990 under suspicious circumstances after receiving threats from an invader against whom she had taken legal action. After tia Nina’s passing, Luzia became the inheritance’s executor and the community’s leader. As she described, “my aunt died fixing fences. . . . Tia Nina would put barbed wire up: ‘here, you do not enter.’ She would put barbed wire up and they’d remove it. . . . When tia Nina died, I swore that I would never let a Luízes end up under the bridge. She fought and died for this land here. We are going to continue this fight.” Luzia then faced the difficult task of making sense of the family’s inheritance, an increasingly complex undertaking as the successive deaths of family members complicated the proceedings. In addition, tia Nina was illiterate and, the family believes, had been taken advantage of by lawyers to whom she had conceded power of attorney. This is how, they argue, the construction company Milão was able to erect a residential building within their territory.40 Faced with these challenges, Luzia decided to start the community’s official recognition process as a quilombo in 2004, after learning about quilombo land rights through her involvement in spaces of Black political organizing in Belo Horizonte.41

Milão is not the most striking case of invasion into the Luízes’ lands. The Greenwich Building, built by the construction company Patrimar, was erected after the completion of their anthropological report and within the territory it recognized as quilombola land. This area had previously been the site of the marble factory Del Rei Pedras, included in the RTID as an irregular invasion into the community’s territory. Patrimar claimed that it purchased the plot from its previous owner in 2009. However, the marble factory had not only been notified of the ongoing titling process but had also been asked to present documentation of the plot’s purchase, which it had not done. For the quilombolas, this leaves no doubt that the new invasion was conducted in bad faith. Construction work began shortly after, and the Luízes mobilized in response. In 2010, they contacted the Federal Public Defender’s Office (Defensoria Pública da União [DPU]), which led to a 2011 court order to stop construction works.42 But Patrimar appealed and won. The building was finished and its units sold in 2014. Raphaël Grisey’s documentary Remanescentes shows
the construction work as it went on full speed ahead (fig. 3.2). These scenes are a record of the mundaneness of Black dispossession in Brazil.

In this context, the family incurred a further loss. The majestic Biroasca tree (fig. 3.3), which used to be located at the heart of the community’s communal area, died in this precise period. For Luzia, the death of

Figure 3.2. Patrimar construction site in the Luízes’ territory. (Film still from Remanescentes, 2015, directed by Raphaël Grisey.)

Figure 3.3. Biroasca tree in bloom. (Photo courtesy of Miriam Aprigio.)
the tree symbolized and helped her articulate the pain of decades of dispossession. “I will always say this, until I die,” she said, “when a quilombola loses their territory, they lose their identity, because they are left without a land to practice their rituals, their dances. They are left without space, without *their* space. . . . Where are our ancestral trees? . . . We used to put our Sant’Ana cross there [on the Birosca tree], our cross would stay from one year to the next, I still have it here all decorated. It kept our cross and our notices, we used to put them in a plastic bag and attach them to the tree when we had to communicate something to the whole quilombo. And then, what happened? . . . And then, what happened? They . . . killed it. It rotted. And now they have cut it. That destroyed me. It killed me.”44 In the context of one more, and a particularly traumatizing invasion, the land, too, had suffered a loss, and so the community was missing yet another important part of its collective self (fig. 3.4).

Returning to the Patrimar’s invasion, for the family the legal system had been tardy and inefficient. For Patrimar, it operated swiftly and to its benefit. To Patrimar, the legal system offered what James Holston describes as “a freedom from the claims of others.”45 For the Luízes, it implied ongoing land insecurity and vulnerability. And since then, Patrimar’s profits have only increased. In 2021, the company broke records in sales after extending its operations beyond the state of Minas, a growth enabled by the public-private partnerships it had formed to build several

Figure 3.4. Birosca tree being cut. (Film still from *Remanescentes*, 2015, directed by Raphaël Grisey.)
of the federal Minha Casa Minha Vida (MCMV) social housing condominums. As part of the Workers’ Party growth acceleration program, MCMV was driven not by housing deficits but by the logics of the real estate market and helped propel the market’s post-2007 boom in Brazil. On a related note, although they ultimately came in second, Patrimar had also entered the bid to build the MCMV condominium to which evicted Aldeia Maracanã members were relocated in 2014 (chapter 1). The latest invasion into the Luízes’ territory was thus one instance of a wider trend of settler capitalist accumulation, even under the Workers’ Party years, from which Patrimar has continued to benefit and for which communities such as the Luízes and Aldeia Maracanã have continued to pay.

Considering this conjuncture, I once asked Miriam what becoming titled as a quilombo meant to her. For her, it was supposed to imply the recognition of their historical struggle and to bring more visibility to it. However, as she concluded, “this has not been the case,” for the injustice of the invasion was further aggravated by the INCRA’s response to it. After having published the community’s RTID in the official government gazette, it decided to exclude ten properties from it. Exactly as in the case of Quilombo Sacopá, the INCRA argued that the compensation legally required for the expropriations of these properties would exceed that year’s national budget of RS$50 million (which, by 2020, had fallen to RS$2.7 million) and was therefore untenable.

The community once again mobilized in resistance. With the support from other state and nongovernmental agencies, several conciliatory meetings followed. In one such meeting, in 2012, the INCRA’s regional superintendent worded its decision in the following way, and I quote at length to enable insight into its logic and language:

The president of Brazil [Dilma Rousseff] did not sign one decree of expropriation in 2011. She signed on December 26 that, of the 380 properties that she was going to expropriate, she chose 60, seven from Minas Gerais. . . . She decided that she would not relocate families if the cost per family would be of more than 100,000 Brazilian reais. Some areas presented were of 600,000 reais per family, and she said that for that money she can expropriate more areas elsewhere, benefitting more people overall. . . . So, it is a circumstantial and political decision by the presidency of Brazil. . . . In Belo Horizonte, in order to make it viable, I have to tell you that, in order for . . . the president to sign off, recognize and title [the community’s lands], we will have to exclude those properties that are already built. . . . And
I, then, approve this decision in our directive committee [of the re-
gional INCRA office] to then refer [it] to [INCRA] president, Celso
[Lacerda] and then to President [Rousseff] . . . Of course, it is po-
lemic and all, but . . . I’m going to tell you exactly what is hindering
us from proceeding to the next stages [of demarcation] so that we
don’t leave this process stagnated, and us here going around in cir-
cles. . . . Putting it clearly—I am not sure if I have been absolutely
clear—that’s the way to be taken, so that everyone knows, “this is the
way,” the clear steps. . . . I think we have to come to the communities
and be as truthful as possible. Within our national conjuncture, the
situation that we are facing, the problems linked to traditional com-
munities, I put everything that I have been experiencing in Brasília
to you. . . . Is there good will? Yes. Is there recognition? Yes. But this
is our context. I think it is better to tell you this truth. To have our
territory recognized, defined, and stop this slowness and stagnation,
I think that we must exclude these properties and the compensa-
tions. Other decrees will otherwise take priority, time will go by, and
we will be unable to gain a victory, which we need. I am using more
reason and less my personal opinion here, as a fellow Black man. . . .
I speak as a manager. . . . We have everything ready, the case for the
titling process is well prepared . . . and so, I have the courage to say
that we will do this, with a knot in our throats, but we will take this
to the President.51

In the superintendent’s statement, the language oscillates between
defending that the decision is being put to the community to defining it
as a done deal, the only reasonable, viable, and rational way forward. This
reasonable way subscribes to a managerial logic and pragmatic budgeting
and prioritizing, necessitated, he claims, by a political conjuncture that
takes precedence over the rights of traditional communities. The com-
munity’s rights were being jointly overrun by the combined forces of set-
tler capitalist appropriation and the rationality and priorities of the settler
state. This liberal democratic state has simultaneously promised recogni-
tion, inclusion, and equality and systemically underfunded and neglected
quilombola land rights. And this is the political context that constrains
the viability or feasibility of the Luízes’ land rights. In this context, qui-
lombola communities can receive their land titles as long as the titling
does not cause too much trouble to this status quo, as long as it happens
within reason, and as long as it is cost efficient. I describe this as the negro
permitido in the previous chapter. But quilombola struggles, challenging
settler property law and the class and racialized power asymmetries that structure it, usually exceed these constraints.

As we learn from the superintendent, the Luízes’ land rights had been monetarily quantified, with a set ceiling. President Rousseff would only relocate settlers for up to R$100,000 per family. Beyond that upper limit, the Luízes’ collective territory was no longer worth the cost, so to say. For the Luízes, one effect of this monetary valuing was the reinforcement of their marginalization in Grajaú, sending the message that the family’s rights were worth less than their neighbors’ and invaders’ property rights. Dispossession was hereby reproduced through racialized socioeconomic inequality. In Belo Horizonte, in 2019, white workers’ income in the formal sector was a striking 94 percent higher than that of formally employed Black workers (pretos and pardos), and 67.8 percent higher in the informal sector. The decision to exclude the invaded territories due to the properties’ value anything but challenged this structural inequality, whose effects the Luízes have felt as one of the few Black families in a mostly white neighborhood. As Miriam put it, “the deal is struck with the weaker side.”

In the INCRA’s official reply to the neighbors’ contestations, we find two additional justifications for its decision. Speaking of convenience, proportionality, and reasonability, it argued that the RTID’s reduction would avoid land conflict, as if the community’s land loss did not already constitute such a conflict. The second justification was that the invaded lands were no longer in use by the family, expressing the INCRA’s willingness to only demarcate the territory on which the family lived directly. This was in contradiction to the principle that quilombola lands are those fundamental for their social reproduction, which includes lands used seasonally and/or for the maintenance of their ways of life. In effect, the INCRA was reproducing the logic of “unused land” as terra nullius, which, as stated above, had “justified” the invasions into the Luízes’ territories in the first place. It hereby not only left their dispossession unchallenged but based its decision on the same settler colonial logic.

In this way, the family’s dispossession was justified technically rather than approached as a political matter of historical reparations for enslavement, dispossession, and marginalization. But how could the exclusion of the invaded territories from their RTID not be political? As Miriam stated at that same meeting:

We have the invasion of the Patrimar construction, the biggest territory ever invaded, and which has already been a topic of discussion at public hearings in the assembly, in the city hall, of protests, in the
prefect’s office, . . . and the building is going up, already in its sixth floor. . . . We have already lost a great part of our territory, what we are claiming today is nothing compared to the original territory. . . . And, from my side, I do not give up these properties. It is not just a matter of land, the value of the land, but of everything that we suffer there. Discrimination and racism of all kinds, today, we suffer there. It is for all this and a lot more. It is for our history, for the struggle of our ancestors.

But one thing I cannot manage to understand. If there is an anthropological report that is ready, if we have so much evidence that we are the legitimate owners of this land, if documents go back to 1895, why are we still losing land? . . . And if the INCRA is acting at state and federal level, is there not one law that can guarantee to us what we have left? And if there is a law, then why are we failing to have it guaranteed?55

Luzia, at the same meeting, added: “It is in this Constitution here, the new one [holding up the 1988 constitution]. . . . I know it by heart: Indigenous and quilombola areas . . . are inalienable and cannot be seized, cannot be sold, and cannot be taken. I don’t want to get nervous, but, if we were white, this would count as a document [holding up one of their historical documents].”56 In a March 2012 meeting at the INCRA, Miriam thus concluded (fig. 3.5):

We do not agree with the decision, until now, unless we are given the right, which we have not been assured so far, to claim the rest of the territory once you have demarcated the community’s land without those properties. I would like to leave this noted here. . . . And you must do what we choose, you have to give us the right to choose, this is what the Decree [5051/2004, article 6, which ratified the ILO Convention 169] says. . . . It is already proven that the property is ours. . . .

We are realistic, realistic about the incompetence of the state. . . . The Patrimar construction started less than two years ago, our anthropological report was completed in 2008. . . . Don’t you understand that you are protecting the other, the invader. . . . They don’t have to be compensated for anything. They should compensate us for having occupied our lands! . . .

It is not a matter of opinion. I . . . still . . . believe in the law. And the decree is very clear about our rights, plus the Luízes community
even has the peculiarity of being documented since 1893, fully registered, with accessible documentation—do you understand?

This is what I do not understand: If the state is sovereign, why does it not guarantee the law? I do not understand what is stopping it. Maybe no one here has a clue about what is being discussed. I am talking about blood. I am talking about stories and histories. I am talking about the story and history of my family. And our history demonstrates that in the condition of recently freed slaves, my family has had to give their blood for that place. And we, now, simply due to an omission of the state, have to hand it to the holders of capital.57

Miriam hereby repoliticized the conversation, locating the quilombo’s struggle in the family’s ongoing experiences of racism and dispossession, in turn connected to their ancestors’ status as enslaved persons. Making the link between the family’s color, race, class, and land loss explicit, Miriam challenged the attempt to erase their political agency, an agency that is embedded in their right to be consulted and to self-determination over their territory. She defied the idea that the family was not being realistic about their rights, and when she asked, “if the state is sovereign, why does it not guarantee the law?” Miriam was also pointing to the inconsistencies of a dependent settler sovereignty that promises to defend Black

Figure 3.5. Miriam and other Luízes members in a meeting with Minas Gerais’s Colonization and Agrarian Reform Institute (INCRA-MG). (Film still from Remanescentes, 2015, directed by Raphaël Grisey.)
land rights but consistently fails to do so. Through this move, she positioned herself both as a rights-bearing citizen and as part of a community to whom reparations are owed. She was holding the state accountable to its duties while pointing out its structural contradictions. And the Luízes were collectively refusing to become a negro permitido, to accept the restrictions within which the settler capitalist state has been willing to grant concessions to Black and Indigenous peoples and movements. With the support of the DPU and the MPF, they subsequently filed a public civil action against the INCRA. Since then, their land demarcation has come to a halt, a situation that was further entrenched under Bolsonaro’s right-wing government. As mentioned, the budget for quilombola land demarcations has only decreased since 2012, for instance.

This ongoing impasse is inseparable from the community’s position as Black, poor Brazilians, descendants of enslaved persons. As Miriam has argued, “what we really do need to think about is real reparations for historical mistakes. . . . Discrimination is ongoing. We experience it all the time. Who are we? A Brazilian people. Here, no one is purely A or B. We are a nation of mixed peoples, but . . . the reality that we are forced to live with all the time is that there is a difference based on your skin color. If you are Black, you are inferior. For being Black, you cannot live in a region that is considered privileged today.” Despite the promises of Brazil’s 1988 constitution, the longer-term myth of racial democracy and the reality of miscegenation in Brazil—and despite the INCRA’s attempts to depoliticize the exclusion of the ten properties from their RTID—for the Luízes, things remain black and white.

**CONCLUSION**

The story of the Quilombo dos Luízes in Belo Horizonte’s upper-class Grajaú neighborhood indicates that quilombola land titles have served to grant only limited historical reparations for slavery. The Luízes have struggled against the effects of unregulated urbanization and real estate speculation that have driven ongoing land invasions in their territory, with all the transformations these have imposed on their traditions. More recently, the community has also had to resist the INCRA-MG’s decision to normalize their dispossession by simply removing the invaded plots from the community’s officially recognized territory, including the luxury building and mall built by the Patrimar construction company after their RTID’s completion. The INCRA’s decision, in violation of their right to free, prior, and informed consent, as guaranteed by the ILO Convention
169, thus reproduced the community’s dispossession and the adverse effects it has historically had on their well-being and communal life.

For the Luízes, to give in to the INCRA’s decision would have been to give up the struggle of their ancestors, succumbing to the racist structures against which their land fight has always been positioned. To resist a compromise with the INCRA was to resist the sociopolitical and geographical place, or nonplace, ascribed to them as Black and quilombola people in Brazil. At the many seminars, protests, forums, and meetings at which state authorities only performed their quilombola rights, the Luízes constantly repoliticized the conversation, turning them into sites of contestation and countercolonization. Acting as political subjects with clear demands on the state and an unmovable stance against settler capitalism, they embodied previous quilombola dreams for a world not structured by anti-Blackness. The Quilombo dos Luízes thus illustrates the structural limits of quilombola land titles in a society and state whose colonial foundations have not been unsettled. In this context, as Miriam affirmed, “on our part, we fight for and expect better days, in which our values and heritage will prevail over the interests of speculative capital and individualistic ambitions. . . . In respect to the memory of our ancestors, resistance will always be our watchword.”
What Counts as Indigenous Politics?

The Pindorama Scholarship Program and São Paulo’s Urban Indigenous Movement

In the evening of August 26, 2016, a small group of Indigenous and non-Indigenous persons gathered at the square known as Pátio do Colégio in São Paulo’s historic center (fig. 4.1). We were there at the invitation of Amaro Potiguara, then a Pindorama Program student at São Paulo’s Pontifícia Universidade Católica (PUC-SP). Amaro was leading an opening ceremony for the month-long Agosto Índigena (Indigenous August). Running for a third consecutive year, the initiative included talks, workshops, and cultural activities held throughout São Paulo’s municipal public schools to help teachers integrate Indigenous history and culture into school curricula.\(^1\) Gathering around Amaro, we stood in a circle by the Memorial to the Founders of the City of São Paulo. We were surrounded on one side by what was left of the sixteenth-century Jesuit school Colégio de São Paulo de Piratininga and on the other by the two nineteenth-century neoclassical buildings that house São Paulo’s Justice and Citizenship State Department. Leaning against these historical buildings were tents and make-shift homes set up by people who, facing homelessness in the city, were spending the night at the square.

After a brief period of greetings and chatter, Amaro began the opening ceremony. Welcoming us all, he proclaimed, “Standing here, where the city of São Paulo began through the foundation of a Jesuit school on Indigenous territory, we reclaim the city and this land.” Amaro was reminding us that the historic Pátio do Colégio was built inside the aldeia of Tupi chief Tibiriçá. São Paulo, the capital of Brazil’s wealthiest and most populous state and one of Latin America’s main financial, industrial, and cultural centers, is located atop Indigenous lands.

Amaro then invited us to dance the toré, which Chirley Pankará helped
lead. As we danced, we drew the attention of those around us. Children, teenagers, and adults who were spending the night at the square joined, and the toré circle grew. This spontaneous and playful encounter connected the experiences its participants shared across their differences.
Homelessness in a city like São Paulo is also a product of dependent settler capitalist urbanization, a process premised on the dispossession, exploitation, and forced displacement of Indigenous peoples as well as of other marginalized populations. In the city, Indigenous peoples, too, have been systemically excluded from adequate housing, employment, and access to land. At this square, on dispossessed Indigenous lands in the heart of São Paulo, Amaro’s opening ceremony organically connected the urban Indigenous struggle to those of other people who are marginalized, displaced, and erased in settler society.

São Paulo, as the Brazilian state with the highest GDP per capita in 2021, was also the city with the highest number of migrants in 2010 and the fourth largest city in absolute numbers of Indigenous people. Most Indigenous persons in São Paulo were from northeastern nations such as the Fulni-ô, Pankararé, Atikum, Potiguara, Pataxó, and the Pankararu. Only the Guarani, a small fraction of this number, lived in state-recognized Indigenous territories inside São Paulo’s metropolitan region. Outside of official Indigenous territories, the Favela do Real Parque has been identified as the location with the largest concentration of Indigenous persons in the city (fig. 4.2). It is the home of around 826 Pankararu who are members of more or less 300 families. The FUNAI has officially recognized the Pankararu as an offshoot of their community of origin, in Pernambuco, and they have successfully mobilized for the provision of several differentiated services in the city. Alongside São Paulo’s broader urban Indigenous movement, for example, they have fought for access to higher education as part of a struggle for better employment opportunities. From this struggle emerged the Pindorama scholarship program, or Pindorama Program, the focus of this chapter.

The Pindorama Program is part of wider and relatively recent trends of rising numbers of Indigenous students in higher education. Estimates suggest that, in 2015, about 8,000 Indigenous persons were enrolled at a university, double the amount estimated for 2010. The 2022 Higher Education Census in turn revealed that a striking 72,086 students self-identified as Indigenous, an increase that can be attributed to improved reporting of data on color and race by universities in the latest census. This increase is in part due to post-2000s reforms that helped universalize access to higher education in Brazil. These included the institution of the National Secondary Education Examination (Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio [ENEM]) as the standard entrance exam for all public universities, affirmative action policies such as quotas, and the Universidade Para Todos (PROUNI) program, which offers scholarships to low-income
students at private universities. A 2008 study found that around seventy-two universities offered some kind of affirmative action designed for Indigenous applicants.

While access has increased, student retention has remained an obstacle in the absence of federal actions that could sustainably support
Indigenous people in higher education. And, overall, there is still limited understanding of the diverse trajectories of Indigenous peoples to and in higher education, especially when considering those who study at private universities and/or are not enrolled in governmental scholarship schemes. A growing body of academic production, often led by Indigenous scholars, has been addressing this gap. This chapter contributes to this literature through its focus on a scholarship program aimed exclusively at students normally residing in the city, investigating how higher education is also a space of urban Indigenous political organizing.

