AN ALABAMIAN IN ABYSSINIA

By

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A THESIS

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Samuel Henry Lockett was a Confederate Military engineer responsible for the defenses of such strategic places as Mobile and Pensacola harbors and Vicksburg, Mississippi, during the Civil War. Afterwards, he resumed his military career in 1875 as a member of an American Military Mission in Egypt which was an integral part of the Egyptian army. This study attempts to illustrate his role as a military engineer, as a staff officer in the Khedive's army, and as a military observer.

As a military engineer, Lockett illustrated how typographical features might be utilized to offset the disadvantages of a small defending garrison and inadequate entrenching tools and equipment. At Vicksburg and Kayah Khor, he formed a compact fortified line while utilizing detached strong points dominating the crests of ridges as high or higher than any in the vicinity. These strong points were supported by outer works and rifle pits. Siege guns were rendered ineffective by forcing the enemy to fire from a vertical position. At the same time, a superior force was made ineffective as
the rough nature of the terrain prevented the use of a large enemy force and forced the enemy to attack points on a fortified line. A small ill-equipped garrison might, therefore, retrench and serve as a mobile self-relief force for any point under attack.

As a staff officer, Lockett directed the American Military Mission in surveying and mapping the little known regions along the Nile River to Kordofan and Darfour, almost to the Equatorial Lakes, and down the Red Sea to Berbera, Harrar, Guardafui and Juba. Under his supervision the information thus gained was classified and catalogued.

As a military observer, Lockett witnessed the self-destruction which resulted from lack of co-operation in both the civil and military arena. At Vicksburg, he showed how a split command immobilized the Confederate Army and left it helpless before Grant's invading force. In Abyssinia, he showed how a split American-Egyptian staff command failed to co-operate and thus brought about defeat. Furthermore, he illustrated how this unfortunate military breach eventually paralyzed the work of the American Military Mission by making the American
military experts susceptible to "constant, intentional, underhanded interference" from the power-conscious Egyptian officials and from the power-jealous Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers, especially France and England which had opposed the American military and civil reforms from the beginning.
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CHAPTER I

FIVE HUNDRED PICKS AND SHOVELS

I am a Virginian by birth, but was reared from an infant in Alabama, and my parents resided in that state in 1854, when I was nominated to a cadetship by the Hon. Samson W. Harris. I have, therefore, always considered myself as much a representative of Alabama at the National Military Academy as my Congressman was her representative in the national legislature. When I was graduated, and commissioned a brevet second lieutenant of Engineers in the United States Army, I considered myself a part of Alabama's quota to the Federal Army for purposes of national defense. All this, with the doctrines of States' rights, State sovereignty, and the principles of loyalty, fidelity and devotion to one's native state had been instilled into me from my earliest childhood. . . .

Thus wrote the self-adopted Alabamian, Samuel Henry Lockett, born in Mecklenburg County, Virginia on July 6, 1837, but who, while still an infant, moved with his

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1. Samuel H. Lockett, "West Pointers of the Confederate States Armies," letter to the editor of The Nation (New York, 1865- ), XL (January, 1885), 95. A copy of this article is also available in the Samuel H. Lockett Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library). Hereinafter cited as Lockett Papers.
parents to Marion, Perry County, Alabama. Perry County is located in Alabama's famed "Black Belt," so-called because of the rich, black Selma chalk soil formed in the river valleys of the Central Plains area. Here an aristocratic plantation life developed, prior to the Civil War, based on cotton and slaves. Marion near the center of the county, was chosen as its county seat in 1822. The years that followed witnessed a steady increase in population and the Lockett family became part of the wave of settlers streaming into South Alabama before the Civil War. By 1850, the population of Marion was 1,544; by 1860, 1,708; and by 1870, 2,646.

Not only was Marion an aristocratic administrative center, but it also became a cultural seat; the center of Baptist influence throughout the South. Two Baptist

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schools were located in Marion. Judson Female Institute, founded in 1838, had primary, preparatory and collegiate departments; and Howard College, which opened its doors in 1841, taught preparatory, classical and collegiate courses.  

In this atmosphere, Napoleon and Mary Clay Lockett chose to rear their nine children, of whom Samuel was the second. Although the Lockett's were Episcopalian, they enrolled young Samuel in the preparatory course at Howard College in 1845. By October of 1850 he was ready for his classical year, and the following year became a member of the Freshman class. He completed his Junior year in 1853.

The next year, a lifetime ambition was fulfilled when he was appointed to the United States Military Academy by the Honorable Samson W. Harris, representative from Alabama's third electoral district. At West Point, Lockett was regarded as "modest, frank, unassuming, and showed by every action more than ordinary firmness of character. He measured "right and wrong, honor and dishonor by so strict a standard as to give his

5. Ibid., I, 711; Ibid., II, 940-41.

views a distinctive individuality."  
Winning great scholarly distinction he was graduated second in the class of 1859 and received his commission as a brevet Second Lieutenant of Engineers in the United States Army.

Lockett's career in the United States Army had an auspicious beginning. Immediately following graduation, he was appointed an Assistant Professor at the Military Academy, a position which Ellsworth Eliot, Jr. in his book *West Point in the Confederacy* describes as "generally considered a most desirable appointment." After one year, he resigned and was assigned to the Corps of Engineers in the Eighth Light House District as an assistant to Captain W. H. C. Whiting. While here, he held the position of engineer at Forts Pulaski and Jackson on the Savannah River, and was responsible for the construction of Fort Clinch at Amelia Island, Florida. His position was again enviable, according

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8. Ibid.


10. Ibid., 379.
to Eliot, who says, "Those graduating with the highest rank were assigned to the much coveted engineers' corps, with duties of fortifying important rivers and harbors. . . ." Lockett's first two years with the army had "made more bright" his dream of usefulness and promotion in an honorable army career.

His dream was shattered by a telegram, January 11, 1861, from Alabama's energetic governor, A. B. Moore, ordering him to resign his commission because Alabama had seceded from the Union. After a sleepless night, Lockett, while doubting the policy of secession, adhered to his duty to his State and on the thirteenth resigned, effective February the first. He describes his departure from Fort Clinch in the following words:

The first day of February, 1861, was a beautiful bright, warm but breezy day. The broad "star-spangled banner" which floated from the flagstaff of the fort, stood straight out from its halyards and as I looked up to it to bid it farewell, I thought it had never looked so proud, so bright, so beautiful before. With

11. Ibid., 22-23.
hat off, and tears in my eyes
I bade it "good-by," and started
for Montgomery. And that was
the saddest journey of my life.\textsuperscript{13}

Governor Moore commissioned Lockett a major in the engineering corps of the State of Alabama and ordered him to report to General Braxton Bragg at Pensacola, Florida. On April 16, 1861, Lockett was made a captain in the newly organized Confederate States Army and ordered to Mobile where he became chief engineer of the defenses of the Alabama port. From February 1861 to March 1862, Captain Lockett, with practically no materials, planned and partially constructed the defenses of both Mobile, the center of blockade runners, and Pensacola, the only naval station in the Gulf of Mexico. Pensacola possessed a fine harbor, a good dry-dock, and a well equipped naval yard. Despite Lockett's able works, the presence of Union troops at Fort Pickens, located on an island near the entrance to the Pensacola harbor, and pressure by General Ulysses S. Grant in Tennessee and Kentucky in 1862, resulted in the abandonment of the harbor at Pensacola and the partial

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.

destruction of its dry-docks and buildings. Admiral David G. Farragut recognized the importance of the Pensacola area, where he made his headquarters for repairs and supplies in August, 1862. But Lockett's fortifications in Mobile harbor, although weakened by the withdrawal of 10,000 troops from the coast for concentration at Corinth, Mississippi, to stem the advance of Union troops down the Tennessee, were not taken until August 1864, and Mobile itself was never taken.15

Lockett was among the troops transferred from the coast in 1862 to Corinth. As chief engineer on the staff of General Bragg, who realized his unusual construction ability, Lockett was assigned the duty of fortifying the Confederate position at Corinth. This city was strategically located at the juncture of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad in Northern Mississippi and lay adjacent to Hamburg, Eastport, and Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee. Corinth was also the great rallying point of retreating troops from Tennessee and reinforcements from over the South, and became the point where General A. S.

Johnson determined to meet General Grant. Lockett occupied a key position in the construction of the new line of Confederate defenses in the West. 16

Lockett's fortifications at Corinth were temporarily halted when an abortive attempt by General William T. Sherman to sever rail connections between Generals G. T. Beauregard and Johnson placed Federal troops in a quadrilateral pocket formed at Pittsburg Landing. Federal troops at Pittsburg Landing recognized that this was naturally a strong position. The northern line of this site was protected by Snake Creek, the northwest by Owl Creek, and the southeast by Lick Creek. However, the southwest was totally unprotected if the rough nature of the terrain is discounted. General Grant determined to concentrate the bulk of the Federal Army at Pittsburg Landing before marching upon the 40,000 troops behind Lockett's fortifications at Corinth. Adhering to the West Point theory that "field works made the men cowardly," General Grant ignored orders to entrench. Instead he drilled his 33,000 raw troops while awaiting the

arrival of General D. C. Buell with 20,000 men from Nashville. But the Confederate generals, observing the unfortified position of General Grant and gambling on surprise determined to strike Grant's position swiftly before Buell's reenforcements arrived. 17 On Sunday, April 6, 1862, the storm broke at Shiloh!

During the engagement, Lockett reconnoitered the enemy and aided in the arrangement of battle line. At the outbreak of hostilities, he was chief engineer of Bragg's Corps. However, early in the battle, Major J. F. Gilmer was wounded and Lockett was attached to the staff of General Johnson in the former's position as chief engineer of the army. When General Johnson fell mortally wounded, Lockett reported to General Beauregard. 18 Lockett served during the Shiloh battle on the staffs of the Chief of Staff, General Bragg, the


Commander in Chief, General Johnson, and the Second in Command and Commander in Chief, General Beauregard. He was, therefore, uniquely fitted to comment on events.

As Lockett so aptly observed, there were two conditions for Confederate success: surprise and time. The first of these two points was won, the second lost. Captain Lockett tells of scouting the Federal camps early on the morning of the sixth where he saw the sleepy camp sentinels, the indifferent camp cooks, and leisurely preparations for Sunday morning inspection. He reported that when "firing had begun on our left, and I could see that it caused some commotion in the camps, but it was evident that it was not understood."

Having illustrated by these examples that the Federal Army was surprised, Lockett avers that the time factor was of paramount importance because if Buell joined Grant with fresh troops all hopes for Confederate victory would be dispelled. Lockett discerned that the battle for time was lost in two stages: the disastrous affair at the "hornets' nest," culminating in the capture of General B. M. Prentiss, and the failure

to carry the battle to a successful conclusion on the sixth.

As a scout, Lockett observed the Confederate Army sweep the unorganized opposition from its path up to the "hornets' nest," a sunken road which formed a natural trench for the forces under General Prentiss. As a member of General Johnson's staff, until the General fell mortally wounded, Lockett witnessed the various contests for this position. In the following episode, Lockett describes his personal bravery in the final struggle for the "hornets' nest."

During one of the dreadful repulses of our forces General Bragg directed me to ride forward to the central regiment of a brigade of troops that was recoiling across an open field, to take its colors and carry them forward. "The flag must not go back again," he said. Obeying the order, I dashed through the line of battle, seized the colors from the color-bearer, and said to him, "General Bragg says these colors must not go to the rear." While I was talking to him the color-sergeant was shot down. A moment or two afterwards I was almost alone on horseback in an open field between the two lines of battle. An officer came up to me with a bullet-hole in each cheek, the blood streaming from his mouth, and asked, "What are you doing with my colors, sir?" "I am obeying
General Bragg's orders, sir, to hold them where they are," was my reply. "Let me have them," he said. "If any man but my color-bearer carries these colors, I am the man. Tell General Bragg I will see that these colors are in the right place. But he must attack this position in flank; we can never carry it alone from the front."

It was Colonel H. W. Allen, afterwards Governor Allen of Louisiana. I returned miraculously preserved, to General Bragg, and reported Colonel Allen's words.20

More important than this colorful incident was the time consumed in taking the "hornets' nest." After Lockett's report, General Bragg, deploying his troops in a flanking movement, attacked and captured General Prentiss. However, Lockett laments, "The time consumed in gathering Prentiss's command together, in taking their arms, in marching them to the rear, was inestimably valuable."21 And he adds that the Confederate forces fell the victim to a vast hoax of fate. Believing that the bulk of the Federal Army had been captured many men broke ranks to see the vanquished "Yanks," and precious time was consumed in reforming the battle line.


Lockett asserts that there might still have been time to push the battle to a successful conclusion on the sixth. The Federal Army had been pushed back into the narrow pocket formed at Pittsburg Landing, but already the first of General Buell's reinforcements were arriving to halt the Confederate advance. At this critical point, General Beauregard cautiously ordered the Confederate troops to withdraw. Lockett describes the fateful scene:

In our front only one single point was showing fight, a hill crowned with artillery. I was with General Bragg, and rode with him along the front of his corps. I heard him say over and over again, "One more charge, my men, and we will capture them all." While this was going on a staff-officer (or rather I think, it was one of the detailed clerks of General Beauregard's headquarters, for he wore no uniform) came up to General Bragg and said, "The General directs that the pursuit be stopped; the victory is sufficiently complete; it is needless to expose our men to the fire of the gun-boats." General Bragg said, "My god, was a victory ever sufficiently complete?" and added, "Have you given that order to any one else?" "Yes, sir," was the reply, "to General Polk on your left; and if you will look to the left, you will see that the order is being obeyed." General Bragg looked and said, "Captain, carry that order to the troops on the right"; and to
Captain Frank Parker, "You carry it to the left." In a short time the troops were all falling back—and the victory was lost.\textsuperscript{22}

When hostilities were renewed the next day, it was too late. General Buell's troops had arrived during the night and the Confederate line was forced to retreat slowly throughout the day. Lockett was occupied gathering, organizing, and commanding scattered Confederate troops in an improvised regiment that fought valiantly in the face of disheartening odds. That afternoon an order was given to retire, and by nightfall the army was in full retreat to Lockett's fortifications at Corinth. Fortunately for General Beauregard, General Grant failed to push his advantage, and the retreat was effected without incident.\textsuperscript{23}

At Corinth, Lockett pushed forward the preparation of a semi-oval line of light defensive works covering the northeast of the city. Meanwhile, the Northern Army, consisting of over 100,000 reenforced and re-organized troops under the command of General H. W. Halleck, entrenching every step, inched cautiously over

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 605-606.
the twenty miles between Pittsburg Landing and Corinth.\(^{24}\) General Halleck erected elaborate breastworks at Corinth, often hardly 1,000 yards in front of the Confederate position laid out about one-half mile from the town by Lockett. No frontal attack was made on the Confederate works.\(^{25}\) The ground occupied by General Halleck was to the north of Corinth on a ridge that could dominate the Confederate works if Federal troops were allowed to work themselves within shelling distance.\(^{26}\) This fact was undoubtedly perceived by Lockett; yet he prepared no counter works to prevent Halleck from approaching. The explanation was obvious: General William J. Hardee, author of a book on military tactics used by both North and South, showed faith in Lockett and his fortifications when he analysed the situation in a report to General Beauregard:

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25. Fiske, The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War, 136-137.

I think we can successfully repel any attack on our camp by the enemy, but it is manifest no attack is meditated. It will be approached gradually, and will be shelled and bombarded without equal means to reply.  

General Beauregard, fearful that the city would be surrounded and his rail communications broken, secretly determined to evacuate Corinth during the night of May 20 and retire southward over the Mobile and Ohio Railroad without testing the effectiveness of Lockett's fortifications. It was obvious that General Halleck did not contemplate a frontal attack and the Confederate position was too weak to withstand a siege.

Admitting the possibility of retreat from Corinth, Confederate leaders in the West had turned their attention to Vicksburg, located on a hairpin bend of the Mississippi on the first high ground below Memphis. General Bragg, after the evacuation of Pensacola, sent Colonel J. L. Autry with his regiment, the Twenty-Seventh Mississippi to Vicksburg to hold the river stronghold. On April 21, General Beauregard, as a


result of the battle of Shiloh, sent Captain D. B. Harris from Fort Pillow on the Mississippi to Vicksburg with orders to fortify this position so that it might be defended with a garrison of 3,000 men and forty guns. He was to collect a force of 1,000 negroes to carry out the construction work. 29 On April 25, General Mansfield Lovell, Commander of the Mississippi District, was forced to retreat from New Orleans. Realizing the strategic position of Vicksburg, he sent General Martin L. Smith to Vicksburg to assume command of the fortifications. General Lovell augmented General Smith's Vicksburg command by assigning five regiments to him from the retreating New Orleans troops. 30

Less than a month after the evacuation of Corinth, Lockett was transferred to the staff of General Smith at Vicksburg, and arrived at that city in the latter part of June, 1862. 31 Perched on bluffs two hundred feet above the river, Vicksburg was to become the center of


31. Ibid.
future Confederate operations in the West. Running east from the city, the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad joined Vicksburg with every important city in the South. Across the river, the Vicksburg and Shreveport Railroad connected Vicksburg with every significant city in the West. In the hands of the South, Vicksburg made the Confederacy a geographical unity. In the hands of the North, Vicksburg meant death by division. Jefferson Davis spoke of this city as "the Gibraltar of America," while Abraham Lincoln declared that the "war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket."  

Lockett found on his arrival that Captain Harris had already laid out and constructed emplacements for several batteries below the city with an excellent command of the river. Lockett, in addition to compiling an accurate map of the vicinity, continued to fortify Vicksburg. Guns were rushed to the city from Mobile, Richmond and Columbus. Lockett feverishly pushed forward the work of strengthening the batteries, mounting newly arrived guns, and building bomb-proof

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magazines. He constructed several new emplacements at the most dominant points above the city which were later called the "Upper Batteries." By the twenty-eight of June, the Confederate batteries mounted "29 guns of which 2 were 10-inch Columbiads, the rest being old style 42 and 32 pounders." The last of these guns were installed by Lockett under fire from Admiral Farragut's fleet.

Commanding three ships and seven gunboats armed with 106 guns, and sixteen mortar boats each carrying one 13-inch mortar, Admiral Farragut appeared below Vicksburg on June 26. These ships were able to run the batteries and bombard the city, but only at a terrific price. The fleet took a severe beating, the Brooklyn and Octorora being temporarily disabled. On July 1 the upper fleet, under the command of Flagg Officer C. H. Davis, joined Admiral Farragut in what Lockett called the "grand but nearly harmless sport of pitching big shells into Vicksburg." The bombardment ceased on


35. Ibid.
the twenty-seventh of July. Lockett wisely strengthened the river batteries wherever they had shown weakness. After this engagement, General Smith reported:

Of Captain Lockett, the accomplished engineer on my staff, I have to speak in terms of unqualified praise, both as regards skill in his profession and qualities as a soldier. The services of such an officer are so important and indispensable as to have all the efforts of a positive increase of force in determining the issue of a contest. I most cordially recommend him to notice.\(^{36}\)

Lockett's estimation of Vicksburg's impregnability to vertical fire from ships nearly 200 feet below was sustained by Admiral Farragut who reported that "the forts can be passed, and we have done it and can do it again as often as may be required of us"; but I am satisfied that it is not possible to take Vicksburg without an army of 12,000 to 15,000 men.\(^{37}\) Lockett, also, realized the vulnerability of Vicksburg to a land attack. Thereupon he began to plan, locate and lay out a line of defense in the rear of Vicksburg. So

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complicated and broken was the site that Lockett devoted a month to studying, surveying and reconnoitering the landscape. Apparently without system or order, the terrain, eroded by washing rains, was marred by deep ravines and a tangle of cane and underbrush. Rising above these were very tortuous, irregular hills, ridges, and bluffs covered with a dense forest whose sides were often a succession of eroded gullies. Lockett says of this project:

No greater typographical puzzle was ever presented to an engineer. The difficulty of the situation was greatly enhanced by the fact that a large part of the hills and hollows had never been cleared of their virgin forest of magnificent magnolia trees and dense undergrowth of cane. At first it seemed impossible to find anything like a general line commanding the ground surrounding the city, but careful study worked out the problem.38

Narrow eroded ridges towering above deep gullies completely dominated the landscape. Following these ridges in a continuous line around Vicksburg would have elongated the defensive works until only a tremendous army could have defended the city. It was equally

impossible to fortify every gully that eroded the sides of the ridges. Yet Lockett constructed a continuous line of defenses about three miles in the rear of the city which, following the crests of the ridges, arced from the river on the north to the river on the south. Six roads and one railroad ran into the city on the scattered ridges of high land. Overlooking these approaches, Lockett constructed forts in the form of redans, lunettes, salients and redoubts which were occupied by artillery batteries. The parapets of these works were up to twenty-five feet thick, and ten feet high, and they towered above seven foot ditches. Supporting the artillery batteries located at these strong points, Lockett ran a line of raised field works with parapets around ten feet thick and five feet high protected by rifle pits four feet deep. This line ingeniously commanded the gullies by running from the head of one to the head of another with an outer work, triangular in shape, thrown up to command the approaches to the gullies where advanced artillery batteries could direct a deadly crossfire toward an attacking force.


The forts were located every few hundred yards so that they not only commanded the approaches to the ridges but supported and protected one another. They were: Fort Hill, on the river to the north; Stockade Redan; Third Louisiana Redan; Great Redoubt; Second Texas Lunette; Railroad Redoubt; Fort Garrott or Square Fort; Salient Works; South Fort on the river to the south. 41

The outstanding feature of these forts, connected by lightly constructed field works and rifle pits, was their ability to protect a position while the army shifted the field artillery to any spot threatened by a storming party. 42 The rifle pits made any attempt to storm the works with ladders an extremely hazardous undertaking. An attacking party would have to climb a steep ridge, cross the deep ditches, and then scale the parapets to enter the fortifications. Lockett wisely ordered the trees and underbrush cleared from the front of the Confederate position and various obstacles placed in the path of the enemy, who would find it nearly


impossible to deploy a large force at any point because of the natural and artificial impediments in their path. Confederate troops behind the parapets and in the ditches could inflict heavy losses with relatively little danger.43 Not only were the light field works and strong detached points covered by artillery batteries conducive to greater freedom behind the line, but they enabled Lockett to compress the length of the defensive line into seven miles, despite meandering ridges and defiant gullies, and to limit the space enclosed to about two by four miles.44 General Sherman was so impressed with Lockett's engineering skill that he wrote his brother that Vicksburg would be "a hard nut to crack. It is the strongest place I ever saw, both by nature and art. . . ."45 At Vicksburg, Lockett utilized nature with consummate skill to design one of the most formidable forts in military history.  

43. Everhart, Vicksburg, 33, 36.  

44. John C. Pemberton, Pemberton, Defender of Vicksburg (Chapel Hill, 1942), 174-175. Hereinafter cited as Pemberton.  

As a rule Lockett located the defensive line on a dividing ridge that was as high or higher than any in the vicinity. It was necessarily irregular because of the formation of the ridges on which his works were placed. The one exception was the Great Redoubt which was located at a break in the ridges that surrounded Vicksburg. Here Lockett constructed a redoubt thirty yards square which closed at the gorge. This break was necessary to maintain a continuous line within a close proximity of the city which could be manned with the troops available. By locating his works on the dividing ridge, Lockett ensured their relative security from enemy artillery. 46

Pemberton in his biography of General John C. Pemberton says, "The fortifications anticipated, in some ways, modern trench systems - detached strong points connected by more lightly held fire trenches or rifle pits." 47 These devices made Vicksburg an intrenched camp rather than a fortified city. 48 Lockett's defensive line which was partly dependent on mobile

47. Pemberton, Pemberton, 174.
artillery positions was undoubtedly one of the supreme expressions of military engineering to come out of the Civil War.

Realizing that the strength of a position was measured not only by the impregnability of its front but also by the security of its flanks, Lockett designed fortifications at Haines' Bluff on the Yazoo River and at Warrenton, about six miles above Vicksburg on the Mississippi. These flanks were cunningly constructed at the extremities of the series of bluffs that touch the Mississippi at Vicksburg. Augmented by innumerable bayous, dense swamps and boggy open ground, studded with heavy guns commanding the approaches to the area, these flank positions made a land approach to Vicksburg practically impossible. A force attempting to land between Vicksburg and either of its flanks would be caught between the two garrisons as Lockett left no immediate land approaches from the river to the bluffs surrounding Vicksburg unfortified.

Lockett tramped the hills around Vicksburg laying out and constructing an impregnable line of defense,

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49. Lockett, "The Defense of Vicksburg," in Battles and Leaders, III, 484.
aided almost entirely by negro slaves. Meanwhile, the strategic value of the river bastion increased daily. An unsuccessful Confederate attack at Baton Rouge on July 30, 1862, culminated in the occupation of Port Hudson, Louisiana, ensuring control of the great Red River, gateway to the southwestern breadbasket of the Confederacy, as long as both Vicksburg and Port Hudson remained in the control of the Grey. Following this coup, the Confederates unsuccessfully attacked Corinth, where the Federals ironically used Lockett's works as an outer line of intrenchments. After the repulse, the Union forces resumed their offensive against Vicksburg.