The Pindorama Program is exceptional in its targeting of students who already live in São Paulo, while most scholarship schemes in Brazil have been designed with students who normally reside in state-recognized Indigenous territories in mind. An example of the latter is the first such program to be founded, the Intercultural Bachelor’s and Teacher Training for Indigenous teachers of primary and secondary schools in Indigenous aldeias. As to the Pindorama Program, it was founded in 2001 through a partnership between São Paulo’s urban Indigenous movement and non-Indigenous supporters, especially the Pastoral Indigenista (pastoral ministry) of São Paulo’s Archdiocese and the Indigenous Missionary Council (Conselho Indigenista Missionário, CIMI). During my fieldwork, the program coordination was shared among one non-Indigenous member of the Pastoral Indigenista, one non-Indigenous CIMI member, and one Indigenous student, at the time, Aparecida (Cida) Pankararu. From the outset, Pindorama was conceived not just as a space of academic and professional training but also of political formation. It has historically maintained strong ties with São Paulo’s urban Indigenous movement, encouraging students to become active in a range of political activities in the city and in their communities of origin.

On this note, Gersem Baniwa and Maria Hoffman have argued that academic and professional training is always political for Indigenous peoples, being part of “a collective aspiration to challenge their current living conditions and marginalization, [serving] as a tool to promote their own visions for development by strengthening their ancestral knowledges, institutions, negotiation skills, and capacity to effect change within and beyond their communities.” For them, higher education is central to Indigenous politics, for it carries the potential, for example, to equalize state-Indigenous relations and further Indigenous autonomy. As I discuss in this chapter, the Pindorama students and coordinators at PUC-SP understood their political mission along precisely these lines. In this task, nonetheless, they also had to counter what Santos Albuquerque calls the
“prejudice of authenticity” not just as it pertains to their Indigenous identities but also to notions of what counts as an authentic Indigenous politics in urban contexts. In other words, the prejudice of authenticity has also attempted to determine and constrain urban Indigenous political horizons, which I theorize throughout this work as a kind of political elimination.

More specifically, my time in São Paulo revealed how external expectations on Indigenous peoples and movements have attempted to circumscribe them within a struggle for differentiated rights from the position of politically and economically marginalized populations, whose empowerment through class mobility, for example, would somehow make them “less Indigenous.” This imposed demarcation of the program’s political mission and its students’ aspirations also attempts to limit Indigenous autonomy and self-determination. Nonetheless, Pindorama students continuously refused and exceeded predetermined notions of what counts as authentic Indigenous politics, illustrating the diverse ways that Indigenous lives are political in the city. In this context, I reflect on how I, too, brought my own expectations on Indigenous movements to my fieldwork in São Paulo. These expectations, too, were challenged by the students and program coordinators.

SÃO PAULO’S INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT, THE PANKARARU, AND THE PINDORAMA PROGRAM

Since at least the mid-1990s and early 2000s, São Paulo’s urban Indigenous movement has comprised diverse kinds of organizations and spaces with different levels of institutionalization. Many Indigenous peoples have formed nation-specific Indigenous associations, for example, and Indigenous leaders also congregate in councils and commissions, some of which are linked to public agencies, such as the Indigenous Municipal Council and São Paulo’s Indigenous State Council. Indigenous organizing in São Paulo has also extended to more autonomous spaces. During my fieldwork, these included the Commission for the Articulation of the Indigenous Peoples of São Paulo (Comissão de Articulação dos Povos Indígenas de São Paulo [CAPISP]), the Popular Tribunal’s Indigenous Working Group (Tribunal Popular-Grupo de Trabalho Indígena), and the Indigenous Formation and Articulation Meetings (Encontros de Formação e Articulação Indígena).

At the First National Conference on Indigenista Policy (1a Conferência Nacional de Política Indigenista, hereinafter First National Conference)
in June 2015, Benedito Prezia, at the time both the Pastoral Indigenista’s and a Pindorama coordinator, recounted how the movement began:

When I arrived here [in São Paulo] in 1992, everyone was preoccupied with the Indigenous peoples that lived in aldeias, the Guarani. But slowly we discovered that there was an Indigenous population here in the city of São Paulo. The Pankararu community was the first to show up, to appear . . . because of a news article published in a local newspaper . . . that showed the indígenas in front of the Cingapura housing complex [a social housing program in the Real Parque favela] dancing the toré ritual. So, that was a surprise. . . . We then gradually identified the Indigenous groups that live here, and in [2001] the Pindorama Program appeared with the help of several people, especially the PUC-SP, the Pastoral Indigenista, and the Indigenous nations themselves. By that time, the Pankararu were already known and politically articulated, and many young Pankararu were in the Poli, a free preuniversity preparatory course. Then, . . . at the end of 2002, we held the first meeting of the Indigenous peoples in São Paulo, at Jardim Elba, in partnership with São Paulo’s Municipal Education Department. We booked buses to pick up the participants . . . and, through that, discovered other Indigenous peoples in the city: the Fulni-ô . . . then the Kariri-Xocó, . . . and then we started noticing the importance of articulating Indigenous peoples in the urban context, because until then an índio or indígena was only someone who lived in an aldeia. Likewise, the Education Department had told us that they would only develop programs for Indigenous peoples who lived in an aldeia and spoke an Indigenous language [*ter língua* (to have a tongue)]. Leaving us with the impression that the others—you [addressing the audience]—are mute, right, you don’t have a tongue. So, this was a thing that shocked me, and I thought “no, we have to change this.” . . . I always say that the Indigenous question is a political question. When public officials open their minds, they gain a new outlook, . . . but it is a big challenge.¹⁵

Upon arrival in the city, the first point of contact for Indigenous peoples was usually the FUNAI, which at first refused to attend to their demands. In the absence of federal support, different Indigenous associations emerged as the only available way to obtain legal representation and agency.¹⁶ As mentioned, the group with the most tangible victories regarding public policies have perhaps been the Pankararu, especially
through the Indigenous association SOS Pankararu, created in 1994 in the Favela Real Parque in the upper-class neighborhood of Morumbi. Following northeast–southeast migration trends, the Pankararu began moving to São Paulo since at least the 1950s to escape violent land conflicts as well as food and economic insecurity in the state of Pernambuco. In São Paulo, they joined the urban surplus population, or franja marginal (see introduction). Many Pankararu women took up jobs as domestic servants while the men worked mostly in the civil construction industry, often as informal workers.

Those who worked on the construction of the Morumbi Stadium built their homes in its vicinity and cofounded the Favela do Real Parque, where they faced gang-related violence as well as inadequate housing, sanitation, health, and education services. Moreover, many Pankararu faced workplace and everyday discrimination for being from the Northeast, a region typically associated with poverty, and often felt compelled to hide their Indigenous identity because of the persisting stigmas attached to it. They formed the SOS Pankararu Association to organize against this context of precarity. Their victories have included their official recognition by the FUNAI-SP in 1997, which afforded them additional administrative powers in São Paulo. Since 2000, they have also had access to differentiated health services provided by the National Health Foundation (FUNASA) through a team of Indigenous health professionals. Finally, they were part of a successful collective fight in Real Parque for a social housing program. The Cingapura complex mentioned belonged to this initiative. Some of its apartment blocks are reserved exclusively for the Pankararu, although not all Pankararu residents have had access to the program.

Unable to afford regular trips back to the Pankararu territories in Pernambuco, known as the Terra Indígena Pankararu and the Terra Indígena Entre Serras, many made efforts to continue practicing their traditions in São Paulo. The 1992 article, mentioned by Benedito, noted for example how “they try to replicate the festivities, dances, songs, and ceremonies. The place of reunion is the house of Josias. In the small living room, they remove the furniture and get together on the nights when they want to dance the game of the Menino do Rancho [one of the Pankararu traditions]. They sing their songs in their language, smoke the pipe, and invoke the spirits of the encantados [enchanted]. These gatherings are only for the Indians. There are also the open festivities, the dances that are performed in schools and in the court of the neighborhood’s Catholic Church.”

As Santos Albuquerque has documented, the SOS Pankararu Association has also been responsible for organizing the public ritualistic
performances known as the toré or praiá dance (dança dos praiás) in São Paulo. In line with the ritual’s historical role in the Pankararu’s reemergence and official recognition in the 1940s, the performances have served to demonstrate to the state and the wider public that the Pankararu are an Indigenous nation in the city and to strengthen the Indigenous identity of Pankararu residents of São Paulo. Several Pindorama Pankararu students, for instance, had otherwise only seen the Pankararu festivities and toré dances on video. Far away from their Indigenous territories and dealing with anti-Indigenous racism in the city, many had struggled with an internalization of the authenticity prejudice. In the words of Amanda Pankararu, a social work student at the time:

When we [Amanda and her brother] were little, we felt some shame and embarrassment. . . . [Once], we had to give an interview to a local newspaper, and they published a picture of my brother and me. They took a picture of us wearing Indigenous ornaments and with a little praiá next to us, and they included statements we gave about our experiences of going to the aldeia. My dad was super proud, he would show it to everyone, and we ended up having to take it with us to school. And, inevitably, we ended up becoming a laughing-stock, with the other kids saying, “you’re not indígena, you have to walk around naked!” . . . So it was a bit difficult for us to affirm our identity. . . .

But within me, I used to question myself a lot: “Man, I really am not Indigenous, I don’t walk around naked, I don’t even own any feathers, . . . but at the same time, I have my grandad, who sings, and I go there [to the community] and everyone tells me that these guys there are my cousins . . . what the hell?” I think it really was a dilemma as a child.

The praiá dance performances were therefore also opportunities to strengthen the connections between the Pankararu territories in Pernambuco and the communities in São Paulo and thereby to interrupt the tenacious logic of elimination. I return to this later, discussing how the Pindorama Program is part of these efforts.

Arguably, the Pankararu have been able to guarantee these public policies because they are concentrated in larger groups in the city, in the Real Parque and in Jardim Elba in São Paulo’s eastern side, for example, where around sixty Pankararu families are represented by the Indigenous Association Comunidade Pankararu da Zona Leste. Unlike other urban
Indigenous peoples who migrated in smaller clusters or as individuals, as was the case of the members of Aldeia Maracanã in Rio, the Pankararu left Pernambuco in larger family units and in a higher number, with the Real Parque as a point of reference. It is estimated that around 1,500 Pankararu live in São Paulo. As Lia Pankararu recounted, “after my sister and I came to São Paulo, my other three sisters and brothers gradually came too. It’s always like this—one person brings the other [um vai puxando o outro].”

They ultimately formed a community in Real Parque that stemmed directly from Pernambuco, drawing an exceptionally strong continuity with a traditional territory, a fact that is likely to have strengthened their claims for collective rights in São Paulo.

**Pindorama: Indigenous Politics and/through Higher Education**

The Pankararu associations have also successfully mobilized for better education opportunities. They have secured access to the preuniversity preparatory course known as Poli, offered by the Engineering School of the University of São Paulo (USP) and, later, helped found and have continued to work closely with the Pindorama Program. The program emerged after Hiparindi TopTiro (Xavante) asked Benedito for help with access to a university education. The CIMI and the Pastoral Indigenista had become a more immediate ally of São Paulo’s urban Indigenous people because they perceived Indigenous struggles as primarily political rather than defined by cultural alterity per its foundational liberation theology, as Benedito stated.

Benedito proceeded to contact Prof. Lucia Rangel at PUC-SP, who was also a CIMI member. At the same time, Hiparindi learned that PUC-SP professor Ana Bataglin was already building a university access program for Indigenous students.

With the assistance of PUC’s scholarship division and with financial support from the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of São Paulo, the collective secured twenty-six scholarships for Indigenous students who passed PUC-SP’s entrance exam, in Brazil called the vestibular. By 2019, the program had admitted around two hundred students from fifteen Indigenous nations. The majority of its students have always been Pankararu, followed by the Pankararé. We can attribute this fact to the SOS Pankararu’s significant involvement in the program. For example, the association has submitted a yearly, nonexhaustive list of candidates for the PUC-SP’s entrance exam, derived from the list of students enrolled in the Poli preuniversity course. We can also attribute it to the central role of family units in the Pankararu’s social organization, for Pankararu applicants were often related to former or current students. As Lia said, “um vai puxando o outro.”
Pindorama students were mostly first-generation, working-class students, who faced financial insecurity and/or the insufficiencies of Brazil’s public school system as they entered higher education. Many, for example, had to juggle full-time employment, care responsibilities at home, and their studies. Aiming to provide them with pastoral and academic support, Lucia, Ana, and Benedito, the program’s first coordinators, instituted compulsory monthly meetings and workshops. The workshops offer training in several academic skills, such as writing and debating, and function as a space of reflexivity and political formation. During the meetings, students discuss matters pertaining to their individual trajectories, to Brazilian politics, Indigenous politics, and their respective Indigenous nations. The meeting agendas include external speakers (such as myself, when I presented on my research), student presentations, and day trips, such as to São Paulo’s Guarani territories. In 2007, Pindorama students also started organizing the Retomada Indígena (Indigenous Retaking), a three-day long, yearly event at PUC-SP that has included debates, roundtables, exhibitions, film showings, cultural performances, and the sale of handicrafts. Its aims have been, among others, to increase the visibility of the Indigenous students at PUC-SP and to establish a dialogue with the wider campus community about Indigenous politics in Brazil and in São Paulo. This range of activities implemented by the program have been identified as among the most effective in terms of Indigenous students’ retention throughout Brazil. As part of this task, the program encourages students to learn about and from their own as well as each other’s Indigenous nations and their trajectories in the city and to become politically engaged at the university and in São Paulo.

That said, the Pindorama Program’s impact has extended beyond the PUC-SP and even the city of São Paulo. Several former students, such as Bruno Xavante, have become civil servants in local, regional, or federal public bodies, often developing projects focused on Indigenous peoples. Many have also been active and some have taken on leadership roles in the Indigenous movements of São Paulo and beyond. Former students Emerson Souza (Guarani) and Amaro Mesquita (Potiguara), for example, have been involved in organizing protests, debates, workshops, and spaces such as the Agosto Indígena and the CAPISP (fig. 4.3). Founded in 2005, the CAPISP led the organization of São Paulo’s local round of the 2015 First National Conference for example. As one of the 4 local rounds in the Southeast region and 131 rounds throughout the country, it was the only one to focus on Indigenous peoples in the urban context. It gathered several Pindorama students and graduates as well as Indigenous organizers.
from Aldeia Maracanã in Rio de Janeiro (see chapter 1). In this way, Pindorama students have helped expand and strengthen the work of Indigenous urban movements in Brazil’s Southeast region.

Pindorama’s monthly meetings also impact students on an individual level. For those who have been born and raised in São Paulo, the meetings are often their first sustained encounter with a collective of Indigenous peoples. Many students have never had, or rarely have, the opportunity to visit their communities of origin. And some of those who had been born in traditional territories moved to São Paulo at a young age. The Pindorama Program offers a space of congregation for Indigenous people who would otherwise remain in isolation in São Paulo. This, too, is an element of political formation. For example, many students report instances of discrimination at the university itself, such as when faculty and peers call their Indigenous identities into question.35 As Emerson Souza writes in his master’s thesis, these experiences create the need for Pindorama students “to know more about themselves, their people, their language, the history of their Indigenous community, and that involved a return and recovery
of their people's history.” In so doing, the meetings help strengthen Indigenous belonging in the city by linking students’ individual experiences to struggles shared with other Indigenous people across the university, the city, and traditional Indigenous territories.

Cida Pankararu, who moved to São Paulo from Pernambuco as a young adult, described this clearly. She discussed how, as part of her academic journey, she “even found [her] parentes again, and reconstructed [her] identity.” Before entering the program, she used to self-identify as “white” in official questionnaires and thought of her Indigenous identity as “a thing of our [her and her husband’s] past.” She further explained: “In the classroom, sometimes I was very quiet, very shy. . . . And then a professor would show that they don’t know how to give a lecture about Indigenous peoples . . . and then that starts bothering you. ‘Hold on! I’m Indigenous and I am not identifying with what they are saying!’ . . . In the Pindorama, we learned how to have autonomy, to position ourselves as Indigenous people, because it is not enough to say, ‘I am Indigenous.’ If you do not know how to position yourself, the non-Indigenous person can ridicule you. . . . ‘Society’—in quotation marks—still expects Indigenous people to have a certain profile, but that is not how things are anymore. There was a mixture; there was a history, but now there is a lack of information. . . . What do you expect of an índio? What is an índio to you?”

At its best, higher education develops Indigenous students’ ability to challenge racist attitudes and a potential internalization of the authenticity prejudice, as Cida’s account illustrated. In such cases, it can improve their sense of autonomy and help develop their voice. For Cida and other women in the program, this sense of autonomy also went through questions of gender. These students had come to challenge heteropatriarchal relations in intimate and public spaces that may have previously hindered not just their professional development but also their political voice and actions. In Cida’s words, “I had this idea of always investing in the men, you know? ‘Ah, the husband will go . . . the husband will go and work, and all.’ And then, we evolve, you know? We say, ‘Hold on, the husband will go but I can go too!’ . . . I am also rediscovering myself. Many issues leave me restless, and so together with my parentes, we struggle, we roll up our sleeves. Today, I am the secretary of the CA-PISP, I am a coordinator of the program in which I graduated, and I am a co-organizer of this [First] National Conference. . . . I also learned how to defend the cause and how to defend myself, how to fight, how to have my voice of resistance. . . . My community needs me as an Indigenous woman with a degree.”
Cícera, who had served as a Pindorama coordinator in previous years, noted that, “in the Pankararu community, the army would come in the morning and build a fence [to protect us from non-Indigenous settlers] that would let us leave the community to go to work or study in the nearby city. By night, the settlers would have taken the fence down, and whoever tried to cross the fence was killed. So, it was a period of a lot of tension. And it’s not that I didn’t know about these conflicts, this history of conflict, but I didn’t have a political formation. And, these things were men’s issues. [laughs] They were issues that men were to solve. We knew that the conflict existed but we did not take part in the decisions. . . . However, the woman has a significant decision-making power. . . . My great-grandmother and my grandmother were really influential for me.”

Cida’s and Cícera’s trajectories contested and interrupted the heteropatriarchal and racist settler colonial institutions imposed on Indigenous peoples discussed in chapter 1. These institutions include the tutelage still practiced de facto by both the state and academia. In Brazil, tutelage is historically also founded on the paternalism of protection and pacification (see introduction). And universities have historically been instrumental to tutelage. They are the institutions where non-Indigenous “experts” are trained and employed, as lawyers and anthropologists for example. These experts have authority in spaces of policy making and implementation, including in the processes of Indigenous and quilombola land demarcation. From this position, they may inadvertently speak for Indigenous peoples, and this renews the institution of tutelage.

On a related note, Tukano anthropologist João Paulo Lima Barreto argues that, on the one hand, the university is a “status apparatus” that also serves the “integration” of Indigenous peoples by training them in predominantly Eurocentric disciplines and worldviews. This comprises another facet of elimination, so central to tutelage, that has not yet been overcome. On the other hand, the university is also a space in which another knowledge production is possible; through which Indigenous students can also make a return to their peoples and to their respective histories and cosmologies. From this place of dialogue between Indigenous and non-Indigenous knowledge production, they make a second return, reengaging academia to “decolonize thought.” This resonates with the work of Brazilian Black and trans writer abigail Campos Leal. Pushing against a “euro-white conception of study, reduced to its epistemological dimension,” she finds that she heals and arms herself through academic study: “Me curo y me armo, estudiantando.” Programs such as Pindorama also appropriate academia to resist pacification and mend colonial ruptures;
to affirm Indigenous identities, agency, and struggles; and to transform higher education. In so doing, the program both expresses and strengthens Indigenous self-determination in the city.

That being said, formal education is not a prerequisite for Indigenous leadership and organizing. It is, rather, one site and path through which Indigenous politics are practiced in the city. After all, many job positions at public bodies and nongovernmental organizations that work with Indigenous peoples, including the FUNAI and FUNASA, require a university degree and are therefore often occupied by non-Indigenous professionals. Aiming to increase their control over services, projects, and programs that pertain to them, Indigenous people with university degrees, including some former Pindorama students such as Bruno Xavante, have begun to take up these positions. As Cicera reflected, “Indigenous peoples do not occupy positions that should treat Indigenous matters with seriousness. And the argument is exactly that—that we don’t have university degrees. So, from the moment on that we have these degrees, no one can make that argument, although they will make other ones up. And then we are also prepared to discuss from equal to equal with other people, because if the question is one of expertise or academic knowledge, then we also have it.”