The Confederate reverses at Corinth resulted in the appointment of General John C. Pemberton, an excellent engineer, as commander of the Department of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana in October, 1862. Observing Lockett's excellent defense strategy and his ingenious engineering skill at Vicksburg, Pemberton made him his chief engineer responsible for the defense of all

approaches to the Confederate strong points on the Mississippi. Pemberton wrote:

The plan for Vicksburg's fortification submitted to me immediately after I assumed command of the Department of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana, in the latter part of October, 1862; was approved, and ordered to be carried out with the utmost dispatch. Similar instructions were about the same time given for fortifying the strong position at Snyder's Mill, and the land defenses of Port Hudson were also ordered to be commenced at once.52

As chief engineer of the department, Lockett moved his headquarters to Jackson where he was in a strategic position to plan the defenses of the Mississippi, and where, in an emergency, he could rush either to Vicksburg on the Mississippi or to the Yazoo River and its tributaries, a great natural highway which emptied into the Mississippi a few miles below Vicksburg. In January, 1863, Lockett was promoted to the rank of Major.53

Natural obstacles and the alertness of the Confederate engineers under Lockett's direction doomed Union attempts to turn the flanks of Vicksburg on either the Mississippi or the Yazoo Rivers from the beginning. While chief engineer at Vicksburg, Lockett had fortified the immediate approaches to Vicksburg at Haines' Bluff on the Yazoo to the north and at Warrenton, flanking Vicksburg on the south, and had planned slight works to protect the intervening ridges. About the time of Lockett's appointment as chief engineer for the defense of the Mississippi, Grant launched a series of attacks along the Yazoo aimed at turning this flank and descending the river to Vicksburg. First, Grant's approach from Holly Springs toward Grenada was halted when his source of supplies was cut by the cavalry raids of Van Dorn and Forrest. Van Dorn praised the work of Lockett at Grenada in conjunction with his cavalry force. Second, Sherman attempted to attack at Chickasaw Bluffs where slight works erected at Lockett's direction prevented Union forces from reaching the firm footing offered by the bluffs between Vicksburg and Haines' Bluff. A small force from Vicksburg was able to rebuff

Sherman's attack. Afterwards, a sudden rise in the Mississippi River flooded Union works on a canal opposite Vicksburg on the peninsula formed by the horseshoe bend of the river, causing all work to cease. Even if successful, Grant admitted that the "enemy have established a battery of heavy guns opposite the mouth of the canal, completely commanding it for one-half its length."55 Furthermore, he adds that "Warrenton, a few miles below, was capable of as strong defense as Vicksburg."56 Natural difficulties also defeated the Lake Providence expedition. Finally, Grant attempted to pass through the Yazoo Pass but a hastily constructed cotton bale fort, erected at the point where the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha merged to form the Yazoo, stopped his advance. Lockett ordered a fort constructed here as the twists of the river formed an island, making an ideal redoubt. Hardly above water level, the fortifications offered no land approach. General W. W. Loring (who in 1876 as second in command of Egyptian forces in Abyssinia was destined to use one

56. Greene, The Mississippi, 93.
of Lockett's forts) foiled Union efforts to take this fort with only 1,500 men and three guns.57

Fortifying the approaches to Vicksburg along the Yazoo River did not ensure the bluffs between Vicksburg and Port Hudson against an invading army. Studying the typographical features of this area, Lockett perceived that the river eleven miles below Vicksburg swung away from the bluffs and meandered through bayous and swamps to the series of bluffs at Grand Gulf. Immediately below Grand Gulf, he observed the river again winding away from the bluffs through a boggy morass for a distance varying from fifty to one hundred miles, not touching them again until Port Hudson. It became obvious that an army could not invade by crossing the river below Vicksburg unless either Port Hudson or Grand Gulf provided firm footing on the eastern bank of the river for disembarkation.

Lockett immediately planned fortifications for these two points. At Port Hudson he laid out a continuous line of works with each flank touching the river. Twenty siege guns were placed on the eighty foot bluffs facing

the river and thirty pieces of field artillery protected the rear. The entire line was only three or four miles in length. The parapets of its works, averaging twenty feet in width, towered above ditches nearly fifteen feet in depth. At Grand Gulf, where the Big Black River flows into the Mississippi, the principal bastion was Bald Head, strategically perched above an eroded perpendicular wall eighty feet high. This promontory at the bend of the Mississippi revealed the river for miles, and with a line of smaller batteries on each flank, thoroughly commanded the river below. Behind the river gun positions, hills rose to three hundred and fifty feet and were defended with field works that covered the flanks of the batteries.

When efforts to turn the fortified flanks of Vicksburg constructed on the Yazoo by Lockett were proven practically suicidal, General Grant desperately attempted running the batteries at Vicksburg with transports, protected by cotton bales, supported by iron-clads, while marching the army down the west bank of the Mississippi where it could be ferried across the


river in the vicinity of Grand Gulf. Then by marching east to west, he could attack Vicksburg from the rear where fortifications might be less formidable. As soon as it became evident that Grant threatened the Confederate position at Grand Gulf, Lockett rushed to this point to examine the works. On the night of the twenty-ninth of April, the batteries at Vicksburg were successfully passed. The campaign still depended on silencing the gun fortifications carefully placed at Grand Gulf by Lockett. The guns at Grand Gulf repulsed the Union force. But Grant accidentally discovered that receding waters at Bruinsburg had exposed a land bridge over which he might pass his force of only 33,000 men.

After gaining a foothold on the bluffs on the east bank of the Mississippi, Grant marched through Port Gibson and Grand Gulf, which were abandoned to Grant's vastly superior land force, and moved rapidly against the works hastily contrived by Lockett at Jackson, now


headquarters of General Johnston and depot for reinforcements and supplies being rushed to Vicksburg. Outnumbered by General Grant, General Johnston chose to abandon Jackson and moved northward on the Canton Road. 63

Lockett had returned to Jackson on April 30, 1863, where he received orders to ready the defenses of that city and then report to General Pemberton at Vicksburg. Lockett writes that he reported on May 2, and that it soon became evident that he must take "immediate steps ... to meet him /Grant/ on all available approaches to the city of Vicksburg. The several ferries across the Big Black River and the railroad bridge became points of great strategic interest." 65 As early as February 10, 1863, Lockett had surveyed this river and reported:

At Baldwin's Ferry there is a bluff on the east bank some 15 feet above the high-water mark, and a mound on this bluff 12 or


64. Lockett, "The Defense of Vicksburg," in Battles and Leaders, III, 486.

15 feet higher, ... Below the ferry the river is straight for 600 or 700 yards. Above the ferry, and less than 200 yards from the mound, there is a very sudden bend, difficult of passage even for small boats. These advantages, together with the easy accessibility of this point from Edward's Depot, decided me in selecting it for the location of a couple of batteries and some rifle-pits. ... 66

Lockett went to the railroad bridge and Edward's Depot to erect works to maintain this important line of communications. He detached an engineer officer to Baldwin's, Hall's, and Hankinson's Ferries to fortify against Grant's utilization of these crossings. However, the Confederates hampered by lack of cavalry, failed to reach Hankinson's Ferry and fortify the eastern bank of the river before Sherman's troops captured the crossing. 67

Lockett returned to Vicksburg temporarily in order to plan the necessary repairs on the rear line of defenses, but on May 12, he journeyed again to Edward's Depot where he placed Confederate troops in the works so that they covered all approaches from the south and

66. Ibid., Pt. 3, p. 621.

67. Ibid., Pt. 2, p. 69.
east to that point. Lockett describes this position as "naturally a strong one, on high ground, with the cultivated valley of Baker's Creek in its front." Pemberton selected this point to fortify and hold against the Federal approach. As chief engineer, Lockett saw the numerous dispatches from President Davis and from General Johnston proposing different methods of defeating the Northern Army. Uniquely he was in a position to observe the weakness of General Pemberton's attempt to reconcile the contradictory orders from President Davis (urging him to hold Vicksburg and Port Hudson at all costs) and General Johnston (urging him to abandon Vicksburg and concentrate all Confederate forces elsewhere before coming to grips with General Grant) with his own wish to fortify and hold the position at Edward's Depot. Lockett analyzed the situation thusly:

Here General Pemberton wished to wait to be attacked by Grant. There can be no doubt that if he had been allowed to do so a desperate and bloody battle would have been fought on that ground, the issue of which might have been different.

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from that of the two unfortunate engagements which did actually occur.69

At Edward's Depot, General Pemberton received a dispatch from General Johnston requesting him to attack the enemy's rear at Clinton. Unknown to General Pemberton, General Johnston was already in the process of evacuating Jackson. Believing the proposed attack at Clinton impossible with his present troops if Vicksburg was to be secure, General Pemberton called a staff council where it was determined to aid General Johnston by moving on the fifteenth to Dillion's on the Raymond road and cutting the communication line of the enemies loosely guarded rear. The march was delayed because General Pemberton wanted to order supplies from Vicksburg, while the engineer corps, commanded by Lockett, constructed a bridge across the unusually high waters of Baker's Creek.70 On the fifteenth, General Pemberton's Army crossed the creek and bivouacked on the fork connecting the two Raymond Roads. The next morning after


the march was resumed General Pemberton learned that General Johnston had retreated from Jackson. Realizing his dangerous position and his now futile mission, General Pemberton ordered the army to return to Edward's Depot. This order came too late. Union troops informed of General Pemberton's movement, overtook the Confederate forces in the vicinity of Champion's Hill, a naturally strong position commanding the surrounding terrain, where the Confederates chose to fight.71

Fighting gallantly, General Bowen's and General Stephenson's divisions made a determined stand almost turning the left flank of the enemy. But at the critical moment, reinforcements ordered from General Loring's division on the right flank failed to appear. Investigation revealed that General Loring had retreated southward. Apparently he feared the Confederate forces had lost the battle and determined to extract his division before the whole army fell into the hands of the enemy. Years later Lockett was to observe with irony a similar situation when General Loring bitterly assailed an Egyptian general who failed to enter battle for similar

reasons. After General Loring's retreat, the remaining Confederate troops were forced to stream across Baker's Creek on the bridge earlier constructed by Lockett and across the now passable ford.

The retreat was halted to await General Loring at Big Black River near the railroad bridge previously fortified by Lockett as part of the strongly defensible area along the river against invasion from the rear. North of the bridge a bayou ran from the Big Black in an irregular line east, and then south to a cypress brake. This bayou, ordinarily above the river, now contained nearly two feet of water because of the heavy rains. Following the bayou, Lockett had constructed a line of pits which ran for nearly a mile north and south. For their defense, the Confederates had approximately twenty pieces of artillery. To increase the difficulty of attacking this position, Lockett had ordered a maze of timber felled in the bayou. On the

72. Samuel H. Lockett, Private Notes, a manuscript article in Lockett Papers.

73. General Loring, unable to reach General Pemberton, withdrew his troops through Federal lines to join General Johnston at Canton.
inner bank of the bayou, the engineer corps had constructed a parapet from cotton bales acquired from the surrounding plantations. To the west, the river made a sharp curve and formed a height where Lockett placed separate Confederate works commanding the entire battle field. The area to the front of the Confederate fortifications was primarily in cultivated fields where scant cover existed excepting a strip of uncleared land at the upper end of the bayou. Apparently it was foolhardy to attack this strongly fortified position, but the Southern troops were unsteady. In their rear was perfectly open ground and the supporting force on the opposite bank of the river was inadequate. The absence of General Loring's Division left two recently defeated divisions to defend a position fortified for three against nearly double their number.74

Early the next morning the battle was renewed. The badly shaken Confederate troops slowly yielded ground until they cascaded into a pell-mell retreat. Lockett, observing the battle from the railroad bridge, reported signs of unsteadiness in the men and was

74. Greene, The Mississippi, 163-164.
ordered to prepare to destroy the bridge if the army failed to repulse the Union attack. The steamer, Dot, which had been swung across the river earlier as a temporary bridge to facilitate communications with Vicksburg by Lockett's direction, was also readied for destruction. In the following sketch, Lockett describes the action as he obeyed General Pemberton's order:

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... soon the whole force was crossing the river by the bridges and by swimming, hotly pursued by the Federals. I was on the Dot at the time. Waiting until all the Confederates in sight were across the river I touched a match to the barrel of turpentine, and with the aid of one of my lieutenants tipped it over. In a moment the boat was in a blaze. The railroad bridge was likewise fired, and all immediate danger of pursuit prevented.75
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A biographer of General Pemberton reported:

Meanwhile the destruction of the crossings of the Big Black (the quick work of the Confederate engineers under Lockett in setting fire to barrels of turpentine alongside) had gained time for the others against their pursuers.

This happy delay gave Pemberton needed opportunity to properly place his men in their freshly fortified lines. 76

A contemporary historian wrote:

The bridge and steamer were then burned under the direction of Major Lockett, and Federal pursuit was checked. 77

Following the stampede at Big Black Bridge, Vicksburg might have been evacuated as General Johnston advised but for the counsel of Lockett. General Pemberton placed General Stevenson in command of the retreating army and road on about two and a half miles to a small railroad station at Bovina. Lockett was the only staff officer who accompanied him during his depressed journey. He quoted General Pemberton as exclaiming that his career was "ended in disaster and disgrace." Having fortified Vicksburg, Lockett thoroughly understood its impregnability to frontal attack. He advised General Pemberton to hold Vicksburg, and begged for the opportunity to organize the dismayed troops to meet the

76. Pemberton, Pemberton, 176.

attack before the few days grace, which his timely action at Big Black gave the Confederates, passed. His reasons for giving this advice are recorded in the following analysis:

I strove to encourage him, urging that things were not so bad as they seemed to be; that we still had two excellent divisions (Smith's and Forney's) which had not been engaged and were, therefore, fresh and not demoralized; that they could occupy our lines at Vicksburg, covering especially the approaches from the position now occupied by the Federal forces, which they would naturally follow; that the rest of the troops could be put, at first, in the less exposed parts of the line, or in reserve until they had steadied themselves; that Vicksburg was strong and could not be carried by assault; and that Mr. Davis had telegraphed him "to hold Vicksburg at all hazard," adding that "if besieged he would be relieved."78

Skeptical of the results General Pemberton did write an order which "directed all officers, of whatsoever rank, to obey all requisitions of the chief engineer for men, materials, and labor, and to render all possible aid in carrying out his plans." Before nightfall Lockett was back in Vicksburg where he not only

supervised the construction and repairs on the main works and the river batteries, but organized the troops for a determined defense of the river bastion. It was necessary to build new platforms and embrasures for Parrot guns and siege pieces transferred from the river to the rear line and for field artillery possessed by the retreating troops. He readied 102 guns for the defense of the rear lines. And he arranged the disposition of the troops thusly: General C. L. Stephenson's division was extended from the Warrenton road on the extreme right to the railroad; General John H. Forney's division covered the center from the railroad to the Graveyard road; General M. L. Smith's division spanned the space from the Graveyard road to the river; and Generals John S. Bowen's and T. N. Waul's troops were held in reserve. Lockett's plan placed Stephenson's and Forney's excellent divisions, which were in Vicksburg during the demoralizing retreat, in command of the approaches to the city.79

The defense of Vicksburg was readied by Lockett under severe hardships. Lockett had a working force of only "26 sappers and miners of Captain Wintter's company;

79. Ibid., 488 ff.
8 detailed mechanics and firemen, 4 overseers for negroes, 72 hired negroes (20 were sick); 3 four-mule teams, and 25 yoke of oxen. In addition to this inadequate working force, he was handicapped by a serious lack of materials. Lockett describes the intense rivalry for tools:

> About five hundred picks and shovels is perhaps a near estimate of the number of entrenching tools. They were distributed to the different brigades according to the amount of work required, and being much scattered along our lines were considered so precious by both men and officers that when not in actual use they were hidden for fear that they would be stolen by other troops, or ordered to some other part of the line by the chief engineer. They were entirely inadequate for the work, and the men soon improvised wooden shovels, using their bayonets as picks.

No commentary on the effectiveness of these hasty entrenchments would be as explanatory as events themselves. Twice, on May the nineteenth and twentieth, the Federal troops launched frontal attacks, and were repulsed by the Lockett-constructed and organized Confederate lines. The second attack was made in conjunction

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80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
with the river fleet which bombarded the city. Both attacks were repulsed with huge Union losses. A Federal participant laments: "Afterward, when Vicksburg was ours, I walked time and again over the very ground where we had so desperately fought, and looked at the forts which we had sought to storm, reflecting on the extreme madness of the undertaking." In despair of ever conquering Vicksburg by frontal attack, Union troops surrounded the city for a long siege. During the twenty-first and twenty-second, the Federals placed their lines at an average distance of about eight hundred yards from Lockett's outer defense works. During this same period the Confederate engineers erected traverses against enfilade fires and began covered approaches from the city to the rear line as a precautionary measure against Federal sharpshooters.

Throughout the siege Lockett directed the erection of the traverses, prepared various obstacles, such as entanglements of pickets and telegraph wires, abatis,

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ditches and palisades; shifted guns to the most destructive points; planned the defense against the activities of the Federal sap rollers and counter miners; constructed retrenchments or innerlines at all points where a Federal breach threatened; and repaired damages to the lines. Pemberton's chief of staff wrote that "works which under the ceaseless and concentrated fire of hundreds of guns were demolished, reappeared in improved forms which could be suggested only by consummate ingenuity."  

As a result of Lockett's activities the Union engineers were able to explode mines only twice during the siege. On the twenty-fifth of June, the vertex was torn off one of the Confederates most salient redans. However, when the Federals rushed into the breach, they were met by a deadly volley from the retrenchments which Lockett had wisely ordered. When the second mine was exploded on the first of July, making a breach of nearly twenty feet at the third Louisiana redan, no assault was

84. Pemberton, Pemberton, 174.
attempted. Nevertheless, before the gap was plugged over a hundred men were killed. Lockett ingeniously hit upon the device of rolling masses of dirt into tent flies and wagon covers and pushing these into the breach.

Federal sappers slowly penetrated the Confederate defenses. Lockett admits that "by the first of July they had gradually closed up to our lines so that some portions, for a hundred yards or more, the thickness of our parapet was all that separated us." General Grant wrote that by the "1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a number of places. At ten points we could move under cover to within five to 100 yards of the enemy." It became evident that the defenses of Vicksburg were slowly crumbling away. Yet when all hostilities ceased, under a flag of truce on the second of July, Federal troops had not been able to break the Confederate line. Furthermore Lockett, observing the


87. Ibid., 492.

88. Grant, "The Vicksburg Campaign," in Battles and Leaders, III, 529.
Union position, had ready for explosion eleven mines "containing from 100 to 125 pounds of powder, and extending at a depth of 6 to 9 feet for a distance of from 18 to 20 feet in front of our works." 89

Partly responsible for the slow but steady approach of the Federals to the Confederate line was a serious lack of ammunition. Ironically, one reputable historian has been led to believe that "the confidence felt by Pemberton's gunners in holding and calling their shots must be explained by the careful planning and construction of the Rebel forts." 90 Yet, as early as May 21, General Pemberton ordered that "ammunition should be hoarded with the most zealous care." 91 And on May 24, the General was urging his troops to "have the cartridge boxes of the enemy's dead emptied of their contents, it being important to add in any way to our limited supply of ammunition. . . ." 92 Before the end

91. Pemberton, Pemberton, 185.
92. Ibid., 194.
of siege it was necessary for the Confederates to silently endure shelling for several hours. As the distance between the two lines decreased the importance of hand grenades increased. Lockett observed that "the Federals had the hand grenades and we had none, we obtained our supply by using such of theirs as failed to explode, or by catching them as they came over the parapet and hurling them back." 93

Equally important as the shortage of ammunition was the shortage of manpower in the lines. Lockett reported that the men were so physically exhausted that their officers listed them as "unfit for any duty but simply standing in the trenches and firing." 94 In contrast the Union Army was continually receiving material and men. Before the surrender an army of over 100,000 men camped outside the city. 95

Lockett's bravery during the defense of Vicksburg was attested by the comment of a Federal sharpshooter

94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
who, after the surrender, exclaimed to him: "See here, Mister, - you man on the little white horse! Danged if you ain't the hardest feller to hit I ever saw; I've shot at you more'n a hundred times!" Valiantly, Lockett continuously checked the breastworks throughout the siege exposing himself to constant danger.

The battle for Port Hudson was overshadowed by the dramatic show at Vicksburg. Port Hudson, the only other Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi, was attacked on May 14 by a force of 14,000 men who surrounded the Confederate garrison of only 7,000. Despite overwhelming numbers, Federal troops were forced to commence siege operations that lasted until the seventh of July when news of the surrender of Vicksburg made further resistance futile. At this strategic point, fortified under the direction of Lockett, the military genius of the designer was again demonstrated.

Lockett was exchanged about one month after the surrender of Vicksburg. He reported to the staff of


General Joseph E. Johnson as his chief engineer with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Showing unusual skill and engineering talent, Lockett played a prominent role in the battles that ensued between General Grant and the Confederates for the control of Mississippi and Louisiana. In rapid succession, he served on the staffs of General Leonidas Polk, General S. D. Lee, and General Richard Taylor as chief engineer. While serving under Taylor, Lockett was given command of the Third Regiment of the Confederate Engineer Corps and made chief engineer for the Department of Mississippi, Alabama and East Louisiana. He was given the rank of Colonel in August of 1864. Lockett served in this capacity until the end of the Civil War when he returned to Marion, Alabama, and accepted a teaching assignment at Judson Female Institute. 98

Young Lockett developed into a first class army engineer under the stress of the Civil War. During the campaign he had been promoted from chief engineer for the defenses of Mobile to the chief engineer for the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and Eastern Louisiana. Not only was he instrumental in holding

Mobile, a center for blockade runners, but he had de-
defended Corinth and Vicksburg, centers of Confederate
strength in the West, against combined land and river
attacks. Working steadily despite an ever changing line
of second-rate commanding officers, he constructed forts
that defied the best military talent of the North. At
Vicksburg Lockett was fortunate in having a commander
who was known as an excellent engineer. The defense of
this city rested upon extensive fortifications of all
land approaches to the Vicksburg center. Lockett was
given a unique opportunity to exhibit his engineering
cunning. Eliot, a prominent New York surgeon and
historian, considered Lockett one of the three most im-
portant engineers possessed by the Confederacy.99 A
more careful study of Lockett's impenetrable forts,
which delayed the Union Army under its foremost general
for more than a year leads this writer to the conclusion
that Lockett was not only the foremost military engineer
in the Confederacy but one of the most important military
figures stationed in the great Mississippi Valley.

Recognition of Lockett's key role in the defense of
the Mississippi Valley has been relatively unnoticed.

The defense of Vicksburg in the final analysis was not a test of military strategy but of engineering skill. As chief of the engineer corps, Lockett designed a system of defenses that only the fateful receding waters at Bruinsburg and the divided command of the Confederates made penetrable. In addition to his services as an engineer, Lockett influenced the organization of troops. A biographer of Pemberton claims that "in the quartermaster, comissary, engineer and ordnance corps confusion reigned without distinction" when General Pemberton assumed command in October, 1862. "No semblance of system prevailed; the entire Department was in distressing chaos."¹⁰⁰ Not only was Lockett's organization of the engineering department during the Vicksburg campaign proven effective, but he was responsible for the organization of troops for the final defense of the city. It was his construction of the defenses of Vicksburg and his conception of the proper organization of the defending garrison that held back Federal troops from the river bastion for a month and a half after Grant secured firm footing on the eastern bank of the river.

¹⁰⁰. Pemberton, Pemberton, 60.
Not only was Lockett an able engineer, he was an acute military observer. His eyewitness account of the surprise of the Union forces and the critical importance of the time factor at Shiloh are widely quoted. His comments on the self destruction of the Confederates at Vicksburg as a result of divided command between Generals Pemberton and Johnson and President Davis are considered most acute. However, his supreme accomplishment, the fortifications at Vicksburg and its environs and the organization of troops in the critical hours before the arrival of Union troops, while applauded by military experts who use his breastworks as models, merits more attention in the histories of the period. When the Federal Government erected a park on the famous grounds at Vicksburg to the combatants of both armies, Lockett was given recognition for his key position by a plaque bearing his image and the following simple words:

Samuel H. Lockett
Major C. S. Engineers
Chief Engineer Army of Vicksburg
March 29----------July 4, 1863
CHAPTER II

HEAD OF THE THIRD SECTION

Excluded from the United States Army because of his allegiance to his State during the Civil War, Lockett returned to Marion where he found the South in the grip of economic depression. A people plagued with the problem of survival did not require the services of an engineer. Upon graduation in 1859, he had taught Spanish at West Point but after one year he resigned his professorship to undertake more active duty in the engineering corps. It was logical, following the Civil War, that he should return to the teaching profession when the doors of the military world were closed to him. He became a professor of mathematics and natural science at Judson Female Institute in Marion.¹

In January 1867, an opportunity to teach mechanics and engineering lured him to Alexandria where the Louisiana State Seminary of Learning (Louisiana State

¹. Eliot, West Point in the Confederacy, 22-23.
University) was then located. In addition to his teaching duties, Lockett acted as commandant of cadets from 1869 to 1871. He drew the first typographical map of the State of Louisiana as part of a State Typographical and Geographical Survey. He, also, painted several pictures for the University, including one of his Civil War adversary, General William T. Sherman, who was the first Superintendent of the University, and one of General Graham, who was the first President of the University Board.²

As a teacher Lockett was known as a strict disciplinarian but a man tempered by kindness, friendship, affection, and a genial disposition. Major Frank M. Kerr, one of his prominent pupils, while serving on the Louisiana Board of Engineers in 1911 wrote:

His discipline was exceedingly strict, yet he had a way of correcting that, even while he reprimanded, made a friend of a boy for life. I can remember him, with that old cane of his, which he always carried, and used to gesticulate with, to emphasize his remarks and to demonstrate with on the blackboard. We were all devoted to him, and the boys loved to go to his home.³

³. Ibid.
At this time, Louisiana was struggling under the burden of the radical carpet-bag rule. Money was extremely hard to acquire and university professors were generally unpaid. Lockett, having a wife and five children, was forced to resign. In 1873 he returned to his native state to teach in small academies.4

Lockett served as President of Calhoun College in Jacksonville, Alabama during the year 1873-74. The following year, on October 1, he became Principal of his own school, Hammer Hall in Montgomery, Alabama. While here, he came in contact with an old classmate from West Point, Colonel William E. Merrill, who wrote that General Sherman wanted an engineering expert for the Egyptian Khedive's army and he had specifically asked for Lockett.5


5. Samuel H. Lockett, How We Happened to Go to Egypt, a manuscript article in Lockett Papers. Apparently no official documents exist showing the reasons for this American-Egyptian co-operation. Egypt was not a recognized independent state and had no diplomatic representative abroad. Much evidence exists of friendly co-operation between Sherman and the Khedive from 1869 when Sherman visited Egypt. A notation in the uncatalogued file of the Archives Abdin show that Sherman at one time received 125 pounds from the Khedive. When Sherman's daughter married, the Khedive sent a gift of jewels so expensive that Sherman was forced to ask Ismail to pay the custom duties. See Frederick J. Cox, "The American Naval Mission in Egypt," in The Journal of Modern History (Chicago, 1929- ), XXVI (June, 1954), 164 ff.
General Sherman was then Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army. It is not surprising that he thought of Lockett when asked by Khedive Ismail for recommendations for his staff. General Sherman, camping outside Vicksburg for nearly two months had reason to respect the engineering genius of Lockett. In a brief truce on the twenty-fifth of May, 1863, General Sherman first met Lockett and complimented him on his defense of the city in the following words:

"You have an admirable position for defense here, and you have taken excellent advantage of the ground." "Yes, General," I replied, "but it is equally as well adapted to offensive operations and your engineers have not been slow to discover it." To this General Sherman assented...6

Not only was General Sherman cognizant of Lockett's ability as a military engineer but he was aware of his fame as an educator as well as his contributions to the typographical and geological information on Louisiana. In 1868 shortly before his tour of the Mediterranean and his historic meeting with Khedive Ismail, General

Sherman revisited the Louisiana Seminary of Learning where he served as the first Superintendent. There he "found [his] own portrait, in full uniform, in the main hall, and in the library many books on our Union side of the war." The portrait was Lockett's. In the artist, General Sherman recognized a combination of talents highly prized by the Egyptian Khedive: a consummate military engineer and draughtsman; an experienced topographical and geographical surveyor; and a skilled educator, which all made for an excellent staff officer.

Following Colonel Merrill's letter, an extended correspondence began between Lockett, S. L. Merchant, the Egyptian agent in New York, General Sherman, and Colonel O. M. Poe, director of the Engineering Bureau of the United States Army. At first, Lockett rejected the overtures of the Khedive because he felt that the proffered rank of Major would not allow him to support his family, nor did he feel that the rank was commensurate with his brilliant Civil War record. To his


8. Lockett, How We Happened to go to Egypt, in Lockett Papers; Samuel H. Lockett, Engineering in the Egyptian Service, a manuscript article in Lockett Papers.
surprise, Lockett received a letter from Colonel Poe in January, 1875, stating that General Charles P. Stone, Chief-of-Staff of the Egyptian Army, had cabled General Sherman to "Accept Lockett Colonel of Engineers." At that time in the midst of his school term at Hamner Hall, Lockett agreed to accept the new offer on condition that he be allowed to complete his year at the Montgomery school; his acceptance to become effective July 1, 1875.9

Plagued by financial ruin following the Civil War, Lockett yielded to the call of his chosen profession mainly for mercenary reasons. An American Military Mission, recruited by General Sherman and under the direction of an ex-Union general, Charles P. Stone, had come to Egypt in 1870 and was engaged in revamping the Khedivial army. Lockett was to become a member of the American Mission as head of the Third Section or geographical division of the General Staff.

Unwilling to be separated from his family, Lockett borrowed a thousand dollars so that his wife and five children might accompany him. The Locketts sailed from

9. Lockett, How We Happened to go to Egypt, in Lockett Papers.
New York for Liverpool, England on the steamer Spain on July 17, 1875. Lockett carried over a dozen supplications to the Khedive from Americans asking for positions in the Egyptian Army. Sailing on the same ship were Colonel and Mrs. William McE. Dye and their three children, Colonel and Mrs. C. W. Field and their two children, Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Derrick, and Major Charles F. Loshe. All excepting Colonel Dye, who had returned to the United States from Egypt for his family, were new recruitments in the Egyptian Army.  

From Liverpool, the group proceeded through France and Italy, and, excepting Colonels Field and Dye, who wished to settle their families in Europe for the summer, embarked on the steamship Africa at Naples for Alexandria. On August 13, 1875, they arrived in Alexandria. The following day, they completed their journey to Cairo, arriving at the capitol of the Khedive.

The customary term of Egyptian service was five years. However due to a misunderstanding between the

10. Henry C. Derrick to his wife, July 12, 15, 17, 1875. The Derrick Letters are in private possession.

11. Derrick to Derrick, August 3, 13, 1875, in Derrick Letters.
Khedive and his New York agent, Merchant, all of the new arrivals excepting Lockett had signed contracts for only three years of Egyptian service before leaving New York. They were allowed to reaffirm these contracts. Lockett, contacted earlier than the other new arrivals, had originally agreed to the customary five years, and his new contract stipulated the same amount of time. ¹²

Soon after his arrival in Cairo, Lockett was formally introduced to H. H. Khedive Ismail Pasha. Not over five feet tall and stoutly built, the Khedive was far from regal in appearance. His most outstanding features were penetrating black eyes, watching visitors beneath half closed eyelids, and a large brown mustache. Despite his outward appearance, he was responsible for widespread reforms in Egypt that affected every phase of Egyptian life. Lockett regarded him as a "right royal and courteous master. . . who showed kindness to the foreigners in his service." ¹⁴ Ismail brought the

¹². Derrick to Derrick, August 29, 1875, in Derrick Letters.


¹⁴. Samuel H. Lockett, Egypt, Her Ancient and Modern Wonders, a manuscript article in Lockett Papers.
American Military Mission to Egypt to modernize his army. To understand the position of Lockett as head of the Third Section of the General Staff, a brief resume of its origin and organization might be helpful.

Ismail had come to the Egyptian throne as representative of the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Aziz, in 1863, determined to ultimately free himself from Turkish sovereignty. The ex-Union and Confederate veterans were to be his instruments of freedom, and Ismail's address to his Chamber of Delegates in 1869 clearly revealed that he was embarking on an ambitious military program on both land and sea.

When I came to power the army did not possess an effective strength of 3,000 men, and the navy was scarcely 600 strong, the whole fleet consisting of only three or four ships. The troops were completely disorganized, and the arsenals, in the case of need would not have been able to equip more than 15,000 or 20,000 men. Since mon avenement our material has been quite reformed and renewed, and a large proportion of muskets of a new model has been ordered. The fulfillment of this order is under the eye of a high

functionary of the War Department. Workshops for the manufacture of military stores have been set up, ships of war, such as frigates, ironclad corvettes, and sailing vessels to the number of 22, have been built or brought a notable disposition in the Red Sea or Mediterranean. Now, thank God! our army and our navy are on a regular and respectable footing, and we are fully prepared to provide the safety of the country.\(^1\)

Almost immediately he aroused the wrath of a jealous Turkish master and of the mutually interested French and English, who were striving for political dominance of this strategic area, made more important by the opening of the Suez Canal in November, 1869. To sabotage the Egyptian independence movement, the Sultan demanded immediate delivery of 200,000 breechloaders, purchased by Ismail, and some ironclads, then in Toulon harbor but intended for Egypt. Not yet ready to defy his Sultan and because of British and French pressures, Ismail complied.\(^2\) The British also criticized the Khedive for his lack of reliance on the influence of the Great Powers, especially England and

\(^{1\text{The London Times, January 28, 1870, p. 10.}}\)
\(^{2\text{Ibid., January 1, 1870, p. 10.}}\)
France, as they could not allow the quarrel between the Sultan and the Khedive to jeopardize the peace of the East. 18 The French also attacked both the American mission and Ismail's desire for freedom and Ferdinand de Lesseps, builder of the Suez Canal, issued the following memorandum on May 10, 1870:

.. .the Government of the Emperor had received information that the Khedive had made a treaty with the United States by which His Highness had engaged about fifty American officers, ordered men-of-war and war material and torpedoes, and had decided to raise the standard of revolt against the Sultan. .. . France, notwithstanding her friendship for the Khedive and for Egypt, cannot support this policy, and will be compelled to side with England and with the rest of Europe. In the event of trouble America will be far away, and it is not Egypt or the Canal that will suffer, - but the Khedive.19

The furor aroused by the Khedive's speech lapsed when "friendly explanations," between the Sultan and the Khedive, limited the Egyptian Army to 15,000 troops.20

18. Ibid., January 28, 1870, p. 10.
The Turko-Egyptian crisis of 1870 exemplified the Khedive's touchy relations with Abdul Aziz who was backed by the French and English. This was to effect the lives of approximately fifty American military experts. The French Military Mission nominally under the control of Ismail, but actually subject to the whims of the French Emperor and his Consul-general in Egypt, had been recalled in 1869. It was natural that the Khedive should turn to a group with no national stake in Egypt for advice and guidance in his military program. Equally important, expert American military advisers could be secured in 1870 as an integral part of the Egyptian staff and field officers. In the event of a European War it was improbable that the United States would become involved. American experts would remain faithful in case of political complications in Europe but European experts might be ordered home and carry valuable and secret information to an enemy. Ismail knew that little need be feared from a nation

concerned principally with the "Monroe Doctrine," "Manifest Destiny," and the healing of internal wounds. Had not the withdrawal of French troops from Mexico, bowing to American demands, vividly illustrated both the potential power of American troops, tempered by a bloody Civil War, and the direction of American foreign policy? Obviously, this army was equal, if not superior, to its European counterparts and the United States possessed some of the best trained and least prejudiced military experts available as war mercenaries.

As early as 1869, representatives of the Khedive began recruiting American officers. The first recruits were secured for the express purpose of striking a blow for Egyptian independence. Probably the best known American adviser of the Khedive was General Sherman who personally contacted many able men in the United States. At first he co-operated with Thaddeus P. Mott, Ismail's American aide-de-camp, who was sent to New York for the sole purpose of recruiting civilian experts to serve in Egypt. When Mott resigned, in 1874, he was replaced by a Mr. S. L. Merchant, who became the Khedive's agent
in New York.Officers were recruited ranking from captains to generals who represented all branches of military knowledge: artillery, cavalry, infantry, various staffs and departments, naval experts, and signal corps. Usually they signed a five year contract in which they swore allegiance to the Khedive and promised to fight all his enemies or opposers, "excepting they could not be required to make war against the United States of America." In return they were to receive pay relative to that of an officer in the United States Army of equal rank and if exposed to danger in either battle or on an expedition would receive one-fifth extra pay, lodging and fodder for three animals.

The men selected were outstanding in both Confederate and Union Armies. However, financial need

22. Lockett, How We Happened to Go to Egypt, in Lockett Papers.


24. James Morris Morgan, Recollections of a Rebel Reefer (Boston and New York, 1917), 268; Derrick to Derrick, September 10, 1875, in Derrick Letters.
caused more of the former to join the Khedive's army.\textsuperscript{25} Out of approximately fifty appointees, eight were graduates of West Point. Others like Edward Colston, a graduate of Virginia Military Institute, the "West Point of the South," received their military training elsewhere. In addition there were many professional men such as Doctor L. D. Johnson of Tennessee and Doctor Edward Warren of Baltimore.\textsuperscript{26} With the exception of three captains, Eugene Fechet, Robert W. Rogers, and Captain Martin, who were given leaves of absence from the United States Army by General Sherman, all came to Egypt as civilians.\textsuperscript{27}

This American Mission provided the Egyptian Army with a general staff, reorganized the Army, directed explorations which extended the border of Egypt to nearly inaccessible parts of Central Africa and mapped well-known trade routes through the Libyan and Arabian deserts.


\textsuperscript{26} Crabites, \textit{Americans in the Egyptian Army}, 153, 154, 15, 16.

The foundations of a trained and efficient Egyptian staff was formed under the direction of General Charles P. Stone, American Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Army. General Stone justified his staff work as a necessary part for training the new Egyptian Army:

The report was made that, considering the army as a human body, the staff represents the nerves - starting from the head, which represents the commander-in-chief and extending through all the various members. That, as the nerves communicate to the brain the exact condition and wants of the members, so the staff communicates to the commander-in-chief the condition and wants of even the smallest fraction of the army. And as the nerves communicate the will of the brain to all members of the body, so the staff, in its various branches, communicates the orders of the commander-in-chief to the different units of the army, and provides for and watches over the execution of such orders. That a staff is of quite as much necessity to an army as the nerves are necessary to the human body. 28

Stone's general staff, composed of the chief and six sections, was as follows:

First Section ....... Adjutant General's Department
Second Section .... Military history, manuscripts (past and present), library and printing office
Third Section (Lockett's Section) .... Geography, military reconnaissance, fortifications, signal service and telegraphy
Fourth Section .... Military justice, inspections and secret service
Fifth Section .... Administration; Quartermaster's and Commissary's Department
Sixth Section .... Coastal Defense, Ordnance

In 1873, a Seventh Section, the Department of Public Works, was added which controlled and maintained the vast irrigation system of Egypt and directed the harbor improvements at Alexandria and Suez.²⁹

An interesting facet of the staff work was its connection with wide spread educational reforms. An anecdote illustrates the connection between military

²⁹. Ibid., 170.
reforms and educational reforms in Egypt during the 1870's.

When this officer (probably Stone) had been some months in Egypt, the Khedive sent for him one day, and asked what was the worst thing he had observed in regard to the army. He replied that it was that the regiments were commanded by civilians. The Khedive said:

"No, there is a colonel for every regiment."

"Yes," said the American, "but every colonel, chief of battalion, and captain has a civilian clerk, who controls everything relating to the pay, rations and clothing of the men, and whoever does that really commands."

"You are right," said the Khedive, "But how would you correct this."

"By requiring that the colonels should have sergeants as their clerks; the chiefs of battalions, corporals; the captains, private soldiers; and also requiring the officers should supervise, and do much of the real work themselves."

"That means that the army should learn reading, writing, and arithmetic!"

"That is exactly what I was coming at Your Highness."

The Khedive reflected for a moment, and then at once wrote an order to the Minister of War, requiring that, from that moment no person in the army (either officer or soldier) would be promoted until he was master of reading, writing, and arithmetic.
The consequence was that the whole army immediately became a school. . . . 30

Among the educational reforms carried out at the suggestion of Stone were: (1) a school for each battalion where the men were instructed for one and a half hours per day; (2) a staff college where select pupils were trained for the staff or for command posts; (3) special schools for non-commissioned officers; (4) a torpedo school for river and harbor service and for a naval arm; (5) a school for the soldiers' sons. 31

The success of this program was remarkable. General Loring wrote:

In 1870 one third of the officers in the Egyptian army could neither read or write, and not a tenth of the rank and file could read or write. In 1873 more than seventy per cent of the rank and file of the army could write well enough to make their own written applications for leave of absence and appeals for justice. 32


32. Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 353.
General Stone in support of his military education program later declared:

The result of this regulation was, that in 1873 fully seventy-five per cent of the rank and file of the army could read and write, and knew more or less of arithmetic and the geography of Africa. To become a non-commissioned officer in that army a man must be able to keep his roster and make out the necessary papers.33

Even with modern educational methods this would be a record that any military mission might point to with pride.

Another major improvement was the reorganization of the army by General Stone in 1873 when the Khedive succeeded in removing the restrictions placed on its size and equipment by the Sultan. The following recommendations were adopted:

1 Division, Troops of the Guard (reserve troops who had retired from active service) 4 regiments, infantry
2 regiments, cavalry
1 regiment, artillery
1 battalion, engineer troops

4 Divisions of the Line (consisting of two divisions corps d'armée with each division having 2 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade, 1 artillery regiment, and 1 engineer troops battalion)

16 regiments, infantry
8 regiments, cavalry
4 regiments, artillery
4 battalions, engineer troops

The regiment of field artillery was composed of ten batteries, two of which were horse artillery. The regiment of cavalry was composed of six squadrons having 150 men each. All of these reforms were carried out excepting part of the fourth division. 34

Many other military reforms were innovated by the Americans. Among these were: (1) standard equipment for the army - the Remington musket for infantry, the Krupp breech-loading cannon and Remington carbine for artillery, the Remington carbine and revolver, with sabre, for cavalry; (2) adequate reserves of ammunition for emergencies - large supplies of Remington muskets and Minie muskets (for irregular troops in the Sudan) were stored in magazines; (3) modern means of communication - a net work of railroads covered Lower and Middle Egypt designed to facilitate rapid concentrations of troops at strategic points; telegraphic connections

34. Ibid., 172-173.
with remote regions such as Massowah, Suakin, and Darfour; postal services instituted with the most remote districts; (4) coastal defenses were planned - mechanical and electric torpedoes were ordered for defense of the harbors and wire cable and electric apparatus stored at Aboukir, Rosetta, and Damietta with heavy earthen parapets fifth feet thick replacing old masonry; (5) standard army drill practices were introduced. 35

Americans in the Khedive's service were generally given positions on the general staff. 36 General Charles

35. Ibid., 173. The American naval experts evolved plans for use of a crude submarine and torpedo suspension mines. The automatic suspension torpedo mines were augmented by mechanical mines. The entire system would explode upon contact by ships or by means of push-button controls on shore. A submarine was ordered which could be submerged for at least two miles and could move forward or backward, to the right or left, and discharge torpedoes against any target. The torpedo net system was actually installed in Alexandria harbor by graduates of the American instigated naval college at Rosetta. A submarine was shipped to Alexandria from the United States but lay uncrated in the custom house and useless to the Egyptian government during the English bombardment of Alexandria in 1882. See Cox, "The American Naval Mission in Egypt," in The Journal of Modern History, XXVI, 173-178.

36. Derrick to Derrick, August 29, 1875, in Derrick Letters.
P. Stone came to Egypt in 1870 as Chief-of-Staff. But there were important exceptions when Americans served in other strategic capacities: General Thadeous P. Mott was an aide-de-camp to the Khedive; General W. W. Loring was given command of the coast from the western limit to Damietta, with headquarters at Alexandria, until he was called to Cairo to assume command of Egyptian troops in the Abyssinian campaign of 1875-76; General Stone commanded Egyptian troops in the Suez Canal during the crisis of 1874; Colonels Mason and Cambell were, for a short time, in charge of the Khedivial mail steamer between Alexandria and Constantinople but were later placed in the Third Section of the general staff; and Colonel Edward Colston taught geology at the Military Academy in Cairo until September 1873 when he was assigned to the Third Section.

37. Crabites, Americans in the Egyptian Army, 8.
41. Crabites, Americans in the Egyptian Army, 64.
Offices of the staff were located in the Citadel, once a harem palace of Mohammed Ali, built by Saladin in the twelfth century to repulse the Crusaders. Standing on the Mokkatam hills overlooking Cairo, it commands a view of the pyramids and the desert to the west, the course of the Nile to the south, and the Valley of Goshen visible to the east. The immense halls and magnificent chambers were furnished in the finest luxuries of the East such as velvet carpets, tapestry curtains, silk and satin divans and huge gold chandeliers.

As director of the Third Section Lockett's offices were located in a magnificent room, twenty by thirty feet, overlooking the handsome gardens of the Citadel. In addition to his office his section included a tremendous hall, forty by sixty feet, which was completely furnished with drawing tables and instruments; another hall to store elaborate and costly base line apparatus; a room for maps, charts, drawing materials, instruments, and miscellaneous equipment necessary for a typographical expedition. His section also cooperated with the litographing, printing, and other departments of the staff.
Lockett's staff consisted of several American officers and about sixty native officers, usually graduates of the Khedive's military academy, ranking from lieutenant-colonels to second lieutenants. Lockett avers that one of his chief duties was to train young Egyptian officers "in their duties; and undoubtedly the chief's hardest duty was to keep some of his young 'subs' awake, and attentive to the work...."\(^4^2\)

One of the most important facets of the American mission was the training of native Egyptians to do work which "in their absence, would require the importation of European engineers, who would require double, treble or five times their salaries."\(^4^3\) General Stone explains the role of the staff in training the young native officers who graduated from the staff college:

Young officers graduating at the staff college were assigned, on graduation and promotion to the grade of officer, to one of the sections of the General Bureau for one year to become accustomed to

\(^4^2\). Lockett, Engineering in the Egyptian Service, in Lockett Papers.

\(^4^3\). Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 356.
staff duty, and then were to be sent for a year to a regiment, or on service in the field. If they returned after a year of such outside service with a good report, they were to be promoted captain in the staff; but otherwise they should be transferred permanently to a regiment of the line, or discharged altogether, according to the state of their case.44

The success of Lockett and others in the American Mission in training these young officers was attested by Edwin De Leon, American Consul-General to Cairo, who wrote: "I saw native young men busily employed at typesetting, proof-correcting, book-publishing, lithographing, and map-making, and showing wonderful skill and aptitude at their work."45

Another important duty performed by Lockett was laying out the defenses and fortified barracks for many strategic points, often working with notes sent to Cairo by staff members of places he had never seen. One such fort was Tajurrah on the Red Sea where he "placed


the soldier's kitchens so that the smoke from them will blow directly towards the officers quarters." A mistake which the Khedive fortunately caught. Probably the most important fortifications designed by Lockett were for the defenses of Cairo.

Lockett's chief task was directing expeditions "engaged in making surveys, explorations, and reconnaissances in outlying regions of the Khedive's domains; and in compiling and constructing maps and charts from the information thus gathered." As the Khedive was deterred from his plan to rid himself of Turkish sovereignty by the action of the Sultan supported by England and France, Ismail turned his energies to empire-building in Africa, especially to the southeast in the Sudan where the slavers had become so powerful that they challenged the power of the Khedive who tenuously ruled this area through military outposts.


47. Lois Gordon, "Bygones of Marion," Marion Times Standard, April 11, 1941.

Ismail determined to stamp out the power of the slavers and to establish an extensive Egyptian Empire in Central Africa. Little was known of this area and much of it was an absolute blank to western map makers. The Third Section sent expeditions which either resulted in or followed the expansion of Egyptian territorial power to the south, primarily along the Nile River to Korodofan and Darfour, almost to the Equatorial Lakes; and southeast down the Red Sea, to Berbera, Harrar, Guardafui, and Juba. In 1874, Darfour, east of the Soudan was conquered. In 1875, Harrar, on the coast of the Red Sea opposite the British port at Aden, was invaded and occupied. By 1876, steamships regularly carried supplies to military posts in Unyora, a province of Uganda, by way of Lake Albert. Gradually the Khedive's power was extended until military posts dotted the terrain from Damietta to Urundogani, to latitude thirty-one degrees. From these military acquisitions, a great amount of new geographical information, as well as

startling new facts about African flora and fauna, were gathered.\textsuperscript{50} Its classification and cataloging was an immense task which was first entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Purdy and later to Lockett. As General Loring wrote, "...the Egyptian general staff officers, between the years 1871 and 1878 explored and mapped in detail more of unknown African territory than all other explorers of the world... The aggregate work done in hitherto unexplored portions of Africa by the Egyptian staff is more than that of all the European explorers during the period mentioned."\textsuperscript{51}

To illustrate the vastness of Lockett's task a brief survey of the expeditions which set out from Cairo directed by the Third Section into the little known regions southeast of Egypt to map vast and remote districts of Central Africa follows:

In 1871, Colonel Purdy explored and mapped the regions between Cairo and Suez, and the desert route between Keneh on the Nile and Kosseir on the Red Sea.