THE INDIGENOUS POLITICS THAT OTHERS HAVE IN MIND

As a site of political formation, the Pindorama Program is also a space in which the content—the analyses, demands, and goals—of São Paulo’s Indigenous movement are debated and developed with long-term effects. The non-Indigenous coordinators’ own political views have influenced this political work, as Lucia recognized:

When you have an education program, inevitably the investment is in the individual student. . . . But we think: “Well, but this is a scholarship for Indigenous people.” So what does this imply? That this student, who passed through Pindorama or is going through it, that they have an expansion of their awareness, of their thinking in relation to the condition of Indigenous peoples in Brazil, in relation to the questions that are specific to Indigenous peoples in Brazil. And that, therefore, they set the goal to return something to the community from which they come, which was also the community that endorsed them to come and study here. But this is not a requirement. You cannot require a person to come to a program
and acquire awareness—awareness is not acquired in a program. . . .
What I mean is: you cannot really do a test to verify political aware-
ness, right? So, this is an objective that is ours [the coordinators’] in
the sense of how we understand the Indigenous question in Brazil. . . .
This objective has more to do with how we think.45

In the program’s first few years, the three coordinators disagreed on
the political vision that should direct the program and its monthly meet-
ings. Ana Bataglin, for example, rejected the idea that racism and inequality structured Brazilian society and did not believe that this assessment should drive Pindorama’s political mission.46 I interpret her understanding as more aligned with a discourse of cultural diversity and racial democracy in Brazil. Lucia and Benedito, however, as members of the CIMI and the Pastoral Indigenista, analytically grounded their work on questions of class, race, and colonialism and saw Indigenous politics as political rather than cultural or diversity oriented, as stated. From this perspective, they centered the importance of students giving back to their Indigenous na-
tions through their professional and/or political work. As Lucia’s state-
ment shows, while they recognized that higher education implies, perhaps more immediately, an investment in an individual student, they encour-
aged students to locate their individual trajectories within a collective his-
torical and ongoing struggle.

Benedito and Lucia also had a specific vision for this struggle. In my
conversations with Benedito, in the program’s meetings, and in related
spaces of São Paulo’s urban Indigenous movement, I noted how the dis-
cussion commonly focused on demands for differentiated public policies
in the city, such as for housing, health care, and education, and on the de-
fense of Indigenous constitutional rights. This was an important task in the
face of state neglect. Selma Pankararu stated that “at PUC, I understood
what social inequality meant. What it means to guarantee people’s rights.
What it means to recognize that I am Indigenous, to have to fight every
day for public policies for Indigenous peoples.”47 Taking on the work of Na-
tive American/Indigenous scholars in Anglophone contexts, I also inter-
preted this focus as a politics of recognition and inclusion into the state’s
bureaucracy and within the established discourses and framework of the
1988 constitution (see introduction). Many scholars have by now demon-
strated the pitfalls of such a rights-oriented Indigenous politics. As I dis-
cuss in previous chapters, this kind of politics can in fact relegate the
still-settling colonial and capitalist state, its experts, and its ways of know-

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I also demonstrate throughout this work that Indigenous rights in Brazil have been structured by institutionalized understandings of authenticity—the semiotic labor of settler colonial conquest—that ultimately renew the flawed and eliminationist framework of acculturation. The 1988 constitution, for example, captures Indigenous rights, ultimately, as those of culturally differentiated communities within Brazilian national sovereignty, even while granting them status as original peoples. As Native American/Indigenous authors have shown, settler states hereby attempt to confine Indigenous struggles to those of minoritized, ethnic groups under its management, circumventing how they call the state’s legitimacy and integrity into question. In other words, dominant and institutionalized definitions of Indigenous difference attempt to determine, discipline, and contain the form and content of Indigenous political horizons, most commonly as struggles for their survival as culturally (or socially but never politically) different communities.

Relatedly, the popular imagination continues to be steeped in essentializing and evolutionist depictions of indigeneity as rural and nonmodern. One incident with a Pindorama student revealed these flawed assumptions and how they attempt to constrain the program’s political work and the lives of its Indigenous students. At a public event at which the student Edcarlos Pereira (Pankararu) was speaking, non-Indigenous audience members challenged the program’s legitimacy by accusing it of aiming to “create Indigenous CEOs and bankers.” This accusation reveals two prejudiced expectations. First, that Indigenous persons should professionally and politically work within Indigenous issues and not aim to become professionals in unrelated areas. Beyond this anecdotal incident, this assumption has also structured higher education access and scholarship schemes for Indigenous peoples in Brazil more broadly. Several universities have not offered all courses to Indigenous applicants but only degrees deemed relevant to Indigenous communities, sometimes defined in dialogue with Indigenous nations and the FUNAI and at other times by the university. In the case of the former, such close partnerships with Indigenous nations are praiseworthy. But this policy also raises the question of why there should be any limitation on the courses open to Indigenous peoples at all. Whose notions of Indigenous identities and demands inform such a policy?

Arguably, this circumscription of the areas of Indigenous professionalization both stems from and reproduces marginalization. Limiting the work of Indigenous peoples only to Indigenous issues is also a way to control the impact Indigenous peoples can have in settler society by demarcating the areas in which they can be deemed to have relevant expertise.
Furthermore, it caps Indigenous autonomy and self-determination by attempting to externally determine Indigenous people’s aspirations. As Trinh T. Minh-ha argues, “marginalized peoples are herded to mind their own business. So that the area, the ‘homeland’ in which they are allowed to work remains heavily marked, whereas the areas in which Euro-Americans’ activities are deployed can go unmarked. One is here confined to one’s own culture, ethnicity, sexuality, and gender. And that’s often the only way for insiders within the marked boundaries to make themselves heard or to gain approval.”

In addition, the discomfort with the idea of Pindorama students becoming CEOs and bankers also reveals the expectation that they should remain economically marginalized and should not seek too much social mobility. Put differently, the essentializing idea that Indigenous peoples are nonmodern implies that Indigenous lives must somehow remain outside of capitalism and neither seek nor achieve economic prosperity. This is how Edcarlos understood their statement, feeling compelled to reply: “We do not aim to be bank managers or CEOs of any multinationals, we seek only a decent work and our Indigenous rights.” This was an often-repeated statement in Pindorama. For the coordinators, it expressed the program’s political vision.

But what does an Indigenous CEO or banker upset? Why would the program be illegitimate if it produced Indigenous CEOs and bankers? I have come to understand that, in that case, the program would unsettle the interconnected representation of Indigenous peoples as radical alterities and their political and economic marginalization in Brazil, which are falsely understood as legitimizing their claim to differentiated public policies and rights. In other words, the exchange between Edcarlos and his non-Indigenous interlocutors illustrated the flawed but prevalent idea that someone is a real Indigenous person and deserves (special) Indigenous rights and self-determination because and insofar as they are “a victim of failed policies, historical circumstances, and so on,” to borrow the words of Cherokee scholar Jeff Corntassel and Richard Witmer. Alongside Kate Spilde, these scholars theorize this narrative as “rich Indian racism.” According to this racism, Pindorama students’ class mobility and work in non-Indigenous areas would make them and their political work less Indigenous.

Pindorama students consistently challenge and unsettle this racism. For example, when I discussed Edcarlos’s response to the non-Indigenous speakers, he explained that his reply had been in direct reaction to their “challenge.” That is, Edcarlos knew and was responding to what they
expected to hear, to the Indian and Indigenous struggle “they had in mind.” In this regard, for him, the Pindorama had been an opportunity to better understand and unpack such external expectations, to “aggregate this kind of knowledge,” as he put it. To extrapolate this point, an important contribution of the Pindorama Program is to provide its students with the tools to be in dialogue with the settler colonial state and society, including with non-Indigenous allies, on equal terms and when they so desire. Cida equally demonstrated this awareness when she asked me, “What do you expect of an índio? What is an índio to you?”

The monthly meetings develop students’ abilities to respond with knowledge and confidence to those who would tell them that “they are not the Indian they had in mind” and that includes “rich Indian racism.” Another example of how students challenge this racism was offered in Carol’s joint interview with her mother, Lia. For Carol, the Pindorama had been primarily an opportunity to study and learn a profession, affording her greater social mobility than her mother’s generation had experienced. For Lia, in turn, Carol’s financial independence had enabled her to cover travel costs to return to the Pankararu Brejo dos Padres aldeia, in Pernambuco, once a year. While the Pindorama did not inspire Carol to become active in the Indigenous movement, the financial and professional security it enabled her to achieve helped maintain her family’s ties with the community. This, too, was political for it curbed the work of Indigenous elimination that urban-rural divides reproduce, strengthening Indigenous belonging to land and community across the countryside and the city.

These discussions within the Pindorama Program illustrate how non-Indigenous allies and supporters also bring their own understandings of what counts as legitimately Indigenous political struggles, and I am included here. For example, in my view, the CIMI’s focus on public policies and constitutional rights missed an understanding of contemporary Brazil as a settler colony, which structurally limited the transformative potential of Indigenous rights. In my conversations with the Pindorama coordinators and students, we discussed this critique and the Native American/Indigenous scholarship I mentioned. In our dialogues, they acknowledged the contradictions of the Brazilian state as well as those of the CIMI. But they also insisted on the relevance of defending Indigenous rights, as the unkept promises of the 1988 constitution. Recognizing these paradoxes, Edcarlos, for example, chooses to be politically active not through institutionalized channels, such as associations or government-led councils, but by giving talks and running workshops that allow him to “speak with others directly.” For him, working through state-oriented organizations is
“too political,” in the sense that they contain their own logics and interests that do not necessarily prioritize Indigenous peoples. Students are thus politically engaged in diverse ways, not necessarily aligning with the coordinators’ visions for Indigenous organizing.

Taking on a broader perspective, Emerson Souza offers an alternative interpretation of public policies and ethnic rights, including of affirmative action policies in higher education. He challenges the understanding that they are a politics of inclusion and reframes them as a kind of reparation that compensates Indigenous peoples for the visceral and structural violence that the state, nonetheless, continues to practice. As he states in his master’s thesis, “these reparation policies . . . are based on the exclusion of the specificities of other nations” that challenge the sovereign nation-state, while this nation-state continues to “covet and intend to usurp the lands of our Indigenous families.” Universities, including the Pindorama Program, thus “advance at the slowest pace in this 500-year dichotomy.”

For Souza, it is within the contradictions of hegemonic spaces such as universities or public policies more generally that we find their possibilities.

Pindorama students and coordinators pushed back against my interpretation of Indigenous rights and public policies as merely another form of settler colonialism. Indeed, they laid bare how I too carried my own expectations on Indigenous politics. In so doing, they reminded me of the importance of not transposing knowledge produced in other contexts, even if by fellow Indigenous thinkers, without engaging with the intellectual and political labor already underway in Brazil. In this regard, and noting that I have discussed this in greater detail elsewhere, Tracy Guzmán argues that Indigenous peoples in Brazil have worked to “construct indigeneity as compatible with Brazilianness rather than as prior, anti-theoretical, or exterior to it.” Building on Indigenous political thought and practice in Brazil, she offers a “Native critique of sovereignty” as valuing Indigenous principles such as reciprocity and mutual respect without advocating for “mutually exclusive national separatisms” or for an Indigenous-led national government and economy. In the words of Gersem Baniwa, “Indigenous peoples . . . carry feelings of Brazilianness . . . and should equally benefit from the rights and duties of every other Brazilian citizen without having to give up their own ways of life.”

Returning to Bispo, this statement illustrates Indigenous peoples’ pluralistic thought, under which “not everything that comes together, mixes” or becomes the same but coflows as confluence. Indigenous peoples can thus access and demand national citizenship without giving up their own sociopolitical systems.
For the Brazilian Indigenous movement, the realization of the 1988 constitution’s promises remains an important goal. In a similar vein, São Paulo’s urban Indigenous movement—including the SOS Pankararu association in Real Parque—has defended the importance of securing public policies and official recognition as Indigenous peoples in the city.66 This urban struggle is in continuity with the defense of Indigenous rights, including to land, in the countryside. They are both set against the imperatives of a land-grabbing, eliminationist, and exploitative state and socio-economic system. As Rejane Pankararu puts it, “the inspiration for our struggle comes from all these centuries of Indigenous elimination, of discrimination, of the total lack of knowledge about our culture and ways of being, of the denial of our rights, in the city and in the aldeia.”67 In this task, many organizers of São Paulo’s urban Indigenous movement, including Pindorama students, argue not for a turning away from the state but for the development of diverse, Indigenous-centered ways of engaging and transforming the Brazilian state and society, aiming to expand the contradictions of what Souza calls Brazil’s “500-year dichotomy.”68 In a similar vein, the Pindorama Program articulates distinct notions of education, as a site and tool of Indigenous politics that aim to change the university as it engages with Indigenous perspectives as well as the society in which it is embedded.

CONCLUSION

The Pindorama Program reveals how, in a settler society, Indigenous persons are repeatedly forced to engage with the Indian and the Indigenous movement that others—including non-Indigenous allies and researchers—have in mind. While Indigenous peoples in São Paulo have formed one of the most well-articulated and established urban Indigenous movements in Brazil’s Southeast region, they have still repeatedly been put in the position to assert the very basic fact that they exist. In the Pindorama Program, they challenge the flawed notion that they are or can become less Indigenous for being in the city, for completing a university degree, for practicing a profession not directly related to Indigenous issues, and for achieving social mobility. Every repetition of this basic fact, nonetheless, has also recentered the white, settler gaze and the eliminationist logic that also attempts to constrain the content and form of Indigenous organizing in the city.

Pindorama students’ trajectories express their refusal to be determined by such external expectations and illustrate the diverse ways that
Indigenous lives are political in the city and through higher education. For the students, access to the program implies a journey of political formation and the possibility of better living standards. It helps strengthen their autonomy and voice as Indigenous peoples in the city, generally, and sometimes as Indigenous women, more specifically, as well as their sense of belonging not only to their respective Indigenous nations but also to a shared political struggle across rural-urban divides. In this way, the Pindorama Program, albeit marked by contradictions, is a space in which Indigenous elimination, dispossession, and marginalization in the city are curtailed and the asymmetrical relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people and institutions disputed. Public policies, including of access to higher education, remain an important goal for urban Indigenous movements in Brazil. And despite these policies’ structural limitations, they are not a straightforward reproduction of settler colonialism either. They can also be sites and processes of Indigenous self-determination, including in the city.
A New Siege of Peace

Pacification and Militarization in the Complexo da Maré

Around two months before the 2014 World Cup, the sprawling group of sixteen favelas in Rio de Janeiro’s North Zone known as Complexo da Maré woke up to a scheduled operation by the Special Operations Battalion (Batalhão de Operações Especiais [BOPE]) of Rio’s military police (fig. 5.1). Conducting sweeps to arrest members of drug organizations and apprehend arms, drugs, and stolen objects, Operação Cerco (Operation Siege) aimed to prepare the community for the military occupation that would precede the installation of four Pacification Police Unit (UPP) stations in the favela. The UPPs belonged to Rio’s latest public security policy, implemented since 2008 with the promise to “make Rio safe” for the sports megaevents and thereafter. With the pacification of Maré, the number of UPP units in the city would increase to forty-two. Marked by several police abuses, Operação Cerco lasted until the start of April.

On April 5, 2014, 2,050 soldiers, 450 marines, and 200 military police officers from Brazil’s army, navy, and air force jointly occupied Maré. The documentary Ocupação (directed by Diego Jesus and produced by Henrique Gomes) takes the viewer on a journey through Maré’s streets and corners on the evening of the military incursion. As a storm is brewing in the background, we get a glimpse into the community’s routine, into the rhythms and scenes of life in it. We see a boy playing with a plastic bag as if it were a kite from his window; we watch people pass by on their motorbikes, by foot, or by car; we observe children running, playing soccer and videogames, and singing and dancing the passinho; we join a birthday party taking place on a street, as is common in Maré, at which people dance under disco lights; we watch a local market close for the night and stop by a local fair with rides for children, where a vendor sells popcorn.
The documentary cuts to a conversation between the two filmmakers as they drive around Maré that night. We listen to Gomes, who is also a Maré resident, discuss the mix of emotions passing through him that night. “The feeling of losing something,” he says, “and you don’t even know what it is—I don’t know if it’s freedom, or what it is, really.” It is, perhaps,
the fear of losing the routine, he adds—the one we just watched unfold. What would change in Maré under military occupation?

In a later scene, we hear a helicopter hovering as a tank rolls down one of Maré’s main streets. It is followed closely by several photographers. Day is breaking and military personnel pose for the cameras with their war machinery. The number of press vests seems almost equal to the number of military and police uniforms. After all, Maré’s invasion was being broadcast live on the multimedia conglomerate Globo. Gomes offers an analysis: “All that’s missing is the tent to start the circus.” We witness photo shoots of police officers with local children riding on police horses. We also spot the BOPE’s infamous armored car, the *caveirão* (literally, big skull) parked in a corner. A young woman with a baby in her arms crosses this corner, and the camera, making a 180-degree turn, follows her. We still hear the helicopter above. The baby’s eyes follow it, and we follow the baby. To the ongoing sound of the propellers, the final scene is a freeze of this sequence of gazes. What is the baby seeing? What will he grow up witnessing?

At the time of its launch, the Pacification Program was marketed as a paradigm shift in public security, ambitious in its aim to break with “the logic of war” and the “culture of fear” that shaped a city recurrently described as “divided” between the favela and “the asphalt,” the “informal” and “formal” city.6 But no such paradigm shift ever materialized. In the aftermath of Pacification, Rio’s drug organizations have prevailed, and militarized police violence in Rio has only intensified.

As I argue in this chapter, the program’s underlying logics and practices already indicated this outcome. Starting with a brief history of Maré, I show how favelization, militarization, and the pacification of Rio’s favelas are embedded within Brazil’s dependent settler capitalist structures. Stressing the continuities between the (unfinished) pacification of Indigenous peoples in colonial and republican Brazil and the UPPs today, I describe both as a necrohumanitarianism, or as projects of Indigenous and Black elimination in the name of a “civilizing mission.”7 In the twenty-first century, this mission promises security, democracy, and development.8 The UPPs thus comprise only the most recent moment in five hundred years of settler colonial wars of conquest and pacification, which Antônio Carlos de Souza Lima insightfully describes as “um grande cerco de paz” (a massive siege of peace).9 As such, settler colonies are militarized societies in which the security of the settler state and settlers’ individual safety rest on Indigenous and Black vulnerability, even as settler colonialism shape-shifts to meet changing historical contexts.
Maré means tide in Portuguese. The favela’s name derives from the mangrove-lined shores of the Guanabara Bay on which it was founded. At least part of Maré emerged not on firm ground but on this coastline, which, covered by shallow water, would regularly flood according to the tide. This hybrid location, in between water and land, is a generative place from which to think about favelas as spaces of Black and Indigenous encounter and friction. Maré was built on this liminal, dynamic, and moving space as a site of Black and Indigenous working-class homemaking in the face of twentieth-century dependent settler capitalism.

Before then, at the time of the arrival of the Portuguese, much of the ground on which Maré is currently built was under water or consisted of bays, beaches, and small islands off the coast. Tupi-Guarani (Tupinambá or Temiminó/Maracajá) Indigenous peoples lived throughout the bay in dozens of villages, as part of what has been described as a “Tupi-Guarani continuum.” The area was rich in the coveted pau-brasil wood, which attracted different European colonizers to the region in defiance of the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. In 1565, after a period of military dispute between the Portuguese and their Indigenous allies, the Temininó, on one hand, and the French and the Tamoios, enemies of the Temininó, on the other, the Portuguese Crown subdivided the region into two sesmarias, stretches of lands assigned to beneficiaries of the Crown to settle and make productive (see introduction). It called the area Inhaúma, after the Indigenous name for a local black bird. The first sesmaria went to Antônio da Costa and the second to the Companhia de Jesus, the Jesuits, at the request of Father Gonçalo de Oliveira. These became the Fazenda do Engenho da Pedra and the Fazenda do Engenho Novo, respectively, where forced labor, including by Indigenous peoples, produced mainly sugar but also several crops such as corn, beans, and, as sugar declined, coffee. Over the following two centuries, the two ports of Inhaúma and Maria Angu, which served as distribution points for local produce, attracted more and more settlers to the area. The lands of the Engenho da Pedra were legally disputed at various points and finally fragmented in the second half of the eighteenth century. At this point, the Engenho Novo had already been subdivided into smaller parcels after the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1759 by the Pombaline Reforms. Maré would later emerge at what used to be the border between these two engenhos.