\textsuperscript{51} Loring, \textit{A Confederate Soldier in Egypt}, 355.
In 1872, Colonel Mason explored and mapped the Fayoum and the Oasis of Siwa (site of the temple of Jupiter Ammon).

In 1873, Colonel Colston explored and mapped the ancient Roman military road between Keheh on the Nile and Berenice on the Red Sea, including a geological survey and map of the surrounding desert.

In 1874, Colonels Purdy, Colston, and Mason made a hydrographic survey of the gulf and harbor at Berenice, explored and mapped the Abadeh and Bishareen deserts from Berenice to Berber on the Nile, including Colston's survey of the ancient Derehib gold mines in Wady (Valley) Allakee worked by both the Ptolemies and the Arabs in the ninth century. They also mapped the Korosko route on their return trip. At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Abd-el-Kadir (native) and Major Fechet (American) explored the area between Assouan and Berber, returning by the Korosko route, and Colonel Long, with Gordon at Gondokora on the White Nile, was sent on a mission to M'tese, King of Uganda, on Lake Victoria, and discovered Lake Ibrahim; returning down the Nile he identified the Nile with the Somerset River.
In 1874-75, Colonel Colston explored and mapped the route from Debbeh on the Nile to El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, and Colonels Purdy and Mason explored and mapped the route from New Dongola on the Nile to El Fasher, the capital of Darfour.

In 1875, Colonel Prout surveyed and mapped the profile of the Suakim-Berber route, explored and mapped the province of Kordofan and part of Darfour. Joining Colonels Purdy and Mason, they explored and mapped the greater part of Darfour, locating El Fasher the capital, nearly three degrees further west than was marked by previous maps. During this same year, Colonel Long explored Lerdo into Makraka Niam-Niam Country.

From 1875-79, General Charles Gordon (English) and his staff explored and mapped extensive areas of the White Nile as far as the Lakes.

In 1876, Lieutenant Colonel Mahammed Moktar (native) explored the districts of Berbera and Harrar. Colonel Lockett, Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick, and Professor L. H. Mitchell explored and mapped the region southwest of Massowah, and Colonels Long and Ward explored the Juba River.
In 1878, Colonel Mason circumnavigated and surveyed the Lake Albert Nyanza, and Lieutenant-Colonel Graves surveyed Cape Guardafui.  

Lockett as head of the Third Section directed these expeditions from 1875-1877. The majority of his staff saw service in the Sudan, the region of the Equatorial Lakes, or on the coast of the Red Sea. But even more important, he studied the findings of all the expeditions and directed his section in drawing the first excellent maps of the regions along the borders of the Upper Nile, of the Red Sea Littoral, and of the distant kingdoms of Darfour, Kordofan and Wadai. To illustrate the importance of these maps to geography, General Stone asserted that the capitol of Darfour, Kobbe, was approximately one hundred and sixty miles incorrect in longitude on the best African maps existing before the American Mission reconnoitered and mapped this area.  

Crowning all these was a map of Africa,


twelve by fifteen feet designed by Lockett and approved by Stone on August 13, 1877, showing the information gained by the many typographical and geographical expeditions in distant regions of Africa. On this map, written in French, the official language of the Egyptian staff, are these words:

General Map of Africa drawn up under the direction of Colonel Lockett, Chief of the third section, by the officers and employees of that section according to the Egyptian explorations and the best geographical authorities. Cairo, 1877.54

Listed according to rank, Lockett's "Authorities" were: Colonels Purdy, Colston, Long, Lockett, and Ward; Lieutenant-Colonels Mason, Abdel Kadir (native), Baligh (native), Durhol (Austrian), Roffat (native), and Dullier (Swiss). American names do not appear among the lower ranks or under "Foreign explorations." This map was awarded the medal of honor at the World's Exposition in Paris in 1878. Afterward, it hung for many years in Abdin Palace.55 In 1931, King Fuad of

Egypt decided that it should be reproduced and the Survey Department of the Egyptian Government, at the King's expense, issued a reduced facsimile of the original masterpiece.  

Lockett's tremendous contributions were recognized by General Stone who reported that there were only three maps - one, copied from the English, of Abyssinia, one of Candia, and another rough map - in the War Department in 1870. But by 1876, there were thousands of well-arranged maps available to the War Department.  

Being intimately connected with the acquisition of new territories, Lockett made this penetrating observation of Egyptian conquests made under the American staff officers:

It is true that during the reign of Khedive Ismail Pasha the boundaries of Egyptian domain were extended apparently by military conquest, over a part of Nubia, Darfur, Kordofan, and up the Nile almost to the Equatorial Lakes. But these conquests were really not won by fighting successful battles; they


were the result of creating dispositions among the native tribes, of purchase and bribery, of superior diplomacy and treachery, of following up the march of trade by detachments of troops, and converting trading stations into forts and military posts. In 1876, the Egyptian troops, under Rauf Pasha, made a successful attack upon Harrar, a walled town of the Sumalis. With this single exception, all of their recent military efforts have been most disastrous failures...

Lockett charges that, in general, the American directors of the Egyptian Army adroitly took advantage of the lack of centralized government in Central Africa and along the Red Sea to push the power of the Khedive southeast. By diplomacy and bribes, they extended Egyptian control over the ignorant savages of Africa. Not until 1876 was the Egyptian Army, so thoroughly reorganized by the American officers, put to a decisive military test.

Lockett also observed the importance of English pressure in Egyptian expansion. He maintained that "since Sir Samuel Baker explored the Nile...the duty

of suppressing the slave trade, of which Khartum is the great centre, has been impressed upon the Egyptian Government in the strongest terms by both politicians and philanthropists, and it was under this stimulation that the attempt at real annexation was made. By supporting the suppression of the slave trade, Ismail hoped to get English support for territorial expansion.

The extension of Egyptian military and territorial power met a combined European and Ottoman resistance. Despite a relaxation of the Turkish firman on the size and equipment of the Egyptian Army in 1873 in return for an enormous bribe, the Sultan, Abdul Aziz, still distrusted his restive Khedive and continued to wrangle over the importation of arms and the reorganization of the army. As late as July of 1874, the Khedive was secretly receiving consignments of arms from Germany. During this month, a diplomatic furor resulted when the Turkish ambassador at Berlin discovered that five hundred Krupp cannon (four and six pounders) were

secretly shipped from Rotterdam to Cairo as ordinary merchandise. The Porte immediately sent a plenipotentiary to demand surrender of the cannon, and Ismail was again foiled in his plans to enlarge his army.61

England was placed in an equivocal position by welcoming Egyptian expansion toward the Equatorial Lakes, as Lockett observes, but bitterly opposing expansion down the coast of the Red Sea. A partial explanation of her position is found in the violent attacks on the Khedive by English journals on the existence of slavery in Egypt. The Khedive claimed, with much justification, that he could not rectify the situation so long as the Sudan and the vast regions of Central Africa were either outside his domain or under a loose administrative system whereby the local chieftains retained most of the actual power. In these districts, slaves were obtained and slave dealers operated in defiance of his government. It cannot be doubted that this was one of the reasons for his expansion toward the Equatorial Lakes, but with English blessings. He even employed an Englishman, General

Charles Gordon, for the express purpose of stamping out the slave trade. However, the English public was apparently blind to the fact that slavery was rampant on the coast of the Red Sea and that this was the great passage way from Central Africa to the Arabian peninsula. Foreseeing the necessity for ports on the Red Sea as outlets for his great African Empire, the Khedive determined to expand in both directions and abolition of slavery was his justification. 62

The English position was stated by The London Times which proclaimed that the "defeat of the King of Darfur is of interest as showing that the Khedive is in earnest in his efforts to suppress the slave trade in Egypt." 63 But this same power observes a "certain disinclination on the part of the British Foreign Office towards the projects of extension based on ancient suzerainty or modern aspirations which find scope along the shores of the Red Sea." 64 The Egyptian conquest of Harrar threatened the British position in Aden, on

62. Shukry, The Khedive Ismail and Slavery in the Sudan (1863-1879), 91, 238-239. Shukry has an excellent study of conditions in the Sudan but fails to grasp the split nature of English policy in Egypt.

63. The London Times, March 9, 1874, p. 4.

64. Ibid., June 5, 1874, p. 4.
the Arabian peninsula. Harrar possessed an excellent port at Berbera which the Egyptian government planned to develop. An English resident reported that with the installation of a screw pile jetty and a light house, Berbera promised "to be a rival port to Aden." Furthermore, in 1876 English opposition thwarted the expedition of Colonels Ward and Long to the Juba River where Ismail dreamed of a port on the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile, the French, who owned a controlling share in the Suez Canal, were also anxious over the military plans of the ambitious Khedive. The French consul at Damietta sent regular reports on the improvements of Egyptian coastal defenses as well as in the army.

The Khedive was heavily indebted to the European financiers at ruinous rates of interest. With this money he had financed his military program, the building

65. Ibid., May 22, 1876, p. 12.


of harbors, docks, railroads and many hundred civic improvements. According to Lockett, all went well so long as American cotton was kept out of competition with the Khedive's huge new cotton plantations. During the Civil War, when the cotton mills of Europe were starving for lack of work, Egyptian cotton was purchased for the unheard of price of from fifty to seventy-five cents per pound. But when the cotton of the United States forced the Khedive's prices down, he had to lay or assess heavy taxes upon the people of Egypt to meet even the interest on his loans. 68

Continued Turkish opposition to Egyptian expansion backed by France and England, and heavy financial burdens, dominated Egyptian foreign relations in the seventies. To avoid any crisis was paramount if Ismail was to achieve his ambitions - independence and empire. Yet, according to Lockett, he was led into the ill-fated Abyssinian Crisis of 1876 by two men, animated by ambition who used ancient and recent animosities between Egypt and Abyssinia to serve their own ends. One was a thirty-five year old Jesuit priest, Father Dufloe, who

68. Samuel H. Lockett, Recent Military Events in Egyptian History, in Lockett Papers.
hoped to break up the Abyssinian kingdom and establish an independent principality in the province of Okuloh Kisueh. Of only medium height, Father Dufloe plotted with the mind of a giant to advance his order. He forbade his charges from paying tribute to the Abyssinian King and made them nominally tributary to Egypt. In a region situated between Greek Orthodox Abyssinia and the Muslin area on the coast, this daring and scheming priest played upon the discord of the region to advance his own Catholic cause, and in so doing gave the Egyptian government much valuable information about the little known terrain and peoples of Abyssinia. 69

The other malcontent, driven by ambition, was Munzinger Pasha, whom Lockett describes as a man of undoubted ability. Munzinger, a Swiss adventurer, arrived at Massowah at the age of twenty as a merchant trader. He married an Abyssinian Princess and plotted the overthrow of King John so that he might rule himself. Living along the Red Sea coast for over twenty years, his rise to power was rapid. During the English War of 1867 against King Theodore of Abyssinia,

69. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
Munzinger became the English consul at Massowah and director of the successful expedition to Muguala. Afterwards he became the French consul at Massowah. From 1855 to 1875, Munzinger was one of the most ardent advocates of Egyptian expansion along the Nile River. His tracts, *Observations sur la Situation Economique du Soudan*, written in 1871, when Munzinger was serving as agent for both Egypt and France at Massowah, probably stimulated Ismail "to continue his efforts to pacify and control the Sudan" with the aid of American military experts. It contains many of the economic concepts held by Ismail of the Sudan. In 1871, Munzinger was given the post of Egyptian Governor to Massowah and received the rank of Bey. In this position Munzinger increased his activities promoting Egyptian expansion, constantly reporting Egyptian prospects in East Africa. He suggested that Ismail expand to the port of Berbera, on the Red Sea, which dominated the Somaliland coast, conquer Harrar, acquire the border province of Bogos between Massowah and Abyssinia, acquire Aussa (a point coveted by the French), and control Keren before the nations of Europe, who were looking for prizes in southeast Africa, became firmly entrenched on
the Red Sea coast. By consolidating Egyptian possessions on the coast early, adequate outlets for the proposed Central African Empire would be secured, Europe would be blocked, and Abyssinia might be effectively surrounded and rendered powerless to prevent further seizure of inland territory to be absorbed at the Khedive's leisure. For his services, Munzinger was given the rank of Pasha and made Governor-General of the Red Sea region in the West Sudan.70

Lockett believed that the intrigues of Munzinger Pasha and Father Dufloe were probably the most important factor in the conflict between Egypt and Abyssinia that erupted in 1875. His comments on the role of these two men as political agitators are substantiated in a letter written by King John of Abyssinia to the English, who had placed him on the Abyssinian throne in 1869. John wrote:

I am desired by the King of Kings, Youarnisse of Ethiopia, to write and inform you of what has taken place in Abyssinia since the English have left this country. Mr. Munzinger, when consul of

70. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers; Frederick J. Cox, "Munzinger's Observations on the Sudan, 1871," Sudan Notes and Records (Khartum, 1918- ), XXXIII (1952), 189-201.
France at Massowah, wrote me a letter saying, "If you do not let the Roman Catholic priests teach their religion in your country, you know that I took the English troops to Magdala, and destroyed Theodore and all his people; and you, if you do not like to receive the Roman Catholic priest, you shall be destroyed like King Theodore." I ask the Government of England and the people, whether this is a proper letter for a consul to write to a king of his own country, and also a Christian. I and all my people are all baptized in the name of the Trinity; we all believe in the Gospel, and in Christ; and if these Roman Catholic priests wish to teach their religion there are plenty of wild people that are not baptized in the Shankuar country. I have written several letters to Mr. Munzinger on this subject but he will not hear my words. I sent my people last year to Allee for the purpose of collecting my revenue; but when my people asked for the taxes, all the Roman Catholic priests and the people said that they did not know any other king except the Roman Catholic priests, and they were baptized by them, and they would not pay any taxes, until I was forced to send a large force to make them pay; and then when the taxes were demanded they all ran away to the low country (Bewia Whius) and some of my soldiers set fire to some of the uninhabited houses, but it was not by my orders. I have given these Roman Catholic priests orders to leave my country several times by letters and messengers, but it was all of no use; they still would force their religion on my people; and taught
my people to look to them as their king. I also wrote several letters to Munzinger telling him that I did not want the Roman Catholic priests to misguide my people. Also, at the same time, the Roman Catholic priests and Consul Munzinger and their friends at Massowah were supplying one of my chiefs who had turned rebel against my kingdom, and sending him guns, powder, and all that he required to plunder my country and destroy my people; and when I sent an army against him, he would run to Consul Munzinger, and hide from my troops so as to avoid being taken; and, when I got the victory over Gobzee, I found a letter in the treasury of Gobzee that was written in the language of my country by them, telling Gobzee, that if he would give them permission to do what they liked in Abyssinia, they will send him cannon, guns, powder, rockets, and all that he wanted to fight me; so, after all these things happened, I sent an army to drive them out of my country, but they will not leave. Please let the people of England know this for my friendship to your people.\(^{71}\)

This was only one of a series of appeals to the English complaining of border relations between Abyssinia and Massowah.\(^ {72}\) Massowah was a possession of the

71. The London *Times*, July 17, 1872, p. 5.

Egyptian government as the result of Egyptian purchase from the Turks in 1865. The Turks had seized the seaport from the Abyssinians nearly two hundred years before. King John resented the expansion of Egypt which slowly surrounded his ancient mountain kingdom and cut off all exits to the sea. Egypt controlled nearly all the territory southward to the Equatorial Lakes and across to the entrance of the Red Sea with the exception of Abyssinia. Abyssinia, lying at the head of the Blue Nile, was directly in line with the Egyptian expansion either down the Red Sea coast or down the Nile River. In 1875, Egypt conquered Harrar, blocking Berbera and Zeila, the only ports beside Massowah which gave Abyssinia access to the sea. Countless disputes arose, such as the occupation of Bogos by Munzinger in 1875, with Egypt claiming the grand plateau and Abyssinia claiming the sea. Throughout these difficult disputes, King John astutely bombarded Europe with propaganda calculated to incite the readers with fear of Egyptian expansion.73

73. Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 289-290; Shurky, The Khedive Ismail and Slavery in the Sudan (1863-1879), 250-254; Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
These circumstances mitigated against the devious plans of Munzinger Pasha and Father Dufloe. In view of the Egyptian encirclement of Abyssinia, it is doubtful if Ismail would have deliberately risked the disapproval of Turkey, England and France if he had been allowed to have waited for "his own good time to absorb and tame the wild inhabitants of the interior. . . ."74 Within Abyssinia bitter border feuds raged. Nominally the Abyssinian chieftains acknowledged the authority of King John. Actually his power was limited to requiring the chieftains to pay a yearly tribute and furnish support in times of war, much like the political system which existed in feudal Europe. In effect, every Raz (Chief) was a law unto himself, and Abyssinia was in a constant state of unrest. Nominally Christian, their religion consisted of fanatic religious ceremonies that would have shocked a Western Christian. Yet their religion contributed to the unrest by preaching an undying hatred of the Muslim peoples who occupied the borders between Egyptian and Abyssinian territory.75 With the exception

74. Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 301, 319-326.

of the invasion of Harrar, in 1875, all attempts to take advantage of these feudal conditions proved a dismal failure; even in Harrar, the turbulent inhabitants withstood the Egyptian inroads for nearly a year, preventing a junction of Egyptian forces with the powerful King of Shoa, Meneleh, during the critical months before the Abyssinian War.76

In the northern provinces of Abyssinian the disputes rapidly neared a crisis. Munzinger occupied Bogos in 1874 and King John gave this disputed territory to General Kirkham, a Scotsman in the Abyssinian service, for life. Kirkham raised the British flag during the same year. The result, as perceived by Lockett, was the outfitting of two expeditions aimed at Abyssinia proper.77 There two expeditions led by Colonel Adrendrup, a Dane in the Egyptian army, and the ambitious Munzinger Pasha culminated in the Egyptian invasion of Abyssinia in 1876 in which Lockett distinguished himself.

76. Shukry, The Khedive Ismail and Slavery in the Sudan, (1863-1879), 253-255.

77. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
CHAPTER III

AT MASSOWAH AND AT FORT GURA

When Lockett arrived in Cairo there was only an old English map of Abyssinia in the War Department. He was commissioned by General Stone to bring it up to date and instructed secretly to compile all possible cartographic information on Abyssinia.\(^1\) Lockett's instructions were not the only indications of Ismail's interest in Abyssinia. Despite the fact that as early as August 22, 1875, Lockett's chief engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick, assured his wife that it was unlikely that any American officers would be sent to Abyssinia, General Stone had already sent a secret expedition to the Red Sea area headed by Colonel Adrendrup, a Dane in the Egyptian Army, to explore and map the border districts between Abyssinia and Massowah. According to Lockett, Colonel Adrendrup left Cairo about the first of September supposedly to explore Berbera or Tajurrah

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\(^1\) Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers; Stone, "Military Affairs," in Military Service Institution Journal, V, 174.
at the lower coast of the Red Sea. His real purpose was unknown even to the staff officers outside the immediate counsel of the Khedive. In connection with his cartographic work, Colonel Adrendrup was to make treaties with friendly chieftains in the border districts who wished to become allies of the Khedive. But he was not to proceed past the province of Hamasen unless military conditions warranted it. The expedition served the double purpose of blocking the creation of an "independent" kingdom of Bogos, under the rule of General Kirkham, an English adventurer in the service of King John of Abyssinia, and of adding to the immense volume of material being compiled by the Third Section, under Lockett's direction, on the geography and typography of little known districts of southeast Africa. 2

Through frequent conferences with General Stone, Lockett plotted the progress of Adrendrup's expedition which landed at Massowah. Making this seaport on the Red Sea his base of supplies, Adrendrup marched inland

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by the Asmara route to Tzazega, the capitol of Hamasen, the most northerly province of Abyssinia. There he signed a treaty of friendship with the Raz (Governor) of that province, Walter Michael. He had sent a message to King John from Guida, thirty miles in the interior, demanding boundary adjustments and indemnity for considered past outrages upon the Egyptian people. Adrendrup threatened to invade Abyssinia if these conditions were not met. King John, advised by Kirkham, failed to reply. When Adrendrup secured a treaty from the Raz of Hamasen, he was emboldened to exceed his instructions and invade Abyssinia proper after he received reinforcements from Cairo. About October 12, 1875, Lockett sent Major Dennison, an American on the general staff, Major Rouchy and three other native officers from the Third Section to report to Colonel Adrendrup who requested additional engineering officers. Lockett writes that when the Colonel was next heard from he was at Adi-Bahro, where he established a depot for supplies; then, he proceeded through Kayah Khor to

3. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
Godofelassie with the bulk of the army. At Kayah Khor, Adrendrup left Major Raif to fortify the heights with four companies of infantry and two pieces of artillery. The troops were further dispersed when Major Durholtz, an Austrian, was detached from the army and sent to reconnoiter Saganeite in the province of Kuleh Kiseieh (Father Dufloe's province) with two companies of infantry.  

Lockett became alarmed at the over-zealous plans of a commander, who "had never heard a hostile gun fired and had never been in a wild country or held intercourse with a savage people," marching over a hundred miles inland from his base of supplies into enemy country, and then, dispersing his small army of 3,500 men armed with but three batteries or twelve pieces of mountain artillery. He advised General Stone that it would be "true military policy" for Adrendrup to halt his advance and fortify his position while awaiting additional reenforcements before venturing further into enemy territory. He received a vague

5. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
reply from General Stone "that all that will be attended to." Later when catastrophe struck, Stone claimed to have shared Lockett's concern but those in "highest authority" had been confident to the point of ignoring his counsel.

While at Godofelassie, Colonel Adrendrup decided that the Asmara route was too steep and changed his line of communications to the Kayah Khor route.7 This necessitated a shifting of supply lines and caused much unavoidable confusion. During the shifting, intrenchments were thrown up at Godofelassie by Major Dennison. Adrendrup commanded Count Zinchy, a Hungarian who left a hunting party at Massowah to join the column, to move forward and reconnoiter Adi Huaala, an elevated ridge overlooking the Mareb River Valley. Count Zinchy's command consisted of six companies of infantry armed

7. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers; Loring states that Adrendrup first tried the Asmara route but finding this too steep, shifted to the Godofelassie route. Lockett who was constantly in conferences with Stone concerning the route of the expeditionary force, wrote in his notes shortly after the Abyssinian War of 1876 that Adrendrup went to Godofelassie and then shifted his route. See, Loring, 
A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 302.
with two pieces of artillery and two rocket stands. Adi Huaala was only two days march from King John's capitol at Adua.

These arrangements were scarcely completed when Adrendrup learned that the Abyssinians were advancing along the Mareb River toward Adi Huaala. He hastened to Adi Huaala with the bulk of the army. There he discovered that Count Zinchy had already advanced to the elevated height of Gundet where he encountered a small party of the enemy. With four companies of infantry and two mountain pieces, Colonel Adrendrup hastened on to Gundet. 8

Giving Major Dennison and Major Rucky command of small detachments, the Colonel ordered the former to the right and front of the position at Adi Huaala and the latter to a corresponding position on the left flank. Later Adrendrup instructed Rushton Bey, who had remained at Adi Huaala, to move at daylight with five companies, two pieces of mountain artillery and two rocket stands to occupy Gundet and Major Dennison was ordered back to Adi Huaala to hold that position with two pieces of mountain artillery.

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8. Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 302-303; Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
At Gundet, on November 18, 1875, Colonel Adrendrup sent Count Zinchy, with two companies to scout the valley. The Count discovered a few Abyssinian soldiers on the opposite bank of the river and fired upon them, causing them to retire. Elated, Colonel Adrendrup ignored the cautious advice of the battle-tested Dennison and hurried into the thickly-vegetated valley screened by huge mimosa trees. Scorning his savage adversary, the Colonel failed to take ordinary precautions to ascertain all possible information about the size and movements of the Abyssinians. Leaving Arakel Bey, Governor of Massowah and nephew of Nubar Pasha, with the reserves in the rear, Colonel Adrendrup advanced with about 1200 men, four pieces of artillery and two rockett stands. Arakel Bey observed with horror as thousands of Abyssinians surrounded and attacked the Egyptian troops. Vainly he rushed the reserves toward the battle, only to suffer the same fate of the main army which had been decimated in about a half hour.9

Lockett wrote of Adrendrup's fiasco:

9. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers; Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 303-304. Loring says that Rushton Bey commanded the reserves.
The true story of Adrendrup's defeat is briefly this. He advanced with foolhardy confidence into the heart of an enemy's country, was deceived and betrayed by the Governor of Hamasen, was enveigled by superior strategy into the valley of the Mareb, and was completely surrounded by an overwhelming force of the Abyssinians. And when his little army was attacked on all sides his men instead of fighting like soldiers, huddled together like sheep and fired in short time in the air, and then stood and allowed themselves to be mowed down like grain before the reaper's blade. The whole party with the exception of a few outposts, rear guards and reconnoitering parties was demolished in about 1 hour as reported by an Englishman in King John's army. 10

Major Dennison at Adi Huaala received news of the disaster nearly twelve hours later from fugitives. He refused to believe their tale of annihilation even after being joined by a company posted on a hill overlooking the battlefield to guard an akabah (pass), and another company posted in the rear to guard supplies. The addition of these two companies brought his command, including the troops of Major Rouchdy, to nearly six hundred men. The following day, King John sent a message

10. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
demanding that Dennison surrender in return for safe
conduct to Massowah. The arrival of Arakel Bey's
bodyguard, who told of the death of his master, con­
vinced Major Dennison that the entire force had been
wiped out. Stalling for time, the Major assured King
John that he must refer his demand to a mythically
absent commanding officer. That night after spiking
his guns, he retreated with light baggage through
Godofelassie to Kayah Khor where, after nearly thirty­
six hours of ceaseless activity holding together his
thoroughly demoralized command, he joined his superior
officer, Major Riaf Effendi. Under command of the
Egyptian staff officer, the troops then retreated to
Massowah.