The Guanabara Bay was also the first point of arrival for millions of
African persons who were enslaved and trafficked to the Americas. They disembarked and were sold not too far from Inhaúma in Rio’s central port area at the customs house, at the Praça XV square, and, later, at the Cais do Valongo. In the nineteenth century, the Cais do Valongo would become the world’s largest port of entry of enslaved persons. Nineteenth-century police records, in turn, document that Indigenous peoples were regularly arrested in this area, as well as in other central neighborhoods of Rio.

In this way, the land and the water between which Maré was built (the engenhos, the ports, and the bay) were sites of settler capitalist formation, on which Indigenous and Black dispossession, exploitation, and elimination concomitantly and contiguously took place. They were also the places in which Black and Indigenous peoples negotiated, resisted, and unsettled this emerging structure at every stage. In the present context, part of the port area is still known as Little Africa, for example, and remains the home of the Quilombo Pedra do Sal. I pick up this thread when I discuss Maré’s more recent history.

As the nineteenth century progressed, slavery was abolished, and dependent industrialization picked up pace. Inhaúma was caught up in the deep sociospatial transformations that swept over Rio, then the nation’s capital. The Leopoldina Railway, trams, and steamboats replaced the Inhaúma and Maria Angu ports. In the 1930s, urban modernization plans designated the area to the north of the city center an industrial zone, and large infrastructure works, an oil refinery, and factories followed. The major interstate highway Avenida Brasil was built, as was the campus of Rio de Janeiro’s Federal University (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, UFRJ) on the Fundão Island, which required the annexation of several smaller islands of the Guanabara Bay.

In the absence of sufficient formal employment and comprehensive public policy frameworks for land distribution, social housing, and public transport, much like in Lagoa and the Favela do Real Parque, these construction sites attracted workers who built their homes and remained in the North Zone (see introduction and chapters 2 and 4). As Dona Orosina, believed by some to be Maré’s first resident, once recalled: “When I came to live here, this was all mato [weeds or jungle]. I opened this space here. . . . I asked a lot of people to build their barracos [shacks] here. . . . There was no water, to drink we would go to the military barracks. . . . Everything was dark. I asked for electricity, and they came and put up this lamppost.”

Migrants arrived in Maré, at first, from other parts of the city, from Minas Gerais’s and Rio’s countryside, and, after the 1950s, increasingly
from the impoverished northern and especially northeastern regions. 26 They included freed Black people and several segments of the rural poor, such as dispossessed farmers and, we can assume, Indigenous peoples, considering that they too migrated southeastward during this time and had previously been residents of tenement houses (cortiços) (see introduction). On a related note, in present-day Maré, 845 residents self-identified as Indigenous in 2012, making up 0.6 percent of its population—higher than the national average, at 0.47 percent—while 62.1 percent of residents were pardo or negro, and 33.1 percent white. 27 As the Indigenous Maré resident and rapper Kaê Guajajara affirmed, “The favela is Indigenous territory, the city is Indigenous territory, even when they try to hide it.” 28 For Beatriz Nascimento, the favela, after all, is “the place of the landless man,” and “the favela’s quilombo is strong because it is the union of men who seize a piece of land and share this land with many others.” 29

Before residents could make their homes in Maré, nonetheless, they had to create the very ground on which their houses could stand, often creating the land at the Guanabara Bay themselves. 30 They did so with only intermittent state support while instead, and much more frequently, facing the disruptive or oppressive intervention of public authorities, especially the police. 31 This was part of the process that Dona Orosina described, through which she and other residents built the neighborhood by working and preparing the swampy terrain; by installing and demanding infrastructure, such as water and electricity; by developing formal and informal community-led organizations and networks; and creating diverse artistic movements and cultural as well as religious expressions. 32 Present-day Maré is home to numerous community-led political organizations; cultural and artistic projects, including a community museum; as well as educational initiatives, economic endeavors, and dozens of local NGOs. In other words, Maré is a territory from which the political, creative, and intellectual potential of its residents emanates.

From the 1930s onward, Maré’s first community, the Morro do Timbau, gradually emerged at the location of the former Inhaúma Port. 33 The communities of Baixa do Sapateiro, Parque Maré, Parque Rubens Vaz, and Parque União quickly followed the construction of the Avenida Brasil, in the 1940s and 1950s, eventually expanding toward the bay’s floodplains. On such territory, the only type of viable residence were houses built on stilts (palafitas), which residents connected through wooden bridges and walkways (fig. 5.2). This web of stilt houses thereafter became the imagery most associated with Maré, and a symbol of squalor. At the same time, these interactions between the water and the land shaped the community’s
Figure 5.2. Aerial view of Maré, 1979. (Photo by João Mendes. Courtesy of Centro de Estudos e Ações Solidárias da Maré, Museu da Maré, Arquivo Dona Orosina Vieira.)
rhythms. It dictated residents’ mobility, for example, because a high tide made it unsafe for them to cross the flooded bridges and walkways. As the Museu da Maré recounts, the fear of falling into the water, to which children were especially vulnerable, was one aspect of life in the community at this time. But in this context of precarity, as Dona Orosina recalled, residents have historically organized for their rights, forming residents’ associations, commissions, and committees to this end. The communities of Parque Rubens Vaz and Parque União were forged in the 1950s out of such collective action and resistance, including to threats of removal.

Other Maré favelas were the more direct result of state policy. Many residents displaced by the mass favela removals of the 1964–85 military dictatorship, including in Lagoa and around Quilombo Sacopã, were relocated to Maré, where Centers of Provisional Housing had been installed and eventually became permanent. In the 1980s, the major public works project Projeto-Rio drastically transformed Maré’s landscape. It filled in a large area of the bay, on which further communities, such as Vila do João, Conjunto Esperança, and Vila do Pinheiro, were built. Originally, the initiative also aimed to remove several of Maré’s favelas and relocate the families to other housing projects, but the community organized successfully against this plan. They guaranteed the removal of just the palafitas, in which a third of Maré’s population lived at the time. Finally, the project extended Maré’s sewage system and water and electricity supply and installed new facilities such as schools and nurseries. In the 1990s, when public policy shifted from a focus on favela removals to favela upgrading, residents successfully mobilized for the recognition of Maré as an official neighborhood of the city of Rio.

Maré is thus the result of local agency in the face of structural forces, such as state policies. In the words of Museu da Maré director Cláudia Ribeiro, Maré is, in many ways, “an invention of the state” as well as “an invention of the popular classes, who developed an ensemble of strategies to remain in the city center and ensure their survival.” I add to this that Maré is a sociospatial expression of residents’ negotiation of ongoing dependent settler capitalist development. In this sense, favelas resonate with quilombos. They, too, are a geography of resistance in which Black, Indigenous, and other marginalized people have refused to be overdetermined by a system premised upon their dehumanization. In the liminal space of the shores of the Guanabara Bay, Black, Indigenous, and working-class people have (literally and figuratively) molded a geographical and political landscape on which their lives, in all their cultural and political expressions, could be guaranteed. In so doing, as I discuss in the following
Dependent settler capitalism has also been secured through militarization. Historically, the Guanabara Bay, vulnerable to invasions by other European powers, was of strategic importance to the Portuguese Crown. Returning to a previous point, it was the site of French-Portuguese military disputes in the mid-1500s, which resulted in the overthrow of a local French colony (1555–60). To secure the bay for good, the Portuguese engaged in efforts to militarily defend the area and also to administratively control, economically develop, culturally assimilate, and populate it. These were perhaps early versions of principles formalized as *uti possidetis* in the mid-eighteenth century, which dictated (in resonance with *terra nullius*) that lands were free if they were unoccupied. The creation of the two aforementioned sesmarias served this end. The Engenho da Pedra was thus placed in the hands of either military men or high public officials throughout the years. The other engenho, awarded to the Jesuits, is a reminder of the soft conquest of the civilizing mission, such as through catechization, that accompanied wars and forced labor. Local Tupi peoples shaped this entire process, acting as a labor force and as a source of local knowledge, and also as either allies or enemies of the Portuguese, waging their own wars and/or entering alliances with other European powers.

The region of Inhauáma thus illustrates how settler colonial conquest necessitated military control alongside economic development and political, spiritual, as well as cultural domination. In other words, security and development have always played an interconnected, fundamental role in the Portuguese civilizing mission.

Militarization has also been part of Maré’s more immediate history. At the end of the 1940s, to make space for the construction of the Maracanã Stadium (by which Aldeia Maracanã would later be founded), a local military base was relocated to an empty plot of land opposite Morro do Timbú. The base’s personnel soon started controlling the community and its residents. Under the pretense of deterring the invasion of lands the base falsely claimed to own, they removed houses, dictated where new ones should be built, and charged the residents an illegal “occupation tax.”

This first moment of state repression in Maré illustrates that Brazil’s
racialized poor population has historically been the target of militarized violence. Policing’s very origins as an institution for the control of enslaved persons (or, to ensure Black captivity) and, after abolition, for the persecution of Black cultural practices and resistances such as the Candomblé and capoeira are evidence for this.\(^5^1\) That being said, Museu da Maré researcher Antônio Carlos Pinto Vieira also recounts how, from the outset, the community has equally been a site of organized resistance to militarization. Dona Orosina, for example, refused to accept the military’s treatment of the community. She famously complained about its abuses in a 1950’s letter to Pres. Getúlio Vargas (1934–45, 1951–54), who invited her to the Guanabara Palace and promised the community protection from the military personnel.\(^5^2\)

During the democratic period of 1946–64, favela residents continued to face repressive policing and displacement, both of which intensified under the military dictatorship (1964–85).\(^5^3\) In Maré, the dictatorship was a period of growing police violence and evictions during which the state also attempted to control resident-led organizations such as associations.\(^5^4\) Nationally, the dictatorship set the foundations for Brazil’s post-1980s militarization that accompanied democratic and neoliberal reforms, which also furthered the deindustrialization of Rio’s North Zone, including the area in which Maré is located.\(^5^5\) The ensuing so-called war on drugs has been waged against Rio’s criminal organizations, popularly called drug factions and often associated with favelas. Rio’s first faction, the Comando Vermelho, was in fact formed at the end of the 1970s in the Instituto Penal Cândido Mendes facility on the Ilha Grande island, as an organized response to the precarity that the mostly Black and working-class inmates faced.\(^5^6\) It later expanded to Rio’s favelas, including to Maré, by integrating and reorganizing existing local illicit groups.\(^5^7\) In the 1980s and 1990s, the Terceiro Comando (Third Command) and Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends) emerged, respectively, as a separate prison faction and from a schism within the Comando Vermelho.\(^5^8\)

Internationally, the rise of Rio’s criminal organizations was spurred by the expansion of the cocaine trade and the availability of weapons during the Cold War, in part a result of US foreign policy in the region, including counternarcotic operations under its own war on drugs and support for anticommunist guerilla armies and illicit drug networks. These networks found in Brazil a secondary drugs and weapons market as well as an international distribution point.\(^5^9\) For Michel Misse, local interest in these weapons, in turn, must be understood in the context of militarization at home, which triggered an arms race between the state and illicit
groups. So it is fair to conclude that the emergence and militarization of Rio’s drug factions are neither intrinsic to them nor to favelas. They are, instead, also a product of transnational (imperial) and national (settler capitalist) conjunctures.

Alongside the drug factions, Rio has witnessed the rise of militias since the early 2000s. Militias are paramilitary forces composed of former and off-duty police officers, firefighters, and soldiers. These organizations exhibit a particularly strong symbiotic interaction with the state. They are, for example, tied to Rio’s legislative and executive branches and are protected from police operations in favelas such as Maré. Members of militias are suspected to have committed the 2018 murder of Maré-born, Black, feminist, and queer Rio City councilor Marielle Franco and her driver, Anderson Gomes. In Maré specifically, as of 2021, three drug trafficking gangs (connected to the city’s prison-based factions, Comando Vermelho and Terceiro Comando Puro) and a police-connected militia controlled separate sections of the community’s territory.

I tell this story because it is the backdrop against which the present-day militarization of life in Maré has unfolded. Under the guise of the war on drugs, police operations in the community have become increasingly lethal, in part a result of the use of BOPE’s armored car (the caveirão) since the early 2000s. As Eliana Sousa argues, Rio’s military police are trained to kill in favelas, treating its residents as “the civil population of the enemy forces,” the drug factions. While both state agents and drug organizations commit violence in the community, for the Maré-based worker Patrícia Vianna, “the despair is greater during police operations.” And community-produced data supports this perception. In 2019, when Rio’s police killed a record of 1,814 persons, 70 percent of murders in Maré were by the police. That same year, 87 percent of persons killed by the police in the entire state of Rio were men and 66.6 percent were identified as pretos or pardos. In Maré, every single one of the 34 persons killed during police operations in 2019, which took place every nine to ten days on average, was either preta or parda. Counting not just operations, out of 49 victims of lethal violence in Maré, 94 percent were men, 96 percent were pretos or pardos, and 85 percent were between the ages of 15 and 29.

Police operations and shootings are not just a risk to residents’ lives. They imply additional kinds of abuses, such as when officers extort or detain residents, invade their homes illegally, and/or damage their property. For Maré-based human rights activist Flávia Cândido, on the days that the government “decides to act ‘against the drugs’ . . . the action is against education, against the right to come and go, against the right to learn.” On
those days, residents are confined to their homes and life in the community comes to a halt, interrupting local commerce, schools, and public service provisions, among other things. Police operations also leave psychological marks, including stress, anxiety, and depression, which can lead to life-shortening conditions, in a kind of slow death (see chapter 2). In the words of Acari community organizer Buba Aguiar, “the state kills before it pulls the trigger.”

Achille Mbembe theorizes this permanent “state of exception” as the necropolitical governance of the colony, where sovereignty consists primarily of the right to kill. In favelas, the logic of elimination’s otherwise “muted violence” reveals itself through this necropolitical governance of Brazil’s franja marginal. In the stories of Quilombo Sacopã and Quilombo dos Luízes, this work has so far traced the logic of elimination as biocultural and political assimilation. In this regard, it has described how quilombos, as a legal category, have been resignified as permitted Black political subjects, the negro permitido. Favelas, however, are positioned on the flip side of this category and spatial formation. Unlike officially recognized quilombos, favelas and their residents continue to be perceived as dangerous, unruly Black territories and subjects, much like quilombos were perceived during the period of slavery. One pertinent example is the criminalization of favela cultural expressions, the most obvious example being the funk music genre. For Campos, “the favela represents for republican society what the quilombo represented for the slavocratic society.” The franja marginal has thus primarily consisted of a mass of “unpermitted” Black subjects, whose social and physical elimination—as a logic that materializes in diverse forms—is constitutive of and functional to dependent settler capitalism in Brazil.

In this overarching context of militarization, Rio’s governments also made several attempts at community- or human rights–centered policing, starting under Gov. Leonel Brizola’s first and second mandates (1983–87 and 1991–94) and, later, under Govs. Anthony Garotinho (1998–2002) and Rosinha Garotinho (2003–7). While it remains outside the scope of this work to explicate these in detail, I note that, in Maré, these experiments led to the creation of Community Policing Posts (Postos de Policiamento Comunitário [PCCs]) in Baixa do Sapateiro, Parque União, Vila do João, and Praia de Ramos, and to the 2003 opening of the Twenty-Second Police Battalion in Nova Holanda. The battalion was originally designed to contribute to the community by creating jobs, providing professional training opportunities, offering health services, and serving as a hub for several community councils. As the persistence of police violence and
brutality indicates, this model was never implemented. It did, however, lay foundations for Rio’s Pacification Program, to which I turn next.

**A NEW SIEGE OF PEACE**

As mentioned, the military invaded Maré in April 2014 as part of the Pacification Program. Before the armed forces invaded, collective warrants had been given out in preparation, allowing the police to enter and search private homes without justification. That is to say, while the Pacification Program claimed to bring favelas under the democratic rule of law, it in fact implied exceptions to the law. One resident said, “Collective warrants? In other words, all favela residents are suspected of being criminals. They don’t give out collective warrants for luxury condominiums, where drug trafficking proceeds as usual.” This was, perhaps, an early indication that the military invasion of Maré did not, in fact, represent a paradigmatic break from previous anti-Black and antifavela public security approaches.

Returning to the short documentary that opened this chapter, the invasion, as Gomes predicted, interrupted and militarized everyday life in Maré. Soon after their arrival, the armed forces instituted checkpoints at the community’s main access roads, stopping and searching mostly nonwhite residents. That same night, an eighteen-year-old resident was murdered nearby such a checkpoint, raising immediate concerns about the course the occupation would take. During the occupation, the military acted as a police force, patrolling the streets during the day and night, searching and detaining residents, and stopping and inspecting vehicles. Residents’ routines changed, normalizing a state of affairs until then reserved for days of police operations. Schools, nurseries, and public services were regularly forced to close due to shootings and operations, during which killings, physical and verbal aggressions, material damages, home invasions, and other abusive behaviors by military officers were reported.

Overall, during the fifteen months of occupation, Maré was effectively under siege. It does not escape us, here, that the police operation that preceded the occupation was, after all, called Operation Siege. Life under occupation was controlled and surveilled and marked by the fear and threat of arbitrary violence. As the Redes da Maré NGO affirmed, “Maré truly resembled a war zone,” as tanks and heavily armed soldiers patrolled its streets, and barbed wire and sandbags were set up as barricades in the community (fig. 5.3). For local experts, the instances of violence and abuses during the occupation were also a result of the two-month substitution cycles of all military personnel active in Maré, leading
to discontinuity and inconsistency in approaches and activities, besides \textit{a priori} impairing the military’s own stated goal to develop proximity with residents.

Alongside this show of force, the military implemented Civic-Social Actions (Ações Cívico-Sociais [ACISOs]) based on public-private partnerships in the areas of the arts, sports, health, education, legal services, and professional training, as well as improvements to the sewage system and to service provisions such as trash collection.\textsuperscript{85} These initiatives were, in part, designed with the objective to garner residents’ support for the Pacification Program, the military, and, by extension, the state. The photo opportunity with police horses on the night of Maré’s invasion was one instance of this. Nonetheless, immediately after the military occupation, private telecommunications operators were reportedly the first service to enter Maré, much like in other favelas under Pacification. This was met with criticism by the Maré Vive collective, who noted in a social media post that “Sky and Claro TV stands have already been set up in Pinheiro. This is the tone of ‘pacification’ and our entrance into the State of Rights—summarized for us as just the right to consume.”\textsuperscript{86} As mentioned in the introduction to this book, these multifaceted interventions in favelas under Pacification have led scholars to describe it as a wider social intervention.
program aimed at the transformation of favela residents into “law-abiding consumer-citizens,” or “new favelados.”

The aim to produce new favelados is also evidenced in the military’s attempt to control the community’s cultural and social life. It immediately prohibited the open-air baile funk, or funk party, that took place every Saturday on Teixeira Ribeiro Street. It also implemented the Nada Opor (No Objections) requirement, under which private or public events required formal military authorization. Military actions also directly or indirectly interrupted social and cultural gatherings. As one resident described it, “on Fridays, I used to like going for a beer, chatting with friends. Now I go straight home . . . I feel afraid. On Saturday, April 6, we had a shooting that lasted almost an hour. We were playing soccer and had to run to the changing room.” The military invasion thus stifled the community’s social and cultural routine—a politics of death, or elimination, that targets social and cultural life, or a community’s “sociality in all its vibrant formations.” For Amílcar Cabral, military domination is always accompanied by cultural domination. As he writes, “to dominate a nation by force of arms is, above all, to take up arms to destroy or at least, to neutralize and paralyze its culture.”91 Maré’s Pacification thus combined military force, violence, and cultural oppression as well as assimilation for the sake of capital accumulation during the 2014 and 2016 sports megaevents. It reveals the genocidal underbelly disguised under the “humanitarian” face of pacification, as a manifestation of the settler colonial logic of elimination that “destroys to replace.”92 The UPPs amounted, in other words, to what we can call necrohumanitarianism.

By the time Maré’s pacification was announced, however, the UPPs had already been under widespread criticism. In a 2013 meeting in Maré’s Morro do Timbau favela, before its military invasion, Cantagalo-based human rights activist Deize Carvalho had already voiced critiques of the new public security program. She described situations of violence that several “pacified” favelas around Rio experienced at that time and that foreshadowed the meaning of Pacification in Maré a year later:

The main function of the UPP: To take residents’ right to come and go. You can no longer have a party because you have to ask the UPP command for permission to do anything. If you are going to have a party at your house, it has to have a set time to end [referring here to the Nada Opor document]. If you are going to a bar, you have to know the curfew hours. . . . I am fed up with this one Sergeant in my community, who went to get a resident, a worker . . . who was
sitting in a bar because he [the resident] had said that, since the UPP had arrived in the community, he didn’t have the right to stay out at bars until later at night in his free time. The Sergeant sent three of his subordinates to pick him up and take him to the UPP station. He took this resident’s slippers off his feet and slapped him in the face with them several times.