Here they were joined by Major Durholtz, an
Austrian in the Third Section, who fled from the
province of Kuleh Kiseieh where he had been in contact
with Father Dufloe and had been unsuccessful in secur­
ing any military aid against King John but had gained
much information from the Jesuit priest about the
typography of Abyssinia. In the months that followed
a stream of horribly mutilated prisoners and fugitives
who had been left for dead on the battlefield drifted
into Massowah.11

11. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 304-306.
This ill-fated expedition was supported by a diversionary force that landed at Tajurrah, in the south, and marched inland into Shoa country where it was hoped that contact could be established with King Menelek, a rival of King John. It was commanded by Munzinger Pasha who had 600 men and a battery of mountain artillery. Lockett indicates that his purpose was not only the distraction of King John's attention from Colonel Adrendrup's column in the north, but that he was to explore the border districts in this area, securing scientific, geographical and typographical information. Munzinger Pasha's guide was a Gallas chieftain who led the expeditionary force inland almost to Lake Aussal. There he laid a trap for Munzinger and with his warriors, numbering around two thousand, surrounded the Egyptian camp on November 16, 1875, and slaughtered the sleeping troops with the exception of a native captain of engineers and part of his command. The captain had feared foul play, posted guards and made his men sleep with their guns. With a remnant of his force the alert captain was able to reach Tajurrah and report the massacre.12

One of the oddest circumstances connected with these two expeditions was the official censure incurred by Major Dennison, Major Omar Rouchy and the native captain despite their brilliant retreat in the face of overwhelming odds. The captain was even required to pay for Government materials assigned to him, which he abandoned while effecting his retreat and Lockett, as his chief, had to personally supervise the injustice. No logical explanation was ever given. But Egypt, during the reign of Ismail, was a honeycomb of intrigue and jealousy. It is doubtful if the merits of the cases were considered by those who were in command in the Khedive entourage, except that the expeditions resulted in total disaster and someone had to be found guilty.

As a result of these events the Khedive's plans for expansion and exploration of the Red Sea area were radically and unexpectedly altered. Revenge for Adrendrup's and Munzinger's defeats became top priority projects in the cabinet of Ismail. At about the time of Colonel Adrendrup's departure from Cairo, Lockett's chief engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick, wrote his

13. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
wife of a proposed expedition to the head of the Gulf of Aden where he would lay out a town and construct a fort. This project became still-born. Derrick disclosed that other proposed expeditions under Colonel Dye, assisted by Major Loshe, and under Colonel Long, assisted by Colonel Graves were later changed in deference to Abyssinian war plans. Other explorations set up under the direction of Colonel Derrick to map the area from Suakin on the Red Sea, across by Kassala toward the Nile, and under Colonel Graves further south on the Red Sea, also were postponed. Due to the Muslim custom of delaying all activity during Ramadan, which occurred in the latter part of October and nevertheless other delays it was the latter part of October before Derrick was paid in advance to conduct the proposed expedition. Before Derrick departed from Cairo orders arrived cancelling the expedition, and holding him in Cairo to await further developments in Abyssinia.

14. Derrick to Derrick, August 20, 22, 1875, in Derrick Letters.

15. Derrick to Derrick, September 10, 1875, in Derrick Letters.

Colonel Dye, Major Loshe, Captain Porter, and Major White, who were to depart on expeditions at the same time as Derrick, also had their orders countermanded.  

Derrick wrote his wife, "All our plans of survey, etc. have been changed by the force of circumstances."  

The Khedive could not ignore the Egyptian reverses in Abyssinia. Even the usually critical London Times conceded, "If that affair (Adrendrup) had been allowed to go unpunished no Egyptian territory would have been safe." Much of the Egyptian Empire in Central Africa was the result of recent conquest under the direction of Ismail's American experts and the result of the Munzinger and Adrendrup expeditions did have serious effects on the newly conquered territories. Lockett's comments on these two fiascos are worth noting:

The effect of these two defeats was to destroy Egyptian prestige and raise that of the Abyssinians to a degree never before enjoyed by these people.

17. Derrick to Derrick, November 23, 25, 1875, in Derrick Letters.  
18. Derrick to Derrick, December 3, 1875, in Derrick Letters.  
20. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
The Khedive determined that these two setbacks by the Abyssinians must be punished and that his American staff officers should be used in a military conquest of Abyssinia.

During the fall of 1875 mammoth preparations for a punitive expedition against Abyssinia were made. General Loring, then at Alexandria, was recalled to Cairo to command the expedition. Upon arrival in Cairo he discovered that a native general, Ratib Pasha, was to receive the post of Commander-in-Chief in his stead since it was believed that the Egyptians would object to the command of a Christian and a foreigner. General Loring was made Second-in-Command and Chief of Staff of the army being formed in Cairo. The Khedive instructed General Loring and Ratib Pasha to be of one mind and to cooperate but failed to supply the directive whereby this might be accomplished. Later General Stone assured General Loring that "I urged that you were accustomed to mountain warfare with savage tribes, and that your advice must be acted on when once in the field." 21 Nevertheless, Ismail provided his expedition with a dual command and under these conditions, the

21. Ibid.
responsibility for the Abyssinian assignment was not clearly defined. 22

Lockett's comments on the two officers in charge of the expedition are very revealing and explain in part a weakness in the chosen Abyssinian commanders. Ratib Pasha was but five feet six inches tall and slightly built. He was very active despite his fifty years and wrinkled appearance. His career had begun as a slave in the household of Said Pasha where he became a favorite and was sent to a French military school. Upon graduation he earned a commission in the Egyptian army. Somewhat deficient in military knowledge, Ratib Pasha was further handicapped by any real battle experience. Lockett describes his obstinacy and pertinacity as "Grantish." As for Loring, Lockett observed that he had seventeen years of military experience as a cavalry officer and field commander but practically none as a staff officer. Lockett, who served with General Loring in both the Civil War and the Abyssinian campaign, wrote that "he is easily excited, easily thrown off his balance. . . . His great fault of character is quickness of temper and impulsiveness." As Lockett perceived

the Abyssinian expedition, it had two leaders, neither clearly defined as to responsibilities, neither having staff experience in battle, and temperamentally opposed to each other. 23

The army was completely revamped for the Abyssinian campaign. Highly secret meetings, attended by the Khedive's counsellors and those officers to be trusted with command, were called by the Khedive. Americans who took part in these deliberations were: General Stone, General Loring, Colonel Dye, and Colonel Field. While Lockett was not included in the secret Khedival conferences, he was necessarily cognizant of much that occurred during the meetings. When news of Colonel Adrendrup's defeat reached Cairo, General Stone immediately summoned Lockett and instructed him to devote the Third Section to the preparation of maps and charts of Abyssinia. It was through Lockett's efforts, and with his advice, that Generals Loring and Stone were able to select the route of the Egyptian Army before leaving Cairo. Lockett utilized information received from Father Dufloe, the Catholic priest, concerning trails, mountains, passes, defiles, and rivers to

23. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
prepare surprisingly accurate maps of a region that was nearly a cartographic blank in geographical archives.  

In late November, 1875, the following foreign officers received orders for duty on the newly created staff of the Abyssinian expedition. These were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel William</td>
<td>West Point, 1853; served on the frontier; colonel and brevet-brigadier-general in Civil War, USA; Egypt, 1873</td>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McE. Dye</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Charles W. Field</td>
<td>West Point, 1849; served on frontier; major-general, CSA; Egypt, 1875; a Virginian</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Samuel H. Lockett</td>
<td>West Point, 1859; colonel, CSA; Egypt, 1875; an Alabamian</td>
<td>Head of survey, later, Chief Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Derrick</td>
<td>Civil War, CSA; railroad engineer; Egypt, 1875; a Virginian</td>
<td>Chief Engineer, at Lockett's arrival, Assistant to the Chief Engineer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel Charles I. Graves</td>
<td>Annapolis; lieutenant, USN; resigned 1861; Civil War, CSN; Egypt, 1875; a Georgian</td>
<td>Port Officer at Massowah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Bey</td>
<td>Italian in the Egyptian army</td>
<td>Assistant Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel Baron von Mocklin</td>
<td>Austrian army</td>
<td>Assistant Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Charles F. Loshe</td>
<td>Civil War, Officer of volunteers, USA; Egypt, 1875</td>
<td>Chief of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major J. D. Dennison</td>
<td>Civil War, USA; of New York</td>
<td>Assistant to Chief Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Durholtz</td>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>Assistant to Chief Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major (Count) Turnheysen</td>
<td>Austrian, with Maximilian in Mexico; Egypt, 1875; appointed on eve of departure for Abyssinia</td>
<td>Aide-de-Camp to Ratib Pasha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Dulier</td>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>Assistant to Chief Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Essex Porter</td>
<td>Son of Admiral Porter; Egypt, 1875</td>
<td>Assistant to Chief of Transportion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Irgens</td>
<td>Civil War, USA; immigrant to Montana</td>
<td>Assistant to Chief Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain (Count) Italian Sormanl</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Inspector General</td>
</tr>
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On December 5, 1875, the arrangements were completed and Lockett watched the bulk of the Egyptian army leave Cairo for Massowah. The force consisted of 11,000 men in the following categories:

**Force** | **Men** | **Horses** | **Mules**
--- | --- | --- | ---
Four regiments of infantry of three battalions each aggregating | 9,600 | 68 | 720
One regiment of cavalry of the Guard (sabres) | 800 | 900 | none
Two field batteries, one of brass and one of steel, of six pieces each, calibre about seven centimetres; two mountain batteries, and one rock battery | 474 | 54 | 334
One company of sappers and miners (afterward increased to five companies) | 150 | 66 | 100

25. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers; Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 363-364; Derrick to Derrick, passim, in Derrick Letters.
The general-in-chief, chief-of-staff, two generals of brigade, two colonels, three lieutenant-colonels, six majors, two captains, five lieutenants, and fourteen soldiers, constituting general headquarters

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Horses</th>
<th>Mules</th>
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<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
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General Stone ordered the survivors of Adrendrup's column at Massowah to join the expedition thus increasing the total number of men to twelve thousand. Loring's and Ratib's forces were further augmented by 1,200 troops stationed at Sanheet, on the frontier between Abyssinia and Egypt, who would act in concert with the main army. 26

Neither Lockett or Graves sailed with their fellow staff officers on the steamer Dakaliah on December 6, 1875, from Suez for Massowah. 27 The first Egyptian troops arrived at Massowah around December 11, 1875. 28 Almost daily thereafter a steamer loaded with men and


27. Derrick to Derrick, December 6, 1875, in Derrick Letters.

ammunition arrived from Suez. Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick describes the period in Massowah as a busy time during which the engineering department made maps, adjusted instruments, overhauled supplies, and looked after a million details.  

The Governor's palace became the headquarters and barracks for the staff. Oriental in style, the building was made of glittering white limestone. Its large rooms had highly decorated walls and ceilings. A dome that could be seen for miles rested atop the official residence. Derrick was first quartered in the sumptuous palace but on arrival of a member of the royal family, Prince Hassan, on the thirtieth of December, he was ousted to make room for the Prince. Colonel Derrick had to content himself with a tent in the yard.

In the embarkation confusion the need for an experienced naval officer to take charge of the port was

29. Derrick to Derrick, December 21, 28, 1875, in Derrick Letters.

30. Derrick to Derrick, January 4, 1876, in Derrick Letters; Lockett, Experiences Among the Wild Tribes and Wild Animals of Africa, a manuscript article in Lockett Papers. Hereinafter cited as Wild Tribes and Wild Animals.
felt and Colonel Graves arrived on December 29, 1875, to fill the assignment. Throughout the Abyssinian campaign he regulated the transport ships, arranged for the movement of supplies and troops from the ships and served as a general superintendent of the bay and town.³¹

On January 11, 1867, the advance guard of the army pulled away from the flies and sweltering heat of Massowah under the command of an Egyptian, Osman Pasha. After days of delay because of a shortage of camels, the three thousand men in the vanguard began the arduous task of trail breaking. Colonel Field, Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick, Major Dennison and Captain Irgens and several other Egyptian staff and engineering officers were included in the group.³² Their first encampment was at Yangers where they prepared a permanent military station by installing pumps and digging wells. Moving

³¹ Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 365; Derrick to Derrick, December 5, 1875, in Derrick Letters.

³² Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers; Derrick to Derrick, January 15, 1876, in Derrick Letters; Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 343.
forward to Baraka, the group established a large depot for supplies. Here they halted until joined by Ratib Pasha and General Loring about the middle of January.

The main army, after rejoining at Baraka, was marched on to Adi Rasso where a redoubt and garrison was prepared. From Adi Rasso the army advanced to Khaya Khor where it camped one night before marching to the Abyssian plateau and going into camp in a valley surrounded by commanding mountains to the south of Gura. Two days later the army moved from its almost undefendable position to Gura, a spot visited by Major Dennison in his retreat from Adi Huaala, which had an abundance of water. Of these encampments Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick wrote his wife:

The town of Kayakhor through which we passed, consists of a lot of mud hovels stuck on the side of a hill, and looking, for all the world like holes in the mountain side. Gura, our present camping ground, is somewhat better, being on top of a hill, and larger than Kiah Khor with somewhat better houses in some instances.

33. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
34. Derrick to Derrick, January 31, 1876, in Derrick Letters.
Camping grounds and stations were chosen not only for military strategy but also because of the proximity of water. The area knew only two seasons - dry and wet. For seven months of each year it was dry, but from May to July torrents of rain, huge pieces of hailstorm, and astonishing volumes of water turned dry stream beds into raging torrents. Consequently water was very scarce and could be found only at certain known points during the dry season. Everyone was dependent upon the known sources of water, although it was often possible to secure water by digging five or six feet in a dry bed of a water course. 35

The punitive expedition had slowly pushed its way into the northerly provinces of Abyssinia in January 1876, confident of victory. Back in Cairo, General Stone turned his energies toward planning a mapping and exploring expedition into Abyssinia. It was his belief that the army, outfitted with the best military equipment of the day, and led by the foremost leaders of the Egyptian army, could easily defeat the Abyssinians. When the campaign was planned, Lockett, undoubtedly the

35. Lockett, Wild Tribes and Wild Animals, in Lockett Papers.
best military engineer in Egypt, was left behind by Stone and for good reason. On December 29, 1876, Lockett was ordered to fit out a special expedition of the General Staff to make scientific explorations, topographical maps and fortifications in connection with the progress of the Egyptian army into Abyssinia. In General Stone's estimation this was the most important task assigned to any individual at the outset of the Abyssinian War.

Lockett traveling alone left his family in Cairo on January 19, 1876, for Abyssinia. A pleasant trip down the Red Sea followed which enabled him to leisurely view the historic waters through which Moses led the Israli children and to observe Mount Sinai's ragged peaks "bathed in the golden glow of a setting sun while his riven sides and winding wadys and the level plain of Tor at his base were wrapped in a beautiful veil of blue shadow." Lockett reached Massowah on the twenty-ninth of January. Finding the main army had already departed, he was his own commander in the Red Sea port. Lockett clarified his position in the following exposition:

36. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
Whilst I was connected with and to a certain extent dependent upon the movements of the Egyptian Army, which intended to invade Abyssinia, yet, I had an independent command of my own. I was chief of a special engineering expedition whose object was to secure topographical, geographical and other scientific information.37

Lockett's first task in Massowah was extremely unpleasant and grew out of one of the most dramatic incidents of the Abyssinian campaign. Soon after the landing of the army at Massowah, the English adventurer, Kirkham, arrived with some Egyptian prisoners from the Adrendrup affair. Horribly mutilated, they became object lessons to the ignorant and easily impressionable Egyptian soldiers of the cruelty of the enemy. Kirkham had been captured by Egyptian sentries with letters from King John to Queen Victoria appealing for aid. Kirkham had once been a hardy, bold and adventurous man. When he appeared in Massowah he was doomed by chronic dysentery, disease of the kidneys and incipient dropsy. Of average stature, fair complexioned and blue eyed, this coarse red-haired Englishman was accused of being an envoy to England to secure arms, ammunition and

37. Lockett, Wild Tribes and Wild Animals, in Lockett Papers.
support. After his capture, he became the prisoner of the Egyptians for the duration of the campaign. Lockett devoted much of his time to ministering to the dying man. He had him moved to a Lutheran mission where he died in relative comfort before the war ended. The Kirkham episode was unfortunate because of the adverse effects on the morale of the Egyptian soldiers, although Lockett did what he could to mitigate its effects.\footnote{38}

During this period at Massowah, Lockett was the first to fix the exact navigational position of the port. According to his calculations, it lies on the west side of the Red Sea at \(15^\circ 38'\) n. lat. and \(39^\circ 27'45''\) e. of Greenwich, the most important of a group of coral islands at the northern end of the Gulf of Arkiko. The Gulf of Arkiko is formed by a depression between Ras-Abdel Kadir on the north and Ras Guddm of the south. Massowah is almost at the center of Ras-Abdel-Kadir, Garrar, Taualoud, and Shek-Said, coral islands in the gulf. Shaped like a parallelogram with 1,200 meters at the longest side and 500 meters at the shortest, the port of Massowah is between the island of

\footnote{38. Loring, \textit{A Confederate Soldier in Egypt}, 347-348.}
Massowah and Gerrar, partly calmed by the point of Abd-il-Kadir. Lockett also discovered that Gerrar was not an island but a peninsula. His report points out that a spot between Gerrar and Taoualoud might serve as a place of anchorage in case of need for the Egyptian navy as the water was unusually calm.\(^{39}\)

The survey of Massowah was not accomplished without heavy work. When Lockett began the map of the environs after selecting a base line on the level sandy beach of the mainland, he ordered his second in command, a native lieutenant-colonel, Baligh Bey, to begin the preliminary measurements of the base line. Lockett was not able to do this work because he was suffering from an attack of inflammatory rheumatism in his arm and shoulder. In the following sketch, Lockett describes the hilarious results:

The Lieut. Colonel took with him pretty much the whole of our party, and made big preparations for his work in the way of instruments and materials, by taking along nearly our entire outfit of transits, levels, tapers, chains, odometers, baseline rods, camp stools and umbrellas. The

\(^{39}\) Bulletin de la Societe, IX and X (August and November, 1880), 45-46; Crabites, Americans in the Egyptian Army, 199.
site of the base line was in view from our camp. After trying in vain to get some rest; the writer [Lockett] arose and directed his field glass towards the scene of operations. And this is what he saw. The Lieut. Colonel sitting on a camp stool with one commissioned officer holding an umbrella over him, and the other fanning him, a couple of others lolling on the ground near him, and three soldiers under the sergeant measuring the line, by making the base line rods play leap frog with each other, in quick time.40

Irritated with his staff officers' indolence, Lockett found that his rheumatism wasn't so bad as he supposed. Riding to the base line site, he was informed by the lieutenant-colonel that actual work was degrading to one in his position. Thereafter Lockett entrusted little to his subordinates and the maps of Massowah are almost all his personal work.41

In addition to Baligh Bey, Lockett's command consisted of M. Achille Robert, a French expert on transportation who knew the Arabic language well, Major Dulier, a Belgian attached to the Third Section, six


41. Ibid.
Egyptian lieutenants of engineering, approximately eighteen infantry soldiers, three cavalry men, four couriers and cooks, servants and camel drivers for eighteen camels. Also included were a French photographer and an English draughtsman. The former became frightened by the barking of jackals and the latter became sick the first night out from Massowah. Both had to be returned. Fortunately Lockett secured Ahmen Omar, governor of several Sudanese villages, as his guide. Lockett describes Ahmen Omar as "black but true and faithful and intelligent," and as an "absolutely reliable companion."

While still engaged in surveys around Massowah, Lockett was summoned to the site at Gura by General Loring. Leaving Massowah on February 3, 1876, and following the trail established by the army, he arrived at Gura on the eleventh. Over the trail, he found small dispositions of forces established to keep the supply line open. They were placed as follows:

1 Battalion at Massowah
1 Regiment at Mu Kullu
1 Company at Yangres
1 Regiment at Baraka with a battery of steel guns in park

42. Lockett, Wild Tribes and Wild Animals, in Lockett Papers; Samuel H. Lockett, How the Egyptians Make War, in Lockett Papers.
4 Companies and 4 pieces of artillery in the fort at Baraka
3 Companies and 4 pieces of artillery at Adi Russo
garrisoning fort
5000-6000 troops of all arms at Gura

Immediately on arrival, Lockett reported to General
Loring who was aware of Lockett's talents as a builder
of impregnable military forts. He laments General
Stone's placing Lockett on a surveying expedition when
"I had looked forward in case of a fight with the
Abyssinians, to having the assistance of Colonel
Lockett... whose services were much needed, and upon
whom I relied for valuable aid..." Despite the
fact that Lockett had been assigned another duty,
General Loring, after the engineers at Gura became
paralyzed by controversy, felt it was imperative to
have Lockett's aid in selecting the site for the de­
fenses. For four days, Lockett and Lieutenant-Colonel
Derrick combed the countryside for the most suitable
position for a fort. They were greatly handicapped by
the fact that Ratib Pasha had already rejected a
position about two and a half miles from Kayah Khor,

43. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
44. Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 335.
where wells had already been started, on the basis that there was no water. It was the opinion of most Americans that an abundant water supply would have been found if the project had continued. Moving two miles further down the valley the army halted. However, many of the American officers were dissatisfied because they felt that the new camp was too far from Kayah Khor. In this emergency, General Loring turned to Lockett for advice. Lockett made the best of the situation and, in consultation with Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick, Chief Engineer for the Abyssinian expedition, selected a site near the obviously abundant water supply about five miles from Kayah Khor. Having designated the site and fort plan of Gura, Lockett returned to Massowah, a trip that occupied only two days. Actual construction was left to Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick. 45

To Lockett, the most impressive aspect of the return trip was the greatly improved roads which formerly had been mere trails over gorges and rugged passes too narrow to allow one convoy to pass another. As a result of the skill of the engineering battalions the roads were fast becoming suitable for artillery and other

45. Ibid., 381-482; Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
wheeled vehicles. Large convoys were travelling these roads to the front with ammunition and provisions. One serious defect in the transportation system, the direct result of the duality of command was almost immediately noted by Lockett. American officers were receiving commands from General Loring while Egyptian officers were receiving nearly opposite orders from Ratib Pasha. This, of course, was later mitigated when Colonel Field and Major Dennison were sent to Massowah on February the twenty-second for the express purpose of speeding up the convoys. Colonel Field was given plenary powers in solving the transportation problem.46

Lockett returned to Massowah on the eighteenth, and resumed his survey of the harbor of Massowah and the surrounding environs. During the early spring, Lockett planned the defensive works at Massowah. His greatest problem in fortifying the port was the water supply. The system of waterworks constructed by the former governor, Munzinger Pasha, consisted of two wells on the mainland, from twelve to fifteen feet in diameter sunk below sea level. Using the ancient palm-leaf

46. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
bucket chain system the water was carried to wooden 
tanks standing on trestles. From here the water flowed 
through iron pipes to a large cistern on the island 
next to the city. The inhabitants were then forced to 
cross on a dike and brought the water to their homes in 
calf-skin vessels. Continuous dipping often kept the 
water level extremely low in the cistern. Obviously no 
considerable garrison could be stationed at Massowah 
unless the water supply was increased. It became 
Lockett's responsibility to dig other wells, find more 
and bigger pipes, and construct more cisterns. Nearly 
a year after the commencement of the work the additional 
wells and pipes were still on the planning board although 
through no fault of Lockett's who was forced by the 
exigencies of the military expedition to turn to other 
tasks. 47

Having laid out the fortifications at Massowah, 
Lockett turned his attention to selecting and completing 
the measurements of the base line. In this task he 
moved five miles inland to Bei Hammassat, where he made 
his first camp on February 23, 1876. After making sur-
veys and mapping the surrounding country, the group

47. Lockett, Engineering in the Egyptian Service, in Lockett Papers.
moved forward slowly, running transit and level lines and measuring and plotting distances in order to correctly ascertain the typographical and geographical nature of the territory which they were surveying. They made their second camp eighteen miles further inland on the banks of the Yangees River where an abundant supply of water was available.