People have the illusion that the UPP is going to come and stop the drug trafficking. The only positive outcome of the UPP is that I no longer wake up to helicopters flying low close to my house. I don’t wake up to the sound of that machine gun. But I do live every day, twenty-four hours a day, with state violence in my community, which wasn’t supposed to happen. If the state is here to protect, why does it violate citizens’ rights?93

In this statement, Deize pointed to necrohumanitarianism’s empty promises of a “brighter and nicer new life.”94 She also identified practices of Black captivity and incarceration that are part of this new life and security paradigm. Life under occupation, as she described it, was life without freedom of movement in which a community (especially its young, male residents, as the group most targeted by the military) was held under collective arrest.

At this point, we can turn to the parallels between the UPPs and the pacification of Indigenous peoples. To paraphrase João Pacheco de Oliveira, the UPPs adapted the pedagogical content of indigenista pacification to the “secularized and globalized” present context, “versed in the rhetoric of multiculturalism, popular participation, and citizenship rights”—in other words, of democracy, development, and security.95 Declaring a twenty-first-century just war (on drugs) against Rio’s drug factions and the population and territories associated with them, the UPPs were imagined as implementing a civilizing transformation of a population identified as in need of protection. Under Rio’s neoliberal “urban entrepreneurial governance model,” the objectives and interests of state agents took precedence over popular participation and besieged the voice and agency of favela residents.96 The whole endeavor has rested on the dehumanization of favelados and Black and Indigenous people, which has served to justify their deaths (in case of resistance) and captivities and discipline into “new men” or permitted subjects (in aldeamentos or other pacified territories).97

For favela residents under Pacification and for Indigenous peoples, the available options seem to have remained, in the words of Frank B.
Wilderson III, “be accumulated and die” (either through assimilation or visceral violence). Both pacifications have aimed at territorial (re)conquest and elimination to secure accumulation and have been justified by a humanitarian mission. Antonio Carlos de Sousa Lima’s description of the Indian Protection Service’s paternalistic pacification policy might as well have been written about the Pacification of Rio’s favelas: “Of the consequences of pacification, the clearest and most immediate is . . . the opening up of the sertão lands to private interests” while “civilizing the índio and educating the national worker, conferring on them a precise place in the [nation’s] social and geographical spaces.”

Building on previous chapters and adapting his apt depiction of pacification as um grande cerco de paz (a massive siege of peace), we can describe the Pacification of Maré, and UPPs more generally, as um novo cerco de paz (a new siege of peace). The grand finale of the occupation’s live transmission illustrates the analogy: after Brazil’s and Rio’s state flags were raised in Maré (a declaration of territorial reconquest), white doves were released (symbolizing peace). The necrohumanitarian symbolic and material apparatus of settler colonial conquest was in full sight, renewed and re legitimized for the twenty-first century. Pacification, in other words, reenacted an ongoing and unfinished settler colonial conquest, whose ideological scaffolding has always been a civilizing mission. To return to a statement by Emerson Souza (Guarani) in the previous chapter, Pacification, too, is an expression of Brazil’s “500-year dichotomy.”

The logics, practices, and effects of Pacification, however, were never completely secured. They were met with the negotiation and resistance of its so-called target populations. Emblematic of this resistance in Maré was, for example, the 2015 Se Benze Que Dá (SBQD) carnival group parade, created in 2005 to instigate residents to cross Maré’s internal and external borders and exercise their right to come and go. Defying the military occupation of Maré, the parade followed an itinerary that would cross one of the military barricades. Renata Souza recounted how this symbolic gesture unfolded:

Suddenly two tanks appeared. From the tanks, they projected strong cannon lights. They were trying to blind us. From the tanks, deafening sirens echoed. They were trying to silence us. We persisted on our path, but the tanks crossed right in front of Se Benze in an intimidating way. They were trying to stop us. At that moment, we stopped and shouted[,] . . . “No, no, no/I don’t want tanks, no[,]” and we repeated it, and repeated it, until our throats hurt. . . . We
defeated the tanks with our screams and the drumming of our instruments. We kept walking all the way to the trench. . . . Our main weapon [was] our sound [o som], our rallying cry, our indignation for being submitted to a military regime. We then finally continued our itinerary and celebrated as if we had truly won a war against the militarization of our lives. They will not silence our voice and our music, not without resistance.102

Maré residents refused to give in to this imposed order by continuing to organize all kinds of activities that articulated critiques of the military invasion, in the process often dealing with harassment and violence. These included the cinema club Na Favela, which continued to film and show its productions clandestinely during the invasion, the food and arts festival Sarau da Roça, and the swapping fair Maré 0800. It also included the aforementioned Maré Vive, a residents-led media collective that monitored the military, recording its activities via mobile phones and social media, partially in response to the Pacification Program’s own media campaign. The funk, too, continued through parties held without the military’s permission. In fact, many residents refused to ask for authorization for private events, and others expressed their discontent by throwing rocks and bottles and shouting at the soldiers.103 Finally, the NGO Redes da Maré monitored the military occupation and organized several spaces of dialogue with the state, the military, and the police, insisting on residents’ democratic right to participation and safety. In other words, Maré residents found often fugitive and creative ways to keep on living and producing, refusing to be confined, silenced, controlled, and pacified—to become “permitted Black subjects.” And in this sense, the favela continues previous quilombola struggles.

CONCLUSION

The documentary that opens this chapter ends with a central frame of a baby in a woman’s arms, as he looked up to the sky, drawn by the sound of a helicopter. In this play with temporality, the documentary in fact foreshadows later developments. After the military fully withdrew from Maré in June 2015, the drug factions quickly returned to its streets and a UPP was never installed in the community.104 Since then, the lethality of police operations in Maré has only increased, partially due to a more deadly use of helicopters, nicknamed the flying caveirão. In 2019, residents circulated recordings of the helicopters as they flew low, close to houses, and
shooting from the air. Sixty-two percent of deaths resulting from state interventions in Maré that year were during police operations with helicopters. To fight this new wave of violence, a local campaign mailed letters and drawings by children to government representatives, in which they described the effects of police operations on their lives and community. Many of them featured the helicopters. In one such drawing, the text reads: “I don’t like the helicopter because it shoots and people die. This is wrong.”

The settler colony is never fully pacified; its militarization is permanent. In this context, if the humanitarian promises of pacification (i.e., security, development, and democracy) never materialize, that is not because of circumstantial policy or other such failures but because they are structured by the anti-Black and anti-Indigenous racisms and violence that are foundational to dependent settler capitalism. In other words, these promises remain steeped in a necrohumanitarianism, as a “massive siege of peace” that continuously attempts to superdispossess and superexploit peoples to be eliminated as they are “civilized.” In this process, what is secured is local and global capital accumulation in the periphery, as I argue throughout this book. Nonetheless, favelas, as Black and Indigenous working-class geographies of homemaking and resistance, also constantly disrupt militarized dependent settler capitalism. Even under direct occupation, favela residents continue to emanate creative, political, and intellectual power, including—but not just—in opposition to this very violence. After all, as Beatriz Nascimento argues, quilombos, much like favelas, are precisely “the continuity of life, the act of creating a happy moment, even when the enemy is powerful, and even when he wants to kill you. Resistance. A possibility in the days of destruction.”
I started this research with the aim to understand why Indigenous constitutional rights were not extended to Indigenous peoples in urban contexts in Brazil. I was also puzzled by the small number of urban quilombola land titles in relation to how many Black Brazilians have historically struggled against housing and land insecurity. I had the hunch that this conjuncture had something to do with the fact that, until Aldeia Maracanã gained international visibility in the media as part of their fight against eviction in 2013, I, too, had grown up unaware of the historical and ongoing presence of quilombola and Indigenous peoples in Rio. This invisibility and state neglect articulated the question of which peoples count as an ethnic group and can access Indigenous and quilombola rights and with what limits and possibilities. As I argue in this work, one limit is that the framework of ethnic rights reserve Indigenous and quilombola rights to a minority that can fulfil the state’s and its experts’ “authenticating desires.”

The latter retain the authority to ultimately determine who does and does not count as ethnic. Favelas, for example, have remained excluded from ethnic rights, even though Brazilian Black radical thought and many quilombolas have argued that they are a kind of quilombo. These thinkers have highlighted their shared cultural, spiritual, and political practices, as well as their shared struggles. Brazilian settler society has, for instance, characterized both the favela and the quilombo as “dangerous Black subjects” to be “civilized” in different historical periods.

I also came of age in the misplaced optimism of the 1990s and early 2000s, under the promises of the 1988 constitution and the relative stability of the real currency with no memory of the anticommunist 1964–85 military dictatorship. The 2002 election of Workers’ Party President Lula and the early 2000s economic growth, which was enabled (and limited, as
we now know) by the commodity boom, suggested that twenty-first century Brazil was a progressive and modern nation that was taking increasingly confident steps toward greater equality and equity. Perhaps Brazil’s 7–1 defeat in the 2014 World Cup was not a bad metaphor for its rise and fall in the past two decades.2 But even as the 2000s optimism unraveled on all fronts, my subjective attachment to this linear progressivism proved to be quite tenacious. I still started this research with the assumption that the visibility and state neglect inflicted upon quilombola and Indigenous peoples were primarily a policy failure, repairable if we extended and improved legislation.

These assumptions without doubt carry the mark of my own privileged position in Brazil. I first began to unlearn them from the quilombolas of Sacopã, in Rio, whose official territory had been reduced by the INCRA to exclude the lands invaded by the neighboring luxury buildings. The justification for this reduction was the limited federal budget allocated to quilombola land demarcation. The family had felt forced to agree to this reduction with the promise that it would speed up the subsequent steps in their titling process. But this had not been the case, and their demarcation has since proceeded at a halting pace. To repeat the words of Luiz Sacopã, “when the [titling] process makes a small progress, people ask ‘are you happy, are you glad?’ Listen, our victory should be a matter of fact, of the law, it is a right that we should sort out in a week’s time, and it takes us ten years and I am supposed to be happy about this? . . . What, I’m supposed to be glad for something that is already mine?”3 For the quilombola Maria Rosalina dos Santos (Quilombo Tapuio, Piauí), this structural neglect of quilombola land titling is “because they know that to regulate quilombola territories is to give autonomy to Black men and women . . . [and] Black people with autonomy is Black people with power.”4

The Quilombo dos Luízes in Belo Horizonte faced a similar situation to Quilombo Sacopã, even though the Luízes family held the historical, legal titles to their lands. In their case, the latest invasion into their territory by the construction company Patrimar had begun after the publication of their official anthropological report and so with the public knowledge that this was quilombola land. In this context, they also had to fight against the state’s decision to remove the invaded plots from their official territory without having consulted the quilombolas first. The Luízes vehemently refused this exclusion and the justification that it was necessitated by federal budgetary restrictions. In Sacopã and Luízes, I began to understand how quilombola land titles functioned as a way of enabling limited historical
reparations for slavery and in fact often served to reproduce and normalize Black dispossession as part of the titling process itself.

Why fight for public policies and constitutional rights if they continuously fail Indigenous and quilombola communities or, in the words of Eliane Potiguara, if “the treaties signed . . . ultimately benefit the government”? In Aldeia Maracanã, for example, the partnership that Rio’s Department of Culture offered the collective in exchange for their forced eviction was not just a way to appease growing social unrest leading up to June 2013. It also fundamentally changed Aldeia Maracanã’s political project, dividing their collective in the process. When the military police arrived heavily armed to remove them one last time, part of the group accepted the deal with Rio’s state government. In this case, the militarized force behind the agreement could perhaps explain their strategic decision to compromise. In so doing, it evidenced the contradictions of partnering with a state that has consistently prioritized public and private capital to the detriment of Indigenous peoples.

These contradictions are inherent to Brazil’s dependent, settler capitalist structures, premised on the intensified and militarized dispossession, exploitation, and elimination of Black and Indigenous peoples. This internal and external structure explains the systemic failures of quilombola and Indigenous rights. How could such a society and state extensively and fairly implement Indigenous and Black rights? And, if neoliberal multicultural policy in fact re legitimized these very structures as seemingly more benevolent, why partner with the state at all? In this dependent and settler capitalist context, what role can rights and citizenship play in the historical and increasingly salient struggles for decolonization?

I took all these questions with me to my research with São Paulo’s urban Indigenous movement. And there, once again, I had much to learn. As I introduced the language of settler colonialism and its implications for Indigenous constitutional rights, the Pindorama-affiliated students and organizers responded with their own critiques of the Brazilian state and their own approaches to Indigenous rights. These rights were demands for reparations rather than inclusion, some argued, and a concrete victory of their ancestors’ political mobilizations. Amanda Pankararu, for example, understood them as belonging to a historical and ongoing Indigenous struggle, which was also a class struggle. And, precisely because a society and state structured by colonialism would not guarantee Indigenous rights, their fight for rights was also for the transformation of the Brazilian state and society. In other words, Indigenous rights were structurally limited and therefore they insisted on prodding its inconsistencies open
in an expression of Indigenous autonomy rather than a capitulation to the superficial promises of the 1988 constitution. In the words of Gersem Baniwa, Indigenous peoples “propose the transformation of the unitary and homogeneous state into a plural and decentralized state” marked by “just and equitable spaces of autonomy and interdependence.”

I encountered this same stance in the Complexo da Maré favela. There, community organizers, such as those linked to the locally run NGO Re-des da Maré, have been mobilizing to demand favela residents’ constitutional rights, including to public services and public security. To this end, they have produced their own data on a vast array of social indicators about Maré, which they use to argue for specific policies more effectively. They have equally done so with the understanding that an expansion of favelados’ rights necessitates a transformation of the state and society, for the state neglect and militarized violence inflicted upon them is structural rather than accidental. In other words, they and the quilombola and Indigenous people in this book understand that the Brazilian state and society have much to unlearn and relearn from favela, Indigenous, and quilombola people. For Beatriz Nascimento, the quilombo, after all, is also a contribution to the nation; it emerges whenever nationality is in crisis.

Conversely, in Anglophone Indigenous political thought and practice, the structural critiques of multicultural citizenship have given rise to the notion of refusal. Refusal implies a turning away from the state in a rejection of its gifts with the aim to strengthen Indigenous sovereignty and relations to land, culture, and community in its stead. But, in Brazil, turning to the state is also a form of quilombola, Indigenous, and favelado political agency and part of a transformative project. This was not an absolute consensus, as evidenced by the decision of part of Aldeia Maracanã to refuse a partnership with the state and form the Aldeia Rexiste collective instead. Indigenous approaches to the state are therefore varied, although overall the organizations that comprise Brazil’s contemporary Indigenous Movement have generally chosen to engage with it.

In this context, what I learned from the five communities and movements was the imperative to center their own political and intellectual labor without transposing other, even if Indigenous, knowledge production to Brazil. This matters because Euro-American imperialism is not only reproduced through the hegemony of the Western academy but also the (sometimes related) global prominence of social movements from the Global North, especially those based in the United States. I had to be careful not to replicate these North-South asymmetries in my work. In this book, I take this care in my discussions of settler colonialism, refracting
Conclusion

it through the specificities of Brazil’s dependent position in the colonial/capitalist world system, as well as of Indigenous and Black resistance strategies. Returning to Baniwa, in so doing I have sought to place political thought and practice in Brazil and the Global North in a sustained, equitable dialogue based on the principles of autonomy and interdependence.

North-South differences include, for example, a notion of Indigenous autonomy in Brazil that articulates Marcos Terena’s much-cited saying, “I can be what you are without ceasing to be who I am.” Tracy Guzmán built on this affirmation to delineate a specifically Brazilian “Native critique of sovereignty” as reciprocity, mutual respect, autonomy, and coexistence of Indigenous and non-Indigenous cultural and political systems. This critique does not argue for national separatism, understanding the Indigenous struggle as a Brazilian Indigenous Movement, with all the tensions this implies. In this context, Baniwa has stressed that Indigenous peoples instrumentalize (rather than naturalize) citizenship, while remaining primarily attached to their Indigenous nationhood. This, he argues, comprises a demand for a differentiated citizenship, through which “Indigenous peoples can access both the universal rights of a Brazilian or global citizen and their rights to their cultures, traditions, values, knowledges, and rites.” Nevertheless, as he recognizes, within Brazil’s current colonial “political and juridical order, there can be no justice for Indigenous and other excluded peoples.”

Post-1988 Brazil has not guaranteed a differentiated citizenship, and Indigenous peoples have therefore continued to push against the limits of the 1988 constitution.

Staying with Baniwa, Indigenous citizenship practices in Brazil thus demand equivalence with other sociopolitical systems. This resonates with Bispo’s notion of Indigenous and Black matrices as marked by pluralism and confluence, a practice through which “not everything that comes together . . . is the same,” or, in Terena’s terms, in which “I can be what you are without ceasing to be who I am.” Afro-Pindoramic thought and political practice, Bispo asserts, calls for a transformation of “our divergences into diversities, and in diversity we reach the confluence of all our experiences.” The 1988 constitution’s timid steps in this direction “can advance,” he believes, if the present authoritarian state is dismantled.

In this book, I have built on Bispo’s notion of confluence and pluralism as linked to the circularity of Afro-Pindoramic thought. In his work, we find an account of Black and Indigenous thought as a constant return—as future-oriented spiritual, intellectual, and political movements that encounter (but do not assimilate into) the other and return to Afro-Pindoramic ancestries. These movements also adapt to changing
circumstances by reengaging the past, in which their strength is rooted. This was precisely how Miriam Aprigio understood the Luízes’ travessia (traverse) across geographical space, generations, and differences with other social groups in their efforts to remake their community in the present. And it was how Aldeia Maracanã understood their retomada of the republican Museu do Índio by the Maracanã Stadium, resignifying a site of Indigenous assimilation into a space of Indigenous resurgence.

So, what does it mean to talk about decolonization in a context such as Brazil? Moving beyond Brazil, decolonization historically included, but has never been reducible to, political, cultural, and economic independence from the metropole. It has comprised material as well as epistemic restitution and ontological reconstitution, sometimes through armed struggle.\(^{16}\) In the present context, to expand the argument brought forward by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, decolonization demands the repatriation of Indigenous and Black land and life, “simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted.”\(^{17}\) Land restitution is thus never merely material because, to borrow the words of Aprigio once again, it possesses “social and affective value, way beyond any monetary value; . . . it is on the territory that the constant circle of life unfolds.” The traditional territory, she continues, is “a privileged site of experience [and] links the past, the present, and our perspectives for the future,” in “a circularity through which cultures take root.”\(^{18}\) More broadly, Indigenous, quilombola, and favela demands for public policies articulate distinct notions of land, education, housing, and culture, among others, that “exceed the limit of what the state recognises as legitimate, and from this excess they challenge the limits imposed upon them, remolding the state and pluriversalising society.”\(^{19}\) In this sense, they are also ontological disputes and negotiations. That said, as the quilombolas of Sacopã showed, quilombolas recognize that they, too, are on Indigenous land and articulate their struggles against settler appropriation as connected (but not identical) countercolonization efforts. In this context, quilombola and Indigenous land rights under the 1988 constitution have been important for enabling some, even if limited, land reparations. But they remain insufficient within the structural constraints of Brazil’s dependent settler capitalist society and state, and especially in the absence of a wider agrarian reform.

Unlike the constitution’s multicultural and liberal democratic model, decolonization demands the unsettling of dependent settler capitalism as a socioeconomic and political system. This system comprises a regime of permanent war, private property, and exploitative labor relations underpinned
by racist and gendered logics that foreclose the possibility for confluences with Black and Indigenous universes. Indigenous, quilombola, and favela communities, as geographies of Black and Indigenous homemaking, already negate this system. For example, by articulating alternative relations to land and by simply refusing landlessness and homelessness, Black and Indigenous territories pose a fundamental challenge to the private property regime and produce the geographical and political landscapes in which their political and cultural existence endures into the future.

Structurally, from the perspective of the world’s settler colonial peripheries, decolonization implies the dislodging of the interests of the settler elite (as an internal, antisettler decolonization) and, as Abdias Nascimento puts it, an interrelated break with the practice of handing over “our mineral reserves and our economy to international monopolistic corporations” (an external, anti-imperialist decolonization). Decolonization is a struggle against the asymmetries between nation-states as well as those between social groups and classes in complex globalized and localized patterns of inequality that are within and simultaneously exceed national boundaries. In this context, Third World national sovereignty remains an important tool for dependency theorists, for it carries the potential to put a check on foreign political and economic infiltration and domination enabled by the domestic settler bourgeoisie. True Third World sovereignty allows for the greater self-determination of currently subordinated nations by expanding their national policy space, including in defense of Indigenous and Black peoples.