Again Lockett was amazed at the reasoning of his subordinate, Baligh Bey, who selected for a camp site a vermined-filled old zariba constructed by a cavalry unit several days before. After lighting bright fires for protection against the numerous beasts of prey, Lockett insisted upon camping outside the zariba despite the protests of his demoralized men who believed Abyssinians lurked in every flicker of the firelight. The next day Lockett made a new camp and dug wells in the bed of the dry river.

During the survey, Lockett became increasingly dismayed over the slowness and calibre of work done by his native assistants. In desperation, Lockett designed an odograph and a clinograph: the former to measure and

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49. Lockett, Wild Tribes and Wild Animals, in Lockett Papers.
record distances and changes in direction; the latter to measure distances and changes in level. Lockett says that both instruments were practical and uncomplicated but would only measure actual distance, not horizontal distances, making them especially useful for reconnaissances. He sent these designs to Cairo, but no mechanic could be found skillful enough to construct them. 50

Lockett was extremely handicapped by lack of exact surveying instruments. He was forced to judge his surveying estimates by the summits of high mountains along the coast. He did not even possess a good pocket watch and therefore no means of taking longitude. Furthermore, the native pronunciations of place names were almost entirely different from the names which he found on the guide map, increasing the difficulty of positively identifying fixed positions. However, Lockett assured General Stone, in his official report, that he had carefully measured the lengths and taken the bearings of their route and that he had taken the magnetic bearing of all principal stations from the Governor's palace in Massowah.

50. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers; Lockett, Engineering in the Egyptian Service, in Lockett Papers.
On the fourth of March Lockett and his party moved forward to Ambatogam, a half day's march from the Yangus. Ambatogam is located on an extensive plain which afforded an extensive view of the area. Pausing for three days, Lockett took advantage of the location to extend his survey somewhat further on either side of the route. From the summit of Gebel Ambatogam, at the extreme west of the southern limit of the plain, Lockett could see the coast and Massowah to the north. He could also follow the course of the Baraka River which flows from the Gebel Ambatogam to the sea near Souakim to the south. Unable to believe his eyes, Lockett observed that the waters of the Hanazaa flowed into the Baraka and then joined the Wakiro, a fact not shown on any map of that day. Lockett deduced from his observations that the villages of Ailet and Asstu were mapped too far west, while the Yangus, Ambatogam, and Baraka were mapped too far south and east on the old maps. While urging the necessity of exact measurement, Lockett stated that he was convinced that the maps continually fixed his route too far south. Lockett also noted the error of representing the area between the
coastal tablelands and the Gangus Mountain as a plain, since he found this area a series of "abrupt hills of the most fantastic formations of different height." 51

Lockett, on the basis of his first-hand observations and measurements, prepared a technical report of over ten thousand words and submitted it to General Stone. The results of Lockett's survey, as summarized by Stone, are:

It is now established that:
(1) the natural drainage of the country, that is to say, the direction followed by the main streams, as shown upon existing maps, is far from correct:
(2) the natural drainage of the country follows a well-defined general system. This general system, now brought to light, may serve as a key to explain the mysteries of the typographical details of the entire territory;
(3) published maps, by their topographical indications, represent the zone between the tablelands as shown and the coast as a series of terraces, whereas it is now established by this expedition that this zone is traversed by numerous mountains, valleys and plains. 52

51. Lockett to Stone, Camp Baaraza, March 9, 1876, A. A., doss. 9/1.

52. Crabites, Americans in the Egyptian Army, 199.
Because of its commanding geographical and strategic position, Lockett suggested to the Egyptian government that Ambatogam be fortified as a military station. He stated that he was positive that the problem of water could be solved by digging wells, although there was none then available except a small pond. About half an hour's distance from his camp, a torrent bed of water could be found. He also pointed out the ease with which defensive works could dominate the road from Yangus to Baraka. There was an abundance of grass on the plain and the natives cultivated doura, for bread, over much of the area, showing the fertility of the soil.53

On March 8, Lockett moved forward to Baraka, which had been fortified and used as a depot for supplies by the main army. Setting up camp near Baraka, he established his base line and began work on an accurate topographical survey of the area. However, the boom of distant guns and the wild tales of the progress of the battle taking place at the front convinced Lockett that he should leave his survey and join the major in

53. Lockett to Stone, Camp Baaraza, March 9, 1876, A. A., doss. 9/1.
command of Baraka. Upon arriving at the fort, he worked for the next two days on the fortifications at Bakara. Despite the fact that a major commanding four hundred troops was in command of the position, Lockett discovered that there were two more groups - a convoy with two hundred men and Ali Bey Italianai with his escort of about one hundred men who were the working force for the telegraph line - at the fort. Independently of one another, each of these groups was busy fortifying. Observing the resultant confusion, Lockett, who was the ranking officer, refrained from taking command because he was of the General Staff. However, he set an example by reporting with his men to the major in command as an engineer force, and advised the major to take charge of all defensive operations so that there would be some system to the work. Powerless to execute anything, Lockett gave the major valuable advice on how to fortify the position. Already constructed by Derrick, the redoubt commanded the principal roads from Bamba and Guida. Lockett noted that the mountain passes would permit an enemy to go around the position and attack from the rear. High ridges outside the position could easily be dominated by an attacking army. Yet, inside
the fort the major insisted on keeping four hundred men and two pieces of artillery in an area whose circumference was not over four hundred feet. Lockett suggested that these crowded men would be much safer and more dangerous to an enemy in holes and rifle pits around the main work, and he pointed out the absolute necessity of occupying the surrounding eminencies, especially the crest of the ridges. Lockett, no doubt, remembered the deadly effectiveness of troops judiciously placed outside the works at Vicksburg to command the ridges and approaches to the fort. In view of the numerous vulnerable points at Baraka, Lockett wrote General Stone that, despite the abundant supply of water it was unpractical for permanent military occupation, and again urged permanent fortifications on the plain of Ambatogam, only six miles from Baraka. 54

Spurred on by wild tales of destruction at the front, Lockett resolutely helped set the defenses at Baraka in order before returning to his survey of the surrounding country. Failing to discover a pass to avoid the high range of the Bamba Mountains, Lockett

54. Ibid.
moved to its eastern foot where he established a camp. The torrent beds which descend in perpendicular precipices made it impossible to follow the valleys of the Bamba. Unable to make a passage with all the baggage in his possession, Lockett was forced to send all tents and instruments not absolutely necessary back to Baraka. Searching in vain for a passage through the Bamba delayed Lockett long enough for Ismail Pasha Kamil and his command en route to the front to overtake him. The Pasha advised Lockett to join his battalion as it was unsafe for so small a party to continue to make reconnaissances. Attaching his party to the Pasha's column, Lockett moved on to Adi Rasso. The force was joined by the battalion of Tacheria Bey at Adi Russo and Ismail Pasha Kamil was ordered to move out during the night to Kayah Khor with all speed and caution. Warned that it might be necessary to fight their way through, Lockett left all equipment with the exception of a few drawing materials, a pocket compass, barometers and his very lightest instruments at Adi Russo.55

55. Lockett to Stone, Near Kayah Khor, March 21, 1876, A. A., doss. 9/1.
At one o'clock the next morning (the moon rose at midnight) the two battalions moved out in columns of fours down a narrow bed of a stream. The convoy was extended for at least a mile with a platoon of soldiers in the rear as a guard. Marching his army into what he believed was country swarming with the enemy, Ismail Pasha Kamil unbelievably proceeded without flankers, without reconnaissances, or any other precautionary measure. Nor did he send out skirmishers or sharp shooters although he expected an attack.

As day broke on what Lockett described as "the most wonderful military movement I ever witnessed," the column had completed the climbing of the akabar (mountain pass) and was beginning the descent into the plain of Huaala. Twice the lively imaginations of the excited troops pictured Abyssinians coming down the mountain side. Once the farce resulted in the forming of squares, the standard military formation of the nineteenth century, to meet the attacks. Both times investigation proved that the suspected "Abyssinians" were only monkeys. 56

To Lockett's relief a squadron of forty cavalry came out to meet the column about four miles from Kayah

56. Lockett, Recent Military Events in Egyptian History, in Lockett Papers.
Khor. As the column resumed its march by twos, Lockett felt compensated for the lack of flankers. Feeling secure for the first time, Lockett was startled to observe the cavalry dashing back toward the column yelling "Abyssinians, form squares!" Surrounded by thick thorn bushes, visibility was limited to a few yards as the column obeyed orders. A square was formed and the cavalry led by its major was the first to enter the enclosure. Remaining outside the square, Lockett, Major Dulier, and Ismail Pasha Kamil sought fruitlessly to spot the enemy. When a nervous soldier fired his gun confusion was everywhere apparent as a wild volley of shots poured from every side of the square. At great personal risk, Major Dulier, Ismail Pasha Kamil and Lockett remained in front of the square in order to quiet the men. Strange to say, the troops were firing at a forty-five degree angle and not only missed their brave leaders, but also the entire convoy approaching from the rear. Not a man nor an animal was hurt. Lockett, completely stripped of his faith in the cavalry, volunteered to search for the enemy. Accompanied by Major Dulier, he returned to the point from which the cavalry had turned back. Finding nothing more formidable
than two shepherds, Lockett and Major Dulier returned to the column. Lockett suggested that the cavalry scour the thickets in order to make absolutely sure that the enemy did not threaten. The Pasha called to the cavalry but could get neither the cavalry or its commanding officer from the square.

Lockett, at his own request, was then given temporary command of the cavalry. With the aid of Major Dulier, M. Achille Robert, and Mustapha as squad leaders, a thorough reconnaissance was made. It was conceded finally that this was another miserable stampede and false alarm, and the column then resumed its march. Within the column the major of the cavalry, with ten bodyguards, marched for over an hour before venturing out to rejoin his command.

Passing near the village of Kayah Khor about noon the troops were too frightened to pause even for a drink of water although there was no sign of the Abyssinians. Reaching the summit of the Akabah and the entrenchments of Osman Pasha at around three o'clock, Lockett sighed with relief at his "marvellous escape." Segments of the convoy wandered in until dark without
After this experience Lockett reported to General Stone, probably with a tongue in his cheek, that they "had a terrible fatiguing march with occasional alarms." Only a few short months before these same troops had been chosen in Cairo as the elite of the Egyptian army. What had happened in the meantime to make them appear so ridiculous? Only three weeks before Lockett had been at the front hopefully selecting and planning the fort at Gura. In March he returned to find himself a part of a virtually defeated army.

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57. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers. These notes were loose-leaf and apparently had no place in the body of Lockett's Private Notes.

58. Lockett to Stone, Near Kayah Khor, March 21, 1876, A. A., doss. 9/1.
CHAPTER IV

LOCKETT'S FORTS IN ABYSSINIA

Lockett, who selected the site and designed the breastworks at Gura, located the fort near the southern extremity of the plain of Gura. To the south hills terminated the plain, but to the north the plain extended for miles forming the Hamasen Plateau. The plain, varying in width from two to three miles, widening in the north, was limited in the east by high mountainous country. In the west a low range of ricky hills led to the tragic valley of the Mareb. To the east, five miles from Gura, the Akhaba of Kayah Khor provided ascent from the low country to the Plateau. The fort had an excellent command of the plain and deep trenches surrounding the works gave protection to troops stationed outside the walls.¹

The selection and fortification of the site occasioned a bitter controversy between the American and Egyptian officers. Ratib Pasha had first selected a

¹. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.

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small valley behind the Abyssinian village of Gura that was dominated by towering hills which provided excellent protection to any attacking force. Loring persuaded Ratib to move out into the Gura Valley so that the valuable pass at Kayah Khor might be more easily defended and the bulk of the army would not be at the mercy of an enemy force attacking from the hills. The American engineers selected a site around two and a half miles from Kayah Khor and began digging wells. Ratib, fearing that they would not find a sufficient supply of water, insisted that the army move about two and a half miles further up the valley to an abundant supply of water. The American engineers and the Egyptian commander became embroiled in a hopeless controversy over the wisdom of a position so far from Kayah Khor, a vital link in an eighty mile supply line from the coast. A protected line running from Massowah through strong mountain passes at Bahr Reza, Adi Russo, and Kayah Khor ensured the Egyptian army of a continuous flow of supplies. Loring felt that this supply line must be maintained and improved before the army moved into the interior, and that Gura should be established within supporting distance of the only link in Abyssinia,
the Ahabah at Kayah Khor. Lockett was called to the front in order to settle the dispute. In order to bring harmony to the command, Lockett, probably under the advice of Loring, demonstrated that the site chosen by Ratib Pasha could be made impregnable. In view of Lockett's arguments, the American engineers reluctantly agreed to accept the position dictated by Ratib.\textsuperscript{2} It is well to note, however, that the compromise solution mitigated against Lockett's best judgment in the selection of Fort Gura, although he did agree to its ultimate disposition.

Originally it had been assumed that King John would meet the Egyptian Army near his capitol, Adua, about sixty miles further in the Abyssinian interior. After the arrival of approximately 6,000 troops, Loring insisted, over the protests of the cautious Ratib, that the bulk of the army be kept in the rear improving the trail and organizing the supplies that must be brought to Gura before the march into the interior. An efficient transportation system was imperative since the advent of the rainy season in the latter part of May

\textsuperscript{2} Loring, \textit{A Confederate Soldier in Egypt}, 380-382; Notes of a Staff Officer, "in Blackwood's Magazine, CXXII, 29.
would make all military movements impossible for at least three months. King John, apparently hoping to lure the unsuspecting Egyptians into a trap similar to the Adrendrup affair, remained stationary while the Egyptian forces advanced to the Gura Plain and built their fortifications. Suddenly he began to move northward along the Endolilassie Road into Hamesen and as far east as Asmara. This falsely led the Egyptian commander to fear an attack from the rear. Lack of knowledge of the object of King John's march northward, due to the lack of adequate scouting, led to confusion in the Egyptian camp. Then the Abyssinian horde turned southward and marched into the Mareb Valley camping at Aratoor Derhel, only six miles from Gura. The Egyptian troops were ordered up from the rear and the troops at Kayah Khor were ordered upon the plain in supporting distance of Gura.

Fort Gura was so well planned by Lockett that it now became the center of a controversy over divergent battle plans conceived by Ratib Pasha and Loring. Both generals agreed that Gura was impregnable to enemy attack.

3. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
Ratib Pasha reported that the strength of the fortifications at Gura made this site more ideal for battle than the relatively unfortified position of Osman Pasha at Kayah Khor. Osman Pasha dominated the narrow ravines and valleys leading to the plain with about ten pieces of mountain artillery and 2500 men. But General Loring felt that "even 500 men could hold the place" where Derrick, following Lockett's instructions, had thrown "up an impregnable fortification, which did him great credit and answered all that we required, and eventually stood the test of a severe ordeal." He believed that the bulk of the Egyptian command should effect a union with Osman Pasha at Kayah Khor to protect the Ahabah and render impossible any effort by King John to cross the valley between the two Egyptian forces so as to cut communications and reenforcements to Gura.

5. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
7. Ibid., 398.
A counsel of war between Ratib and Loring followed and they agreed that the troops should be so disposed as to prevent the capture of the Ahabah or Osman Pasha at Kayah Khor; that if King John moved against Osman Pasha as if to attack, a force from Gura would assault from the rear; and that if he tried to cross between the two forts, he would be intercepted and fought by their combined forces.8

The Egyptian forces had not organized scouting details until after their arrival into enemy territory. Feeling the imperative need for reliable news of Abyssinian movements, the Americans voluntarily organized and led scouting details. Loring states that "it proved difficult to organize them," but staff officer Derrick, Irgins, Somani and Doctor Wilson courageously volunteered for this important duty. When King John advanced toward Gura, Ratib became alarmed and halted all scouting details.9 This was a grave error. The Egyptian army was located in the northernmost provinces of Abyssinia. The native population was, on the whole,

8. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
friendly to the Egyptians and regarded them as liberators. The Abyssinian army lived upon the countryside and did not depend upon a supply line. Without wagons or baggage, the army was enabled to move rapidly over wide expanses of territory. But no organized effort was made to follow the movements of the Abyssinians as they advanced toward Gura.10

Couriers brought news that King John's constantly moving force planned to march across the valley in the rear of the village of Gura. If allowed to do so, King John would possess the eastern range of mountains that commanded the entire plain. In order to ascertain the validity of these reports, Derrick volunteered to lead a daring reconnaissance of the enemy camp. He viewed King John's army and camp from the village of Durhel and learned from natives that Abyssinian soldiers who retreated as he approached with a cavalry escort, had bragged that they would advance in two days. Acting on Derrick's report, plans were made to move the main force out onto the plain Tuesday morning, March the seventh, to a position between Kayah Khor and Gura so that a juncture could be effected between the two forts.

if necessary.  

Early Tuesday morning, Derrick reconnoitered the enemy camp again. Observing signs of movement, he reported the advance of the Abyssinians. Watching until nearly captured by King John's cavalry, Derrick reported the approach of the Abyssinian troops at great personal risk since the unnerved Egyptian soldiers threatened to fire as he approached his own lines.

Meanwhile Osman Pasha reported that the Abyssinian Army was nearing his command at Kayah Khor. Ratib Pasha verbally ordered seven battalions armed with 18 pieces of mountain artillery, five Krupp guns and six steel muzzle loaders called the "Bulbuls." Suddenly within a few yards of the front a battery of "Bulbuls" was ordered back to the fort by the Commander-in-Chief, Ratib Pasha. Since Loring strenuously objected, a small delay resulted while the two discussed the situation.

To the surprise of the staff officers who expected a junction with the forces at Kayah Khor, the troops

11. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers; Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 404.

12. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers; Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 404.
marched only about three-fourths of a mile from Gura and assumed battle lines. After persuasion by the American officers the march was resumed. The column advanced only a mile further when again Ratib ordered the troops to form a battle line at the rear of a ravine that ran from the hills to the plain in an east to west direction. Considering the Egyptian troops still too far from Kayah Khor to effect a junction with the troops under Osman Pasha, Loring appealed to Prince Hassan, who served as an unofficial third commander to order the Commander-in-Chief to move further in the direction of Kayah Khor. Ratib Pasha, against his will, crossed the ravine and finally placed the army with its back against the range of hills and the right flank extending to the Asmara Road, the route which Derrick reported that the Abyssinian army would use to invade the plain. The left flank was almost midway between the forts and the east of a straight line between them. Neither Osman Pasha, who wished to remain near Gura nor Loring, who wished to move nearer Kayah Khor, was completely satisfied with the position chosen for battle.13

13. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers; Shukry, The Khedive Ismail and Slavery in the Sudan (1863-1879), 268.
However Lockett describes the Egyptian site as excellent. The Egyptians were on rising ground with a relatively clear view of the area in front of them for several hundred yards. On either side they were flanked by forts armed with Krupp and Napoleon guns and howitzers. Furthermore the troops were armed with the most modern Remington breech-loading rifles, at least a dozen French mountain howitzers, a battery of English steel guns, and a battery of rocket tubes. Their cavalry had the finest mounts available. Their own Commander-in-Chief and around a dozen American and foreign officers, many of whom had seen active service under similar conditions, accompanied the army.

No sooner had the battle line been settled than the Abyssinian horde moving in masses, crossed the plain. Even before the Abyssinians were within range, the Egyptian artillery began firing. Lockett has estimated that King John raised an army of 65,000 men, but all of these were not present at Gura since it was necessary to leave troops in Adua to preserve peace among his rebellious chieftains. Estimates of the total force at Gura vary from 40,000 to 50,000, but the

nature of the terrain permitted King John to deploy no more than 20,000 in the attack on the Egyptian position.\textsuperscript{15} The Abyssinians advanced steadily on the Asmara Road toward the right flank of the Egyptian Army. The Egyptian musketry poured a continuous rifle fire toward the oncoming adversary. Considering the vast numbers, the Egyptian should have mowed down thousands of the naked warriors who had few fire arms, no artillery and no military organization. But, according to Lockett, "firing without aiming and generally without even bringing the gun to the shoulder, their bullets were wasted in the air," and the "loss of the Abyssinians was about 750 men!"\textsuperscript{16} The courageous Abyssinians slipped up under the Egyptian fire and soon overwhelmed the right flank of the army. It soon became obvious that reinforcements were necessary if the position was to be held. Colonel Dye repeatedly requested more troops and constantly rearranged battle lines to stem the advancing wave. When reinforcements

\textsuperscript{15} "Notes of a Staff Officer," in \textit{Blackwood's Magazine}, CXXII, 30.

\textsuperscript{16} Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers; Lockett, "Arabi and his Army," in \textit{The Nation}, XXXV, 257.
failed to appear, the cavalry, which should have
guarded against a flank movement, bolted and riding
over everything in sight, retreated in full view of the
army after stampeding the munition train. A battalion
placed to the rear of the right flank by Derrick, re­
mained in their midst. Dye, wounded in the foot,
joined the retreating troops in a movement to the left.

Meanwhile, Osman Pasha at Kayah Khor, only two and
one-half miles away, had fired four shots from his
mountain pieces which were directly in line with the
right flank. Seeing these shots fall short, he ceased
firing without attempting to move closer. Osman Pasha
later claimed that he feared to move forward lest King
John deploy his entire force in a determined attack on
Kayah Khor. Thus the two Egyptian forces were never
united during the fierce battle.17

The center and left wings of the Egyptian army
kept up a tremendous fire although they had not been
directly attacked. Having shortened the right wing,
King John sent a detachment of troops to the left in
order to isolate the Egyptians from their fort at Gura.
As the right wing fell back, the Abyssinians took

17. Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 410.
possession of the hills in the rear and the Egyptian soldiers without haste or panic calmly shouldered their guns and began a countermarch toward the entrenchments at Gura. No order had been given, but they seemed to think that the battle was over. Native officers, from company commanders to regimental officers, apparently agreed with the men and made no effort to rally the troops. The American officers attempted to stop the march to the rear but failing, tried to get the retreating troops to fire while marching. As this was a new maneuver, they looked blankly amazed as they continued their retreat. When the ravine was reached the troops marched calmly into it and became wedged in a thick mass. With Abyssinians on both sides, the cavalry assumed that all was lost and moved toward the fort. All efforts of Prince Hassan to rally the cavalry to resist the Abyssinian cavalry, then scouring the plain and indiscriminately cutting down Egyptians, was in vain. Probably a thousand men were slaughtered in the ravine, and those who escaped, seeing Abyssinian cavalry between them and the fort, turned toward the mountains and into the brush. The Abyssinians followed them, killing or capturing most of the group.
Ratib Pasha, Prince Hassan and General Loring were among those who succeeded in getting through the Abyssinian cavalry to the fort. All of the American officers were safe excepting Doctor Johnson of Tennessee who was slightly wounded and captured. A Hungarian, Major Durholtz was severely wounded and also captured. Dye was wounded in the foot and Doctor Wilson suffered a broken leg but both reached the fort safely. Most of the cavalry reached the fort, but only about one hundred officers and men of the artillery and infantry escaped behind the breastworks.

Not all the native officers and personnel proved inept during combat. Lockett sites impressive exceptions as Raschid Pasha, division commander, and Mahamet Ali Pasha, Chief Surgeon. Raschid Pasha, was a man of character as well as ability and courage. Wounded early in the battle, he remained at his post on the right flank vainly striving to rally and reorganize his men. Surrounded by Abyssinians, bleeding and almost exhausted, he was finally cut down by several of the enemy. Mahamet Ali Pasha, an excellent physician and skillful surgeon, had been educated in Paris. The kindly doctor left Fort Gura during the engagement.
thinking all was going well. Captured by the Abyssinians, he was held prisoner several weeks before being killed. 18

After their decisive victory the Abyssinians took over the site of the first Egyptian camp on the plateau, a valley surrounded by hills behind the village of Gura. The prisoners were bound together, back to back, without even a guard over them. The Abyssinians, elated by success indulged in wild orgies, and then slept like logs. No sentinels, pickets, or guards were posted. Some Egyptian prisoners escaped and reported the state of affairs.

Meanwhile reinforcements were rushed to the front by Field and Dennison who joined the regiment of Raschid Bey and marched across the plain of Huaala to the village of Kayah Khor. King John made no effort to prevent the junction of these troops with those under the command of Osman Pasha at Kayah Khor. At Kayah Khor, Field dispatched Dennison to Osman Pasha's entrenched position to get instruction. The force was ordered to join Osman Pasha at the summit of the Akabah. After reaching this position at about ten o'clock on the night

18. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
of the seventh, they were told that the combined forces of the Kayah Khor garrison and the reenforcements would move forward to Gura in obedience to a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief. This movement never materialized.