At this juncture, we can delineate a potential confluence (not sameness) between Afro-Pindoramic and dependency theorists’ approaches to decolonization. For both, the state can serve as a tool for change, at least in the short term, but it must also be re-created and reinvented, its colonial-capitalist structures unsettled. In the words of Carlos Eduardo Martins, “it will be necessary to decolonialize power in civilizing struggles that, rather than destroying the state’s capacity to cope, make it sovereign and plurinational, developing other forms of relationship such as [the Indigenous worldview and practice of] buen vivir between people and between them and nature. The Marxist theory of dependency thus opens up to incorporating ethnic, gender, sexual, and ecological orientation issues”—and, to be more precise, to incorporating Black and Indigenous intellectual and political traditions. In so doing, both dependency theories and Afro-Pindoramic thought draw on “a principle and practice from within the existing order in order to move beyond that order,” to borrow the words of David Blaney, in a circular and transcending move.
To be precise, this Third World national autonomy need not follow the hegemonic model of nation-states, as a homogenized and centralized (vertical) power within fixed, territorialized borders, and it also does not reify the notion that nation-states are the only viable format that political communities can take on. In this regard, Native American/Indigenous sovereignty and nationhood in Anglophone contexts that refuse the US American or Canadian settler nation-states are in a transnational confluence with anti-imperialist struggles in the Global South. As the former erode the political, economic, and cultural integrity and supremacy of the United States and Canada as imperialistic settler colonies, they help unsettle the capitalist/colonial world system. That is, a call for Third World sovereignty spills over into a defense of Native American/Indigenous sovereignty in the Global North. Decolonization in the Global North and South come together in a dialectical anti-imperialism. In this confluence, what is at stake is a world marked by equivalence—by difference and equality, by “autonomy within interdependence,” including of different forms of governance. This is a plural world in which “not everything that comes together . . . is the same.”

Returning to the movements and communities in this book specifically, their political projects include struggles for citizenship and rights. However, returning to Abdias Nascimento, they “cannot be exhausted in the attainment of small gains in employment or civil rights, in the context of the dominant capitalist white society.” In the words of Maré resident and Guajajara rapper Kaê Guajajara, “I will not be contained with the crumbs, I will never be content with neglect, with hunger, with the margin of a system that we did not choose.” Across their varied strategies, Indigenous and Black struggles have aimed, instead, at the “defeat of all components of the system in force.” For Beatriz Nascimento, this is the Afro-Pindoramic “desire for utopia.” And this utopia, as a “no place,” is prefigured (or already finds a place) in the urban and rural Indigenous and Black geographies of resistance of the past and the present in the favela, the quilombo, and the Indigenous territory. In so doing, quilombo, favela, and Indigenous communities are not fully outside the structures of settler capitalism but are always imagining a politics beyond them. As Jota Mombaça affirms, “it was impossible to flee, and this is why we insisted on the escape.”

Aiming to defeat, decolonization is also a destructive politics. For Frantz Fanon, it “is clearly an agenda for total disorder” and “a violent event.” It is fundamentally unsettling. For Mombaça, the destruction of the present system is a fight for “the end of the world as we know it.” In
this ending, we encounter an open horizon “without final guarantees,” even as some signposts (such as land repatriation) and tools (such as sovereignty) are presently available to us on this journey. That is, decolonization destroys the universe of modernity/coloniality for the sake of a “positive, formative” project. The alternative to the end of this world is another ending—one that is already tangible as we face worsening climate crises and the ongoing and uneven effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. To either of those ends, some peoples will come with more experience than others. As Davi Kopenawa recounts, the sky has already fallen for Indigenous peoples, it is just about to fall again under the destructive weight of the colonial/capitalist system. The forced diaspora and enslavement, too, were an end of a world—a world that ends every time a Black person is murdered. As Ailton Krenak summarizes it, Indigenous and Black peoples “have been resisting for 500 years, it is white people I worry about.”

On this note, the questions that usually surface at this point regarding the particularities of the world to come if decolonization is not reduced to a metaphor often emerge from settler anxieties for a settler future. Mombaca suggests that these anxieties must be resisted to “liberate the world to come from the traps of the ending world.” It is in this sense that Afro-Pindoramic models for liberation such as quilombos are “a possibility in the days of destruction.” By holding on to this possibility, quilombolas such as Miriam Aprigio aim to create a world in which it is “clear that the struggle of our ancestors was worth it.” In the words of quilombola Vercilene Francisco Dias (Comunidade Quilombola Kalunga, Goiás), “the harder the journey and the obstacles, the more we have the strength to win, because every obstacle overcome brings an inexplicable feeling. Maybe it is these obstacles, the strength, the courage, and persistence of a people united in the past and the present, who have never given up despite all we have been through, maybe it is the search for a dream that is not yet realized, that give me the strength to not give up.”

When we talk about decolonization in Brazil, we are talking about these plural and connected desires and dreams for a different world. On this journey, the struggles of urban Indigenous and Black peoples are likely to continue to instrumentalize the contradictions of the present system to push against its limits, using it “like an offensive boomerang.” For non-Indigenous researchers and allies such as myself, the question is how and to what extent our work can help propel the force of this boomerang, with all the (im)possibilities this implies.
Glossary

ABA: Associação Brasileira de Antropologia (Brazilian Anthropology Association)
ACQUILERJ: Associação das Comunidades Remanescentes de Quilombo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Association of the Quilombo Communities of the State of Rio de Janeiro)
ADCT: Ato das Disposições Constitucionais Transitórias (Temporary Constitutional Provisions)
AIAM: Associação Indígena Aldeia Maracanã (Indigenous Association Aldeia Maracanã)
aldeia: Community or village
aldeamento: Missionary settlement
APIB: Articulação dos Povos Indígenas do Brasil
bandeirante: Flag-bearing troop
bloco: Carnival street parade
CAPISP: Comissão de Articulação dos Povos Indígenas de São Paulo (Commission for the Articulation of the Indigenous Peoples of São Paulo)
Carioca: Resident of Rio de Janeiro
CIMI: Conselho Indigenista Missionário (Indigenous Missionary Council)
cortiço: Tenement house
DPU: Defensoria Pública da União (Public Defender’s Office)
engenho: Sugarcane mill and associated facilities, during the Portuguese colonial era
favelado: Favela resident
favela: Peripheral, often informal neighborhood
favelização: Favelization
FCP: Fundação Cultural Palmares
feijoada: Black bean and meat stew
**franja marginal:** Marginal fringes

**FUNAI:** Fundação Nacional do Índio (Indian National Foundation)

**FUNASA:** Fundação Nacional de Saúde (National Health Foundation)

**IBGE:** Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics)

**ILO:** International Labour Organization

**INCRA:** Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (Colonization and Agrarian Reform Institute)

**indigenista:** State policies and officials dedicated to Indigenous peoples

**ISI:** Import Substitution Industrialization

**latifúndio:** Large estate

**MCMV:** Minha Casa Minha Vida, social housing program

**MPF:** Ministério Público Federal (Public Prosecutor’s Office)

**mestiça:** Person of mixed descent

**mesticação:** Historical mixing of different peoples in Brazil

**oca:** Indigenous-style thatch-roof hut

**PAC:** Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Growth Acceleration Program)

**pagode:** Subgenre of samba

**palafita:** House built on stilts

**pajé:** Shaman

**pardo:** Person of mixed ancestry, an official category of the national census

**parentes:** Relatives

**pensão:** Boardinghouse

**preto:** Black person, an official category of the national census

**PT:** Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)

**PUC-SP:** São Paulo’s Pontifícia Universidade Católica

**quilombo:** Community formed by enslaved or free Black people, sometimes with other marginalized groups

**retomada:** Recovery, revival, retaking, restoration, resumption, return

**RTID:** Technical Identification and Delimitation Report

**sesmaria:** Plot of land of varied size granted to petitioners in colonial Brazil by the Portuguese Crown

**SE:** Indian Protection Service’s Studies Section

**sertão:** Hinterlands

**SPI:** Serviço de Proteção ao Índio (Indian Protection Service)

**UPP:** Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacification Police Unit)

**usucapião:** Adverse possession
Introduction

1. Introduction “Há 4 anos, abertura da Copa no Brasil rendia memes e críticas. Relembre,” Veja, June 14, 2018; “Sem empolgar o público, festa de abertura da Copa exalta o Brasil,” Jornal do Comércio, June 12, 2014. All translations are by the author unless otherwise noted.


3. Von Martius and Rodrigues, “Como se deve escrever a historia,” 442. Even in the absence of scare quotes, I do not use terms and phrases such as “the superiority of Europeans” or “authentic indigeneity” in the literal sense and problematize them in this work.


5. “Racial harmony” in the Brazilian colony was attributed to Portugal’s long history of interethnic contact and to Portuguese colonizers’ resulting “natural capacity” to relate to “different people” and to successfully create new, hybrid civilizations in “the tropics.” This idea has been called the “almost-theory” of Luso-Tropicalism. In the twentieth century, and especially under Salazar’s Estado Novo dictatorship in Portugal (1933–74), Luso-Tropicalism served to legitimize the Portuguese Empire in opposition to decolonization movements in Africa and Asia. Until at least the 1960s, the Brazilian settler state indeed supported the Portuguese Empire in Africa. Cláudia Castelo, O modo português de estar no mundo: O luso-tropicalismo e a ideologia colonial portuguesa (1933–1961) (Porto, Portugal: Afromento, 1998).


8. The protest took place under president-elect Dilma Rousseff’s Workers’ Party (PT) administrations (2011–16), but it was in opposition to a trend that had begun under Pres. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s two terms (2003–11). During Lula’s first mandate (2003–6), sixty-six Indigenous territories were homologated (approved by decree), dropping to twenty-one in his second term (2006–11), and then to eleven and, finally, ten in each of Dilma’s two mandates. On average, Lula’s and Dilma Rousseff’s governments homologated fewer (79 and 11, respectively) Indigenous territories than Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), who homologated 145 territories overall. “Relatório: Violência
contra os povos indígenas no Brasil, dados de 2013” (Brasília: Conselho Indigenista Missionário (CIMI), 2013), 31.


16. In the preindependence period and until the Empire of Brazil (1822–89), the most common term used to describe what we now call quilombos was mocambo. Flavio dos Santos Gomes, Mocambos e quilombos: Uma história do campesinato negro no Brasil (São Paulo: Claro Enigma, 2015), 10–11. In other parts of Latin America, quilombos have been called cimarrones, palenques, or cumbes.


20. This translation is by Smith, Davies, and Gomes, “In Front of the World,” 301.


28. Bispo, Colonização, quilombos, 89.
29. For an account of how quilombola and Indigenous experiences and struggles overlap and diverge, see Jan Hoffman French, Legalizing Identities: Becoming Black or Indian in Brazil’s Northeast (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).
30. Interview with Rejane Pankararu, former Pindorama student, June 28, 2015, São Paulo.
31. The 1988 constitution recognized Brazil as a pluriethnic state, declared racism a felony, instituted universal suffrage (until then limited by literacy levels), and guaranteed quilombola and Indigenous rights to land, difference, and political autonomy, officially breaking both with tutelage and racial democracy. Internationally, the constitution followed a consolidated international human rights regime, a turn to multiculturalism in Global North countries since the 1960s and in Latin America since the 1980s, and the growing worldwide prominence of environmental concerns and movements. It was also passed in the context of neoliberal reforms that renewed Brazil’s economic dependency.
32. “Decreto No. 4887, de 20 de novembro de 2003.”
33. For a summary of Indigenous peoples’ constitutional rights, see “Constituição— povos indígenas no Brasil,” Pib Socioambiental website.
35. The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística’s (IBGE) latest estimates counted around five thousand communities, but a closer look at the data revealed that some entries were duplicated and others mislocated. IBGE, “Cadastro de localidades quilombolas em 2019”; Secretaria de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial (SEPIR), “Relatório de gestão 2012 do programa Brasil Quilombola” (Brasília, 2013).
36. Nonetheless, authors of the two literatures on quilombos outlined here were in dialogue. The post-1988 anthropological literature also recognized that researchers had been developing projects with Black communities who were fighting for their lands since at least the 1970s. Until 1988, these communities were often referred to by other terms, such as terras de preto (Black peoples’ territories) or territórios negros (Black territories). In 1986, the First Meeting of the Rural Black Communities of the state of Maranhão had already taken place. Verena Alberti and Amilcar Araujo Pereira, Histórias do movimento negro no Brasil: Depoimentos ao CPDOC (Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil-Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2007), 243–48.
42. Percentagewise of national GDP, the highest contributors in 2021 were São Paulo
at 10.3 percent, Rio de Janeiro at 4.8 percent, Brasília at 3.7 percent, and Belo Horizonte at 1.3 percent. “Produto interno bruto dos municípios 2019” (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2021), 3.


46. Urban Indigenous territories, such as the Guarani Jaraguá community in São Paulo, have also been marked by processes of favelization.

47. See, for example, the story of the Zicas in Conceição Evaristo’s novel, or the story of Quilombo Sacopã, in this volume. Conceição Evaristo, Becos da memória (Rio de Janeiro: Pallas, 2017), 54–69.


52. The Xingu Indigenous Park in the state of Mato Grosso was created in 1961 and is home to over a dozen Indigenous nations and thousands of Indigenous persons.


57. One of the reasons for the FUNAI’s refusal to support urban Indigenous groups is, arguably, that the post-1980s neoliberal reforms redistributed several of its duties, such as regarding health and education, to other public organs, leaving land demarcation as its primary responsibility.


60. See also Desirée Poets, “Citizenship and Settler Colonialism in Brazil: The Toré Ritual as a Decolonial Indigenous Practice in the Northeast Region,” *Citizenship Studies*, 2021, 3.


63. Dependency theories comprise a diverse tradition throughout Latin America and within Brazilian academia. Preceded by the works of José Martí and Jose Carlos Mariátegui, one way to differentiate its strands is between those scholars (such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto) who have defended the possibility of Latin American development in association with (or within) the capitalist world system and those (such as Ruy Mauro Marini and Theotônio dos Santos) who took a Marxist approach and saw the imperial designs of this system as tending to reproduce underdevelopment (including superexploitation) in Latin America. As a detailed discussion of this literature exceeds the scope of the present work, I point readers to existing overviews: Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, “From the National-Bourgeoisie to the Dependency Interpretation of Latin America,” *Latin American Perspectives* 38, no. 3 (2011). See also the 2022 *Latin American Perspectives* special issue on the more recent resurgence of dependency theories. Ronald H. Chilcote and Joana Salém Vasconcelos, “Introduction: Whither Development Theory?,” *Latin American Perspectives* 49, no. 1 (2022).

64. In studies of Brazil, we can trace the definition of Brazil as an extraction colony to Caio Prado Júnior’s seminal work, *Formação do Brasil contemporâneo* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2011). In this book, Prado Júnior argues that Portuguese colonialism in “the tropics” was extractive and starkly different from the “temperate” settler colonies of Anglophone North America, often called *colônias de povoamento* (population...
colonies) in the Brazilian literature. His differentiation has influenced much dependency theory and other social scientific thinking in Brazil (for an example, see Bambirra, *O capitalismo dependente latino-americano*, 45–46). This common differentiation between the colonization of the north and south of the Americas has remained trapped within Prado Júnior’s reductionist definition of settlement as *povoamento* (peopling or population). Settler colonialism, however, is not just marked by a process of “peopling.” It comprises a wider, still-settling, and imperfect structure through which a new society is built atop Indigenous lands, which includes but also exceeds “peopling” or the movement of people. Furthermore, because Prado Júnior espouses explicit anti-Indigenous and anti-Black racism in his work, I see little benefit in centering his analysis as the standard against which subsequent arguments need to stand. But I recognize that many Brazilian scholars will have been influenced by his account of Brazilian nation and state formation. I hope that my book generatively addresses at least some of their questions and, in so doing, contributes to debates regarding north-south comparisons.

65. Speaking to settler colonial studies, Chickasaw scholar Shannon Speed helpfully traces the reductionist idea that settler colonialism is synonymous with Indigenous dispossession and that it is not extractive to Patrick Wolfe’s differentiation between Indigenous dispossession as land related and the exploitation of Black people as labor related. This differentiation is flawed. First, as has by now been sufficiently demonstrated, it does not hold in Latin America, where Indigenous labor exploitation was practiced as a form of elimination. Wolfe himself began to recognize this in his later work on Brazil. On this, see Speed, “Structures of Settler Capitalism,” 784; Patrick Wolfe, *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (London: Verso Books, 2016), chapter 4, iBooks. Secondly, Indigenous exploitation was also practiced in North America. See Andrés Reséndez, *The Other Slavery: The Uncovered Story of Indian Enslavement in America* (Boston: Mariner Books, 2016).


68. “Regimento que levou Tomé de Souza governador do Brasil, Almerim,” December 17, 1548, Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisboa. See also João Pacheco de Oliveira, “Pacificação e tutela militar na gestão de populações e territórios,” *Mana* 20 (2014): 129. For Celso Furtado, agricultural production was a solution to the problem of funding the colony’s defense in the absence of precious metals, especially from European rivals such as the Dutch, French, and English, by productively and thus effectively occupying the territory. Celso Furtado, *Formação econômica do Brasil*, 32nd ed. (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 2005), chapter 1, iBooks.

69. On the practice of engaging Indigenous peoples as “povoadores,” see Manuela


72. Felipe Antunes de Oliveira argues, for example, that Brazil’s “dominated-dominant classes,” as Vânia Bambirra called the multifaceted and at times contradictory position of Brazil’s comprador bourgeoisie, “are overwhelmingly white men.” Relatedly, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira found that the majority of São Paulo’s entrepreneurial class in 1962 were descendants of European immigrants, mostly of Italian origin. This work understands the arrival of these migrants as part of the settler state’s project and so it argues that they too are settlers on Indigenous lands, even if they did not arrive in the first waves of colonization. Felipe Antunes de Oliveira, “Who Are the Super-Exploited? Gender, Race, and the Intersectional Potentialities of Dependency Theory,” in *Dependent Capitalisms in Contemporary Latin America and Europe*, ed. Aldo Madariaga and Stefano Palestini (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 104, citing; Vânia Bambirra, *La revolución cubana: Una reinterpretación* (Mexico City: Nuestro Tiempo, 1974), 99; Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, “Origens étnicas e sociais do empresário Paulista,” *Revista de administração de empresas* 4, no. 11 (1964): 95. See also Bambirra, *O capitalismo dependente latino-americano*, 113.

73. The pardo category is a point of debate between Indigenous and Black movements. Statistically, pardo and preto are often combined under the “negro” category because the two groups experience similar levels of structural inequality and discrimination. At the same time, the Indigenous movement stresses that many pardos are Indigenous people who have not self-identified as such because of persisting anti-Indigenous prejudices and the ideology of whitening, which also affects Black people’s self-identification. For the Indigenous movement, it should not be assumed that pardos are culturally or ethnically “negros” despite their structural similarities, and many believe that the number of Indigenous peoples officially identified in the last (2010) census is still underreported. For me, the pardo category articulates not just the complexities of self-identification in Brazil but also, by stressing the structural (class- and race-related) similarities between Black and Indigenous peoples, can offer an opening from which to think about Black and Indigenous relationality in Brazil.


75. Until 2022, Indigenous federal representatives included Joênia Wapichana (2019–23) and Mário Juruna, of the Xavante nation (1983–87). In 2022, Sônia Guajajar, Célia Xakriabá, Juliana Cardoso (of Terena descent), and Silvia Waiápi, as well as Wellington Dias and Paulo Guedes, who self-identify as of Indigenous descent, were elected to Congress.


77. “Síntese de indicadores sociais: Uma análise das condições de vida” (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2016), 96.

78. “La matriz de la desigualdad social en América Latina” (Santiago, Chile: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2016), 32.

79. As mentioned, in some scholarship on settler colonialism in the Anglophone
world, dispossession has been seen as affecting Indigenous peoples exclusively, while (labor) exploitation targets Black peoples, e.g., Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*; Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus*.

80. Industrialization and autonomous development were capped, for example, through the absence of a substantial domestic market in a slavery-based economy and through direct interventions to dismantle whatever industries did emerge. Prado Júnior, *Formação do Brasil contemporâneo*, 237; Clóvis Moura, *Dialética radical do Brasil negro*, 2nd ed. (São Paulo: Fundação Maurício-Grabois, Anita Garibaldi, 2014), 66.

81. The discussion of settler capitalism I present here does not do justice to the dynamic and sometimes conflicting relationships that marked Portuguese colonialism in Brazil, where the interests of the Crown, settlers, and the Church sometimes clashed. What I draw out is a long historical process that reveals the formation of a dependent settler capitalist society in the present.


83. Lorenzo Veracini identified studies of settler capitalism as a precursor to settler colonial studies, and the term has more recently been taken up by Shannon Speed and Iyko Day. To the best of my knowledge, the notion of settler capitalism was first developed in the late 1970s and 1980s in studies with a primary focus on Australia. As part of this literature, Donald Denoon’s *Settler Capitalism* offered a comparative analysis of development and underdevelopment across the globe and identified settler capitalism as a particular type of capitalism that formed in colonies marked by settlement and, although they were dependent on Great Britain, economic success. In other words, he did not understand dependence as a cause of underdevelopment in settler societies, a conclusion that this work challenges. He included Latin American societies such as Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina in this category and identified the state and class conflict as playing key roles in the direction development took in these different settler colonies. These are insights on which the present work builds. Overall, Denoon’s work demonstrates the need for further comparative studies of the relationship between settler capitalism and (under)development. Donald Denoon, *Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Donald Denoon, “Understanding Settler Societies,” *Historical Studies* 18, no. 73 (1979); Lorenzo Veracini, “‘Settler Colonialism’: Career of a Concept,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, no. 2 (2013): 321–23; Speed, “Structures of Settler Capitalism in Abya Yala”; Shannon Speed, *Incarcerated Stories: Indigenous Women Migrants and Violence in the Settler-Capitalist State* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2019); Iyko Day, *Alien Capital: Asian Racialization and the Logic of Settler Colonial Capitalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).


86. In settler colonial studies, including in Patrick Wolfe’s own work, the logic of elimination is often understood as affecting only Indigenous peoples to further processes of dispossession, but a significant literature has by now built on Wolfe’s work to show that it structures the introduction of both Indigenous and Black peoples into (emerging) settler societies. Iyko Day, “Being or Nothingness: Indigeneity, Antiblackness, and Settler
89. “Regimento que levou Tomé de Souza,” 5.
90. Monteiro, Negros da terra, 155.
91. The military recruitment and deployment of Indigenous peoples was practiced until after independence. Carneiro da Cunha, História dos índios no Brasil, 149–52.
94. Nascimento, O genocídio do negro brasileiro.
98. Moura, Dialética radical do Brasil negro, 243.
100. Moura, Dialética radical do Brasil negro, 119.
110. Goebel, “Settler Colonialism in Postcolonial Latin America,” 140. In his chapter, Goebel argues that this wave of European movement to Brazil was not a settler colonial movement. The present chapter challenges the assumptions that lead Goebel to this conclusion. For example, (1) settlement can neither be reduced to a short-term movement of Europeans nor to colonies to which Europeans moved en masse. It is, instead, an enduring structure, and (2) so is the logic of elimination. In the settler colony, descendants
of Europeans (settlers) maintain their structurally dominant position without necessitating the “summary liquidation” of dominated peoples. (3) Settler colonialism is not exclusive to the countryside. Urbanization takes place on dispossessed Indigenous lands and results from processes of dispossession in the countryside (and the city) that spur rural-urban migrations, including of Indigenous people. Industrialization and related urbanization, as I argue in this work, have resulted from and have reproduced settler colonial dispossession, exploitation, and elimination. As Porter and Yiftachel have argued, “urban settlement has been central to the making of European settler-colonial societies since their inception.” Libby Porter and Oren Yiftachel, “Urbanizing Settler-Colonial Studies: Introduction to the Special Issue,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 9, no. 2 (2019): 177.

111. Santos, “Historical Roots of the ‘Whitening’ of Brazil,” 70.


121. For an overview of Brazil’s various stages of dependent development, see Leda Maria Paulani, “Dependency 4.0: Theoretical Considerations and the Brazilian Case,” *Latin American Perspectives* 49, no. 2 (2022); Bresser-Pereira, “From the National-Bourgeoisie to the Dependency Interpretation,” 51. For a critical overview of import substitution in Brazil, see Tavares, “Growth and Decline of Import Substitution.”
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125. Marini, *Subdesenvolvimento e revolução*, 60.


127. Hunger rates in Brazil were reduced by Workers’ Party programs but resurfaced under the Bolsonaro administration, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. Renato S. Maluf and Sandra Maria Chaves dos Santos, “Inquérito Nacional Sobre Insegurança Alimentar no contexto da pandemia da Covid-19 no Brasil” (São Paulo: Rede Brasileira de Pesquisa em Soberania e Segurança Alimentar (PENSSAN), 2022); Liliana D. Sousa, “Poverty and Equity Brief Latin America and the Caribbean: Brazil” (World Bank, April 2020); Antunes de Oliveira, “Who Are the Super-Exploited?,” 118.


129. Felipe Antunes de Oliveira has shown how the superexploited class is reproduced through gendered as well as racist logics and power structures. Antunes de Oliveira, “Who Are the Super-Exploited?”

130. This argument follows Moura’s work but differs from some interpretations of dependent capitalist development, such as Kay’s differentiation between colonial and capitalist relations. Cristóbal Kay, “Internal Colonialism: Ethnic and Class Relations,” in *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment* (London: Routledge, 1989), 72–73.


133. The Vargas Era comprises the fifteen years of Pres. Getúlio Vargas’ governments, which witnessed the implementation of numerous populist reforms such as for the protection of workers’ rights and the celebration of Brazilian culture as including Indigenous and Black cultural expressions. Jhonata Goulart Serafim and Jeferson Luiz de Azeredo, “A (des)criminalização da cultura negra nos Códigos de 1890 e 1940,” *Amicus curiae* 6 (2009): 8–13; Seth Garfield, “As raízes de uma planta que hoje é o Brasil: Os índios e o Estado-nação na Era Vargas,” *Revista brasileira de história* 20 (2000).


139. In the city of Rio specifically, most incarcerated persons in 2015 were from the Vila Kennedy and Vila Aliança favelas in the working-class Bangu neighborhood, in Rio’s West Zone, and second from Bonsucesso, in the North Zone, which included the Complexo da Maré. In fact, within Bonsucesso, most detained persons self-identified as from the Parque União and Nova Holanda favelas, in Maré. The 2015 study also highlighted that Bonsucesso ranked first in the city of Rio in the rate of incarcerated persons per inhabitant. In other words, Maré is disproportionately affected by mass incarceration. Marco Aurélio Ruediger, “Geografia do encarceramento (online)” (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas/DAPP).


143. For a discussion of how the murder of Brazil’s Black (and especially male and young) population comprises a genocide, see João H. Costa Vargas, *Never Meant to Survive: Genocide and Utopias in Black Diaspora Communities* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 1–3.

144. Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being,” 325.


147. One example of a work that recognizes the differences and similarities between Brazil and the United States in terms of anti-Black state violence is Costa Vargas, *Never Meant to Survive*, 17.


155. Neocleous, “‘Brighter and Nicer New Life.’” Harvey also highlights that working-class or capitalist formation has functioned through both consent and coercion, entailing “a mix of coercions and appropriations [which has included the erasure or co-optation] of pre-capitalist skills, social relations, knowledges, habits of mind, and beliefs.” Harvey, New Imperialism, 146.

156. Veracini, “Containment, Elimination, Endogeneity.”

157. The SPI was founded under the Republican Positivist principles of “order and progress.” Positivism was highly influential in Rio de Janeiro’s elite Republican teaching centers, including the Escola Militar da Praia Vermelha and the Escola Politécnica, where the SPI’s leaders were educated. The SPI was in fact called the Service for the Protection of the Indian and Localization of National Workers (Serviço de Proteção ao Índio e Localização de Trabalhadores Nacionais, SPILTN) until 1918. The SPI’s origin is commonly associated with the work of Lt. Col. Cândido Rondon, today something of a mythical figure of Brazil’s política indigenista. Rondon became well-known in Brazil after leading the 1906–9 Commission for Strategic Telegraphic Lines from Mato Grosso to Amazonas (Comissão de Linhas Telegráficas Estratégicas do Mato Grosso ao Amazonas, CLTEMGA), later simply Comissão Rondon. On these journeys, the commission encountered “unpacified” Indigenous nations, with whom it “peacefully” established contact by applying attraction and pacification techniques developed by Jesuit missionaries. Antonio Carlos de Souza Lima, “Poder tutelar y formación del Estado en Brasil: Notas a partir de la creación del Servicio de Protección a los Indios y Localización de Trabajadores Nacionales,” Desacatos no. 33 (2010): 55–60.

158. The SPI’s “nonviolent” approach, in turn, could already be found in José Bonifácio’s (1763–1838) Imperial indigenista project, which defended “gentle and persuasive methods.” Carneiro da Cunha, “Política indigenista no século XIX,” 136–37.

159. Antonio Carlos de Souza Lima, Um grande cerco de paz: Poder tutelar, indígenidade e formação do Estado no Brasil (Petrópolis, Brazil: Vozes, 1995), 45.

160. Lima speaks of wars of conquest in ways that resonate with what Patrick Wolfe calls settler colonialism’s “positive” aspect, as not just destroying but also constituting new social relations. Lima, Um grande cerco de paz, 18, 44. I am here following Tracy Guzmán’s translation of “um grande cerco de paz.” Tracy Guzmán, Native and National in Brazil: Indigeneity after Independence (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 119.

161. The recently released 1967 Figueiredo Report revealed the rampant corruption and atrocities that SPI officials committed during this time, including enslavement, child trafficking, sexual abuse, and torture.

162. The 1973 statute defined Indigenous peoples (also referred to as silvícolas, those who live in the forest) as “every individual of pre-Columbian origin and ascendency that identifies and is identified as belonging to an ethnic group whose cultural characteristics distinguish it from national society,” “Lei No. 6.001, de 19 de Dezembro de 1973.”

164. Brazil’s contemporary Indigenous Movement emerged in the 1970s as part of growing civil society mobilization and with the support of the Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI) which, informed by liberation theology, gathered different Indigenous nations in the so-called Indigenous Assemblies that eventually gave rise to a unified movement. Since the 1990s, the Indigenous Movement comprises numerous local and regional organizations, many of which come together under the Articulação dos Povos Indígenas do Brasil (APIB). See Daniel Munduruku, *O caráter educativo do movimento indígena brasileiro* (1970–1990) (São Paulo: Paulinas, 2012).


171. Cusicanqui’s notion of the indio permitido has inspired scholars to identify numerous other such “permitted categories.” Webber and Carr for instance identified an *izquierda permitida* that, while proposing important social policies, “signals deep continuities with neoliberal capitalism and adapts easily to U.S. Imperial strategies,” co-opting more radical leftist projects, a category under which we can include Brazil’s Workers’ Party. John Rahier and Christen Smith, in turn, speak of different kinds of


173. For this reason, I avoid describing specific Indigenous peoples as communities in this text and opt for peoples and nations instead. In so doing, I use these terms interchangeably and stress that Indigenous nationhood or peoplehood (as povos) in Brazil follows neither a Western state-centric understanding of nationhood, nor the meaning of Indigenous nationhood in the North of the Americas. Alcida Rita Ramos, “Nações dentro da nação: Um desencontro de ideologias,” in Etnia e nação na América Latina, ed. George Zarur (Washington, DC: Organization of American States, 1996), 1:79–88; Guzmán, Native and National in Brazil, 175.


180. The UPPs were inaugurated alongside the 2007 federal Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), whose PAC favelas foresaw investments in infrastructure and urbanization in favela communities, alongside urban renewal (such as in Rio’s port area) and infrastructure projects throughout the city.


199. Stavenhagen, “Classes, Colonialism and Acculturation,” 72, 76. We also find this interpretation in Kay, “Internal Colonialism.”


202. In the Anglophone academy, there has been some debate regarding the notion of Black people as “arrivant settlers” in settler colonies. Since then, Black and Native American/Indigenous studies have increasingly been in conversation. Some may still argue that there is incommensurability between Black and Indigenous struggles, but many have begun to explore their relationalities, stressing for example the “imbrication of settler colonialism and antiblackness.” I engage with this matter to some extent in the chapter on Quilombo Sacopã (chapter 2). Eve Tuck, Allison Guess, and Hannah Sultan, “Not Nowhere: Collaborating on Selfsame Land,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education and Society* (blog), June 26, 2014.

203. Tuck, Guess, and Sultan, “Not Nowhere.”


211. Speed, “Structures of Settler Capitalism in Abya Yala,” 785.


217. In this stance, I follow thinkers who have always articulated settler colonial studies in relation to Native American/Indigenous studies, and I thank Sharri Plonski for pointing my attention to these discussions. See Kauanui, “A Structure, Not an Event.” See also the *Postcolonial Studies* 24, no. 2 (2021) forum “On the Uses of Settler Colonial Studies.”

221. Santos Albuquerque, “O regime imagético Pankararu.”

Chapter 1


3. In Brazil, resurgence is a term most immediately associated with the processes of “ethnogenesis” or the (re)emergence of Indigenous nations previously declared “extinct,” especially in the Northeast region. In this work, resurgence in AM is understood as a new instance of this history of Indigenous reemergence. But this book also takes inspiration from how Indigenous/Native American scholars in Canada and the United States have theorized resurgence, as practices through which Indigenous peoples reconnect with homelands, cultures, and communities and thereby prefigure the aims of decolonization.


6. *Uruçum* or annatto is a raw material commonly used by Indigenous people to make dye.

7. Interview with Marize Guarani, January 8, 2015, Rio de Janeiro.


13. Some AM members are featured in the movie Brazil Red (2014), for example. Carlos Tukano has appeared in several telenovelas. In December 2014, Zahy Guajajara had a short-term contract with the mass media giant Globo as an Indigenous actress and, after several TV and film appearances, starred in the Netflix show Invisible City (2021). Índia, Garapirí, Patxiá, Arassari, and Niara often sold their crafts in the city’s street markets (feiras artesanais). Vângri Kaingang is a visual artist and published writer.

14. Antonio Carlos de Souza Lima, Um grande cerco de paz: Poder tutelar, indigeneidade e formação do Estado no Brasil (Petrópolis, Brazil: Vozes, 1995), 47.

15. “Decreto No. 10.652, de 16 de outubro de 1942”.


17. Instituto Estadual do Patrimônio Cultural (INEPAC), Relatório processo de tombamento do prédio do antigo Museu do Índio (1997), from Carlos Tukano’s personal archive; Couto, “A Seção de Estudos do Serviço,” 229. The Dia do Índio was implemented in 1934 by Pres. Getúlio Vargas as part of its nationalist and populist agenda. Seth Garfield, “As raízes de uma planta que hoje é o Brasil: Os índios e o Estado-nação na Era Vargas,” Revista brasileira de história 20 (2000).


21. The available documentation points to the Ministry of Agriculture as the plot’s owner. Daniele Ferreira da Costa, “Quando os índios vêm para a cidade: Magia e narrativa no Instituto Tamoio dos Povos Originários,” master’s thesis, Pontificia Universidade


27. This leadership structure has historically also been made hegemonic by the SPI, which demanded that Indigenous nations that were “re-emerging” in the Northeast region in the twentieth century adopt this structure. The SPI hereby coproduced a generalized indigeneity (indianidade) that crosses the specificities of Indigenous nations. João Pacheco de Oliveira, “Uma etnologia dos ‘índios misturados’? Situação colonial, territorialização e fluxos culturais,” Mana 4 (1998): 59.

28. Other urban Indigenous movements frowned upon the practice of giving an urban leader the title of cacique. São Paulo leaders, for example, argued that urban leaders should not replicate the position of traditional leaderships. For AM, however, it was important to emulate a community in Rio for a variety of reasons, as I discuss in this chapter.

29. Antônio Bispo, Colonização, quilombos: Modos e significados (Brasília: Instituto de Inclusão no Ensino Superior e na Pesquisa/Universidade de Brasília, 2015), 95.


33. Interview with Índia (Iracema), AM member, December 19, 2014, Rio de Janeiro.

34. Interview with Índia (Iracema), December 19, 2014.


36. In her own words: “He started asking those questions that everyone asks: ‘How is it in the community? Do you walk around naked? Do men have two wives? Etc. ... And then at the police station, he confessed. He said, ‘I thought that, well I wanted to know what it was like with an Indian, but I am a man of God,’ and he started crying, saying he was evangelical, that I had enchanted him and seduced him.” This logic reflects how ideologies of race and gender reproduce violence against Indigenous women and impunity for it, as Speed argues. Shannon Speed, Incarcerated Stories: Indigenous Women Migrants and Violence in the Settler-Capitalist State (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2019), 43; Interview with Índia (Iracema), December 19, 2014.


38. Lélia Gonzales, “Racismo e sexismo na cultura brasileira,” Revista ciências sociais


43. Simpson, “The State Is a Man.”

44. The Articulação Nacional das Mulheres Indígenas Guerreiras da Ancestralidade (ANMIGA) has been mobilizing to bring visibility to and fight violence against Indigenous women in Brazil, in a context of systemic underreporting and scarce nationwide data about this violence. On the structural racialized and gendered violence against Black women, see Gonzales, “Racismo e sexismo na cultura brasileira.”


46. Índia, in conversation with the author over Zoom, August 13, 2021.

47. Speed, *Incarcerated Stories*, 5.


51. Langfur and de Resende, “Indian Autonomy and Slavery,” 159.


58. These were conversations I frequently heard, such as during the FUNAI’s First National Conference on Indigenous Policies in June 2015 in São Paulo.

59. Viveiros de Castro, “No Brasil, todo mundo é índio.”

60. Challenging this narrative, Corntassel reminds us of the several states and regions where Indigenous peoples are the majority, such as Fiji (51 percent), Bolivia (51–71 percent), and Greenland (80 percent). Jeff Corntassel, “Who Is Indigenous? ‘Peoplehood’ and Ethnonationalist Approaches to Rearticulating Indigenous Identity,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 9, no. 1 (2003): 89. On the role of the minoritization of Indigenous peoples in settler societies, see Glen Sean Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 179.
61. Interview with Zahy Guajajara, AM member, January 10, 2015, Rio de Janeiro.
63. Interview with Sandra Guarani, AM member, December 16, 2014, Rio de Janeiro.
64. For example, when a Pankararu person meets another Pankararu whom they did not know before, the first question is usually: “Você é filho de quem?” (whose child are you?). In response, the other person gives their mother’s and/or father’s names as well as their grandmothers’ and grandfathers’ names and so on, until the first person recognizes the other’s ancestry and the kinship relation among them has been established. As Cicera Pankararu stated, “when I meet a Pankararu, I don’t just say my name, I say whose daughter I am.” Cicera Pankararu, former Pindorama student and coordinator, July 6, 2015, São Paulo.
66. I am here adapting the words of Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus, 9–10, 15. Simpson calls this practice “membership talk.”
69. Oliveira, “Uma etnologia dos ‘índios misturados?’”
71. All this resonates for instance with what Santos Albuquerque observed in the Pankararu’s mobilization in São Paulo’s Favela Real Parque, showing how the story of AM is similar to that of other Indigenous peoples in urban contexts. Santos Albuquerque, “O regime imagético Pankararu,” 229–35.
73. Interview with Emerson de Oliveira Souza-Guarani, former Pindorama student, July 10, 2015, São Paulo.
74. Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks, 176, citing; Lawrence, Real Indians and Others, 246. We find a similar argument in Simpson, As We Have Always Done, 195.
75. The Favela do Metrô used to be located about 500 meters (1,600 feet) from the Maracanã Stadium. Its residents started protesting and resisting removal in November 2010. By 2015, most residents had been relocated to the Cosmos neighborhood, 75 kilometers (around 50 miles) away from their previous homes. Other residents who resisted for longer were provided with housing nearby the favela. Cláudia Freitas, “Moradores da Favela do Metrô fazem novos protestos contra remoção,” Jornal do Brasil, January 9, 2014.
77. “‘Chamar de aldeia indígena é deboche,’ diz Cabral sobre museu,” G1, January 15, 2013.
79. After the group secured a deal with the state of Rio, it also attempted to reconcile with FUNAI. Since then, the movement and public body have built a more collaborative
relationship. In May 2015, for instance, they co-organized the “O Rio de Janeiro continua índio” (Rio de Janeiro Continues to Be Indigenous) speaker series event. The Museu do Índio’s director, however, refused my interview requests.

84. In my interview with Adriana Rattes, former secretary of Culture of the State of Rio, July 20, 2015, Rio de Janeiro, she confirmed that the state approached the group because of falling approval rates and because of AM’s growing visibility in the press.
86. Lima, Um grande cerco de paz, 44.
87. Interview with Carlos Tukano, July 24, 2014, Rio de Janeiro.
93. Simpson, As We Have Always Done, 192.
94. Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks, 18; Corntassel, “Re-Envisioning Resurgence”; Simpson, As We Have Always Done, 194–95.
95. Telephone communication with Marize Guarani, January 5, 2019.
96. Interview with Carlos Tukano, July 24, 2014, Rio de Janeiro.

Chapter 2


6. “Relatório técnico de identificação e delimitação.”