Within Gura, differing counsels prevailed. Hearing of the conditions in the Abyssinian camp and realizing the vulnerability of the Abyssians to attack, General Loring urged that the troops from Kayah Khor should be brought to Gura during the night, and that a combined force be placed in the hills above the sleeping Abyssinians to recapture the prisoners and lost material. Lockett says that an attack at daybreak might have succeeded admirably. Ratib Pasha did order the troops from Kayah Khor, but once safe in the haven of Lockett's Gura fortifications, he remained unenthusiastic about leaving. Though never explained, the reenforcements from Kayah Khor did not arrive, and Ratib refused to move without them. He even declined to make any effort to rescue the wounded men outside the fort.

The next day the Abyssinians bravely but without opposition, descended to the plain and captured camels, mules, horses, and tents outside the fort. No regular attack was made by the Egyptians although some exchange
of shots continued throughout the day. The Egyptians had abandoned as much ammunition as eight hundred camels could carry on the field along with eighteen cannons and a number of rocket guns. All the transport animals as well as the horses and mules of the artillery were captured.

On Thursday, March the ninth, the Abyssinians returned in force to attack the fort at Gura. Using a ravine running north and south through the valley and inching up by means of a branch ravine under cover of some old and partly destroyed Egyptian works, the Abyssinians approached to within sixty or seventy feet of the fort. Abyssinian sharpshooters, behind bushes about three quarters of the circumference of the fort, picked off every visible soldier in the Lockett designed fort. Many of the Egyptian troops behaved handsomely, especially the artillery and the Sudanese troops in the infantry. But the bulk of the troops from lower Egypt were more accustomed to curbash and sticks than the expensive guns of the Khedive and remained huddled in the fort. A continuous fire from the fort proved too deadly for the Abyssinians who were accustomed to fighting in the open. Although they showed great
courage during the attack, lack of experience in carrying fortified places defeated them. Lockett says, "Ignorance on their part saved the remnant of the Egyptian army."

Behind Lockett's fortifications, the Egyptians had fared well during the battle. Only four officers and fourteen privates had been killed. A few others were wounded, but this number was nominal. For the first time the Abyssinians were at the mercy of the humiliated and defeated Egyptian troops and they took their victory with vengeance. Many Arab officers seemed indifferent to the mutilation and slaughter of the wounded Abyssinians left outside the fort. The infuriated Egyptian soldiers killed these men by throwing burning hay and brush upon them while their officers stood idly by and watched. The Americans halted the disgraceful spectacle as soon as possible. 19

In retaliation, early the next day on Friday, the Abyssinians began a wholesale slaughter of over a thousand prisoners in their camp. However, the slaughter began so early in the morning that it is doubtful that

the fate of their own soldiers was yet known. Furthermore, their record in the two previous clashes boded little good for any hapless victim that fell into their hands. With a small remnant of the prisoners, they then retreated into the interior. King John sent a message to Ratib Pasha offering to negotiate and saying that he did not wish to kill the Egyptians, but wished only that they leave the country. Upon acceptance of this condition, the remaining prisoners would be returned.20

As soon as the Americans realized that King John had retreated into the interior, they urged Ratib Pasha to send the cavalry to the site of his former camp to ascertain if any wounded had been left. Ratib opposed the notion at first but, seeing that the Americans were determined, finally agreed to allow Derrick and Irgins to lead a cavalry detail on the errand of mercy. When the cavalry escort neared the former Abyssinian camp, it turned and fled. Derrick and Irgins proceeded alone and discovered over one hundred wounded Egyptians in the camp. They reported this fact to Ratib, and agreed to lead a new cavalry detail back

20. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
to rescue the wounded. Ratib reluctantly agreed. 21

Meanwhile Lockett, who had missed the battle, arrived at Kayah Khor and on the fourteenth of March reported to Osman Pasha. The next day Lockett was ordered to report to Ratib at Gura. There he received orders from the Commander-in-Chief and Prince Hassan to construct a fort that would command the Ahabah of Kayah Khor. The weakness of the Egyptian position compelled Ratib Pasha to request a position that could be fortified in from twenty to thirty days; that would be almost impregnable and that housed a garrison of three infantry battalions and two artillery batteries (six to twelve pieces). Furthermore, the ever present problem of water must be solved. The fort would have to use the water sources near Kayah Khor.

Lockett says that this was one of the most difficult assignments of his engineering career. He wrote Stone:

This seemed at first a very difficult problem, and one whose selection I had doubts of being able to accomplish. I made the effort, however, with a determination to succeed if possible, and did succeed beyond my most sanguine hope. 22


22. Lockett to Stone, Near Kayah Khor, March 21, 1876, A. A., doss. 9/1.
After carefully studying the area, Lockett chose a spot that covered the two highest points near the Ahabah. This site was commanded by a high plateau to the north and by mountains to the southeast. The former were from six hundred to eight hundred meters away and the latter not less than 1200 meters away. Lockett says that these distances could be occupied by sharpshooters to the detriment of the fort. But while they might also be used as a base for bombarding the fort with cannons the results would not be serious since the heights were the same elevation as the proposed fort. A thorough engineer, Lockett detailed these possibilities in another letter to Stone. He might well have added that while the Egyptians had the modern equipment with a rudiment of training in the use of arms, the Abyssinians lacked both, with the exception of equipment captured after the Battle of Gura, and this did not include many guns that could be used as siege pieces.

Even more important, the site dominated the Gura Plain as far as the range of the best artillery, and commanded the Akabah of Kayah Khor and the Gura Valley as far as the range of the best cannon. Furthermore,
the nature of the rocky and steep terrain would prevent an organized force from attacking the fort except at points on the fortifications. As a result, the troops in the fort might retrench and be able to serve as a relief for points under assault. In addition, the irregular mountain side would prevent an enemy from deploying any great force at any point on the works. The irregular terrain also enabled Lockett to construct well protected magazines, storehouses and other habitations. The site offered a perfect setting for a compact line of fortifications. The troops could garrison the fort and it would not be necessary to have a reserve force to hold it. 23

As at Vicksburg, Lockett planned a fort that would dominate the crests of the ridges, making the enemies' guns ineffective; that would permit mobile forces to rush to the defense of any portion of the line threatened by an attacking party; that would prevent the enemy from deploying a large force against the works; that would enable a small garrison to defend detached strong points on a compact line.

23. Lockett to Stone, Near Kayah Khor, March 17, 1876, A. A., doss. 50/3.
Lockett admits that the position had two disadvantages: (1) certain points were sharp and irregular making a fortified line difficult to construct. However, Lockett's experience at Vicksburg had illustrated the effectiveness of outer works supported by rifle pits in solving this problem. (2) The water supply had to be secured from a spot below the fort. Lockett believed that the engineers could solve this problem since water was to be found in abundance just below the proposed fort.

Fort Kayah Khor, impenetrable with only three battalions and from six to twelve pieces of artillery, could, as Lockett reported, be constructed in around ten days (half the time asked) with a working force of only two battalions of engineers using primitive equipment. Lockett asked for five hundred pickaxes, one hundred spades, fifty ironstrips, fifty hand axes, one thousand baskets, and a large quantity of rope. It is evident that he contemplated the utilization of the rocks of the surrounding mountain to build an impregnable fort.\(^\text{24}\) His experience during the Civil War in constructing fortifications with inadequate working material.

\(^{24}\) Ibid.
forces and equipment had schooled him for a task that a more conventional engineer might have found impossible.

This fort, which was doubtless impregnable to a frontal attack, was never tested by actual battle because King John had already retreated into the interior after battering in vain at Lockett's fort at Gura. In view of the disastrous results of the actual Battle of Gura, there can be no doubt that the entire Egyptian force of around six thousand men would have been wiped out but for Lockett's fort. General Raleigh E. Colston, one of the most competent American experts in Egypt, had written of Gura: "It was only that fort, erected by an American engineer officer (Colonel Lockett), that saved the Egyptian army from a defeat as complete as that of Isandula, for the Abyssinians fight as desperately as the Zulus..."25

While Gura undoubtedly saved the remnant of the Khedivial army in Abyssinia, the importance of Fort Kayah Khor cannot be minimized. This fort made it

impossible for the Abyssinians to drive the Egyptian forces from Abyssinian territory. Since the Egyptian army could not be forced out of the country, King John was forced to negotiate with the Egyptians to voluntarily leave the country. The Egyptian government was thus enabled to claim that the defeat had been an Egyptian victory and that the punitive expedition was a complete success. It is doubtful that this claim actually impressed the Great Powers as to the success of the Egyptian expedition even though the government rigidly censored all news released to the press concerning the battle and all letters leaving the battle field. 26 The London Times was able to get an interview with a staff officer who witnessed the conflict. Their reporter commented:

The Egyptians have been able to imagine, or, at least, to say that they remained masters of the situation thus occupied without resistance, and the three provinces; but it would seem that King John has repeated what he did in the defiles of Goundel... 27

26. Derrick to Derrick, December 11, 1875, in Derrick Letters; Derrick to Derrick, December 22, 1876, in Derrick Letters.

27. The London Times, October 12, 1876, p. 5.
On the other hand, Colonel Derrick, who Lockett describes as very sympathetic toward the Egyptian government and people, writes:

The Egyptian flag still floats over the points taken, and the battle field of Gura still lies under the command of Egyptian artillery, and Egyptian Soldiers still march on Abyssinian soil and Egyptian bugles still awaken the echoes of her rugged mountains. In other words, Egypt holds all that portion of Abyssinia of which she had taken possession, and can continue to do so as long as she may so desire. If this be "total failure," then the object of the invasion must have been different entirely. 28

Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes. The Abyssinian warrior was helpless before the bricks and stones of Lockett's fortifications. Abyssinians were accustomed to being led into battle by chieftains. Their army organization was feudal. Each chieftain chose an opponent and dashed toward him followed by his subjects. Hand to hand combat resulted. This type of battle was not understood by the demoralized and drill-trained Egyptian troops. If the Egyptian

28. Derrick to Derrick, September 8, 1876, in Derrick Letters.
soldier was helpless on an open battlefield, the Abyssinian warrior was equally helpless before a fort. Any success connected with the Abyssinian campaign must be accredited to the engineering genius that defied the savage advance.

During March, Egyptian reserves were rushed to the plain of Gura. The Egyptian officers were faced with the question of continuing the campaign or waiting until the summer rainy season was over. About the middle of April, conclusive signs that the summer rainy season was approaching caused the Egyptians to conclude that no further military movements would be practical. The troops were marched from Gura to Kayah Khor. Kayah Khor received provisions and ammunition for a year, and a garrison of three battalions of infantry and two batteries of artillery. Adi Russo and Baraza were also garrisoned before the main army retired to Massowah.

On the twenty-second of April, Lockett was placed in charge of all the engineering work necessary to maintain the position of the Egyptian army. He placed Derrick at Adi Russo, Dennison at Baraza, Baligh Bey (the native who aided him on the typographical survey) at Embatokan, and Dulier at Kayah Khor. On the twenty-fourth of April, Lockett was ordered to follow the main
army to Massowah and to fortify the sea port. He was also to strengthen the fortifications at Adi Russo and Baraza. Leaving Major Edouard Dulier in charge at Kayah Khor, Lockett proceeded to Massowah where he found that the bulk of the army had already departed to Cairo. However, the American staff officers remained without duties to perform. Lockett began construction of new redoubts at Massowah. Several weeks later, the additional fortifications at Massowah, Adi Russo, and Baraza were completed under his supervision. Meanwhile the rains began and continued day and night without ceasing. Lockett and his party were given a couple of weeks inactivity. 29

In the latter part of May orders arrived from Stone directing Field and Derrick to explore Baraza. Derrick's party consisted of Durholtz, a Swiss officer of the staff, two young Arab engineering officers, twenty-five soldiers, their non-commissioned officers, a native lieutenant, three guides of the Shoho tribe, five or six camel drivers, twenty-five camels and five mules. Leaving Massowah on the twenty-ninth of May, Derrick

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29. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
proceeded through McKulloo and on to Yangousse. Before he had traveled far, he received a telegram from Cairo ordering him back to Massowah before the twelfth. Going as far as possible into the interior, Derrick mapped this section between Massowah and Abyssinia. He was handicapped by the fact that none of his command spoke English, and he knew little Arabic. On the tenth, Derrick, following orders, broke camp at Yangousse and returned to Massowah to await orders to embark. Apparently Stone still hoped to map this section of the Red Sea littoral, but these contradictory orders indicate that his plans were receiving formidable opposition in Cairo. The staff officers remained idle in Massowah until the twenty-fourth of June before finally receiving orders to embark.30

Lockett expectantly hoped to depart with this group, but instead he received orders to remain in Massowah. Stone still hoped to acquire valuable information about the surrounding area which was a cartographical blank on western maps. Lockett was the only available American untainted by the disastrous defeat at Gura. His engineering skill had been praised by

30. Ibid.; Derrick to Derrick, July 28, 1876, in Derrick Letters.
both Ratib Pasha and General Loring. Stone decided that his work in the Third Section could temporarily be directed by Colonel Derrick, while Lockett remained on the Red Sea littoral compiling information about this region. On the twenty-seventh of June, Lockett was ordered to send his second officer, Colonel Baligh Bey with part of the command to survey the possibilities of a railway from Massowah to Guida via Ailet. During the next three weeks this survey was completed. Meanwhile, Lockett became ill for ten days. Afterwards, on July the tenth, he personally visited Ailet as a precautionary measure since Baligh Bey had so often proven a careless workman. The next month and a half were spent in idleness awaiting orders in Massowah. Lockett, still handicapped by the lack of equipment, sent a request to Cairo for more exact instruments with which to continue his survey.

The Egyptian Abyssinian question continued during these months. The Egyptian representative, Arabi Bey, continued to negotiate with King John. Two thousand Bashi Bazoucks (black troops from regions in Central Africa) arrived from Cairo to replace the garrisons at Massowah, Baraza, and Adi Russo. The former Raz of
Hamasen, Walter Michael, attacked that province with about two thousand troops, including two hundred Bashi Bazouks. Capturing Tzazega, the capital, he killed men, women, and children, and even murdered several European inhabitants of the city. As a result King John tortured Arabi Bey, the Egyptian negotiator, and sent word to the Khedive that there could be no peace until every Egyptian left his territory and Walter Michael, who enjoyed the protection of Egypt, was either dead or his prisoner. By the twenty-seventh of August, Major Dulier arrived from Kayah Khor with news that Ratib Pasha was abandoning Fort Kayah Khor to concentrate in the rear at Barzaa. From this position, the Egyptian general proposed to go to the province of Hamasen, probably locating at Asmara. Lack of proper sanitary measures in the Egyptian forts had made them resemble cesspools as the rainy season progressed, and it was generally conceded that the Egyptian army would withdraw from Abyssinia without attempting to renew the costly campaign.  

The existence of Lockett's impregnable forts enabled Arabi Bey to effect a quiet withdrawal from

31. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.

32. Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt.
Abyssinia. Arabi Bey received a medal from the Khedive and became the first native Egyptian ever honored by the title of Pasha as a reward for the quiet withdrawal. Ten years later this Pasha was to write a bloody page across Egyptian history as head of a nationalist revolt against foreign, especially English, intervention.

Lockett remained at Massowah until the eighteenth of September. On the sixth Graves arrived with needed engineering equipment for proposed surveys on the Red Sea littoral. Two weeks later both were ordered back to Cairo without explanation. The equipment was never used by Lockett. He reached Cairo on the twenty-third of September. It has been generally conceded that

33. Lockett, "Arabi and his Army," in The Nation, XXXV, 257-258. No formal peace was ever concluded between Egypt and Abyssinia. The culmination of the Egyptian defeat in Abyssinia came in 1882 when Abyssinia through a treaty with the English acquired Kassala, Galabat Katarif, and Bogos. With the exception of Bogos these provinces were inhabited entirely by Arab Mohammedans who had little in common with Christian Abyssinia. At the same time Abyssinia was given the right of importing and exporting merchandise and arms through the Massowah port. See Charles G. Gordon, "General Gordon's Journal, from 20th October to 5th November, 1884," in A Egmont Hake (ed.), The Journals of Major-Gen. C. G. Gordon, C. B., At Kartoum (London, 1885), 214.

34. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
Lockett's fort at Gura saved the remnant of the Khedival forces. Students of the Abyssinian campaign agree that Kayah Khor was even more formidable, and probably impenetrable by means of a frontal attack. These twin forts enabled the Egyptians to claim a victory and go through the forms of negotiating with King John. Without Lockett, the campaign would have been very, very different.
Although the Egyptian Government attempted to suppress the news of the Abyssinian disaster, there was little doubt of defeat in the minds of the military counsels. Their punitive expedition would have literally been driven from Abyssinia but for the twin forts of Lockett. When Lockett arrived at Gura in the early part of the campaign, on the seventeenth of March, he found the fort disorganized between the American and Egyptian leaders. Ratib Pasha and General Loring were convinced that the idiotic schemes proposed by the other had doomed the campaign. Camp quarrels, disagreements, and recriminations separated the foreign officers from the native officers as the nationals hastened to support their "commander." Soon the Americans found themselves quietly, without general orders, superseded by Egyptian officers who took over their duties while they sat idle without directions.

Lockett, far removed from the quarrels that split the staff, observed:
There was evidently a lamentable lack of harmony between the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff from the very commencement of operations in spite of the solemn pledge they both made when the Khedive put their hands together and said, "I entrust this war to two men, but there must be but one heart and one head." The differences and the enmity and antagonism existing was almost as great as either party had for the common enemy. I believe even greater.\(^1\)

Since the antagonism and lack of cooperation between the two "commanders" and their nationals played such an important role in the defeat of the Egyptians, an examination of the temperament of the two men and of the travail of the American Mission might be helpful in accounting for the disaster in Abyssinia.

Ratib Pasha pursued the Abyssinian Campaign with determination and perseverance. He had attended a French military school, but lacked any real battle experience. Personally brave, conscious of his duty to his sovereign, and unostentatious, Ratib Pasha often rode off on reconnaissance alone. He never allowed a group of loafing officers to loiter around his headquarters and quietly inspected the camp without fuss of parade or

\(^1\) Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
ceremony. He often went to the officers to discuss business instead of summoning them to his tent. At first, he considered Loring superior in military judgment because of his age and experience. But as the campaign developed he relied more heavily on his own judgment.

In contrast, Lockett observed that Loring's "impulsiveness, irritability, hardiness, and lack of 'savoir faire' ultimately placed him in direct antagonism" with Ratib Pasha and the other Arab officers.

Loring was about sixty years old. Joining the American army at the age of seventeen, he had already participated in five wars, losing an arm in the Mexican War. Lockett, who witnessed his controversial retreat at the Battle of Baker's Creek, says that he is "opinionated," "easily excited, easily thrown off his balance, and then becomes violent, hasty, rude and often unpardonably insulting in his speech and manner," and he adds that his greatest faults are "quickness of temper and impulsiveness." Despite his many years experience, Loring had never been a "bureau man." He was well suited for service as a cavalry officer or as a field commander, but as a staff officer he kept affairs in continual disorganization. His surgeon was an aide-de-camp. His
other aide-de-camps were employed at odd tasks but nothing for long. His Inspector General became a Quartermaster and Commander of troops, and his engineering officers, in common with everybody else, found themselves employed at every task but their own. Lockett does not question that Loring was "thoroughly conscientious and zealous in the discharge of his duties..." He was despite his many years of experience, unsuited to the task given him. Acquainted with Loring as a younger man, Lockett sees "some loss of vigor in his intellect, boldness in his character, and vim and vigor in his will."2

As a result, if we can assume Lockett's conclusions are correct, the American officers attributed the failure to one set of causes, and the native officers to another set of causes. The Americans felt that the campaign failed because of the incapacity of Egyptian troops and subaltern officers as soldiers, and because Osman Pasha, at Kayah Khor, failed to co-operate or leave his position. They claim that the Egyptians displayed little courage or military spirit; had practically no battle experience; neglected to send skirmishers to the front

2. Ibid.
during the battle; had no sharp shooters or flankers; made no effort to out-maneuver the Abyssinians during the battle; and gave no orders to meet the changing aspects of the battle.\(^3\) The Americans believed that the Egyptians lacked "everything that goes to make up the qualifications of an Army except mere paper organization and equipment."\(^4\)

But the Egyptians answered these charges by stating that Ratib Pasha was opposed to an attack in the open field in view of the enormous numeral superiority of the Abyssinians. If the Egyptians had waited for the Abyssinians to attack the fort, the King would have been defeated and discouraged. Then the seriously demoralized Egyptian soldier would have been encouraged and given needed experience. When this was blocked by the influence of the Americans, especially Loring and Dye, the opportunity for a successful conclusion of the campaign and of later meeting the Abyssinians in the open was ruined.\(^5\)

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5. Ibid.
In view of these conditions, it was unfortunate that the position of the Commander of the Army was not clearly defined and that there was a split command. Loring was first considered for this position, but pressure in Cairo to place a native and a Muslim at the head of the army caused him to be replaced by Ratib Pasha. This resulted in a compromise order from the Khedive for the two to cooperate. When this proved impossible the army was thrown into utter confusion by conflicting orders from the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff.\(^6\)

To further complicate matters, Prince Hassan Pasha, the third son of the Khedive, acted as a kind of over-all commander. Only twenty-two years old, he had been educated in England, and had served in the Prussian Cavalry as a subaltern officer. Gallant and courageous at the Battle of Gura, cordial and frank in daily conversation, the Prince was a regular attendant at all counsels of war and consulted about matters of grave import despite the fact that he lacked experience to command. Having been so long abroad, and being of Turkish and Circassian parents, the Prince often

interceded in behalf of the ideas of the foreigners.  

The most outstanding example of the havoc caused by conflicting orders can be found in the situation of the supply convoys. Originally Major Loshe was made Chief of Transportation. At first, the advance of the army was delayed by lack of camels which their Bedouin owners had driven into the "most remote and inaccessible places, beyond reach of the pursuing officers" so that their valuable animals would be saved from government conscription. When enough camels finally arrived to begin the vanguard march, Osman Pasha left Massowah with over three thousand men. The Americans insisted that only materials of war and other necessities be included in the convoys. The Egyptians agreed but in practice were inclined to include luxuries for the Prince and the high ranking Egyptian officers. This resulted in the transportation being reorganized at Baaraza. Next the vanguard camped at Adi Russo where the baggage was again lessened and transportation reorganized. When the army reached Gura, the Inspector General, General

7. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
8. Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 343.
Field, was sent to the rear to assume charge of transportation. General Loring insisted that those troops not already at Gura be kept in the rear working roads and expediting convoys. This met with opposition from Ratib Pasha who wished to concentrate all the troops at the front, but was compelled, against his better judgment, to keep troops in the rear. Therefore, with a force of twelve thousand men presumably at his disposal, he complained that he was forced to face all of the King's troops with half that number.

Lockett, after his brief trip to the front to help select the site for Gura, wrote that at Baaraza he heard a stormy session between Colonel Macklin, Assistant Inspector General, and Raschid Pasha, commander at Baaraza. The argument concerned the composition of a convoy about to leave for the front. Colonel Macklin was receiving one type of orders from General Loring while the Egyptian officers were receiving nearly opposite orders directly from Ratib Pasha. This made the control of transportation impossible.9

While at Gura Lockett observed Loring's extreme anxiety to hurry forward supplies. However, Loring

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9. Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
complained to Lockett that "it was impossible to get his orders executed in regard to this matter. That in spite of most positive commands from his office that nothing but ammunition, hard bread and salt should be brought to Gura, train after train arrived loaded with tents, officers and soldiers' baggage and rubbish of all kind. That instead of accumulating provisions, they were eating up rations nearly as fast as they arrived." As a consequence he feared that sixty days would be needed to advance on Adua, the capitol of King John. Therefore, due to the difficulty of feeding them, he was keeping the rest of the army in the rear to work on supply lines. When two months of supplies and ammunition were collected Loring planned to march into the interior with the concentrated forces. The approach of the rainy season made time vital.10

A dramatic incident emphasized the apathy between the two groups. Colonel Dye became angry at a native officer, Ibrahim Lufti Effendi, and struck him. Dye claimed that Lufti disobeyed an order and left a valuable box on the road. But Lufti says that he carried out his instructions and was struck without provocation.

10. Ibid.
In view of the conflicting orders, both may have been right. This affair had its culmination many months later when Lufti made a formal charge against Dye. In order to avoid the scandal of a military trial, Dye resigned from the Egyptian service.\textsuperscript{11}

To summarize these quarrels and their results, Lockett wrote:

\begin{quote}
The Egyptian Army without the foreign officer I don't think would have accomplished much, but I do not believe they would have suffered such fearful disasters and such tremendous losses and with their peculiar facility of spreading a Couleur de Rose over their actions, they could have easily made out of the actual facts a presentable record for the world's eye.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

To leave the impression that all the trouble began after the troops landed at Massawah would be erroneous. From the beginning of the "American Mission" in 1870, there had been conflict between the native and foreign element in the army. Loring claims that the Americans combated "customs and prejudices" from every person

\textsuperscript{11} Loring, \emph{A Confederate Soldier in Egypt}, 372-373.

\textsuperscript{12} Lockett, Private Notes, in Lockett Papers.
connected with the army from the Coptic clerks to the high ranking native officers. Even the Minister of War, the second son of the Khedive "looked upon the interference of the staff as an infringement of his rights and dignity, and a deprivation of a certain share of prestige. He insisted on his seal being put to every paper however trifling, and he never could be persuaded of the staff's utility or made to understand that a staff added to his dignity and saved him trouble." The native Egyptian distrusted change and especially any change that would result in a share of his influence and authority going to a foreigner.

Not only did the native intrigue against the influence of the Americans, but many Europeans who envied the Americans their place of favoritism in the eyes of the Khedive, worked to discredit the program initiated by the "American Mission." As Derrick so aptly observed to his wife:

There is always a heap of intriguing here to put out those who are in, by those who are out. The English are in great influence here, and would like to absorb all the places of the Government; the French also, the

Italians, and the Germans have their cliques, and all combined would be glad to see the few American Officers here displaced and themselves or their countrymen substituted therefor. 14

Nor need we assume that relations were always cordial between the American officers. Chaille-Long says that "Jealousy... is a hydra-headed monster which held a large place among the American in Egypt..." Long claims that jealousy of his own compatriots prevented the adoption of a subterranean counterpoise battery which Colonel Beverly Kennon designed for the harbor at Alexandria in 1870. 15 On the basis of this statement, it is impossible to determine the depth of rivalry between the American officers, but it is a possibility which should not be ignored while discussing the status of the American officers in the Abyssinian campaign.

Derrick writes of the "ill-will of other foreign officers" toward the American officers in Abyssinia. 16


16. Derrick to Derrick, June 1, 1877, in Derrick Letters.
Much evidence exists that a never ending struggle existed between the Americans and Europeans, and between the nationals of one European country and the nationals of another. Perhaps the most dramatic episode which highlighted the unfortunate split within the ranks of the Egyptian army was the fate of Major Durholtz, who had been severely wounded and captured during the Abyssinian campaign. After his return to Cairo, Loring observes that those "nerved by envy and malice, sought to injure him." From an indeterminable source the rumor was whispered in Cairo that he had manned an Abyssinian cannon while held a captive. His severe wounds would have made this impossible. Yet, while still weak from his confinement and injury, Major Durholtz was challenged to a duel by Count Turnheysen, an experienced swordsman, and killed. Count Turnheysen's second was Count Somani. Afterwards the two were not only promoted to aides-de-camp to Prince Hassan, then Minister of War, but were both decorated by his recommendation for their conduct in the Abyssinian War.17

Not an American was promoted as a result of the Abyssinian War, but, through the recommendation of

17. Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt, 440-442.
Stone, Loring, Field, Derrick, Irgins, Wilson (Irish), and Johnson were all given the grand Order of the Medjidieh by the Khedive. Two odd circumstances arose as a result of the decoration. Dye, who stated he would not accept a medal, was not recommended by Stone. Lockett, the real savior of the Egyptian Army did not receive a decoration although recommended by Stone, who averred that it was the result of "the intrigue of a foreigner."\(^{18}\) Derrick wrote his wife on June 1, 1877, that this "tardy recognition in the shape of a decoration comes for an act of humanity which their own officers were too heartless to perform: but it was not as represented in General Stone's letter, for leaving the camp to seek out wounded officers and soldiers left on the field of battle, but to rescue butchered and mutilated prisoners who had been abandoned in the camp of the enemy." He adds that his military contributions have been overlooked while "Many [Egyptian] officers were promoted who never did a thing and were not worth shucks, . . . ."\(^{19}\)

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 448-449.

\(^{19}\) Derrick to Derrick, June 1, 1877, in Derrick Letters.
Furthermore, the American officers had trouble adjusting to the customs of this Eastern kingdom. Derrick observed that "... If you knew how slow they are in this country your astonishment would not be in the least excited that he was still in Cairo." And he adds, "It takes time to do anything in Egypt and a great deal of patience must be exercised in waiting for coming events which cast their shadow long before." Loring later recorded in his book on Egyptian experiences:

Many of them [Americans] who came were very able and accomplished, but still there were too many who had little to do. Accustomed to lives of usefulness at home, life became irksome to them in Egypt, and a number left soon after arriving there, while others took seats in the bureaus at the Citadel to lament the fate that had brought them to the country.

From Derrick's letters it is evident that there was no lack of schemes to keep the Americans busy, but the customs of the country were different, and the Americans,

20. Derrick to Derrick, December 3, 1875, in Derrick Letters.


long adjusted to competitive American society, felt lost and helpless among the intrigues and corruption in Cairo.

In examining the status of the American officer in the Egyptian army before and during the Abyssinian War one should also understand the status and attitude of the native soldier. Since the time of Mahamed-Aly, the Egyptian army had been composed of two rival groups. One was the Turkish Circassian, of similar origin to the Khedival family, who held the superior ranks in the army, and the other was the native Egyptian soldier who seldom rose to a rank above colonel. As a result the native Egyptian was thoroughly submissive to the Khedival group from his early childhood. A long rule of coyrbash and tax-gatherers, of chains and handcuffs from apparently heartless recruiting sergeants, or corvée labor systems and pashas and beys seemed to have eradicated the self-respect necessary to procure a fighting people. According to Lockett:

The fellaheen are the most abject of slaves, and have been so for hundreds of years. They are not slaves of a single owner who would be responsible for their welfare, 22

and would profit by their well-being, as was the case with the former slaves of the South. They are the slaves of the soil upon which they live, and of every man who occupies a higher position in life than they, from their own sheik-el-beled to the Khedive. Every effendi, bey, and pasha with whom they come in contact in any way whatever looks upon them as different beings from himself, calls them habitually "ebn-el-kelb," sons of dogs, and kicks, cuffs, and beats them ab libitum. In consequence of this bad treatment, and by heredity, they are low, mean, cowardly, and cringing beyond any people on the face of the earth.23

The position of the native soldier who was snatched from his shops and fields without warning by his oppressive superiors to be "brought to the citadel in this wise: fifty men in pairs - fastened by the wrists with short chains on either side of a heavy chain fifty feet long. I don't mean that they are all brought in this way, but great numbers are, accompanied by weeping women and children from their villages, who wish to see the last of them; for though the majority return to their homes, yet the time is altogether uncertain, there being

no rule but arbitrary will.\textsuperscript{24} This conscription system did not make the native enthusiastic about fighting. General Colston, an American member of the Egyptian General Staff, observed that the Egyptian native was able-bodied, well-disciplined, and intelligent yet he did not possess "the fighting quality" necessary to produce a soldier. He wrote:

\begin{quote}
...What motive can the fellah have to fight? Love of country? Why, he has no pride in Egypt as his country; at most he thinks only of his little village of mud huts as such. Personal honor? There is no word in Arabic for that. He has no character or reputation to sustain; he is Abdou or Hassan or Yusuf, and has not even a family name. What is the regimental flag to him? Only the base on which the companies are formed, a piece of green silk fastened to a pole, and nothing more, instead of being the sacred symbol of his country's honor. Loyalty to his prince? What is the Khedive to the Egyptian soldier but a Turkish oppressor, who takes his last piastre for taxes and forces him into the army against his inclination and prejudices? Money? He nominally is entitled to the pay of one dollar per month, but he hardly ever gets it, ... Why should the fellah fight for his present master when he could lose nothing by exchanging him for
\end{quote}

another? . . . The Egyptian army proves that you may take men of splendid physical qualities, clothe them in handsome uniforms, put excellent arms in their hands, drill and discipline them to perfection, and all this will not make soldiers of them unless you give them a motive to fight. . . .

Personally the native Egyptian saw the Abyssinian campaign as an additional weight in taxes that were already inhuman. Morale among the depressed Egyptian native soldier was extremely low. Yet at Massowah they were allowed to see the disfigured and mutilated troops that returned from the Adrendrup Expedition. The average soldier became even more opposed to the senseless expedition that took him from the familiar sandy delta of Egypt to the mountainous Abyssinian landscape.

The attitude and position of the native soldier was revealed in many ways during the campaign. Lockett once witnessed a lieutenant, while held down by two of his men, unmercifully beaten by his colonel. When the lieutenant was allowed to arise, he said: "You have disgraced me in the presence of my own men; I am no longer worthy to be an officer - put me in the ranks."

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25. Ibid., 144-145.
Charged with insubordination the lieutenant was court-martialed and shot. This was, according to Lockett, "the only manly act I ever witnessed among these people." On another occasion, Lockett saw a colonel give his own major a thrashing while the major stood "like a lamb." Lockett and most other American officers were distressed with the rigid caste division between the native Egyptian and Circassian officer. This rigid caste system which destroyed the morale of the native soldier was an impediment to any real reforms in the army. Despite Stone's efforts, the tradition of privilege and class permeated the army and struck at the educational center of the American reforms. A closer analysis of these reforms reveals the privates studying reading, writing and arithmetic; the non-commissioned officers further instructed in drawing, history and geography; but the Turko-Circassian officers firmly entrenched in their positions and receiving complete instructions including some of the European languages. These racial and social


distinctions made impossible the formation of a formidable fighting force. This further widened the breach between the Egyptian and American officers in the army.

With the army organization shakily trying to recover from internal and external wounds inflicted by the Abyssinian campaign, the Egyptian government suddenly found its financial burdens too heavy. The returning soldier, Egyptian and American, found that there was no money to pay them. As discontent in the Egyptian army grew, the myth of the might of the Egyptian army evaporated along with the imperial schemes and plans of the American military mission, especially those of Stone.

In Cairo the corrosive factors of discontent and dissatisfaction spread throughout the American element of the Egyptian army. While none of the American group had received serious physical wounds, mentally the damage was almost incalculable. Lockett wrote that Derrick, an enthusiastic supporter of the Egyptian government and customs prior to the Abyssinian campaign, said afterwards that the Egyptians were "a people without courage, without honesty, without veracity and without shame, as cruel as they are cowardly, as crafty as
they are dishonest, as treacherous as they are false, and as impudent as they are shameless."  

Although the Americans were strongly entrenched in their staff positions prior to the war in spite of the jealousy of the power-conscious Egyptians, an irreparable breach now opened between them and the high ranking Turko-Circassian element in the army. At the same time the English were becoming more entrenched in their positions in the civil service, and the French gained influence in their diplomatic and political functions.  

One of the most important conditioners effecting the unpleasant change of opinion was the mounting Egyptian national debt. The disastrous Abyssinian War plunged the unfortunate Khedive in debt beyond the capacity of the people to pay. His European bondholders sent a financial mission to Egypt under Stephen Cave which decided that the debts of the Khedive were the debts of the people of Egypt. A Commission

28. Samuel H. Lockett, Housekeeping in Egypt, a manuscript article in Lockett Papers.

controlling the finances of Egypt was established to make Egypt solvent, composed mainly of French and British experts. This meant that the finances of the country passed into the hands of foreigners, in essence the political control of the country.\textsuperscript{30}

Dramatically the resignation, arrest, disappearance, and confiscation of the property of the Egyptian Minister of Finance, Sadik Pasha, effected the position of the Americans. By means of his tax-collectors, Sadik had excited the governors and the people of the provinces against the Khedive. He claimed that the Egyptian ills were a direct result of the Khedive bringing foreigners into his service, and that an agreement with the English and French would ruin the Egyptian Government. He added that if the Khedive reached an understanding with the Finance Commission, he would resign as a signal for a general revolt. When this was attempted, Sadik was arrested and disappeared thereafter.\textsuperscript{31}

The intense internal situation was further aggravated by the Abyssinian War. The prestige of the

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\textsuperscript{31} Derrick to Derrick, November 17, 1876, in Derrick Letters; Loring, \textit{A Confederate Soldier in Egypt}, 171-172.
Khedive and of the army suffered tremendously and especially the Americans. The enlisted men in the army could not respect superior officers who led them so badly. They blamed the Khedive for the incompetence with which the war was planned and carried out. On the field of battle the soldiers are recorded as exclaiming to Colonel Dye as he attempted to rally them: "Why should we stay here? Look yonder - see our colonels galloping away into the fort!" The people objected to paying for the mistakes of their rulers and their army leaders. Naturally the Americans were subjected to their share of criticism as everyone connected with the affair sought to shift the blame for failure.

Not only were the Americans subjected to severe criticism, but the Egyptian debt, which enhanced the influence of the Europeans, began to effect vitally the individual American finances. Derrick describes everything being in a "blue state" as months passed and the Americans failed to receive their back pay. Every possible penny was channeled to the debt and to the

Turkish War with Russia to which the Khedive was forced to contribute Egyptian troops.33

The absolute lack of money is best illustrated by the amusing experience of Major Dennison who acquired a leave of absence for four months in order to take his sick wife to the states. By strenuous effort, he was able to get his back pay, but as the Government lacked gold, he was paid twelve hundred dollars in piastres. Derrick describes Dennison's visit to the money changers:

> It would have amused you to have seen us sitting out in public at one of these [money changer's] stands, trying to exchange a bushel of piastres for gold, and counting out and examining the various coins offered by the cunning and dishonest dealer, whilst a crowd of curious Arabs, and blind, variously deformed and crippled beggars swarmed around, eying, with envious glances, the glittering pile and importunately crying out for "Backsheesh" in the name of Allah. I was sometimes forced to use my sabre vigorously to keep them at a respectful distance. Finally the money changer wanted to keep back 16 piastres more than he was entitled to, and refusing to pay it, Maj. Dennison, jumped up,

33. Derrick to Derrick, October 19, 1877, in Derrick Letters; Derrick to Derrick, September 22, 1876, in Derrick Letters.
seized a gold piece of the value of 50 piastres, from the rascal's table, and told him that if he did not pay the 16 piastres, he would go off with the gold he had levied on. The man hesitated some time, and it was only when he saw that Dennison was in earnest, and after we had entered our carriage, that he yielded and handed out, with a very wry countenance the required and just amount, and we went on our way rejoicing.34

Most of the Americans had little or no financial reserves to see them through the Khedive's financial crisis. Money had been one of the main considerations that had tempted them so far away from home. Mere living in Egypt was an expensive luxury. Lockett paid about twelve hundred dollars to bring his wife and five children to Egypt. To meet this bill, he was forced to borrow eight hundred dollars. In the year that he spent in Egypt he had repaid only three hundred dollars of this sum. Setting up housekeeping had cost around three thousand dollars. Most flats rented for from five hundred to one thousand dollars a year, but Lockett managed to find an unfurnished flat recently vacated by Major and Mrs. Martin that cost only four hundred

34. Derrick to Derrick, August 27, 1876, in Derrick Letters.
dollars. It had "one salon, three bedrooms, a dining room and a kitchen and a small room in the basement." Lockett had to first buy new furniture to start housekeeping and every day spent in the luxurious Grand New Hotel in Cairo cost him twenty-eight dollars. During the nine long months he was separated from his family in Abyssinia, his wife rented a house for eight hundred dollars. When Colonel Lockett returned, he let the lower half of his house to an Englishman. Soon afterwards, the Englishman took small pox, and he and his children were rushed off to the hospital, leaving Lockett with an empty flat.35

Another source of discontent was the lack of satisfactory social events for the married American's wives and children. Unfamiliarity with Muslim society forced the American wives to visit principally among themselves. The days were lonely because there was little visiting and ladies could not take walks without escorts. There were no facilities available for the education of the children and few playmates. Lockett expected to direct the work of the Typographical Bureau

35. Derrick to Derrick, October 17, 1875, in Derrick Letters.
from Cairo, but instead he was sent on field trips, taking him away from his wife and children for nine months. Placed in a similar situation Mrs. Field returned to the United States, but Mrs. Lockett remained on in Cairo. As the return of her husband from Abyssinia seemed forever postponed, she was nearly in despair. In addition to her loneliness, the children all came down with light cases of ophthalmia while Lockett was gone. 36

Finally, the Americans experienced extreme difficulty in acquiring satisfactory domestic help. Mrs. Field had a particularly bad experience attempting to find a cook. Derrick wrote:

Mrs. Field had commenced her housekeeping and the very second day got into trouble with her servant. She thought she had got a superior one, who knew everything and did everything just right; and she was boasting what a treasure she had found and how fortunate she had been. I went there last night

36. Derrick to Derrick, October 18, 1875, in Derrick Letters; Derrick to Derrick, August 29, 1875, in Derrick Letters; Derrick to Derrick, September 22, 1875, in Derrick Letters; Derrick to Derrick, July 30, 1876, in Derrick Letters; Derrick to Derrick, November 25, 1875, in Derrick Letters.
about 7 1/2 o'clock, and found that they had just succeeded in getting dinner, and that what they did get had been ruined in the cooking. The woman had been drunk all day, and immediately after dinner left without cleaning up anything at all. Mrs. F. said, when she came that she would not have a man cook, and so Gen'l Field got an Italian woman. The Arab women never go out to service except as nurses and ladies' maids, and the only female cooks to be had are the Italians and French, and I am told by those who have been here that they are all perfectly worthless, and Mrs. F. has concluded to try a man cook. 37

Derrick observes to his wife that Mrs. Lockett also has her domestic troubles:

Mrs. Lockett is in despair about the servants in Cairo. They won't touch anything that has lard in it, as you know it is against their religion to eat hog meat; and they carry it so far that they will not even carry a pot of lard for you from the store to the house, and will not use it in cooking for you. They follow literally the injunction "Touch not the unclean thing." Col. Lockett has to go to the store and bring home his

37. Derrick to Derrick, October 17, 1875, in Derrick Letters.
own lard, and Mrs. Lockett has to cook herself, whenever she uses it. 38

The inevitable result of these conditions was a slow morale disintegration of the American group. On August 20, 1876, Doctor Johnson received his pay and left for the United States on a six months furlough. On August twenty-fifth, Major Dennison received a leave of absence for four months to take his sick wife to the States. Major Hall resigned in the fall of 1876. On July 18, 1877, Captain Irgens received six months sick leave. None of these were to ever return to Egypt for any length of time. On March 13, 1877, Colonel Field and Major Martin were honorably discharged from the service, effective April the first. 39

From the female viewpoint the American colony dwindled away rapidly. Mrs. Hall, Mrs. Dennison, Mrs. Field, Mrs. Martin, and Mrs. Loshe all left Cairo.

38. Derrick to Derrick, September 3, 1875, in Derrick Letters.

39. Derrick to Derrick, August 11, 27, 1876, in Derrick Letters; Derrick to Derrick, December 1, 1876, in Derrick Letters; Derrick to Derrick, July 20, 1877, in Derrick Letters; Derrick to Derrick, March 30, 1877, in Derrick Letters.
Only Mrs. Lockett and Mrs. Stone remained after August, 1877.40

Lockett, after returning from Abyssinia, sought an appointment at a newly established College in Knoxville, Tennessee. Just as it seemed that Lockett hopes of securing a teaching position went "glimmering through the dreams of things that were," the appointment came through for the chair of "Professor of Mathematics and Mechanics" at the University of Tennessee.41

Lockett resigned in the latter part of August, 1877. On the twenty-fifth of August, Stone received a letter from Abdel Gelil Bey saying that the Khedive had received and accepted the resignation of Colonel Lockett. Both Stone and the Khedive expressed regret that Lockett saw fit to break his connection with the Egyptian army.42

Lockett gave the following reasons for his resignation:

41. Derrick to Derrick, August 3, 10, 1877, in Derrick Letters.

42. A. A., Periode Ismail, Liste E, uncatalogued doss.
I served the Khedive as earnestly and zealously as I did my own government, and I feel now that I accomplished almost nothing for him, and not from any fault of mine, but from the constant, intentional underhanded interference of officials who ought to have aided me to the extent of their power. I am not individual in this way of thinking. Every foreigner in the Egyptian service whether in the Army or in the Civil Service has had exactly the same experience. 43

He adds that advancement and promotion came about through "intrigue, sycophancy and corruption" and not through merit. Forced to go for months without a penny in his pockets, he was "nauseated with the daily contact of things I loathed," as he worked in "a body politic that was foul from the lowest to the highest ranks." But most important there was no society, no educational advantages, and but too many unwholesome influences for his family. 44

After his resignation and the government paid up his arrears in salary, and Lockett was just able to rid himself of debt, there was not enough money to take his family home. In order to make up the difference,

43. Lockett, Housekeeping in Egypt, in Lockett Papers.
44. Ibid.
Lockett was forced to borrow money from Colonel Derrick to make the return trip. Afterwards Colonel Derrick observed:

There is Colonel Lockett, who although he has been back in America almost a year and been receiving a good salary since his return, and who received more pay than I did, has not yet finished repaying the money he had to borrow for his expenses. No doubt he enjoyed his family whilst here, but he had to do so at a fearful cost. He didn't save a cent; he came in debt and left more in debt I believe.

The Locketts left Cairo for Alexandria in September of 1877. In Alexandria they took a steamer going by way of Malto, Gibraltar and Barcelona to Liverpool, and then another steamer to New York. Arriving in the United States in mid-October, they proceeded directly to Knoxville where Lockett assumed his duties at the newly established University of Tennessee. Not only did he

45. Derrick to Derrick, September 7, 1877, in Derrick Letters.

46. Derrick to Derrick, July 19, 1878, in Derrick Letters.

47. Derrick to Derrick, September 7, 1877, in Derrick Letters. Derrick to Derrick, November 9, 1877, in Derrick Letters.
serve as Professor of Engineering and Mechanics here, but also he was commandant of cadets. He filled these two positions from 1877 to June, 1883. Speaking to the people of Tennessee, he said:

There is a proverb in Cairo which says: "Egypt to a stranger is perdition the first year, purgatory the second, and paradise ever afterwards." We feel that we passed through the first two stages and preferred not to risk finding our paradise there, but came instead to seek it here in the mountain city of East Tennessee, and I beg leave to say that thus far, we have not been disappointed.


49. Lockett, Housekeeping in Egypt, in Lockett Papers.
Lockett severed his connection with the University of Tennessee in 1883 when, at the request of General Charles P. Stone, his former Egyptian Chief of Staff, he journeyed to New York to aid in the placing of the Bartholdi Statue of Liberty. From 1884-1888, Lockett designed water and gas works in various cities in the United States. In 1888, the North and South American Construction Company sent him to Chile where he secured a $20,000,000 contract for civic projects. While in South America, Lockett was appointed by Columbia to construct water works in Bogota. While performing this work Lockett died on October 12, 1891.

Lockett's experience in Egypt vividly illustrated what happens when reforms are attempted by mercenary soldiers who have no real interest in the country or understanding of political and diplomatic currents of the area. Without comprehending the obstacles presented by an Islamic culture with customs and society alien to their personal experience, the American military mission attempted to superimpose the most modern military reforms. These reforms could not be
effected without destroying the privilege of intrenched members of Egyptian society. Nor could they be effected without destroying vital interests of European powers, especially Turkey, France and England. Many powerful economic groups were already casting covetous eyes toward the continent of Africa, especially the Red Sea area, made strategically and economically important by the opening in 1869 of the Suez Canal.

Substantial and influential elements within and without Egypt sought to wreck the American military reforms from the beginning. Yet no substantial group in Europe or in Egypt backed these reforms. The Khedive did personally support the American projects which he instigated but in so doing he alienated powerful interests in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire as well as influential groups within his own country. The Americans were soldiers, not diplomats or politicians. When their military reforms and territorial acquisitions are viewed from a military standpoint, they served the Khedive well. However, without political or diplomatic support the American military mission could not survive a serious reverse. Abyssinia, where the Americans personally conducted themselves well despite defeat brought to an end this era of American influence in Egypt.
Lockett had faithfully performed his duties as a staff officer in the Egyptian army. Under his direction the geographical and cartographic information about little known regions in Africa was gathered and classified. In Abyssinia, he designed two forts that undoubtedly saved the Egyptian punitive expedition from complete annihilation. These military accomplishments cannot obscure the fact that Lockett’s mission and the mission of the American military experts was a failure. The purpose of the Khedive in securing these experts was to free Egypt from Turkish suzerainty and to carve an Egyptian Empire in central Africa. These tasks proved too difficult for the small American mission.

Perhaps if the Americans had used their influence to impress upon the Khedive the necessity of avoiding any crisis, of consolidating his reforms in Egypt and reducing the Egyptian debt, the gradual expansion of Egypt might have been successful. Eventually the weakness of Turkey might have allowed the Egyptians to attain independence as was the case in the Balkan insurrections which freed Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Montenegro, and Greece. The Americans were limited to
reforms and knew little of the political and diplomatic currents which doomed their efforts. Abyssinia occurred. Egypt was defeated. This not only meant the end of the American military mission, but eventually the fall of Khedive Ismail and the domination of Egypt by England.
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