10. Interview with Luiz Carlos “Carlinhos” Torres de Freitas, Sacopã member, December 17, 2014, Rio de Janeiro.


15. Interview with Luiz “Luizinho” Martins Pinto, Sacopã member, January 3, 2015, Rio de Janeiro.


24. See Mario Sergio Brum, “Favelas e remocionismo ontem e hoje: Da ditadura de


27. “Moradores de favela se mudam.”


29. Interview with Márcia Arruda and José Luiz Pinto, December 14, 2014, Rio de Janeiro.

30. Judge Roberto Wieder, who had decided on their case, was later convicted and removed from office for corruption, including selling sentences. See “Parcerias obscuras no Judiciário do Rio,” O Globo, December 24, 2010.

31. This letter can be found online at the Santa Margarida Maria website.


34. Interview with José Luiz Pinto, June 8, 2014, Rio de Janeiro.


37. Racial democracy became an official national identity as well as academic discourse under Vargas’s Estado Novo dictatorship (1937–45). Antonio Sérgio Alfredo Guimarães reminds us that racial democracy was not only a symbolic “cultural construction” (or an ideological myth) but also a material method of corporatist class conciliation under Vargas, a pact or compromise for the socioeconomic integration of Black Brazilians as southeastern industrialization picked up pace in the 1930s. The expansion of the urban labor market during this period also enabled the class mobility of some Black Brazilians and the emergence of a small Black middle class, supported by labor laws and antidiscrimination legislation that comprised what Ruy Mauro Marini described as a “zone of shared interests” between the industrial bourgeoisie and the middle and working classes. Antonio Sérgio Alfredo Guimarães, “Depois da democracia racial,” Tempo social 18 (2006): 270; Ruy Mauro Marini, Subdesenvolvimento e revolução, 6th ed. (Florianópolis, Brazil: Insular, 2017), 74–76.


41. Juliet Hooker, “Indigenous Inclusion/Black Exclusion: Race, Ethnicity and


44. Interview with Luiz Carlos “Carlinhos” Torres de Freitas, December 17, 2014, Rio de Janeiro.


47. Interview with Márcio do Nascimento, December 17, 2014, Rio de Janeiro.


50. Cláudio raised this point in several conversations throughout the years.

51. The question can also be phrased as why have quilombola land rights been granted to the family, but their right to their lands via adverse possession was denied? Adverse possession, I also note, is a legal instrument to which many favela communities have historically turned in their struggles for land. See Brodwen Fischer, *A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 262.


54. Interview with José Luiz Pinto, June 8, 2014, Rio de Janeiro.

55. Interview with José Luiz Pinto, July 10, 2014, Rio de Janeiro.

Chapter 3


2. Estimates vary but indicate Bahia and Maranhão as the two states with the highest number of quilombos. See Documentação Eloy Ferreira da Silva—CEDEFES, *Comunidades quilombolas de Minas Gerais no século XXI: História e resistência* (Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Autêntica, 2008)


4. I am following the Institute for Research in Economics, Administration, and Accounting (Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas, Administrativas e Contábeis [IPEAD]) of the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) classification of “upper class” as neighborhoods with an average household income of 8.5 to 14.5 minimum wages (*salários mínimos*). “Classificação dos bairros de Belo Horizonte” (Belo Horizonte: IPEAD/ UFMG, 2018).

8. Interview with Estevão Ferreira Couto, federal prosecutor (DPU-MG), January 20, 2016, Belo Horizonte.
10. Sidimar Cristina de Souza and André Augusto Pereira Brandão, “Política de titulação de terras quilombolas” (VII Jornada Internacional de Políticas Públicas, São Luís/ Maranhão, 2015); Brandão, “Juristas querem mais recursos.”
13. The Fazenda Calafate had been broken up and expropriated by the Construction Commission of the New Capital (Comissão Construtora da Nova Capital). See “Relatório antropológico,” 13. The quilombo’s oral history tells several versions of the process through which Nicolau acquired Calafate Farm lands. Some versions claim that he received them as a donation for years of enslaved labor and others that he purchased the land. In conversation with quilombola Miriam Aprigio, it was decided that we should use the language of the family’s official documents, which speak simply of an acquisition by Nicolau.
14. This would make their original territory even larger than their official anthropological and technical report (RTID) recognizes. See “Relatório antropológico,” 12–13.
15. Interview with Maria Luzia Sidônio, Luízes member, December 18, 2015, Belo Horizonte. The property in Anna Apolinária’s name was documented at 629,200 square meters or 155 acres. Over time, it suffered significant reductions. “Relatório antropológico,” 18–20.
17. Interview with Miriam Aprigio Pereira, Luízes member, December 19, 2015, Belo Horizonte.
32. “Relatório antropológico,” 79.
38. Interview with Miriam Aprigio Pereira, December 19, 2015, Belo Horizonte.
39. Interview with Maria Luzia Sidônio, August 4, 2015, Belo Horizonte. See also “Relatório antropológico,” 198–99.
41. According to federal prosecutor Estevão Ferreira Couto, the inheritance has become difficult to execute because some documents have been lost and, while existing documentation attests to about 33 or maybe 50 percent of the territory, as Professor Figoli, the coordinator of the quilombo’s RTID affirmed, they are outdated and difficult to translate into today’s legal language. There are no records attesting to the community’s territory in Belo Horizonte’s city archives. During my fieldwork, the consensus was therefore that the “legal path” was likely to be less beneficial for the family than the administrative process as a quilombo, despite all its limitations. Phone conversation with Leonardo H. G. Figoli, professor of the Faculty of Philosophy and the Humanities (FAFICH) at the Federal University of Minas Gerais and coordinator of Luízes’ anthropological report, January 13, 2016, Rio de Janeiro; Interview with Estevão Ferreira Couto, January 20, 2016, Belo Horizonte.
42. See Zuleide Filgueiras and Estevão Couto, dirs., Vozes da resistência: Os quilombos urbanos de Belo Horizonte (Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Defensoria Pública da União, 2015).
43. Grisey, Remanescentes.
44. Interview with Maria Luzia Sidônio, December 18, 2015, Belo Horizonte.
49. Interview with Miriam Aprigio Pereira, December 19, 2015, Belo Horizonte.
50. Meeting between INCRA of Minas Gerais (INCRA-MG) and the community of Luízes, August 27, 2015, available in Grisey, Remanescentes. For the 2021 budget figures, see Brandão, “Juristas querem mais recursos para titulação.”
51. This statement is extracted from an audio recording of a meeting between the INCRA-MG and the Quilombo Luízes, on March 16, 2012. Personal archive of Raphaël Grisey.
Chapter 4

1. The first Agosto Indígena was held in 2014 with the aim to support the implementation of Law 11.645 of 2008 in São Paulo’s public schools. Its main organizer, Emerson Souza (Guarani), is a former Pindorama Program student.


4. Information obtained at the 2015 First Conference on Indigenista Policies, collected by Real Parque’s Unidade Básica de Saúde (Basic Health Unit [UBS]). Many more Pankararu families lived throughout forty neighborhoods of greater São Paulo.


8. After Rio’s State University (UERJ) first implemented quotas in 2003, Law 12.711 and Decree 7824 of 2012 prescribed that 50 percent of university places be reserved for low-income students from public schools, in proportion to each state’s self-declared Black, parda, and Indigenous population, as well as for people with disabilities. The PROUNI in turn was created in 2004, by Law 11.096.

9. Mariana Paladino, “Algumas notas para a discussão sobre a situação de acesso


17. Cícera Pankararu, a former Pankararu student and coordinator, in an interview, July 6, 2015, São Paulo, discussed the violence her grandmother had suffered due to anti-Indigenous racism, the land conflicts that had shaped her parents’ and grandparents’ lives, and how her family finally chose to migrate to São Paulo after droughts had hindered their subsistence farming.


19. These services were available to any Pankararu in São Paulo and often also other Indigenous people, regardless of place of residence. Access to them was sometimes impeded by long travel distances within the city, considering that many lived in peripheral areas far away from Morumbi. Besides Real Parque, Pankararu Pindorama students at the time of my fieldwork also lived in the industrial region known as ABC Paulista and in São Paulo’s East Zone.

20. While the Pankararu no longer speak their ancestral language, in their ritualistic dances and songs, the *toantes*, they utter sounds that evoke this language but whose meanings they may currently not know.


22. For a detailed anthropological account of the SOS Pankararu, see Santos Albuquerque, “O regime imagético Pankararu.”


25. Interview with Amanda Pankararu, Pindorama student, June 28, 2015, São Paulo.

26. In one document created by the SOS Pankararu, the association describes as part of its mission the aim to “strengthen and revitalize the Pankararu Indigenous community within its social contexts, promoting its traditional culture among Indigenous and non-Indigenous people through social and educational projects.” Cited in Santos Albuquerque, “O regime imagético Pankararu,” 183.

27. In 2010, other Pankararu residents of São Paulo were identified in the neighborhoods of Parque Santa Madalena, Capão Redondo, Butantã, Valo Velho, Cidade Dutra, Grajaú, Paraisópolis, among others, and in cities of greater São Paulo like Mauá, Guarulhos, Itaquaquecetuba, Taboão da Serra, Osasco and Francisco Morato. Vanessa Ramos and Beatriz Maestri, “Indígenas lutam por moradia em São Paulo,” CIMI (blog), May 24, 2010.


30. The Indigenous Missionary Council was founded in 1972 in the aftermath of the reforms instituted by the II Vatican Council (1962–65) and the II General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate (1968), which took place in Medellín (Colombia) and culminated in the formulation of liberation theology. Liberation theology, influenced by dependency theories and by the Church’s praxis as part of region-wide social mobilizations at the time, set out a new mission for the Church as committed to a political-social work with marginalized populations in Latin America. See Ideia Marques de Carvalho, “O CIMI e sua assessoria aos movimentos indígenas,” Tellus 2, no. 2 (2002).

31. After the program’s second year, the university limited the scholarships to twelve students.


34. Interview with Bruno Xavante, former Pindorama student, July 20, 2015, São Paulo.

35. Interview with Raíza and Graciele Pankararu, Pindorama students, June 25, 2015, São Paulo.


37. Interview with Cida Pankararu, former Pindorama student and coordinator, June 21, 2015, São Paulo.

38. Interview with Cida Pankararu, June 21, 2015, São Paulo.

39. Interview with Cícera Pankararu, July 6, 2015, São Paulo.


42. Barreto and dos Santos, “A volta da cobra canoa,” 92.

43. abigail writes her first name in lower case. abigail Campos Leal, “Me curo y me armo, estudando: A dimensão terapêutica y bélica do saber prete e trans,” Cadernos de subjetividade 1, no. 21 (2020).
I thought that we had to work the “Indigenous question” but also the question of young adults who live in a city and who want to contribute to their country. . . . And then a certain difference began to show. I deeply respect the CIMI’s stance because they work very seriously in questioning [society], but I think that theirs is an outdated stance in a way. . . . I think that, as a worldview, to recognize that we are all different means that we can include Black, quilombola, disabled, poor, and rich people. . . . I think that we are many, and I found it very difficult to work this at the university. The vision that predominated—moreover because Benedito is very dedicated, he dedicates his life to this cause—was the vision of the indios and the brancos as two different realities.

Interview with Ana Bataglin, former Pindorama coordinator and professor at the PUC-SP, July 13, 2015, São Paulo.

47. Quoted in Souza, “Povos indígenas na metrópole,” 235.
50. Interview with Edcarlos Pankararu, former Pindorama student, June 25, 2015, São Paulo.
51. This was the case at another program with which I had contact, at the Federal University of Minas Gerais. See also Paladino, “Algunas notas para a discussão,” 182.
54. Interview with Edcarlos Pankararu, June 25, 2015, São Paulo.
56. *I’m Not the Indian You Had in Mind*, National Screen Institute—Canada (NSI), 2007.
57. Interview with Edcarlos Pankararu, June 25, 2015, São Paulo.
58. In her interview, Carol challenged the expectation that she should return to Brejo dos Padres and contribute to the community there. She stated that “my course and career choices led me to stay in São Paulo and work in the private sector. . . . But, before I became a Pindorama student, I had no idea about how many Indigenous people there are in São Paulo and how organized they are. I didn’t have that perception before. . . . But I don’t think that we should contribute only to the community there [in Pernambuco],
we can also contribute to the community where we live.” Carol and Lia Pankararu, June 19, 2015, São Paulo.

59. In my interview with Edcarlos, we discussed how the CIMI’s strong presence in the program reflected debates around the persisting tutelage by nonstate, non-Indigenous individual as well as institutional supporters. Benedito himself often reflected critically on his position and acknowledged the tensions and limitations of his work, and the importance of a future marked by greater Indigenous autonomy, including in the program itself. These discussions were also reflected at the First National Conference, when Indigenous participants openly challenged the participation of non-Indigenous speakers, including Benedito and me.

60. Interview with Edcarlos Pankararu, June 25, 2015, São Paulo.


63. Guzmán, Native and National, 175.

64. Gersem dos Santos Luciano–Baniwa, O índio brasileiro: O que você precisa saber sobre os povos indígenas no Brasil de hoje (Brasília: Laboratório de Pesquisas sobre Etnicidade, Cultura e Desenvolvimento (LACED)/Museu Nacional, 2006), 88.

65. Antônio Bispo, Colonização, quilombos: Modos e significados (Brasília: Instituto de Inclusão no Ensino Superior e na Pesquisa/Universidade de Brasília, 2015), 89.

66. This goal was not necessarily shared by all. At the First National Conference, one working group argued for more autonomous Indigenous spaces that were not state or rights oriented. This stance is shared by some organizers of the Popular Tribunal’s Indigenous Working Group, who also have connections with Aldeia Rexiste in Rio.


Chapter 5

1. Rio’s Military Police is the Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ).


6. The phrasing predates but was made especially popular by the work of journalist Zuenir Ventura, Cidade partida (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994).


8. Security, democracy, and development are key areas of human security, so influential
in policy and research since the 1990s. Human security articulates shifts after the Cold War from a focus on state security to the well-being and development of individuals (their human security). In Rio, the UPPs followed the 2007 creation of the federal Growth Acceleration Program known as PAC favelas, which foresaw investments in infrastructure and urbanization in favela communities. See Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (London: Polity, 2007).


20. Recent research indicates that enslaved persons were first disembarked at the customs house near Candelária, present-day Casa França-Brasil. Reinaldo Bernardes Tavares, Claudia Rodrigues-Carvalho, and Andrea Lessa, “Da alfândega ao Valongo: A entrada dos cativos africanos no Rio de Janeiro no século dezenove sob uma nova perspectiva historiográfica,” *Latin American Antiquity* 31, no. 2 (2020).


25. *Depoimento Orosina Vieira (Ceasm)*, YouTube, 2010. For more on Dona Orosina’s story, see Ribeiro da Silva, “Maré,” 71. I thank Andreza Jorge for noting, at this point, that we can understand Dona Orosina’s mythological status in Maré as a way of bridging gaps in the documentation of marginalized communities whose histories have been systematically erased.

33. Vieira, Histórico da Maré, 43.
38. This was done through Law No. 2119/1994. It has enabled the community greater representation in formal politics, but it did not fundamentally change how residents perceive Maré. Ribeiro da Silva, “Maré,” 104–5.
42. In the present context, Maré’s location in between two of the city’s major inter-state highways and with direct access to the sea continues to make it of strategic interest to the federal and the city’s security apparatuses.
46. Vieira, Histórico da Maré, 17.
47. Lima, Um grande cerco de paz.
49. The base was the First Armored Cars Regiment (1º Batalhão de Carros de Combate).
50. Vieira, Histórico da Maré, 52.
56. According to the National Truth Commission, at least fifty thousand persons were imprisoned in 1964, the year of the military coup, alone. Rio’s criminal organizations formed in prisons after only so-called political prisoners were released at the end of the dictatorship, leaving other inmates, many of whom were working-class, young, Black men, to face the dire conditions of Rio’s penitentiaries. Camila Bomfim Brasilia, “Comissão da Verdade conclui que 50 mil foram presos em 1964,” G1, February 26, 2013.
64. Sousa Silva, *Testemunhos da Maré*, 181–82. Relevant to the discussion in this chapter is that the car was nicknamed pacifier (*pacificador*) by the police but is popularly called caveirão after the BOPE emblem painted on it.
70. “Boletim direito à segurança pública,” 17.
72. In 2019, pupils in Maré missed 12 percent of that year’s school days due to police operations. “Boletim direito à segurança pública,” 7.


78. Under Gov. Leonel Brizola, these included the Practical-Educational Application Group (Grupamento de Aplicação Prático-Escolar [GAPE]) installed in Morro da Providência by Rio’s city center, and, perhaps most effectively, in 1994 in Pavão-Pavãozinho and Cantagalo, in Copacabana. Under the Garotinhos, we can cite the 1999 “Mutirão pela Paz” in the favela Vila Pereira da Silva (known as Pereirão) and the Policing Group for Special Areas (Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais [GPAE]) program in the Cantagalo and Pavão-Pavãozinho communities. These (and more) are listed in Ludmila Mendonça Lopes Ribeiro and Ana Maria Alemão Montandon, “O que os policiais querem dizer com ‘policiação comunitário’: Uma análise dos discursos dos oficiais da PMERJ,” *Dilemas—revista de estudos de conflito e controle social* 7, no. 2 (2014).

79. Sousa Silva, *Testemunhos da Maré*, 94–109. I thank my collaborator Nicholas Barnes for sharing his doubts about this official plan for the battalion, highlighting that it is possible that it was implemented primarily to end shootouts that were spilling onto Linha Vermelha and Avenida Brasil.


85. Legal services were provided through the Justiça Itinerante (Traveling Justice) program, which helped residents obtain vital records that favela residents sometimes do not possess. These initiatives are not a “paradigmatic break” but an emulation of previous practices such as the military’s Civic-Social Actions during the dictatorship, which incorporated, for example, health care provision and investments in infrastructure in postconflict contexts, and especially at the Brazil-Argentina border. See Ronaldo Zatta and Ismael Antônio Vannini, “As ações cívico-sociais do Exército Brasileiro na fronteira Brasil/Argentina durante a década de 1970,” *Semina* 18, no. 3 (2019). On actions in Maré, see “NOTA EB—Força de Pacificação (F Pac)—Operação São Francisco,” DefesaNet, April 4, 2015.

86. As quoted in Clarke, “Maré Vive.”


89. As quoted in Imanishi, “Maré.”

90. Tiffany Lethabo King, Navarro Jenell, and Andrea Smith, *Otherwise Worlds:}


92. On the imperative to destroy to replace, see Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (2006); Lima, Um grande cerco de paz, 46–47.

93. avela não se cala—reunião na favela da Maré, Timbau—Deize Caravalho (Parte 1), YouTube, 2013.


99. Emphasis in the original. Lima, Um grande cerco de paz, 133–34.

100. Souza, “Maré sitiada,” 177.


103. Barnes, "Logic of Criminal Territorial Control,” 806.

104. A survey by the NGO Redes da Maré at the time found that 70 percent of residents deemed the occupation to not have increased their feeling of security, overall. See Roberto de Oliveira, "O resultado da ocupação das Forças Armadas na Maré," Maré de Notícias Online, July 1, 2017, 12. Officially, however, Maré’s occupation was portrayed as a success at the time of military retreat. See “PM assume ocupação de favelas da Maré, Rio, a partir desta terça-feira,” G1, June 30, 2015.


Conclusion


3. Interview with José Luiz Pinto “Luiz Sacopã,” Sacopã member, June 8, 2014, Rio de Janeiro.

5. Eliane Potiguara, Metade cara, metade máscara (Lorena, Brazil: DM Projetos Especiais, 2018), 146.

6. Interview with Amanda Pankararu, Pindorama student, June 28, 2015, São Paulo.

7. Gersem dos Santos Luciano–Baniwa, O índio brasileiro: O que você precisa saber sobre os povos indígenas no Brasil de hoje (Brasília: Laboratório de Pesquisas sobre Etnicidade, Cultura e Desenvolvimento/Museu Nacional, 2006), 95.


10. See Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus.


34. Mombaça, *Não vão nos matar agora*, 82.
36. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 50 (emphasis added).
38. This is an interpretation of their text, “Veio o tempo em que por todos os lados as luzes desta época foram acendidas” in the context of their work overall. See Mombaça, *Não vão nos matar agora*, 95.
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*Depoimento Orosina Vieira (Ceasm)*. YouTube, 2010.


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———. “O Brasil é território indígena só nas terras que os brancos demarcaram na lei deles ou é todo o território? Abra sua mente antes da sua boca, é o Brasil que ninguém vê. A favela é território indígena, a cidade é território indígena, mesmo que eles tentem esconder.” Twitter, @kaeguajajara, December 23, 2021.


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Rejane Pankararu, former Pindorama student, June 28, 2015, São Paulo.
Zahy Guajajara, Aldeia Maracanã member, January 10, 2015, Rio de Janeiro.
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